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THE DVAITA PHILOSOPHY AND ITS
PLACE IN THE VEDĀNTA

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STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY—No. 1

THE DVAITA PHILOSOPHY AND ITS PLACE IN THE VEDĀNTA

BY

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WITH A FOREWORD BY

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PUBLISHED BY
THE UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE
MYSORE
1941

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FOREWORD

Ever since western scholars began to study Indian Philosophy there has been a persistent tendency to identify it with Advaita Vedānta, with the result that other Vedānta schools have been left neglected. In recent years attempts have been made to study Rāmānujācārya's philosophy in its proper perspective, and so far as the West is concerned the labours of so eminent a scholar as the late Dr. Rudolph Otto have gone far to do justice to his thought. Madhvācārya as the founder of Dvaita Vedānta has not had full justice done to him. There has been a tendency even on the part of eminent Indian scholars to dismiss his thought as theology or as mere religion. A work that would do justice to Madhvācārya as a philosopher has been badly needed, and I am very happy that this need has now been met by Vidwan H. N. Raghavendrāchar, M.A., my colleague in the Philosophy Department of the University of Mysore. He is eminently fitted for the task he has undertaken and accomplished with efficiency. Trained in the old time-honoured Punditic traditions of Sanskrit learning, he has also had a good training in the critical methods of Western Philosophy. Though born a Dvaitin, he is also by conviction a Dvaitin. He has attempted to bring out the weaknesses in Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita and to show how these defects have been overcome in the philosophy of Madhvācārya. He has argued with cogency how in essence Madhvācārya is a monist, though the exigencies of nomenclature led him to call his philosophy Dvaitism to distinguish it from the monism of Sankara and Rāmānuja alike. It is not possible to hope that Vidwan Raghavendrāchar's exposition will carry conviction to confirmed Advaitins and Viśiṣṭādvaitins, but I feel sure that it will go a long way to prove that Dvaita Vedānta has sound philosophical merits. Even this may be looked upon as no mean achievement, and because of it Vidwan Raghavendrāchar deserves to be congratulated as well as thanked.

A. R. WADIA.

*The University,
Mysore.*

1 August, 1940.

PREFACE

THE aim of this book is to indicate the philosophy of Dvaita Vedānta and to determine its place in the history of Vedānta. This work presupposes a knowledge of the *Nāstika* and the *Āstika* positions in Indian Philosophy. Dvaita Vedānta forms the last phase in the history of Vedānta. Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita preceded Dvaita Vedānta. Advaita Vedānta has been made familiar to modern readers by the attempts of many great scholars. And my revered teachers, Sir S. Radhakrishnan and Prof. M. Hiriyanna have ably explained the philosophical significance of this Vedānta. Viśiṣṭādvaita has also attracted the attention of many modern scholars and several works on this Vedānta have appeared. But the field of Dvaita Vedānta still remains unexplored. It is in this circumstance that my humble attempt may find its justification.

A brief summary of Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita is included in this work to make the discussions of Dvaita Vedānta more intelligible and to express the continuity of Vedānta thought. The exposition is based on the respective Vedānta works in Sanskrit, but the selections and arrangement of the particular positions are mine. The exposition of Advaita Vedānta has in view both the *Bhāmati* and the *Vivaraṇa* traditions and the reconciliation of the two as expressed by Vidyāranyamuni. In the conclusion the relative merits of the three Vedānta systems are considered. To help the reader the meaning of Sanskrit technical terms with reference to each Vedānta system is given in the glossary.

It has become rather fashionable for Advaita thinkers to say that there is no philosophy in Dvaita Vedānta. I leave it to the reader to judge for himself. If he is convinced that Dvaita Vedānta is philosophical in every sense of the term, my labour will have been amply rewarded and I shall feel that I have done something to repay all I owe to my professors and particularly to my revered *guru*, Sri Holavanahalli Seshacharya, Palace Dharmadhikari, Mysore.

It is my first and foremost duty to express my feelings of gratitude and respect to Rajakaryapravina N. S. Subba Rao, M.A.

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(Cantab.), Bar-at-Law, Vice-Chancellor, Mysore University and to Prof. A. R. Wadia, B.A. (Cantab.), Bar-at-Law, Professor of Philosophy, Mysore University, without whose help and encouragement, this little volume could not have seen the light of the day. I am deeply indebted to the authorities of the University of Mysore for publishing this work and to my revered teacher Prof. A. R. Wadia who has honoured this work with his kind foreword. My sincerest thanks are due to Prof. W. G. Eagleton, M.A. (Cantab.), Professor of English, Maharaja's College, Mysore, who kindly went through the proofs and suggested many corrections, to Mr. H. K. Raja Rao, M.A., my friend and colleague, who was helpful to me throughout the course of this publication and to Mr. F. McD. Tomkinson, Wesley Press, Mysore, who took special pains in the printing of this book.

H. N. RAGHAVENDRACHAR.

*Maharaja's College,
Mysore.
29 March, 1941.*

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ABBREVIATIONS

<i>A.S.</i>	<i>Advaita Siddhi</i>
<i>A.V.</i>	<i>Anu Vyākhyāna</i>
<i>Ch.</i>	<i>Chāndogyaopaniṣad</i>
<i>K.N.</i>	<i>Karma Nirṇaya</i>
<i>K.N.T.</i>	<i>Karma Nirṇaya Tīkā</i>
<i>M.S.S.</i>	<i>Madhva Siddhānta Sāra</i>
<i>N.M.</i>	<i>Nyāyāmṛta</i>
<i>N.S.</i>	<i>Nyāya Sūtra</i>
<i>P.L.T.</i>	<i>Prasānga Lakṣaṇa Tīkā</i>
<i>S.M.</i>	<i>Sarva Mūla</i>
<i>S.V.</i>	<i>Sureśvara Vārtikā</i>
<i>S.B.</i>	<i>Śaṅkara Bhāṣya</i>
<i>Sb.B.</i>	<i>Śabara Bhāṣya</i>
<i>Sr.B.</i>	<i>Śrī Bhāṣya</i>
<i>Tait.</i>	<i>Taittiriyaopaniṣad</i>
<i>T.D.T.</i>	<i>Tattvodyota Tīkā</i>
<i>T.S.</i>	<i>Tattva Saṅkhyāna</i>
<i>Tu.S.</i>	<i>Tantra Sāra</i>
<i>T.S.T.</i>	<i>Tattva Saṅkhyāna Tīkā</i>
<i>T.V.T.</i>	<i>Tattva Vireka Tīkā</i>
<i>V.P.S.</i>	<i>Vimarsya Prasānya Saṅgraha</i>
<i>V.T.V.</i>	<i>Vijñāna Tattva Vinirṇaya</i>
<i>V.T.V.T.</i>	<i>Vijñāna Tattva Vinirṇaya Tīkā</i>

CHAPTER I

AN INTRODUCTION TO VEDĀNTA
SYSTEMS

CHAPTER I

AN INTRODUCTION TO VEDĀNTA SYSTEMS

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE VEDĀNTA SYSTEMS

The Vedānta Systems are the most important among all the Indian philosophical systems. They are the result of well disciplined philosophical thought in India. Ever since the dawn of thought the Indian mind has been distinguished for its natural inclination for philosophical reflection. This is best illustrated by the fact that India could formulate profound philosophies at a time when other nations had not even thought of philosophy in the proper sense of the term. The Vedānta systems mark the culmination of philosophical reflection in India. This accounts for their triumph over the other philosophies and for the respect with which they are held throughout India. We can say that the whole Hindu nation today is in some sense or other influenced by the one or the other Vedānta system. Even the Jainism of today with all its antivedic spirit shows clearly how it is influenced by Vedānta both in its belief in the *varṇāśrama dharmas*, and in its worship of the Siddhas as gods. Strictly speaking such worships and beliefs are alien to the original spirit of Jainism, which condemned the Vedic institutions and founded its own institutions quite independently of the Vedas. The other Indian religions show in some form or other a clear influence of Vedānta on them and are proud of it.

The Meaning of the Term Vedānta

The term Vedānta means several things. (1) The real heart of the Vedic teaching. The *Upaniṣads* are supposed to contain the essence of the Vedic teaching and therefore they are called Vedānta. (2) The thought that systematises the *Upaniṣadic* teaching is also called Vedānta. (3) That which decides the true meaning of the Vedic teaching as a whole. To decide is to determine by means of reason. The system that decides the true meaning of the Veda is Vedānta.

The Veda and the Āstika Thinkers of India

To decide the meaning of the Veda is necessary because for a superficial observer the Veda seems to teach contradictory things. Some passages tell us that the world originates from Nārāyaṇa. Others teach that it comes from Rudra. Some say that *jīva* and Brahman are identical and others that they are different. Some passages believe in the reality of the world and others do not. So different passages seem to teach different things. It is therefore difficult to obtain a definite view.

In this state of affairs there are only two courses open to us. Either we must reject the whole Veda as invalid; or we must explain the central teaching of the Veda so as to remove all contradictions. The former course is quite opposed to the *āstika* spirit of the Indian *Darśanas*. The *āstika* thinkers have profound regard for the intuition of the Ṛsis, the Vedic Seers. They are constructive thinkers. They want to build their systems on the solid ground of the best of their predecessors' thoughts. Hence they could not entertain the idea of rejecting the Veda.

Another alternative is suggested by the modern Vedic scholars. They hold that the Vedas represent the culture of the Aryans at different periods, and that therefore they offer views of the world entertained by thinkers at different times. Obviously this view cannot be accepted by the *āstika* thinkers. Their starting point is that the Veda is valid as a whole. To hold that there are divergent views in the Veda is to accept that some or all of them are false, and this would be inconsistent with the *āstika* spirit.

The Brahma Sūtras as Vedānta

The fact that the Veda is valid as a whole implies that it stands for a definite teaching. That it teaches divergent things is only apparent and not real.

Now the question is 'What is this central teaching for which the whole Veda stands?' Such teaching must be found out in spite of the apparent contradictions. To find out any such view is to reflect over the apparent meanings, and show that they are not final. This necessitates a separate system which embodies reflections that are useful in finding out the true meaning of the Veda. Such a system is called Vedānta.

Reflecting on the early history of Vedānta thought one feels that there were several attempts to systematise the teaching of the Vedas even before Bādarāyaṇa. But it is generally accepted that Bādarāyaṇa's work is the last and the most complete. In his *Brahma Sūtras* he has systematised the thoughts of the Veda. The *sūtras* consist of pithy statements that are very comprehensive in their outlook. They are called *Vedānta Sūtras* because they embody the systematisation of the Vedic thought. They are also called *Brahma Sūtras* because they reveal the nature of the ultimate reality, the Vedic name of which is Brahman. *Sārinaka Sūtras* is another name for them, because they determine the real nature of *Ātman* that appears to us in a body. They are also called the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*. This name brings out their reflective character. They are specially called the *Uttara Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*. The Sanskrit term *uttara* means both latter and better. The *Sūtras* are regarded as *uttara* in both these senses. They are *uttara* because they come after the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*. They are *uttara* also because they deal with the knowledge (*jñāna*) of the ultimate reality which is better than action (*ṛkarma*), which is the subject matter of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*. Knowledge is the direct means of spiritual advancement, and not action (*ṛkarma*). Therefore knowledge is better than *ṛkarma*. The *Brahma Sūtras* are chiefly concerned with the *Upaniṣads*, and with them they emphasise the importance of knowledge and make *ṛkarma* only subservient to it. Hence they are called the *Uttara Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*.

The Number, Date and Teaching of the Brahma Sūtras

The *Brahma Sūtras* are 564 in number.¹ The date of their composition may be fixed by the following considerations. They refute the *Darśanas*, *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga*, *Nyāya*, *Vāiśeṣika*, *Jaina*, *Bauddha*, and so on. This means that they belong to a later date than that in which these *Darśanas* were composed. The names that are mentioned in the *sūtras* are found mentioned in the *Śrauta Sūtras*. *Āśmarathya* is mentioned in the *Āśvalāyana*; *Bādari*, *Kāṛṣṇājini*, and *Kāśakṛtsna* in the *Kātyāyana*; *Ātreya* in the *Taittirīya Prātiśākhya*; *Ātreya*, *Kāśakṛtsna* and *Bādari* in the *Bodhāyana Gṛhya Sūtra*. *Audulomi* is mentioned in the *Mahā Bhāṣya* on the *Pāṇini Sūtras*. This indi-

¹ This is according to *Madhucārya*.

cates that the *Sūtras* were composed at about the time when the other works were composed. *Garuda Purāṇa*, *Padma Purāṇa* and *Manuśarma Sūtra* mention the *Brahma Sūtras*. This implies that the date of the *Sūtras* is prior to that of these works. The commentators of the *Sūtras* generally interpret the word *smṛti* that occurs several times in the *Sūtras*, as meaning Bhagavadgītā. From this it follows that the *Sūtras* are posterior to the Bhagavadgītā. There are also several suggestions regarding the date of the *Sūtras*. Prof. Keith says that the date of the *Sūtras* cannot be later than A.D. 200. Fraser holds that it is somewhere between 500 and 700 A.C. Max Müller is of the opinion that it is prior to the date of the Bhagavadgītā and in support of his position there is the mention of *Brahma Sūtra* in the Bhagavadgītā, 13. 5. There are some difficulties in this view. At the time of the composition of the Bhagavadgītā the systems were not yet formulated. Throughout the Gītā we have several references to prove that it was composed in the pre-Darśana period. The work does not refer to any Darśana. Nor does it mention the position of any Darśana. There is the mention of two terms, *Sāṅkhya* and *yoga*. The work itself makes it clear that these terms do not stand for the Darśanas in their philosophical sense. According to its interpretation *sāṅkhya* is knowledge and *yoga* is disinterested action. But the case of the *Sūtras* is different. They clearly mention the distinguishing features of the several Darśanas in order to refute them with a view to make the position of Vedānta final. From this it follows that the *Sūtras* are far later than the Gītā. There is yet the difficulty of fixing the meaning of *Brahma Sūtra* mentioned in the Gītā. The orthodox view is that the same Bādarāyaṇa is the author of both the Gītā and the *Sūtras*. It is supposed that he had a long career and with different interests wrote different works at different periods. Due to this circumstance there might be the mention of *Brahma Sūtra* in the Bhagavadgītā.

The *Brahma Sūtras* consist of four chapters. The first of them explains that the whole Veda deals with Brahman. To indicate this idea it is called *Samanvayādhyaḥ*. The second chapter removes the difficulties in viewing Brahman as the ground of all. In this connection it refutes several Darśanas. To indicate this idea it is called *Avirodhādhyaḥ*. The third chapter explains how Brahman is realised and liberation is

attained. To indicate this idea it is called *Sādhanaādhyāya*. The fourth chapter mainly describes the course of liberation and the nature of it. To indicate this idea it is called *Phalādhyāya*. Some details may be needed in this connection. The first chapter teaches how Brahman is the ground of all that exists. The second explains how the world consisting of individual souls and matter is entirely dependent on Brahman (being created by Brahman); what the real nature of *jīva* is; and how he is related to his body and action. It also presents some important psychological views. The third explains the state of the *jīva* after death and incidentally it solves some psychological problems and it also presents the course of discipline leading to the realisation of Brahman. The fourth explains the nature of the relation between *jīva* and Brahman.

The whole *sūtra* teaching is based on the presupposition that the Veda is authorless (*apauruṣeya*); and that *smṛti* is valid if its teaching is not opposed to that of the Veda. The term *smṛti* in its wider sense stands for the *Purāṇas* and *Itihāsas*.

The Commentaries on the Brahma Sūtras and Their Originality

The *Sūtras* consist of very brief statements. Their comprehensive outlook makes the teaching obscure and it is difficult to ascertain the final meaning. This has given rise to many commentaries and each commentator professes that he alone has arrived at the genuine teaching. Very often the commentator consciously or unconsciously reads his preconceived ideas into the *Sūtras*. Where he does it consciously his motive is to spread his views under the name of orthodoxy which commands ready respect from laymen. Generally each commentator takes advantage of the contradictory teachings of the Veda and the obscure meaning of the *Sūtras* and imposes his own views on them. Whether he is consistent or not with the Veda and the *Sūtras* there is much scope for originality. The commentator who imposes his own views on the *Sūtras* is obviously original. Supposing that a commentator is very faithful to the *Sūtras* even then his originality does not suffer. The need for an interpretation arises in two ways: (i) When the thing that is interpreted is not clear; and (ii) When a position, which is clear in itself requires fresh interpretation or addition from the novel standpoint which is suggested by the spirit of the times. A commentator who satisfies these conditions is as original as the

author of the *Sūtras*. At times a commentator may have quite a novel idea but he requires the sanction of a previous authority which is already held in high respect. So to suppose that the Indian thinkers are not original because they are only commentators is erroneous.

There are however several commentaries on the same *Sūtras*. If the *Sūtras* stand for a definite position, then it follows that only one, if any, of the commentaries represents the meaning of the *Sūtras*. This means that most or all of the commentaries read their own ideas into the *Sūtras*. In this connection we have to make one point clear. To suppose that a commentator reads his ideas into the *sūtras* is not to impute to him the charge of deceit or hypocrisy. In most cases, his action may not be a deliberate one, though it is difficult to distinguish the deliberate from the non-deliberate. A thinker may feel the need for a fresh philosophy. We all know that India has developed the conviction that philosophy is required not only to satisfy theoretical curiosity but also to help practical life. Practice must have the background of philosophy because its aim is to make the person in question *mukta* both here and hereafter. The thinker may sincerely believe that his philosophy is for the good of the people at large. Under these circumstances there is left only one way for him. If he presents his philosophy as completely independent of the previous thoughts that are popular, then no one may care for it and in that case the probability is that his thought, however valuable it may be, may die along with him. To escape this fate he has to present it in the name of the time-honoured things. This method has a particular advantage also. Though there is the appearance of fresh things, in enthusiasm for them the best of the old things are not forgotten. This accounts for the unique continuity of Indian civilisation. So long as India remains what it is, this is the best method of popularising fresh philosophical thoughts. This method also checks the wild imaginations of thinkers. As India developed this method consistently from the beginning, its spiritual civilisation did not suffer from the influence of the *Nāstika* thoughts, and even now it holds its head high, though politically it is undergoing all sorts of changes which are very often most dangerous for its spirit. If there is to be a proper development of thought leading to the welfare of the country and therefore to the welfare of the individual, the new thoughts

must be made consistent with the spirit of the old things and the old things must be interpreted consistently with new ideas. This is how continuity of civilisation is secured.

THE THREE ĀCĀRYAS AS THE MOST IMPORTANT COMMENTATORS AND PHILOSOPHERS

Among those that appeared as systematisers of the Vedic thoughts, by way of commenting on the *Brahma Sūtras*, Sankarācārya, Rāmānujācārya, and Madhvācārya are the most important. They appeared one after another. Sankarācārya called his systematisation of thought Advaita Vedānta. Rāmānujācārya called his system Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. And Madhvācārya's system is called Dvaita Vedānta.¹

The modern scholars of Indian thought hold divergent views regarding the relative merits of these systems. Some hold that Sankarācārya alone is the true Vedānta philosopher, while the others are only religious leaders. Others assert that Rāmānujācārya alone had the true insight of philosophical thought while Sankarācārya suffered from wild imagination and Madhvācārya could not transcend the commonsense explanation of things. There are yet others who believe that Madhvācārya alone is a truly scientific philosopher, while Sankarācārya is a perverted thinker and Rāmānujācārya is carried away by emotions.

None of these suppositions is correct. They are the result of exclusive interest in a particular school of thought and religious prejudice against other schools. A scientific study of the three systems shows that each of the Ācāryas is equally a philosopher. The difference between them is not due to the lack of philosophical insight. Though each of them has an extraordinarily strong scientific sense, he arrives at a different conclusion because in the course of his philosophy he develops an interest in a particular aspect of reality. This explanation

¹ It is interesting to note that Madhvācārya has nowhere called his system of thought Dvaita Vedānta, yet in view of his final position expressed as '*Svatantramaivatantam ca dividiham tattvam*. (There are two kinds of *tattva*, Independent and Dependent.) [T.S.] and '*Dvaitam na vidyate iti tasmādaññāninām matam*. (That Dvaita is not true is therefore the position of the ignorant.) [A.V. 2. 1. 17] and perhaps on account of his opposition to Advaita Vedānta, his system is known as Dvaita Vedānta.

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is common to all philosophies that differ from one another. No two philosophers agree because their interests do not agree. If each philosopher starts from pure philosophical reasoning, then there is no reason why he should differ from others. If reason or thinking is the same, then the result is the same. So the fact that the three Ācāryas differed simply points to the fact that their interests differed. It may be that one interest is more philosophical than the other but the thinkers do not suffer as philosophers.

Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita are the Expressions of Brahṁādvaita

There is much misconception as to the real significance of the terms, Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita, due to the lack of correct understanding of the respective positions of the systems, and to the undue emphasis laid on the terms themselves. The term Advaita is taken to mean monism. Viśiṣṭādvaita is taken to mean qualified monism. And Dvaita is taken to mean dualism. None of these meanings is correct. The following consideration makes this clear.

The three Ācāryas start from the same point. Their standpoint is *Upaniṣadic*. With the *Upaniṣads* they all agree that Brahman is the ground of all. They all agree that the world has only a derived reality. They all agree that the essence of all is Brahman Itself, and the world is not apart from Brahman. They all accept that everything in the world points to Brahman as its ground. For all, from the standpoint of Brahman, the world is in some sense or other less real than Brahman. So, for all, Brahman is the Absolute. From this point of view we may describe all the three systems as *Brahṁādvaita*. This clearly explains how misleading it is to start from the literal meaning of the terms.

We have now to answer the question, Why are these systems called by such misleading terms? If we understand the proper significance of the terms they are not misleading. The significance of the respective systems lies in ultimate positions with regard to the relation between Brahman and the world.

The position of Sankarācārya is briefly this: Brahman is the only reality. The world has no reality of its own. Then how does the world appear? It appears because it is superimposed on Brahman. This may be illustrated in the following

manner. We may take for instance the shell-silver-illusion. Of the two things, shell and silver, shell is real and silver is not. Yet silver is superimposed on the reality of the shell and appears to be real. Its reality is that of the shell. Apart from the latter it does not exist. So silver is *mithyā* (not real); because it is superimposed. In the same way the world is not real, because it is superimposed. Hence the relation between the world and Brahman is not real, because it is the relation between real and unreal things. So Brahman has nothing outside it. It is an undifferentiated unity. To indicate this position the system is called Advaita. This term also stands for the idea that apart from Brahman nothing appears.

The position of Rāmānujācārya is this: Brahman is the ground of the universe. The universe consists of *cit* (spirit) and *acit* (non-spirit). These two entities, as they appear to us, are in the gross form. Their material causes are *cit* and *acit* in the subtle form. In both the states their ground is Brahman. The relation between them can be formulated in the following manner. Let us take for instance the human body. It has no reality as a living entity apart from the soul in it. It is, when the soul is in it. It is not, when the soul is not in it. When the soul leaves the body at death, it decays. So the body gets its reality as an attribute of the soul. In the same manner the world gets its reality as an attribute of Brahman. It is, because Brahman is in it. Brahman is the soul and the world is Its body. Throughout all the process, as the subtle *cit* and *acit* evolve into the gross *cit* and *acit*, Brahman is immanent in them. Even as the body does not grow if the soul is not immanent in it throughout its growth, there is no evolution of the world without Brahman in the process of evolution. As the body evolves from the more subtle to the grosser form, there is evolution of the soul in the body. In the same manner as the world changes from the more subtle to the grosser states, there is evolution of Brahman in it. From this point of view the world as it appears to us consists of Brahman with *cit* and *acit* in the gross (*sthūla*) form; and the material cause of the world consists of Brahman with *cit* and *acit* in the subtle (*sūkṣma*) form. In both cases *cit* and *acit* form the body of Brahman. Though Brahman is said to evolve along with the world, It is complete throughout. So whether It is in the subtle *cit* and *acit* or in the gross *cit* and *acit*, It is the same. In order to indicate

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this idea the system is called Viśiṣṭādvaita. Its main idea is that though the world is not superimposed on Brahman, it is not apart from Brahman.

The position of Madhvācārya is this: Brahman is the ground of the universe. The universe consists of *cetana* (spirit) and *acetana* (matter). It is not superimposed on Brahman. Even supposing that it is superimposed, it does not follow that it is *mithyā*. Unless it is real it cannot be superimposed. If silver were unreal, as the horn of a hare is unreal, it could not be superimposed. So to hold that the world is superimposed is implicitly to assert that it is real. It may be metaphorically regarded as the body of Brahman. Even to hold that Brahman is the soul of the world is nothing more than a metaphor. We have to explain how the world is the body and Brahman the soul. Of the two, world and Brahman, the former is our starting point, because it is immediately given. It asserts itself as real. There are three senses in which a thing can be real. A thing is real if it has an existence of its own (*sattā*); if it has knowledge (*pramiti*) or if it has its own function (*pravṛtti*). *Cetana* is real in all these three senses and *acetana* is real in the first and the last senses. But in every sense of the term, the reality of the world is dependent (*asvatantra*). This is illustrated by the fact that it undergoes continuous change. The fact that its reality is dependent points to the truth that its source is something else. This source is independent (*svatantra*). It has independent reality. It has its existence (*sattā*), function (*pravṛtti*), and knowledge (*pramiti*) quite independent of other things. It is changeless. It is perfect. It is Brahman. It is immanent in the world and the latter has reality from It. By Itself It is transcendent. Being both immanent and transcendent It is the necessary pre-supposition of the world. Without It the world is not. But with It the world is. In virtue of this conception of the dependent nature of the world this system is called Dvaita.

The three Ācāryas started from the *Upaniṣadic* idea that Brahman is both transcendent and immanent. Śaṅkarācārya somehow emphasised the transcendent aspect, Rāmānujācārya the immanent aspect, and Madhvācārya both the aspects. Therefore they had to name their systems differently. So the names stand for their whole philosophy. If this truth is not grasped they become misleading.

In characterising their philosophies we must bear the fol-

lowing points in mind. From the standpoint of Brahman their philosophy is Advaita, because none of them holds that there is a second to Brahman in the sense of being independent of It and from the standpoint of the world their philosophy is Dvaita, because none of them identifies the world with Brahman. Nor do they hold that the world is an aspect of Brahman. For Sankarācārya, in spite of his position that difference as such is *mithyā*, the world is *mithyā* (not real) and Brahman is *satya* (real). Therefore they are different. For Rāmānujācārya the world is the body (*śarīra*) and Brahman is the soul (*śarīri*). Therefore they are different. Madhvācārya clearly states that the world and Brahman are different. So their philosophies are from one point of view Advaita; and from another Dvaita. Since the chief aim of philosophy is to reveal the nature of the ultimate reality, there is an advantage in describing their philosophies from the standpoint of Brahman. So we may call each system *Brahmādvaita* (Absolutism). This removes many misunderstandings caused by emphasising the literal meaning of the terms, advaita, viśiṣṭādvaita and dvaita.

But we must make one point clear. To call each system *Brahmādvaita* is not to make an improvement on it. It is only to state a fact recognised by each Ācārya. Now we have to answer one question. If the term, *Brahmādvaita* is recognised by the Ācāryas, then why do they not make use of it? The answer is simple. It was clearly known to them all that the *Upaniṣads* teach that Brahman is the sole reality. As the exposition of this truth each system can be nothing but *Brahmādvaita*. So this position needed no clarification from the Ācāryas. But in the detailed working up of this truth each Ācārya arrived at a different conclusion; and to signify this each had to name his philosophy so as to emphasise its distinguishing feature. As time went on the starting point was forgotten, and the literal meaning of the terms was taken to be everything and the result was a misrepresentation of the teaching. Therefore, in order to understand the real significance of the well-known terms, it is necessary to bear in mind that each of the systems is a *Brahmādvaita* system.

The Three Ācāryas are not Theologians but Philosophers

From the very beginning the three Ācāryas are represented as starting from the *Upaniṣadic* Absolutism. This gives rise to

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an important question. If the Ācāryas make the *Upaniṣadic* teaching their starting point and expound their systems to organise the Vedic thought, then they are only theologians and not philosophers. Then how can we call them philosophers and include their thoughts under philosophy? We may answer thus.

To call the exposition of a work theology or philosophy is a question of emphasis. If the exponent is led by the authority of the work whose meaning he explains, then his exposition is theology. If in his exposition there is influence of authority and the exposition is also an attempt to trace the philosophical implication of the work and develop it, then it is philosophy. The mere interpretation of the Veda cannot be philosophy. But an exposition of the philosophical implication of the Vedic teaching is philosophy. Similarly the philosophical exposition of the *Upaniṣads* is philosophy, for instance Deussen's *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*. So the exposition of Vedānta Systems may be regarded as philosophy, because it is nothing but the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads*.

The philosophy of a work is the work of a philosopher. One who is not a philosopher cannot think of expounding the philosophy of any literature. So the exponents of the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads* are philosophers.

The Ācāryas like real philosophers were convinced of the truth of the *Upaniṣadic* teaching. Therefore they systematised the *Upaniṣadic* thoughts. If they were not convinced of the truth independently of the *Upaniṣads* they could not have systematised their thoughts. So the fact that they systematised the thoughts of the *Upaniṣads* implies that they were real philosophers.

The systematisation of the *Upaniṣadic* thoughts is not mere organisation of them. It is systematisation in the sense that the *Upaniṣadic* thought is shown to be final as philosophy. This means that somehow the Ācāryas first arrived at pure philosophical conclusions and next they found that they were completely identical with the systematised *Upaniṣadic* thoughts in so far as their own systematisation went, and they represented the whole position under the title Vedānta. Though this is not the order of writing of their works, it must certainly be the order of their mental outlook. This is made clear by the fact that it is not the unsystematised thought that led them but the

systematised one in the sense explained. So in their exposition they are not directed by authority; but they direct it. In doing this they wanted to have a universal philosophy. A knowledge of these points helps us immensely in understanding the view for which Vedānta stands.

The Three Vedānta Systems are Inter-related

Some further points with regard to the inter-relation of the three Vedānta systems may be noted. These systems represent the different stages of the growth of the same Vedānta thought. Advaita represents the first stage, Viśiṣṭādvaita the second and Dvaita Vedānta the third.

Certain difficulties in the position of Advaita made a re-consideration of the whole of Vedānta thought necessary and as a result there appeared Viśiṣṭādvaita. But this system also was not without difficulties, and by way of removing them there appeared Dvaita. Further, as is shown in the following pages Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita stand like two poles, southern and northern; Dvaita Vedānta maintains a balance between the two. Applying the Hegelian idea to these systems it may be said that Advaita presents thesis, Viśiṣṭādvaita antithesis and Dvaita synthesis. In the light of these ideas it is submitted that full knowledge of Vedānta thought presupposes a careful study of the three systems in their historic order. The knowledge of the later two systems is necessary to understand the scope of Advaita.¹ The knowledge of Advaita and Dvaita is necessary to appreciate the significance of Viśiṣṭādvaita and the knowledge of Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita is necessary to recognise the importance of Dvaita Vedānta.

With these preliminary remarks an attempt is being made in the following pages to summarise very briefly the philosophical positions of the three systems. In order to do full justice to each system, so far as it is possible, the position of each system is presented as it would be done by the exponents of the same system; and in the last chapter it is briefly indicated how Vedānta thought reached its culmination in Dvaita Vedānta.

¹ Knowledge of the scope of Advaita enables us to understand what exactly necessitated the later Vedānta systems and how far some recent interpretations of Advaita can be accepted as representing the original spirit of Advaita Vedānta.

CHAPTER II
ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

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Saṅkarācārya

Saṅkarācārya is the founder of Advaita Vedānta. He lived in the 8th century A.D. His birthplace is said to be Kāñḍi in the Malabar District. He belonged to the Nambūdiri sect of the Brahmins. Even as a boy of 12 years he was very learned. He expounded his system in the form of a commentary upon the classical *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Brahma Sūtras* and wrote several independent works which exhibit both philosophical and religious insight of a very high order. Though he did not live very long by the time he reached the age of 32 he had established his reputation as the true champion of the Vedic teaching; and made almost the whole population of India follow his philosophy and religion.

The Ideas that perhaps led to Advaita Vedānta

Even before Saṅkarācārya there were some schools of thought that upheld certain ideas that are akin to those of Advaita Vedānta. Bhartṛhari distinguished between two aspects of Brahman, *kāraṇa* and *kārya* and held that when the world disappears in Brahman there is only one reality, Brahman. Bhartṛhari held that the empirical world is superimposed (*kūlpita*) and what is called soul is not real. Gauḍapāda maintained that Advaita is ultimate, world is *mithyā* and *Ātman* is the sole reality. Saṅkarācārya seems to have systematised more or less the same ideas in his Advaita Vedānta.

Some Important Works on Advaita

After Saṅkarācārya Sureśvara wrote *Vārtikā* and *Naishkurnya siddhi*; Vācaspati, *Bhāmatī*; Padmapāda, *Pancapādikā*; Anandagiri, *Nyāya nirṇaya*; Sarvajñātmamuni, *Sanḥsepa lārinakā*; Sriharṣa, *Khaṇḍana khaṇḍa khaṇḍa*; Prakāśman, *Pancapādikā vīcarāṇa*; Vidyāranya, *Vīrarupaprameya saṅgraha*; Citsukha, *Tatva pradīpikā*; and Mallināsana Saravati *Advaitasiddhi*. And a host of other authors wrote several works both in the form of commenting on the previous works and in the form of independent treatises. All these writers substantiate the position of their original master, with new arguments that were suggested by the spirit of their times. Some of

them also entertained different opinions as to the position of *Sanḥarācārya* regarding some details of his philosophy.

ANALYSIS

Knowledge in the real sense of the term is eternal, self-evident and undifferentiated unity. In this sense it is called *Cit*. It is the ultimate principle of the world. The world consists of subjective and objective factors. *Ajñāna* is the stuff of the world. It is superimposed on *Cit*. The world is not real from the standpoint of *Cit*. It is real from its own point of view. Knowledge from the practical point of view is either true or false. The object of true knowledge is not sublated. True knowledge is caused by *pramāṇas*. There are six *pramāṇas*: *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *āgama*, *upamāna*, *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi*. These *pramāṇas* not only reveal the objects of the world; but also point to the fact that *Cit* is the basis of the world. *Upaniṣads* directly reveal Brahman. *Cit* is Brahman. It is absolute (*pāramārthika*). The world is *vyāvahārika*. Wrong knowledge also has its object. It is wrong because its object is sublated. Its object is not real, because it is sublated. It is not unreal, because it is known. It cannot be real and unreal simultaneously, and therefore it is called *sadasadvilakṣaṇa*. In this sense it is *mithyā*. The world with its cause, *ajñāna* is also *mithyā* because it is sublated from the standpoint of *Cit*.

There are three types of things. *Cit* or Brahman is *pāramārthika*. The world is *vyāvahārika*. The object of wrong knowledge is *prātibhāsika* in the sense that it exists in so far as its knowledge continues. *Ajñāna* as *māyā* conditions *Cit* and is the material cause of the world. *Cit* being conditioned by *māyā* is *liṅga*, the material and the efficient cause of the world. *Ajñāna* in the form of *avidyā* gives rise to *antahkaraṇa* which is the abode of knowledge in the ordinary sense of the term. *Cit* conditioned by *antahkaraṇa* is the individual soul (*jīva*). *Jīva* in its essence is Brahman. By means of discrimination between eternal and non-eternal things, detachment from the things of the world, development of virtues such as equanimity of mind and self-control, and desire for freedom it becomes fit to understand Brahman. By enquiry it understands the truth. By meditating on it it becomes fit to realise *Cit*. At this stage it understands the correct meaning of the *Upaniṣad* 'That thou art'. It realises *Cit*. There is only *Cit*. This is *mukti* (freedom).

ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

The Advaita thinkers are not satisfied with any of the previous philosophies, holding that they are not sound because they start from the common-sense view of knowledge, that knowledge happens to a subject, is relative to an object, and is produced and destroyed. They believe, rightly too, that a true understanding of knowledge alone gives a clue to the nature of Reality.¹ So they propose to examine knowledge, without having any preconceived ideas.

KNOWLEDGE (JÑĀNA)

By a detailed examination of the fact of knowledge the Advaita thinkers arrive at the conclusion that there are two types of knowledge, one of which is knowledge in the true sense of the term, and the other is only so-called because it reveals objects. They call the former *Svarūpajñāna* and the latter *Vṛstijñāna*. They show that the former is *nitya*, (eternal), *svayashjyoti* (self-evident), and *akhaṇḍa* (undifferentiated unity). They consider the latter as knowledge in the ordinary sense of the term and the former to be the ground of the latter. Their whole philosophical reflection is directed towards explaining this view and drawing the necessary conclusion from it.

Svarūpajñāna

We understand the nature of *svarūpajñāna* as we go on tracing the true nature of knowledge. The true nature of knowledge is that it is eternal, self-evident, and undifferentiated unity. This may be explained as follows:

Knowledge is Eternal (Nitya)

Amid the different intellectual activities we have the feeling of the identity of awareness. We know that all knowledge is of some particular individual. In each instance of knowledge

¹ V.P.S., p. 50.—*Yuktyaikakāraṇenāpi annubhavaḥ nāpalapitum lakṣyate. Annubhavanisṭhataśvādhyukteḥ.* (It is not possible to deny experience even by him who has faith only in reason, because reason has its birth from experience.)

we are aware that it is a phase of the ever identical knowledge. Without this recognition there is no knowledge at all. If this were not true, and if each instance of knowledge had nothing to do with the other instances of the same, then the intellectual activities of an individual would be a chaos without any hope of unity. But we are aware of the unity. This points to the truth of the recognition of the identity of all knowledge that happens to an individual knower. The recognition may be expressed thus: 'The same knowledge that grasped a particular object is now grasping another object.' This implies that knowledge is the same throughout though the objects are different. By extending the force of this implication we arrive at the view that knowledge is beginningless. From the idea that it is beginningless it follows that it is endless. So knowledge is not limited by time. For this reason it is called *nitya* (eternal).

The fact that knowledge is *nitya* is the necessary presupposition of all theories of knowledge. For even supposing that knowledge has both beginning and end we cannot dispense with the view that it is *nitya*. At least to have the awareness of the different pieces of knowledge that come into being and go there must be an enduring phase of knowledge. Without such a phase it is impossible even to suppose that knowledge is produced and destroyed.

In the very act of knowing that knowledge has a beginning the *nitya* character of knowledge asserts itself. To suppose that knowledge has a beginning is impossible unless there is the awareness of what was there before. Hence the awareness of what preceded knowledge is the necessary presupposition of the thought that knowledge has a beginning. In the same manner the supposition that knowledge has an end is impossible unless there is the awareness of what comes after knowledge. There is no beginning to the absence of knowledge which precedes knowledge and no end to the absence of knowledge which follows knowledge. To have awareness of such periods is to have *nitya* knowledge.¹

¹ S.V.—*Kāryam sarvaih yatodṛṣṭam prāgabdhāvapurassaram. Taryūpi samavitsāḥśūvāt prāgabdhāvo nityamvidah.* (By all a product is observed to be preceded by its absence. But there is no absence to precede knowledge since the supposed absence must be revealed by knowledge itself.)

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So the *nitya* character of knowledge is of the very nature of knowledge. We may therefore conclude that knowledge is *nitya* in the sense that time does not limit it.

Knowledge is Self-Evident (Svayamijyoti)

Knowledge is given as *nitya*. If it were not so, then nothing else could determine it to be so. Knowledge is not revealed by any other *pramāṇa*. If it were to be revealed by something other than itself, then there could be no awareness of it at all. If each piece of knowledge is to be revealed by another piece, then we can never arrive at the fact of knowledge. That we have knowledge is a fact. This points to the truth that knowledge is not revealed by anything else. The fact that we have knowledge is evident from thoughts like 'I know this or that object' and 'this is known by me'. If knowledge were revealed by an entity external to it, then we could never have these thoughts. So knowledge is not revealed by an entity that lies outside it. In this sense it is called *svayamijyoti* (self-evident).¹

Knowledge is Undifferentiated (Akhaṇḍa)

The fact that knowledge is not revealed by anything external to it does not mean that knowledge reveals itself. Were knowledge self-revealing the same knowledge must be an object of itself. To suppose that it is an object of itself is to deny that it is self-evident. An object that is inert can be revealed only by an entity that is external to it. If knowledge is an object, at least to that extent, it must be revealed by that which is external to it. But such a conclusion denies the self-evident character of knowledge, whereas knowledge is self-evident. One implication of this is that it is not an object in any sense. So knowledge is devoid of all internal distinctions. This implies that it is independent of all limitations.² If knowledge were limited by any thing external to it, then it would not be devoid of distinctions, and it must contain in itself some distinction at least in so far as it is limited. It has already been shown

¹ *Cit* as *svayamijyoti* is called *draṣṭṛ*. Anything that appears to be other than *cit* is *dṛśya* (*Dṛgdrśyaniveśa*).

² V.P.S., p. 43.—*Svayamijyotiḥ yāvatśatvamaṇbhāṣāt*. . . . (Because being given as *akhaṇḍa* is the state of that which is self-evident. . . .)

how it is devoid of all distinctions. So it is not conditioned by any thing external. From this it follows that it has nothing outside it. To posit anything outside it is to limit it. So it is absolute, having no internal division and nothing outside it. In this sense it is called *akṣhaṇḍa* (undifferentiated).¹

From the consideration that knowledge is *nitya*, *svayam-jyoti*, and *akṣhaṇḍa*, it follows that the common-sense view of knowledge is incorrect. Advaita formulates this theory following the spirit of the *Upaniṣadic* teaching that Brahman is *satya*, *jñāna* and *ānanda* or *ananta*. To imply all that is stated knowledge is called in this philosophy *cit* or *caitanya*. The same is taken to be the *Upaniṣadic* *Ātman* or Brahman. The *Upaniṣadic* description of Brahman as *satya*, *jñāna*, and *ānanda* corresponds to the Advaita description of knowledge as *nitya*, *svayam-jyoti*, and *akṣhaṇḍa* respectively. Knowledge as Brahman is the ground of all. It is the ultimate principle of the universe. It is the Absolute.

The following pages contain a very brief summary of how *caitanya* is shown to be the ground of all that appears and how in fact it has nothing outside itself.

The Empirical Ego (I) is Not the Substratum of Knowledge (Caitanya)

It is ordinarily thought that knowledge happens to the entity that we call Ego or 'I'. This is wrong. Supposing that knowledge happens to 'I', we have to hold that the latter is different from the former. This is impossible, because knowledge is *akṣhaṇḍa* and has nothing outside it. So 'I' independently of knowledge is not possible. Nor can it be held that 'I' is identical with knowledge, for in that case there would be no point in holding that the latter happens to the former.

¹ V.P.S., p. 58.—*Naca nīlapitādyanubhavānām bhinnatvāt nātmavarūpateti vācyaṃ, svarūpato anubhaveṣu bhedapratīteḥ, bhedaḥkalpane ca mānābhāvāt. Naca janmanāśau bhedaḥkalpakau. Tayorbhedasiddhipūrvakātena parasparāśrayatvāt.* (It cannot be said that the perception of the blue and that of the yellow are not the same as *Ātman* (*cit*) since each perception is different from the other, because the difference in the nature of perception is not observed and there is no *pramāṇa* to enable us to posit difference on it. Production and destruction do not prove difference. Since they presuppose difference the argument begs the question.)

Knowledge is Not the Same as 'I'

Knowledge is infinite. But 'I' is an individual thing and as such it is limited by external entities. Knowledge has no internal distinctions. But 'I' is not so. In the experience 'I know this' it is the subject; and in the self-consciousness as 'I' it is the object of consciousness. Thus it is both subject and object. So 'I' is not self-evident. But knowledge is.

NON-KNOWLEDGE (*ACIT* OR *AJÑĀNA*)*'I' is a Product (Cidacitsamvalanātmaka)*

It is explained that 'I' is both subject and object. So it has internal distinctions. In order to have such distinctions it must be a product of different entities. In the knowledge where it is the subject it is self-evident; and it is not revealed by anything external to it. So it must have the character of knowledge. It is also an object, and as such it must be the result of some thing other than knowledge. The thing that is other than knowledge is obviously non-knowledge. Knowledge is *cit*. Non-knowledge is *acit*. 'I' shows the character of both *cit* and *acit*. Therefore it is the product of both *cit* and *acit*. In order to imply this idea it is called *cidacitsamvalanātmaka*.¹

The Relation of Cit and Acit in 'I'

There is a difficulty in regarding 'I' as the product of *cit* and *acit*. *Cit* is infinite and it has nothing outside it. This makes *acit* impossible. If so, it is difficult to hold that 'I' is the product of *cit* and *acit*. But we cannot dispense with the view that 'I' is the product of both *cit* and *acit*; merely because we feel a difficulty in admitting it. 'I' as the product of *cit* and *acit* is given. Now the question is how to reconcile these two ideas. We have to interpret the whole of experience to find out if the two ideas can be reconciled.

Human Experience as a Whole

Human experience consists of three states; waking, dreaming, and sleeping. In waking and dreaming 'I' is the subject

¹ V.P.S., p. 53.—*Idamanidamātmako'haṁpratyayah*.

of experience. In sleeping there is no 'I', nor is there experience. Whether the particular elements that characterise a particular state may or may not be in other states, one thing is certain, and it is that all states have some thing common in them, because they are the states of the same life. Now we have to find out what that common element is. It must be an element that is present in sleep also. From this it follows that the difference of the other two states is only the appearance of that common element. If so the state of sleep is less complex while the other two states are more complex. This suggests the fact that the complexity of the other two states is latent in sleep. What is latent in sleep is patent in the other states. If this is not the fact, then the other states ought not to follow sleep. So sleep is the ground of the other states. If the state of sleep is fully understood we get a clue to the nature of the other states.

The State of Sleep (Supti)

Most of the thinkers of the previous *Darśanas* hold that the state of sleep is characterised by the complete absence of knowledge. Their supposition is not correct. If the state of sleep is completely devoid of knowledge, then how can the individual be conscious of the fact that he had sleep? When the sleep is over, the individual does feel that he had a good sleep. This feeling is the memory of the fact that he had a happy sleep. This memory is impossible, if previously the individual had not the actual knowledge of sleep. The knowledge that grasps sleep must be present during sleep itself. So the memory of sleep in the waking state points to the actual knowledge of sleep in sleep.

Further, even to hold that there is the absence of knowledge during sleep, it is necessary to grant that there is knowledge in sleep at least as grasping the absence of knowledge. Without assuming such knowledge it is impossible to assert that there is the absence of knowledge in sleep.

So in any case we have to admit that there is a type of knowledge in sleep. Now the question is, What is the nature of this knowledge? One thing we know about it. During sleep there are no objects of the waking and the dreaming states. Therefore the knowledge in sleep is not the ordinary type of knowledge. So it is very nearly *cit*. (To indicate this idea it

is called *avidyā vytti*.) It is responsible for the feeling of identity that appears after sleep. In order to reveal sleep it must be evident. It must be made evident by a self-evident entity. Such an entity is *cit*. This means that *cit* is during sleep.

The fact that there is *cit* during sleep points to the eternal character of *cit*. The fact that there is knowledge in sleep points to the self-evident character of *cit*. The fact that there is peace in sleep points to the *ānanda* aspect of *cit*. *Cit* as *nitya*, *svayamīyoti*, and *akhaṇḍa* is ever-present in all the states of individual life. In fact it makes all states possible, because it gives continuity to all states.

So far we know that what is is *cit*, and it has nothing external to it. If so, the question is how are there different states. If there can be any answer to this question, then it must be found with reference to the experience of sleep itself, because it is already explained that sleep has the other states in a latent form. So we have to examine further the case of sleep.

Is There Anything in Sleep to Explain Waking and Dream?

The experience of sleep is peculiar. It cannot be identified with *cit*. *Cit* is infinite. But the experience is finite because it is only the experience in sleep. *Cit* is absolute. But the experience is relative to sleep because it is the experience of sleep. It appears along with sleep and disappears when the sleep ceases. So it has something as its cause (*upādāna* or material cause). *Cit* is not its cause, because it is absolute. To regard *cit* as cause is to make it relative to the effect. So the cause of experience is something other than *cit*. It must be present whenever its effect is present, because¹ it is the matter from which experience appears to come. So the cause of experience is in sleep and it is different from *cit*. What is it? Apparently there is nothing in sleep to tell us anything about it. So in order to answer the question we have to examine if anything is implied in the ideas of the waking state about sleep.

The Cause of the Experience in Sleep

All our ideas in waking about sleep may be expressed in the sentences 'I slept happily and I knew nothing'. We have

¹ V.P.S., p. 16.

already drawn the implications of 'I slept happily'. From them we have arrived at the notion that there is in sleep *cis* with the experience of sleep. We may now draw the implications of 'I knew nothing'. This implies that there is non-knowledge in sleep. What is this non-knowledge? Obviously it cannot be the absence of knowledge. To hold that it is the absence of knowledge is to posit the knowledge of non-knowledge. To have the knowledge of non-knowledge is to have the knowledge of knowledge itself. Knowledge is that of objects. So to know non-knowledge is to have the knowledge of the objects whose non-knowledge is in question. To suppose that there is the knowledge of the objects in sleep is to deny sleep itself.

From the previous considerations it is clear that if sleep is characterised by non-knowledge, then non-knowledge is not the absence of knowledge. If it is not absence, then, it must have some thing positive in it. It is only the non-knowledge that is negative that is relative to the knowledge of knowledge. The knowledge of a positive entity is not relative to any other thing. The knowledge of the absence of a jar is relative to the knowledge of the jar itself. It does not occur to one who does not know the jar whose absence is to be known. But the knowledge of a jar is not relative to any other entity. In the same manner the knowledge of non-knowledge in sleep is not relative to any other knowledge. This means that it is the knowledge of a positive entity and this entity is non-knowledge. To imply this idea non-knowledge is called *bhāvarūpajñāna*. In this term *ajñāna* stands for non-knowledge, and *bhāvarūpa* stands for the fact that it is positive.

The positive non-knowledge is what characterises sleep. So in sleep there seem to be three entities, *cis*, non-knowledge and the experience of non-knowledge.¹ The experience reveals non-knowledge. So it has the character of illumination. *Cis* is illumination. So the experience is not independent of *cis*. If it were so, it would not have the character of illumination. So

¹ V.P.S., p. 69.—*Yadyopyajñānam jñāvacchedopādhiriti puṁśtādūḥṣṭam. Tathāpi suṣuptāvajñānamūtrāmeccinnasya jñāsyā svapnadaśāyām iṣatspaṣṭavyavahārāya antahkaraṇamupādhiriyate. Tathā jāgarāṇe viśpaṣṭavyavahārāya sthūlātārāṇamupādhih. Nacaiśamupādhibhedōtjñābhedaḥprasaṅgah. Pūrṇapūrṇopādhyavacchinnaśy-aiva uttarottarāya . . .* [It is however, previously, said that *ajñāna*

cit is the ground of experience. The essence of experience is *cit* itself. Non-knowledge is illumined by experience. This ultimately stands for the idea that it is illumined by *cit*. Remembering this fact we may now state that there are two entities in sleep, and they are *cit* and non-knowledge (*ajñāna*). The togetherness of these entities is responsible for the state of sleep.

The Function of Ajñāna in Sleep

If *ajñāna* in sleep were a non-entity and if it did not in any manner influence *cit*, then there would be no sleep at all, and there would be no cause of other states. In that case there would be no world and no experience. The world, experience, and the different states of life are all facts. Therefore it follows that *ajñāna* somehow influences *cit*. Such an influence cannot take place from the standpoint of *cit*, because *cit* is *akṣanda*. But there may be influence from the standpoint of *ajñāna*. From its point of view it obscures *cit*, and as a result of this *cit* appears as revealing *ajñāna*. *Cit* by itself does not reveal anything. It appears to be so only from the standpoint of *ajñāna*. With this appearance it is said to be the experience in sleep. Its appearance is the product of *ajñāna*. It does not belong to *cit*. To imply this idea it is called *avidyāvṛtti*. In this term *avidyā* is the same as *ajñāna* and *vṛtti* stands for the idea that experience is its product. We may now conclude that *ajñāna* is as necessary as *cit* itself for the appearance of sleep.

is the condition that brings about *jīva*. What is really meant is that *antahkaraṇa* is the condition in dreaming, in order to account for the somewhat clear experience (*vyaśahāra*) of the same *jīva* which is conditioned only by *ajñāna* during sleep. Similarly in waking in order to bring about clear experience (*vyaśahāra*) the gross body is (taken to be) the condition. From the difference in the conditions the difference in the same *jīva* cannot be argued, because the latter conditions act upon the entity conditioned by the former ones. . . .]

V.P.S., p. 61.—*Tadevaṃ suṣuptau duḥkṣābhāvajñānābhāvau arthāpastivedyau. Bhāvarūpājñānānandātmanastu smaryante iti siddhāntasthitiḥ.* (Therefore the absence of misery and the absence of knowledge during sleep are known by *arthāpasti* (presumption). *Bhāvarūpājñāna*, peace, and *ātman* are remembered. This is the position of Advaita.)

Cit and Ajñāna Form the Basis of the Other Two States

If all that is during sleep consists of *cit* and *ajñāna*, then it follows that these also form the basis of the other two states, waking and dreaming. *Cit* is *akṣanda*. It is the same in all states. But the content of each state differs from that of other states. It is clear that the difference is not due to *cit*. So it must be due to *ajñāna* itself. *Ajñāna* is the cause of life with all its varieties. During sleep its capacities are latent. They are only in the causal form (*bijarūpa*). In the other states they are in the effect-form (*kāryarūpa*). The states of waking and dreaming are characterised by the experience that explicitly involves subject-object-relation. Then some facts appear as subjects, while others as objects. The subject of experience is called 'I' (*aḥamkāra*).

The I-ness of 'I' is the Product of Ajñāna

The appearance of both subject and object is due to *ajñāna*. Yet there is much difference between the two. The subject exhibits the character of *cit* more explicitly than the object. So the influence of *ajñāna* in the former is far less than it is in the latter. In order to indicate this the *ajñāna* that conditions *cit* and gives rise to the subject is called *antaḥkāraṇa*. At the time when sleep is just over *ajñāna* gives rise to *antaḥkāraṇa*, and *antaḥkāraṇa* conditioning *cit* gives rise to the subject in the form 'I'. There is no *antaḥkāraṇa* during sleep, and therefore there is no 'I' then. Just at the time when sleep ceases 'I' appears¹ and the individual has the apprehension of it. So in the knowledge 'I slept happily and I knew nothing' there are involved two elements of knowledge, the apprehension (*pratyakṣa*) of 'I' and the memory of sleep. The

¹ V.P.S., p. 62.—*Ahaṁkāraṇaṁ anādyanirvacanīyānīdyā upādānam. Avidyāyāḥ paramaśvarādhiṣṭhātṛtvaṁ nimittam. Jñānaśakti-kriyāśaktidvayaṁ svarūpam. Kūṭasthacaitanyam pramāṇam. Kartṛsvabhokṛtvādikānc kāryam. Sūptīrantaḥkāraṇapralayarūpatvāt na tatra sabbhāvah.* (Of *aḥamkāra* the beginningless and *anirvacanīya* *avidyā* is the material cause. The presence of *paramaśvara* in *avidyā* is the efficient cause. The power to know and the power to do are both the forms. The infinite *cit* is the proof. Doing, enjoying, and so on are the functions. Since sleep is characterised by the destruction of *antaḥkāraṇa*, it does not exist during sleep.)

apprehension of 'I' is not memory because there is no 'I' in sleep. There are several subjects in the world which are different because *antahkaraṇas* are different.

The Appearance of Objects is Due to Ajñāna

As sleep is over, *ajñāna* evolves into various forms that bear different names. These products are the objects of experience.

So there are different subjects and objects. They are all conditioned by *ajñāna*. But their ground is one. It is *cit*. Our explanation of the different states of life by means of *ajñāna* has throughout assumed that just like *cit ajñāna* also is a fact. But the assumption is not consistent with the fact that *cit* is *akhaṇḍa*. Being *akhaṇḍa*, *cit* has nothing outside it.¹ So *ajñāna* cannot be along with *cit*. If so there is no reason why there should be different states. If we have to explain experience, then we have first to remove this difficulty. In our attempt to do this we may first note that the difficulty is not final. For *cit* as *akhaṇḍa* is a fact. That there are states of life is also a fact. And that *ajñāna* is the cause of life cannot be denied.² This suggests that somehow there is a relation between *cit* and *ajñāna*.³ With this clue we may now find out what this relation is.

The Relation between Cit and Ajñāna

The relation between *cit* and *ajñāna* may be determined by noting the implication of *cit*. *Cit* is *akhaṇḍa*.⁴ There

¹ From the standpoint of the world two entities are responsible for its appearance. They are *cit* and *ajñāna*. *Cit* as such is *akhaṇḍa*. With it the world is not.

² *Pratidhātuvādaśidyūyāh śāpannhotum naśakyate. Anātmano na nā yuktā . . .* (*Ajñāna* is given. It cannot be denied. It is not in *anātman*. . .) quoted by V.P.S., p. 49.

³ *Ajñāna* is *anādi* and *anirvacanīya*.—V.P.S., p. 18. It is the material cause of superimposition.—V.P.S., p. 16.

⁴ V.P.S., p. 82.—*Kūṭasthacaitanye sarvamapyadhyasthatayā pratiyate*. (Everything appears as superimposed on the *akhaṇḍa cit*.) p. 48—*Na ca caitanyasya kālpanikēnāśrayatvena veditavamasangatvam vīkanyate*. (The real absolute character of *cit* is not affected by an imaginary description of it as the basis of superimposition.)

cannot be anything that is really different from it. Nevertheless there may be an entity that is not real. *Ajñāna* as the necessary condition of experience is found with *cit*. This means that *ajñāna* is not real, because the supposition that *ajñāna* is real is sublated by the fact that *cit* is *akṣaṇḍa*. Merely because that *ajñāna* is not real (*sat*) it does not follow that it is unreal (*asat*). If it were unreal (*asat*), then it would not be there; and there would be no cause of experience. As the cause of experience it is given. So it is not *asat*. Because it is not *sat* and not *asat*, we cannot regard it as *sadasat* (real-unreal). To describe an entity as *sadasat* is a contradiction in terms. If a thing is *sat*, then it is not *asat*; and if it is *asat*, then it is not *sat*. It cannot be both *sat* and *asat*. So to determine *ajñāna* as *sat*, *asat* or *sadasat* is not possible,¹ and it must therefore be different from *sat*, *asat* and *sadasat*. To imply this idea it is called *sadasadvilakṣaṇa*. *Mithyā*, *anirvacanīya* and *anirvācya*² are the other Sanskrit names for the same.

Cit is *sat*. *Ajñāna* is *mithyā*. The relation between them cannot be *sat*, because it is the relation between two things one of which is not real. As relating to a *mithyā* entity it is also *mithyā*. The *mithyā* relation is called *adhyāsa* or *āropa*. From the standpoint of this relation *ajñāna* is said to be superimposed (*adyastha* or *āropita*) on *cit*.³ Owing to this *adhyāsa*-relation, *cit*, though it is *akṣaṇḍa*, seems to be conditioned by *ajñāna*, and consequently *ajñāna* seems to have the characters of *cit*, in so far as it appears to be, to appear and to be liked. So to posit an *adhyāsa*-relation between *cit* and *ajñāna* is to superimpose *ajñāna* on *cit* and *cit* on *ajñāna*. The superimposition of *cit*

¹ V.P.S., p. 50 quotes 'Avidyāyā avidyātvaamidamevāturalakṣaṇam, yadvicārāśaktiṣṇutvamanyathāvastu sā bhavet.' (The definition of the *avidyā*-ness of *avidyā* is that it does not stand scrutiny. Otherwise it ought to be an entity.)

² The literal meaning of *Anirvācya* is inexplicable. But this term is used in Advaita in a technical sense and it means *sadasadvilakṣaṇa*.

³ V.P.S., p. 241.—*Adhyāsaḥ tvaṇyasminnanyatvadṛṣṭiḥ*. (To superimpose is to mistake one thing for another.)

V.P.S., p. 14.—*Pratītimātreṇa āropyatvasiddham vastusattvāyā apra-
yojakaḥ*. (The mere notion of a thing enables its superimposition. The reality of it is not necessary.) So the thing that is superimposed may not be real.

and *acis* each on the other is the cause of the whole of experience. The mutual superimposition of *cis* and *acis* is called *isaretarādhyāsa*.

Cis and *ajñāna* are superimposed each on the other in different senses. *Ajñāna* as such is superimposed on *cis*. But *cis* is *akhaṇḍa*, and it cannot be as such superimposed on *ajñāna*. Owing to the superimposition of *ajñāna* on it, it is supposed to be in relation to *ajñāna* in a *mithyā* sense. So while *ajñāna* as *ajñāna* is superimposed on *cis*, it is only the relation of *cis* to *ajñāna* that is superimposed on *ajñāna*.¹ The thing that is superimposed is *mithyā*. So both *ajñāna* and the relation of *cis* to *ajñāna* are *mithyā*, because they are superimposed each on the other.

From the previous considerations it is clear that *cis* is absolute, and it is the ground of all that appears. As *cis* is the ground of all, it cannot be proved as such. For even the so-called proof presupposes this truth. Without *cis* there is no *pramāṇa*. A *pramāṇa* reveals a thing because it has the self-evident *cis* as its ground. By means of philosophical reflections we can only remove the misconceptions regarding the truth.² So the function of philosophy is purely negative. To imply this idea this system of philosophy is called Advaita. In this term *dvaita* stands for *ajñāna* and 'a' stands for the idea that it is not the truth. Though experience is a product of *ajñāna* yet

¹ V.P.S., p. 14.—*Ātmanah svarūpenāpādhyāsa ityanṛtatvam*. (*Ātman* is superimposed only in a qualified form, i.e. only *ātman's* relation is superimposed. *Ātman* is superimposed also as a whole and therefore it is not real.)

² V.P.S., p. 234.—*Prāptameva khaṇḍacūmīkārādikamaññānah puriṣaḥ punaḥ prāptimicchati; pariṣṭamevacarajjuarṣādīkaṃ pariṣhirjati . . . evaṃ ca sati nityaprāptiṛya brahmapah prāptau nityanirṇātavya samśīḍavya parihāre ca hetubhūtam tattvajñānam janayate* (The man who is not conscious of the fact that he wears a necklace desires to wear it. He desires to avoid a rope-serpent even though it is unreal. . . . If so, and if the Vedāntas (*Upaniṣads*) as the cause of one's being Brahman though one is always Brahman, and of getting rid of bondage which is essentially unreal, produce the knowledge of reality, where is the room for thinking that they are useless.) Further V.P.S., p. 102.—*Tarkasya pratibandhanirākaranamātraheturat*. (Reflection is only the means for removing obstruction.)

experience implies that *cit* is the ground of all. A good study of experience removes all our misconception, about *cit*.

EXPERIENCE (VṚTTIJÑĀNA)

We have seen that knowledge in the real sense of the term is *cit*. It is *nitya*, *svayamjyoti* and *akhaṇḍa*. If we have understood this fact it is not difficult to consider that which we commonly call knowledge to be no knowledge at all. It is commonly called knowledge because it reveals objects. Both this knowledge and its objects are the functions of *ajñāna*. *Ajñāna* as *antahkaraṇa* assumes the form of what we ordinarily call knowledge. To distinguish this type of knowledge it is called *vṛttijñāna*. This term stands for the idea that only a particular state of *antahkaraṇa* is knowledge in the ordinary sense of the term.

So far we have dealt with *cit* or *svarūpajñāna*. We have yet to substantiate our view of *cit* with reference to *vṛttijñāna*. To do this we have to study *vṛttijñāna* with all its relations to subjective and objective factors.

Vṛttijñāna and its Divisions

Vṛttijñāna is relative to its object. It is produced by the operation of sense organs, and so on, when the conditions that bring it about are favourable. It disappears when its function is over. It is a state of *antahkaraṇa*. And in some cases the state of *avidyā* is also called *vṛtti*. Thus there are two kinds of *vṛtti*—*antahkaraṇavṛtti* and *avidyāvṛtti*. *Antahkaraṇavṛtti* happens to a subject, 'I'. With its object it is superimposed on *cit*. Both itself¹ and its object are *mithyā*. Similarly *avidyāvṛtti* and its object are also superimposed on *cit* and they are therefore *mithyā*.

Life consists of *vṛtti* or *vṛttijñāna* and its objects. To study life is impossible unless we suppose, at least for the time being, that life is given as real. To regard life as real is to regard

¹ V.P.S., p. 88.—*Tasmādādhyānikānāmapi pratyakṣādīnām nāpramāṇyamityadhyāsa upādānam vyavahāraya*. (Therefore there is no untruth in perception, and so on, though they are superimposed; and so superimposition is the material cause of practical life.)

vytiṣṭhāna and its objects as real. *Vytiṣṭhāna* invariably presents an object. The objects that are presented by it may be divided into two classes. Some of them are real from the standpoint of life. Others are not so. The things like a jar are real from the standpoint of life (*vyaśāhāna*). The things that appear in illusion are not real from the same standpoint. In the shell-silver-illusion there is the appearance of silver. It is sublated from the point of view of life. When the illusion is over the man who had the illusion realises that there is no silver. So from the standpoint of life some objects are sublated and others are not. Corresponding to these divisions there are divisions in *vytiṣṭhāna*. The *vytiṣṭhāna* whose object is not sublated from the standpoint of life is right. It is called *pramā*. The *vytiṣṭhāna* whose object is sublated from this standpoint is wrong. It is called *bhrama*. Among the objects of *pramā* there are two classes. Some are novel, and some are not. Those that are not novel are the objects of memory (*smṛti*). If it is insisted that *pramā* must be of a novel object, then memory is not *pramā*.

Pramā (right knowledge)

Pramā is the knowledge of a novel (*anadhigata*) object which is not sublated (*abūdhita*). It is due to several causes.¹ The proximate cause (*karṇa*) of it is called *pramāṇa*. There are six *pramāṇas*. They are *Pratyakṣa*, *Anumāna*, *Upamāna*, *Āgama*, *Arthāpatti*, and *Anupalabdhi*. There are two types of right knowledge (*pramā*) produced by *pramāṇas*, immediate (*aparokṣa*) and mediate (*parokṣa*). *Pratyakṣa* as such, *anupalabdhi*, and *āgama* under special circumstances give rise to *aparokṣa* knowledge. *Anumāna*, *arthāpatti*, *upamāna* and *āgama* in general give rise to *parokṣa* knowledge.

¹ I.P.S., p. 174.—... Na caitani samavedanavyāpinyasya phalacāsamūhacāh. Vyāyopādhiḥ tasya janmāngikārāt. (It must not be thought that *cit*, being beginningless, cannot be a result. It can be said to have been produced only in the sense of being conditioned by an object.)

THE PRAMĀNAS

PRATYAKṢA

Pratyakṣa as a *pramāṇa* is that which gives rise to a *ṛtti* which manifests *cit*. From the standpoint of the result *cit* itself may be regarded as *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*. It takes place in the following manner: The subject 'I', the *antahkaraṇa*, and the object are the presupposition of the activity of *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*. *Cit* is the ground of all. It is in the subject, the *antahkaraṇa* and the object. In the sense that it is in the subject it is called *pramāṇa caitanya*. In this term *pramāṇa* is the subject and *caitanya* is *cit*. In the sense that it is in the *antahkaraṇa* it is called *pramāṇa caitanya*. And in the sense that it is in the object it is called *viśaya caitanya*. So these three forms of *cit* are the presupposition of *pratyakṣa* activity. *Antahkaraṇa* is the abode of all *ṛtti* knowledge excluding *avidyāṛtti*. So its size is not infinitesimal (*anuparimāṇa*). In order to be the abode of all mental activities¹ it must be of a medium size (*madhyama parimāṇa*). A thing of medium size consists of parts. So *antahkaraṇa* is a composite entity. It is very quick in its activity. There can be no knowledge of objects that are external to the body of the individual who is to have knowledge, unless it is in actual contact with them. In order to have the contact, either *antahkaraṇa* must go to the objects or the objects must go to *antahkaraṇa*. We know that objects do not move to *antahkaraṇa*. Whether there is knowledge or no knowledge they are where they are. If there is to be any contact between them and *antahkaraṇa*, then *antahkaraṇa* itself must go to them. That there is contact between them is a fact. Therefore that *antahkaraṇa* moves to them is also a fact. Some objects are near the body. Some are distant. Some are very distant, as the stars. Sometimes *antahkaraṇa* is almost simultaneously in contact with many objects. This means that its movement is very quick. To have such quick movement it must be of the character of fire (*tejas*). (This conclusion follows the general Indian idea that fire moves fast.)

¹ V.P.S., p. 63.—*Ātmanah upādānatec trahamkāma iti sāmānādhikaranyapratyayah syāt na tu dandidevadatta itirāt ahnikāmiti sambandhapratyayah.* (If *ātmān* were the material cause, then there ought to be the judgement 'I am desire' that identifies 'I' and 'desire'; but not 'I am desirous' which relates desire to 'I' just as 'dandī devadatta' which relates *danda* to *Devadatta*.)

It is the condition of the subject. So it is at no time separate from 'I'. This means that in being in contact with an object it does not leave its seat in the body. It goes to the object through its parts. It is inside the body. To go to an object it must have an outlet in the body. The sense organs are such outlets. Whenever there is any contact between a sense organ and its object *antahkaraṇa* goes out through the sense organ to the object. When it is in contact with the object it assumes the form of the object. This form is called *antahkaraṇa vṛtti*. It is a state of *antahkaraṇa*. Now in the point of space occupied by the object there are two entities, (1) the object and (2) the *vṛtti* of *antahkaraṇa*. The things that occupy the same point of space¹ are identical. So the object and the *vṛtti* become identical. Before the function of the *vṛtti* there is no knowledge of the object. This means that there is non-knowledge of the object. As it is already explained the non-knowledge of the object is not the absence of the knowledge of the object. For to know that there is the absence of the knowledge of the object is to know the object itself. Therefore we have to conclude that before there is the knowledge of the object, there is the *bhāvarūpajñāna* of the object.² This *ajñāna* obscures the object. In order to do this it must be in the object itself. To hold that it is in the object, as object, is not possible. The object is the product of *ajñāna*. It is not therefore the

¹ I.P.S., p. 85.—*Sākṣiṇā manomātreṇaivā pratyakṣe ākṣiṇe*. (In *ākṣiṇ* which is perceived by *sākṣi* or only by *manas*.) This means that *space (ākāśa)* is perceived by *sākṣi* or by *manas*. Further the Advaita thinkers somehow assume that the things that occupy the same point of space are identical.

² Before knowing a thing it is not known. So before there is the knowledge of a thing there is the non-knowledge of it. This non-knowledge is not the absence of knowledge. For to be conscious of such absence is to be conscious of knowledge itself and so of the object of knowledge. Hence the non-knowledge that precedes knowledge is *bhāvarūpajñāna*. This is the *ajñāna* of the object in view. *Ajñāna* is revealed by *sākṣi*. So its object also is revealed by it. So all the objects of *ajñāna* are the objects of *sākṣi*. Likewise all *vṛtti* knowledge is revealed by *sākṣi*, and so all its objects are revealed by the same. Hence all objects whether they are known or not known are the objects of *sākṣi*. Therefore it is stated in the Advaita works, '*Sarvam vastu jñātataya ajñātataya vā sākṣibhāryam*'. (Every object as known or as unknown is revealed by *sākṣi*.)

substratum of *ajñāna*. The only substratum of *ajñāna* is *cit*, which is the substratum of *ajñāna* in the sense that the latter is superimposed on it. So the view that there is *ajñāna* in the object reduces itself to the position that the *ajñāna* is in *cit* which is in the object i.e. *viśaya caitanya*. The object is not known by *pratyakṣa* when there is *ajñāna* in the *viśaya caitanya*. From this it follows that the *pratyakṣa* knowledge of the object presupposes the destruction of the *ajñāna*. The fact that the *vṛtti* of an object gives rise to the *pratyakṣa* points to the fact that the *vṛtti* destroys the *ajñāna*. The *cit* in *vṛtti* is *pramāṇa caitanya*. It destroys *ajñāna* in the *viśaya caitanya* and becomes one with it. Then *viśaya caitanya* is self-evident.¹ This is called *pratyakṣa* knowledge. It is the identity of *pramāṇa caitanya* with the *viśaya caitanya* that distinguishes *pratyakṣa* knowledge from other forms of knowledge.²

We may illustrate the whole analysis by taking the *pratyakṣa* knowledge of a jar. There is the jar. It is not known. There is *ajñāna* in the *cit* that is its ground. The jar comes into contact with the eyes of a percipient. His *antahkaraṇa* goes out through the eyes and reaches the jar. Next it assumes the form of the jar. This form is the *vṛtti* of the jar. Both the

¹ V.P.S., p. 53.—*Caitanyam svarūpato najāyate. Tathāpi viliṣṭa viśayopatrakṭikāreṇa tasya janma na viruddham.* ((In itself *cit* is not produced. Yet as conditioned by an object its production is not impossible.)

² V.P.S., p. 8a.—This passage raises the question, if all is superimposed on *cit*, then how is it that only some objects are *pratyakṣa* and some are not? and answers it as *Kāraṇatvasavyanjanatvayoh niyāmakaśvāt.* (The state of being *kāraṇa* and that of being *vyanjanaka* are responsible for a thing being *pratyakṣa*.) The *pratyakṣa* object is both *kāraṇa* and *vyanjanaka*. It is *kāraṇa* because it is the object of the *vṛtti* assumed by *antahkaraṇa* when it is in contact with it. It is *vyanjanaka* because the *vṛtti* occasioned by it manifests the *cit* in the object.

V.P.S., p. 72 and A.S., the chapter on *Pratīkarmavyavasthā—Antahkaraṇaparīṇāmasūmagryūh puṇyapāpanetrasiroirūpāyāh prativīṣayam vyavasthitatvena parīṇāmasyāpi vyavasthāsiddheh.* (The principle that every piece of knowledge has its individual object is determined on the basis of the fact that the means by which *antahkaraṇa* assumes *vṛtti*, such as merit, demerit, eyes, ears, and so on, determine the respective objects.)

jar and its *virtu* occupy the same point of space. In the *virtu* there is the *pramāṇa caitanya*. In the jar there is the *viśaya caitanya*. On account of the *virtu* the *ajñāna* in the *viśaya caitanya* is destroyed. As a result of this the *pramāṇa caitanya* becomes identical with the *viśaya caitanya*. This identity is called *pratyakṣa*.

From the standpoint of *cit* there is no difference in it as *pramāṇa caitanya*, *viśaya caitanya* and *pramāṇa caitanya*. Nor does it need to be identical. The difference in it is superimposed only from the standpoint of *ajñāna* and its products. After the difference is made the necessity arises for identifying one *cit* with another *cit*.

From the identity of *pramāṇa caitanya* with the *viśaya caitanya* there follows the identity of *pramāṇa caitanya* with the *viśaya caitanya*. Owing to this identity the subject (the knower) realises that the object is as real as himself. From the standpoint of this identity the object also may be regarded as *pratyakṣa*. The identity of *pramāṇa caitanya* with the *viśaya caitanya* simply suggests that both the subject and object have only derived reality and not their own. Their reality is the same as the reality of *cit* in them.

An object is *pratyakṣa* in so far as there is its *virtu*. There may be many properties in the object. Under particular conditions only particular properties along with the object become *pratyakṣa*, because there is, under such conditions, the *virtu* of those properties along with the object.

There are some objects that cannot be *pratyakṣa*. We have to decide which objects are *pratyakṣa* and which are not according to experience. The objects that are not *pratyakṣa* are such as *dharma*, *adharma* (merit, demerit), and so on. Among the objects of *pratyakṣa* knowledge some are external, such as jar; and some are internal, such as pleasure. The object of *pratyakṣa* must be present, when there is *pratyakṣa*.

A thing is not different from its properties. The relation between a sense organ and a thing is not different from that between the same organ and the properties of the thing. Similarly the relation between the organ and the properties of the properties is not different. To indicate this idea the relation between a sense organ and a substance is called *samyoga*; the relation between the same organ and the properties of the substance is *samyuktatādātmya* and the relation between the

sense organ and the properties of the properties is *samyuktābhinnatādātmya*.

In revealing an object a *vytti* reveals itself. To explain a *vytti* by another *vytti* is never to arrive at a *vytti*.

There are two kinds of *pratyakṣa*, *saṁvikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka*. The *pratyakṣa* of an object that involves the relation of the substantive and the attributive is *saṁvikalpaka*. We may take for example the *pratyakṣa*, 'This is a jar.' The object of this *pratyakṣa* is the jar as qualified by jariness. Hence the *pratyakṣa* is *saṁvikalpaka*. The *pratyakṣa* of an object that does not involve the relation between a substance and its attributes is called *nirvikalpaka*.¹ We may take for instance the *pratyakṣa* knowledge that is produced by the statement, 'This is the same man' when the person in question is actually before the percipient. The percipient obtains the *pratyakṣa* knowledge, because he actually sees the man. At the same time he knows the statement made to him that he is the same man. The intention of the statement is that the substantive aspect of the present man is the same as the substantive aspect of the past man. According to this intention the percipient obtains the knowledge of the identity of the substantive aspect of the present man with the substantive aspect of the past man. The knowledge of the identity of the man is *nirvikalpaka* because its object, the identity of the man, does not involve the relation between the substantive and the attributive. It is *pratyakṣa* because when the percipient knows the statement that it is the same man, his eyes are in contact with the man and by the influence of the knowledge of the intention of the statement there is *vytti* of the identity of the man and consequently, there is identity of the *viśaya caitanya* and *pramāṇa caitanya*.

Cit is conditioned by *antahkaraṇa* (*upādhi*) and in this capacity it is called *jīva* (individual soul). It is at the same time marked by *antahkaraṇa* (*lakṣaṇa*) and in this capacity it is called *sākṣi*. *Antahkaraṇa* is different in every body. Therefore *jīva* and its *sākṣi* also are different, i.e. each body has its own *jīva* and *sākṣi*.

The causes of an object's being *pratyakṣa* are many. The sense organs (*indriyas*) make their objects *pratyakṣa*. They are

¹ *Tattvasiddhi* says that *nirvikalpaka* is *saṁmātraviśaya*.

five—eye (*cakṣus*), ear (*śrotra*), nose (*ghrāṇa*), tongue (*rasana*), and the organ of touch (*tvak*). The latter three grasp their objects, being seated in their places in the body, the former two go themselves to the objects and grasp them. If eye does not go to the object, then there cannot be any contact between itself and the object. Similarly the ear also needs to go to its object. Its object is sound. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas suppose that when a sound is produced its waves are formed and they reach the ear and there is the *pratyakṣa* of the sound. Their supposition is not correct. If the ear is in contact only with a wave of sound and not with the actual sound itself, then the resultant knowledge ought to be—‘I hear the wave of the sound’ in place of the knowledge ‘I hear the sound’ which we actually have. So in the light of the implication of knowledge we have to hold that sound itself is heard and not the wave of the sound. The knowledge of the sound presupposes the contact between ear and sound. The contact is impossible unless it is supposed that the ear itself goes to the sound.

Like the sense organs *antahkaraṇa* makes the internal objects pleasure, and so on, *pratyakṣa*. In this case of *pratyakṣa*, *antahkaraṇa* does not go out. Pleasure and so on are in *antahkaraṇa* and this accounts for the identity of *pramāṇa caitanya* and *viśaya caitanya* (*jñāna pratyakṣa*) and the identity of *viśaya caitanya* and *pramāṇa caitanya* (*viśaya pratyakṣa*).

Antahkaraṇa is not a sense organ (*indriya*).¹ It is a composite substance and is the abode of *vyākṛti* knowledge.

An object is made *pratyakṣa* by a verbal testimony also. We may take for instance the following case. There is a group of ten men standing in order. The man who stands tenth does not know that he is the tenth. Somebody tells him that he is the tenth. With the help of this statement he sees his own body as the tenth. There is the identity of *pramāṇa caitanya* and *viśaya caitanya*. As a result of this there is the identity of *pramāṇa caitanya* also and consequently the person as the tenth is *pratyakṣa*.

¹ *Antahkaraṇa* is not an *indriya* according to *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* and *Vivaraṇa*. According to *Bhāmati* and *Ratnaprabhā* it is an *indriya*. It is instrumental according to all. To say that it is instrumental does not mean that it is an *indriya* according to the former authorities. An *indriya* is infinitesimal in size. But a thing that is instrumental may not be so.

Pratyakṣa knowledge involves the element of certainty. In this sense it is called *niscaya*. A *niscaya* knowledge is that which is definite. All definite knowledge is *niscaya*. It may be right or wrong. *Niscaya* is a phase of *antahkaraṇa*. *Antahkaraṇa* has other phases. They are *garva* (egoism), *smarana* (memory) and *samtaya* (doubt). Corresponding to these phases the same *antahkaraṇa* is called by different names. As *niscaya* it is *buddhi*. As *garva* it is *ahamkāra*. As *smarana* it is *citta*.¹ As *samtaya* it is *manas*. Wrong knowledge is *bhrānti*. It is of *niscaya* character.

Wrong Knowledge (*Bhrānti*)

Wrong knowledge or *bhrānti* is that knowledge of which the object is sublated.² When a percipient mistakes a shell for silver he has the knowledge 'This is silver.' The object of this knowledge is silver. It is sublated by the correct knowledge of the shell as 'not silver'.

Wrong knowledge arises in the following manner: We may take the same knowledge 'This is silver' for example. It has already been explained how before there is *ṛtti* knowledge the object is obscured by *ajñāna* and how *ṛtti* knowledge destroys *ajñāna*. Under peculiar circumstances there is no *ṛtti* of the object, though the object is before the percipient. Consequently the *ajñāna* that is in the *viśaya caitanya* is not destroyed, and there arises *bhrānti*. The knowledge 'This is silver' is *bhrānti*. Before the rise of this knowledge these are the circumstances. The percipient's eyes are defective. They are in contact with a shell. *Antahkaraṇa* goes out through the eyes to the shell.

¹ *Pancadālī* and *Vedāntasāra* give a different classification. The former brings *citta* under *manas* and *ahamkāra* under *buddhi*. The latter brings *citta* under *buddhi* and *ahamkāra* under *manas*. The present exposition is based on the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*.

² V.P.S., p. 39.—*Ajñānāya pravṛttena vartamānena vā svakāryeṇa iha tattvajñānena niवृत्तिर्bādhah. . . . Pravyākāṅkṣoccheditvās nedam rajatamiti jñānamapi bādhakatvena vyapadīyate. Tato bādhāt mithyātvaniscayah.* (Sublation is the destruction of *ajñāna* with its past or present effect by the knowledge of reality. . . . Even the knowledge 'This is not silver' is considered to be that which sublates, because it puts an end to the desire for picking the silver up. On account of the sublation there is the determination of *mithyātva*.)

Owing to the defect of the eyes there is only *vytti* of the shell as 'this' and not as shell. The *vytti* 'this' is equivalent to 'This glittering something'. This *vytti* destroys the corresponding *ajñāna* in the object. As a result of this there is identity of the *pramāṇa caitanya* and the corresponding *viśaya caitanya*. This identity is the same as the *pratyakṣa* knowledge 'This glittering something' expressed in the *vytti* 'this'. Owing to the defect of the eyes there is no *vytti* of the thing indicated by 'this' as shell. Therefore the *ajñāna* that is in the *caitanya* of the shell is not destroyed. Under this circumstance the similarity between the thing represented by 'this' and silver is apprehended. This leads to the manifestation of the *saṁskāra* (mental retentum) of silver, which the percipient has previously seen. This *saṁskāra* acts upon the *ajñāna* (*avidyā*) that is in the *caitanya* of the shell. The *ajñāna* evolves into silver. Under the same circumstance with the *saṁskāra* of silver there is the *saṁskāra* of the *vytti* of silver. This *saṁskāra* acts upon the *ajñāna* that is in the *caitanya* of the *vytti* 'this'. This *ajñāna* (*avidyā*) evolves into the *vytti* of silver. So there are silver, the object and the *vytti* of silver. They are made evident by the *sākṣi* of the percipient. (*Sākṣi* is *cit*. It is eternal. It is marked by *antahkaraṇa*. Therefore it reveals things that are superimposed. Both silver and the *vytti* of silver are the products of *ajñāna* and *ajñāna* is superimposed on *cit*. *Sākṣi* reveals them. It is not *pramā*, because its object is superimposed and therefore sublated, even from the standpoint of life.) There is finally the knowledge 'This is silver'. This knowledge consists of two *vyttis*, (1) the *vytti* 'this' and (2) the *vytti* of silver. The former is *antahkaraṇa vytti* and the latter is *ajñāna* or *avidyā vytti*. The knowledge 'This is silver' is considered to be a single piece of knowledge. This is due to the fact that the elements 'this' and silver happen to be the elements of the same knowledge when there is the correct knowledge 'This is silver', and that the ground of the two *vyttis* is the same *cit*.

So 'This is silver' is a single piece of knowledge. Corresponding to its two elements there are two objects, 'this', the actual aspect of the shell, and silver, the product of *avidyā* that is in the *caitanya* of the shell. So even the knowledge that is *bhṛānti* is not without its object. The knowledge is not *bhṛānti* in so far as 'this' aspect is concerned. It is *bhṛānti* in so far as the 'silver'

aspect is concerned. Even as *bhrānti* knowledge it is not devoid of its object. So this explanation of *bhrānti* is different from *asakhyāti* and *ātmakhyāti*, both of which hold that *bhrānti* has no object. It is not *anyathākhyāti*, because it holds that the object of *bhrānti* is before the percipient, and *anyathākhyāti* does not accept this position. It is not *akhyāti*, because it holds that 'This is silver' is a single piece of knowledge and the position of *akhyāti* is that 'This is silver' consists of two cases of knowledge, the perception of 'this' and the memory of silver.

The Advaita theory is based on the idea that the *bhrānti* knowledge has its object which it represents. To one who knows this fact a question suggests itself. If the knowledge 'This is silver' has as its object, silver, then how is it *bhrānti*? This question is answered in the following manner: That there is silver corresponding to the knowledge is a fact. But the silver exists only in so far as there is its *vytti*. With the *vytti* it disappears. In this sense it is called *Pratibhāsiṇi*. To regard silver as *pratibhāsiṇi* simply means that it exists only in so far as its *vytti* exists. The object of *pramā* is not *pratibhāsiṇi*. It is there even before there is its *vytti* and it continues to exist even after its *vytti* ceases to be. It is known by several percipients. It is public. The silver in *bhrānti* appears only to him who has *bhrānti*. Other percipients may perceive the shell as shell at the same time when a man has *bhrānti* knowledge of it. The man who has *bhrānti* may subsequently have the correct knowledge of the shell. Then he may realise that what he took to be silver is not silver. When he has this realisation his *vytti* of silver and along with it the *pratibhāsiṇi* silver disappear. So the silver that appears in *bhrānti* is sublated (*bādhiṭa*) by the correct knowledge of the shell. The object of *pramā* is not sublated. From the standpoint of the object that is not sublated the knowledge of it is called *pramā*. From the standpoint of the object that is sublated its knowledge is called *bhrānti*.

To hold that *bhrānti* has an actual object is not to admit that it is the knowledge of a real object even as *pramā* is. The object of *bhrānti* is not real. It is *anirvacanīya*, i.e. *sadasad-vilakṣaṇa*. It is not *sat*, because it is sublated. It is not *asat*, because it is the object of knowledge.¹ It is not *sadasat*, because

¹ That *asat*, for example, the horn of a hare, is not an object of knowledge is one of the convictions of Advaita.

to describe it so is a contradiction in terms. So it is *sada-sadvilakṣaṇa*, *anirvūcya*, *mithyā* or *anirvacanīya*. To imply this idea this explanation of *bhṛānti* is called *anirvacanīya khyāti*.

Dream experience also is *bhṛānti*. In dream *antaḥkaraṇa* is active. The sense organs are quiescent. In normal circumstances if *antaḥkaraṇa* is active there must be correct memories of objects. In dream the circumstances are not normal. The individual is affected by the fact that he has imperfect sleep. Under this condition the *antaḥkaraṇa* is active. Its *saṁskāras* are manifest. Owing to sleep they do not give rise to the memory of things as they were experienced. There is only the memory of the substantive aspects of things. The *ajñāna* that is in the *pramāṇa caitanya* is not completely destroyed. By the influence of sleep it evolves into fresh *vṛtti*s, as there appear fresh *saṁskāras* on the basis of the memory of the substantive aspects of things. Finally there is the knowledge that 'It is so and so'. It is *anirvacanīya khyāti*.

The Implication of the Analysis of Pratyakṣa and Bhṛānti

In explaining how there is *pratyakṣa* we have seen that *vṛtti* having the manifestation of *pramāṇa caitanya* destroys the *ajñāna* that is in the *viśaya caitanya*. And in explaining how *bhṛāntijñāna* arises we have seen that when there is no *vṛtti* the *pramāṇa caitanya* is not manifested and the *ajñāna* that is in the *viśayacaitanya* is not destroyed. One implication of these facts is clear. It is this. *Vṛtti* itself or *cit* itself is not enough to destroy *ajñāna*. *Vṛtti* is a product of *ajñāna*. So it cannot destroy *ajñāna*. *Cit* reveals *ajñāna*. So it does not destroy *ajñāna* but *cit* as being manifested in *vṛtti* destroys *ajñāna*. There is complete destruction of *ajñāna* in the case of *pratyakṣa*, because there is complete manifestation of *cit* as there is complete *vṛtti*. There is not complete destruction of *ajñāna* in the case of *bhṛānti*, because there is not complete manifestation of *pramāṇa caitanya* as the *vṛtti* is incomplete.

The fact that though *cit* by itself does not destroy *ajñāna*, but being manifested in *vṛtti* it destroys *ajñāna*, may be illustrated as follows. There are three things, the rays of the sun, a double convex lens (*sūryakānta*), and a piece of grass. We have to burn the piece of grass. The sun's rays by themselves are not able to burn it, because by themselves they make the appearance

of the grass possible. The lens by itself does not burn the grass, because by itself it has no burning power. If the sun's rays pass through the lens to the grass they burn it. In the same manner the *cit* that is directed through *vytti* against *ajñāna* destroys it.

So the main function of *vytti* is not to reveal its object, but to destroy the *ajñāna* that is in the *viśaya caitanya*. If the significance of this position is understood, it is not difficult to see that by means of suitable *vytti* the complete destruction of *ajñāna* as a whole is quite possible. If by proper means there is the *vytti* of Brahman, the *ajñāna* that seems to obscure Brahman is completely destroyed; and all that is there, is Brahman.

By the analysis of *pratyakṣa* we have understood that *pratyakṣa* knowledge is nothing but the identity of the two aspects of *cit* (*pramāṇa caitanya* and *viśaya caitanya*) and that the *pratyakṣa* object has no independent reality of its own and its reality is the same as that of the *viśaya caitanya*. This falsifies the common sense view that we perceive objects that have their own reality, and prepares the way to grasp the truth that *cit* is *ākhaṇḍa*.

ANUMĀNA

Anumāna is the proximate cause of *anumiti*. *Anumiti* is the knowledge of the proved (*sādhya*) and it is produced by the knowledge of *vyāpti*, the invariable and unconditional concomitance between the proof and the proved (*hetu* and *sādhya*) when this knowledge of *vyāpti* is recognised. So the knowledge of *vyāpti* produces *anumiti*, and it is *anumāna*. The knowledge of *vyāpti* (*vyāpti jñāna*) produces *anumiti* through its impression (*saṁskāra*). So *saṁskāra* is the help (*vyūpāra*) if *anumiti* is to be produced by the knowledge of *vyāpti*. Before there is *anumiti* this is what happens. The proof (*hetu*) is observed. The observer has previously obtained the knowledge of *vyāpti* between the proof (*hetu*) and the proved (*sādhya*). By the present observation of the proof (*hetu*) the *saṁskāra* of his previous knowledge of *vyāpti* is kindled, and from this he obtains the knowledge of the proved (*sādhya*). We may take the following event for example. A person has the *pratyakṣa* knowledge of a mountain. He observes smoke

on it. He has previously the knowledge of *vyāpti* between smoke and fire. Smoke is the *hetu* and fire is the *sādhya*. By his observation of smoke the *saniskāra* of the knowledge of the *vyāpti* between smoke and fire is kindled. As a result of this *saniskāra* he obtains the knowledge of fire on the mountain. Here it is only the knowledge of fire that is *anumiti*, because it is only this knowledge that is due to the knowledge of *vyāpti*. The knowledge of the mountain is *pratyakṣa*, because it is the identity of *pramāṇa caitanya* and *viśaya caitanya*.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas distinguish between two kinds of *vyāpti*, *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. *Anvaya* is the *vyāpti* between the proof and the proved. *Vyatireka* is the *vyāpti* between the absence of the proved and the absence of the proof. With reference to the inference of fire from smoke the *vyāpti* between smoke and fire is *anvaya* and the *vyāpti* between the absence of fire and the absence of smoke is *vyatireka*. On the basis of the distinction between these two kinds of *vyāpti*, they hold that there are three kinds of *anumāna*: *kevalānvayi*, *kevala-vyatireki* and *anvaya vyatireki*. In *kevalānvayi anumāna* only *anvaya vyāpti* is possible. For instance we may take the *anumāna*, 'This thing is nameable, because it is knowable'. The only *vyāpti* we can have with reference to this *anumāna* is that between knowability and nameability. This is illustrated by the fact that everything that is knowable is also nameable, for example a jar. We cannot have *vyatireka vyāpti* in this kind of *anumāna*. Theoretically this *vyāpti* is that between the absence of nameability and the absence of knowability. There is nothing to illustrate this *vyāpti*. Everything that exists is knowable and nameable. We cannot think of a thing that is neither nameable nor knowable. For the reason that this case of *anumāna* has only *anvaya vyāpti* it is called *kevalānvayi*. With reference to *kevalavyatireki anumāna* we can have only *vyatireka vyāpti*. For instance we may take the *anumāna*, 'All living beings have souls because they have life activities, such as breath'. We cannot have *anvaya vyāpti* in this kind of *anumāna*, because if the very existence of soul in the living bodies is questioned, it is not possible to illustrate the *vyāpti* between the presence of life activities and the existence of soul. This *anumāna* is made possible only with *vyatireka vyāpti*, the *vyāpti* between the absence of soul and the absence of life activities. This *vyāpti* can be illustrated by taking for example a piece of stone which

has neither soul nor life activity in it. From this standpoint this *anumāna* is called *kevala vyatireki*. In the case of *anvaya vyatireki anumāna* both the *vyāptis* are possible. Taking the *anumāna* for example, 'The mountain is on fire because it has smoke' both the *vyāptis* can be illustrated. The *vyāpti* (*anvaya*) between smoke and fire is observed in places like kitchen. The *vyāpti* (*vyatireka*) between the absence of fire and the absence of smoke is observed in places like a tank full of water. For this reason this *anumāna* is called *anvaya vyatireki*.

Having the previous considerations in mind we may note that the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* classification of *anumāna* is wrong. The properties such as knowability and nameability are only empirical. All empirical things are negated in *cit* which is *akhaṇḍa*. So there are no universal properties and there can be no *kevalānvayi anumāna* which is based on the conception of universal properties. Further in every case of *anumāna* we obtain the knowledge of the proved from the knowledge of the proof and for this purpose only the *vyāpti* between the proof and the proved is required. Independently of this *vyāpti* the *vyāpti* between the absence of the proved and the absence of the proof is useless. So the *kevala vyatireki anumāna* which is based on *vyatireka vyāpti* independently of *anvaya vyāpti* is impossible. Further we have seen that *vyatireka vyāpti* is not helpful and there is no point in classifying *anumāna*, on the basis of the two *vyāptis*. For the same reason to distinguish an *anumāna* as *anvaya vyatireki* loses all its significance. So every instance of *anumāna* is based on *anvaya vyāpti* independently of *vyatireka vyāpti* and therefore it is held that every instance of *anumāna* is *anvayi*.

Anumāna may be divided into two classes. *Anumāna* for the use of one who has *anumāna* (*svārtha*) and *anumāna* for the use of others (*parārtha*). The second class of *anumāna*, according to *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* consists of five members: (1) The statement of the subject (*pratijñā*): 'The mountain is on fire'. (2) The statement of the proof (*hetu*): 'because it has smoke'. (3) The statement of the illustration of *vyāpti* (*udāharaṇa*): 'if there is smoke, then there is fire, for example the kitchen'. (4) The statement of the application of *vyāpti* (*upanaya*): 'and so (i.e. provided with smoke which is invariably accompanied by fire) is this (mountain)'. And (5) The statement of conclusion (*nigamaṇa*): 'therefore is it so (i.e. provided with fire)'.

Against the position of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, it may be noted that *parārthānumāna* can have only three members and these three members are either the first three, *pratijñā*, *hetu* and *udāharaṇa* or the last three, *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya* and *nigamana*. So to hold that five members are necessary is not supported by the law of economy of thought.

The Use of Anumāna

Anumāna helps us in understanding how the empirical world is superimposed on *cit* and thereby points to the truth that *cit* is *akhaṇḍa*. Some of the important cases of *anumāna* in this connection are the following. The world is *mithyā*, because it is objective (*dṛśya*), for example, the silver superimposed on a shell. The world is *mithyā*, because it is inert (*jada*) for example, the same silver. The world is *mithyā*, because it is finite (*paricchinna*), for example, the same silver.

UPAMĀNA

Upamāna is the proximate cause of *upamiti*. *Upamiti* is the knowledge of resemblance. It is proximately due to the knowledge of another resemblance. This latter knowledge is what is called *upamāna*. This may be illustrated in the following manner. A man has seen only a cow, and he is informed that a cow and a wild animal called *gauṛaya* resemble each other. He goes to a forest. He sees a *gauṛaya*. He recognises a cow's resemblance in it and remembers that cow and *gauṛaya* resemble each other. From this he obtains the knowledge of the *gauṛaya*'s resemblance in the cow he has seen. This knowledge is what is called *upamiti*. It is the knowledge of the resemblance that is a property of the cow that is not at the present moment *pratyakṣa*. For the same reason *upamāna* is not *pratyakṣa*. Nor is it *anumāna*, because before seeing 'gauṛaya' the man could not have the knowledge of the concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the resemblance in the *gauṛaya* and the resemblance in the cow. Further, in every case of *anumāna* the proof and the proved must be observed together. In the present case we have the knowledge of the *gauṛaya*'s resemblance in the cow from that of the cow's resemblance in the *gauṛaya*. The resemblance to the cow in the *gauṛaya* does not form a part of the cow which has in it a resemblance to the

gavaya. The two resemblances are not therefore observed together. So the fact that the knowledge of such resemblance gives rise to the knowledge of the resemblance to the *gavaya* in the cow is not an instance of *anumāna*.

ĀGAMA

Āgama is also called *śabdapramāṇa*. It produces the knowledge of the relation of the thing intended and not sublated by any *pramāṇa*. In producing such knowledge it requires fulfilment of four conditions, *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā*, *āsatti* and *tātparyajñāna*. *Ākāṅkṣā* consists in having the sense of an expression complete. The mere mention of a subject or of a verb does not yield a complete sense. The mere mention of 'Rama' does not give a full sense unless something about Rama is stated; likewise the mere mention of 'goes' does not give a complete sense unless the subject of going is mentioned. The sentence 'Rama goes' gives a complete sense, because it has *ākāṅkṣā*. An expression without *ākāṅkṣā* is only mere group of words like 'cow, horse, house' meaning nothing which is complete.

What is stated by a sentence must not be sublated by any *pramāṇa*. The state of being not sublated is called *yogyatā*. Without *yogyatā* the meaning of a sentence is sublated. The sentence 'Quench with fire' may be taken for instance. This sentence implies that quenching is a property of fire and this is sublated by the *pratyakṣa* that fire burns. So the sentence is not *āgama*. To illustrate *yogyatā* the sentence 'quench with water' may be taken. This sentence implies that quenching is a property of water and this is not sublated by any *pramāṇa*, and therefore the sentence has *yogyatā*.

The use of words in a sentence must not be separated by undue intervals of time. The state of not being so separated is called *āsatti*. For instance the sentence 'Bring a jar' may be taken. If the word, 'bring' is said today, 'a' tomorrow and 'jar' the day after, the sentence has no meaning. In order to give it meaning the undue interval between the words must be removed. The removal of it is the same as *āsatti* and with it the sentence acquires meaning.

The meaning of a sentence holds good only if it is consistent with the intention of the speaker. For instance the Sanskrit word '*saindhava*' may be taken. It has two meanings, salt

and horse. Supposing a man who is taking food asks the server to bring *saindhava*, what has the server to understand by the word, *saindhava*? To bring a horse because the word means that also is not relevant to the occasion and therefore 'bring *saindhava*' as meaning 'bring a horse' is not *āgama*. To make the meaning relevant to the occasion the meaning of the expression must be 'bring salt' following the intention of the speaker and with this meaning the expression becomes *āgama*. If the meaning is to be relevant to the intention of the speaker the person who is to understand the meaning of the expression must have the idea of the intention of the speaker. Without this idea an expression is meaningless and therefore the idea of the intention of the speaker (*tātparyā jñāna*) is a condition of *āgama*.

The fact that a word gives an idea of a thing implies that there is some relation between the word and the thing. If there were no such relation, then a word would give rise to no idea at all. The relation between a word and the object which it means is called *vytti*. The relation may be primary or secondary. The primary relation is called *śakti*. For instance the word 'jar' may be taken. The word denotes the thing, jar. This is because there is a primary relation between the word and the thing.

In this connection a point is to be noted. A thing is called jar because it partakes of the universal, 'jariness'. So in place of the thing there are two entities; jar, the particular and 'jariness', the universal. If the word jar is applied to the thing which consists of these two factors, then what is the idea involved in the application? Does the word primarily mean both the factors or only one of them? If the latter alternative is accepted, then is the meaning of the word jar, the particular, or 'jariness', the universal? To accept that it means the particular involves an assumption. The particular jars are innumerable. To assume that all are denoted by a single word is both unwarranted and unnecessary. To assume it may be necessary if there is no other explanation of the problem. It may conveniently be held that the word primarily means the universal, 'jariness' and through this universal it is applied to the particular jar in question. The universal does not exist apart from the particular. So when the universal is known by the word the particular also is naturally known. To hold that only a particular is the meaning of a word confines the word to that particular and in this case the

word cannot be applied to other particulars. From the standpoint that the meaning of a word is only universal it may even be held that the particular is meant only secondarily.

The secondary relation between a word and its meaning is called *lakṣaṇā*. From this standpoint the thing that is meant is called *lakṣyārtha*. The secondary meaning of a word must have a relation to its primary meaning. The relation may be direct or indirect. From the standpoint of direct relation the relation between a word and its meaning, i.e. *vr̥tti* is called *kevala-lakṣaṇā-vr̥tti*. And from the standpoint of indirect relation, the relation between a word and its meaning is called *lakṣita-lakṣaṇā-vr̥tti*. The former may be illustrated by taking for instance the statement 'There is a village on the river Ganges'. It may be supposed that this statement is made in order to indicate that the village is very near the Ganges. The statement by itself is absurd, for there can be no village on the bed of a river. But the speaker has used it with a definite view, and this view justifies the statement. In the light of this justification the phrase 'on the Ganges' must be taken to mean 'on the bank of the Ganges'. But 'on the bank of the Ganges' is not the primary meaning of 'on the Ganges' and therefore it is only secondary. The bank is directly connected with the Ganges. To imply this idea the relation between the phrase and its meaning is called *kevala-lakṣaṇā-vr̥tti*.

If the relation between the thing that is meant secondarily and the thing that is meant primarily is only indirect, then the relation between the word in question and the thing which it secondarily means is called *lakṣita-lakṣaṇā-vr̥tti*. This may be illustrated by taking for instance the well known Sanskrit expression '*Dvirephamānaya*'. This is equivalent to 'bring two R's'. The expression 'two R's' signifies first a word that has in it two R's. We may take such a word to be the Sanskrit word, *bhramara* which means a bee. And through this word the expression 'two R's' stands finally for the insect bee. So, in this case the relation between the primary meaning of the expression, i.e. two R's, and the final secondary meaning, i.e. *bhramara* (bee), is only indirect. For this reason the relation between 'two R's' and bee is called *lakṣita-lakṣaṇā-vr̥tti*.

The secondary relation between a word and its meaning i.e. *lakṣaṇā-vr̥tti* can be classified into three divisions, *jahat-lakṣaṇā*, *ajahat-lakṣaṇā*, and *jahadajahat-lakṣaṇā*. This classifica-

tion is made from the standpoint of inclusion or exclusion of the primary meaning in or from the secondary meaning. If the primary meaning is excluded from the secondary one, then the relation between the word and the secondary meaning is called *jahallakṣaṇā*. This may be illustrated by taking for instance 'eat poison', a statement made by a father to his son with the idea of indirectly asking him not to eat food offered by an enemy. So the meaning of the statement is 'do not eat food offered by an enemy' and it is obvious that it does not include the primary meaning. To indicate this idea the relation between the statement and the meaning is called *jahallakṣaṇā*, which literally means the secondary meaning that abandons the primary meaning.

If the primary meaning is included in the secondary one, then the relation between the word and the secondary meaning is called *ajahallakṣaṇā*. This may be illustrated by taking for instance the sentence 'protect the corn from beasts' a statement made by a farmer to his servant. The farmer does not of course mean that birds for example, can be allowed to eat the corn, and so what he means by the statement is that the corn must be protected from any creature likely to destroy it. In this meaning the primary meaning of the statement i.e. 'protecting the corn from beasts', is also included. To indicate this idea the relation between the statement and the meaning is called *ajahallakṣaṇā*, which literally means the secondary meaning that does not abandon the primary meaning.

If an aspect of the primary meaning is included in, and the other aspect is excluded from the secondary meaning, then the relation between the word and the secondary meaning is called *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*, which literally means the secondary meaning that partly includes and partly excludes the primary meaning. We may take for instance the *Upaniṣadic* statement 'That thou art'. In this statement the literal meaning of 'that' is the Creator. The Creator is omniscient and omnipotent. The literal meaning of 'thou' is the individual soul of Svetaketu to whom this statement is made. He is deluded and impotent. The meaning of 'art' is identity. So the statement teaches the identity of the Creator and the individual. This is obviously impossible. The properties of the Creator are opposed to those of the individual. Therefore they are not identical. So with regard to the apparent meaning the statement is not *pramāṇa*. But we

know that the statement is *pramāṇa*, because it belongs to the *Upaniṣads* whose *prāmāṇya* is self-evident. So the identity that the statement teaches is a fact. 'But whose identity is it?' is the question. In order to answer this question we must abandon the literal meanings of the two terms 'that' and 'thou'. By means of *jahadajahallakṣaṇā* we must understand by 'that' only the *cit* aspect of the Creator and by 'thou' only the *cit* aspect of the individual. Now it is easy to see how *cit* is *akṣanda* and is therefore perfectly identical. This meaning is also supported by the intention of the whole teaching. The one aim of the teaching is to reveal that *cit* is *akṣanda*. Our interpretation of the teaching is consistent with this intention.

ARTHĀPATTI

When we have an idea of something which is found to be impossible unless we presume something else, we make the presumption and explain our idea. Here the presumption is *arthāpatti*. There are two kinds of *arthāpatti*, *dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti* and *brūārthāpatti*.

Dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti

A person has the *bhrānti*, 'this is silver'. He attempts to take the silver. But he finds that it is not silver. Now he has two ideas which are inconsistent with each other. The *bhrānti* knowledge reveals that silver is a fact. And the later perception reveals that it is not there. Either is impossible in the face of the other. But both pieces of knowledge are actual. So we have to presume something in order to remove the inconsistency. We may do this as follows: the silver is not real because it is sublated by 'this is not silver'. It is not unreal, because it is the object of *bhrānti*. It is not real-unreal, because to describe a thing as real-unreal is a contradiction in terms. Therefore the silver is something other than real, unreal or real-unreal (*sadasadvilakṣaṇa*). This presumption removes the inconsistency between the two kinds of knowledge. Since these kinds of knowledge are *pratyakṣa* the presumption is called *dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti*.

Srutārthāpatti

'One who knows *Ātman* transcends misery' is a passage from the *Upaniṣad*. It conveys the idea that knowledge of *Ātman* destroys misery. We know that misery is a fact. We also know that knowledge does not destroy a fact, because it is not opposed to a fact. So the statement teaches inconsistent things. We have to remove the inconsistency, because the statement is *pramāṇa*. This can only be done by presuming that misery is of the character of *ajñāna*. It is clear that knowledge destroys non-knowledge. So the statement stands for the idea that misery or the world for which the term misery stands is the product of *ajñāna* and it is removed by the knowledge of *Ātman*. Here the presumption is made in order to remove the inconsistency found in the apparent meaning of *fruti*. Hence it is called *frutārthāpatti*.

The Use of Arthāpatti

We have seen how by means of *arthāpatti* the world is determined to be *mithyā* and how indirectly the idea that *cit* is the ground of all is made clear.

ANUPALABDHI

Anupalabdhi is non-apprehension. It produces the knowledge of the absence of a thing. A thing that is capable of being perceived is perceived if it is there and if the conditions that lead to its perception are satisfactory. If it is not perceived even though the conditions are satisfactory, then it follows that it is not there. For instance we may take a jar. We may suppose that it is there. If there is an eye to see it and if there is sufficient light to help the seeing of it, then the jar is perceived. If, when all the conditions are fulfilled except the presence of the jar, the jar is not perceived, then there is the knowledge that there is no jar. So the state of not being perceived or the non-apprehension of the jar leads to the knowledge of the absence of the jar. The knowledge of the absence of the jar is *pramā*. The non-apprehension is its proximate cause, *pramāṇa*. Non-apprehension is *anupalabdhi*.

Anupalabdhi is different from the other five *pramāṇas*. If it is not accepted as a separate *pramāṇa*, then there is no means of obtaining the knowledge of the absence of a thing. The knowledge of the absence of a thing is not due to the activity

of a sense organ, because there can be no relation between a sense organ and the absence of a thing. A sense organ can only be in contact with a positive entity. So the supposition of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* that a sense organ grasps both a positive entity and its absence is wrong.

Anupalabdhi gives rise to *pratyakṣa* knowledge, because the knowledge that it produces is an instance of the identity of the *pramāṇa caitanya* and *viśaya caitanya*. This may be illustrated as follows: there is the absence of a jar on the ground. The eye is in contact with the ground. Through this there results the *vyṣṭi* of the ground. Next follows the identity of the *pramāṇa caitanya* with the *viśaya caitanya*. Hence the ground is *pratyakṣa*. The absence of the jar is an attribute of the ground. Therefore it is also *pratyakṣa*.

THE QUESTION OF TRUTH (*PRAMĀṆYA*)

How Does Knowledge Come to Have Truth?

There are two alternatives by which the question 'How does knowledge come to have truth?' can be answered. They are (i) The proximate cause of knowledge generates the bare knowledge which is devoid both of truth and of untruth, and the soundness of the cause generates its truth; and (ii) The soundness of the proximate cause is not different from the cause itself. The first is the answer of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* to the question. According to this answer the cause of truth is other than the cause of knowledge (*pramāṇya is paratah*). This answer unnecessarily separates the cause from its soundness. This separation is not true to experience. A cause without soundness is no cause. This means that soundness is not other than the cause. So this answer automatically reduces itself to the second answer that the soundness of the cause is not different from the cause itself. The implication of this answer is that as a rule the cause of knowledge produces true knowledge. To generate the truth of knowledge does not require a separate effort from the cause. The cause is by nature sound. It is inconceivable how the cause can generate the bare knowledge devoid of truth. The cause of knowledge produces true knowledge. Hence the cause of knowledge is also the cause of its truth. The rise of truth does not require any outside condition. For this reason the production of truth is called *svatah*.

How is the Truth of Knowledge Determined?

There are two alternatives by which we can answer the question 'How is the validity of knowledge determined?' They are (i) The truth of knowledge is determined by *samvāda* (coherence) and (ii) The truth of knowledge is given along with knowledge. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika answers the question by the first alternative. According to him knowledge is given, its truth is in question, and it is determined by *samvāda*. If the right significance of this answer is understood, then it is easy to see that it offers no solution at all. His idea is that no knowledge is given as true. Yet his attempt is to determine the truth of a certain piece of knowledge by *samvāda*. This is impossible. In showing how it is impossible we have to note first how it is not the bare fact, that there is *samvāda*, that determines the truth of knowledge. If the fact of *samvāda* itself were enough to determine truth, then there ought to be no doubt regarding its presence, because if there is truth, then there is also *samvāda* and the truth is determined by it. If there is any doubt regarding truth, then it means that there can be no *samvāda*, and the truth of knowledge can never be determined. So in both the cases the determination of truth is impossible.

Further, the solution of the problem according to this alternative is not true to experience. There are kinds of knowledge in whose truth we believe without referring to any other thing and act up to it. We may take for example the knowledge of meeting a friend. In the presence of a friend we do not begin to testify the perception that presents him and, after making ourselves sure, greet him. When we see him, immediately, without any doubt as to the truth of knowledge, we welcome him. This and similar experiences strongly suggest that the truth of the knowledge in question is given along with the knowledge itself. If it can be given in one instance of knowledge it must be equally so in all. Of course we know by experience that sometimes we have to question the truth of knowledge. For instance the knowledge of a new theory propounded by a thinker. In such circumstances the doubt regarding the truth of knowledge is removed by the knowledge of coherence whose truth is given along with knowledge (*svataḥ*). With reference to such cases we must make sure that the truth itself is not determined by the knowledge of coherence; and that the function of coherence consists only in removing doubt.

So the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's answer to the question reduces itself to the second alternative, that the truth of knowledge is given along with knowledge itself. We have already seen, in criticising the first alternative, how this is the correct answer to the question. Therefore the determination of truth is called *svataḥ*.

The *pramāṇas* give rise to right knowledge. This means that they give rise to both knowledge and its truth. The fact that there is knowledge is evident by *sākṣi*. The truth of the knowledge also is evident along with the knowledge. So truth (*prāmāṇya*) with regard both to its rise and to its knowledge is *svataḥ*. For its rise it does not require a cause that is other than the proximate cause of the *pramā*. And for its knowledge it does not require the help of any entity that is other than that by which the *pramā* is evident.

It is already shown how the question of truth and error is concerned only with *vyṭti* knowledge. *Sākṣi* is *caitanya*. It is neither *pramā* nor *apramā*.

If *vyṭtiḥ* is not *pramā*, then it is due to a defect in its cause. The knowledge that is not *pramā* has *apramāṇya* in it. *Aprāmāṇya* is due to a defect that is distinct from the cause of knowledge. It is determined by the absence of the harmony in the intellectual and volitional activities. The absence of harmony is other than that which makes knowledge evident. Knowledge is made evident by *sākṣi*. So *apramāṇya* is determined by something that is other than that which makes knowledge evident. To imply these ideas *apramāṇya* with regard both to its rise and to its determination is called *parataḥ*.

The Main Function of the Pramāṇas Consists in Revealing the Fact that Everything in the World is the Result of the Superimposition of Ātman and Anātman Each on the Other

The *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *arthāpatti*, and *āgama* imply that the activities of the world originate from superimposing *anātman* and *ātman* each on the other. This may be illustrated in the following manner. The *pratyakṣa* knowledge 'I am a man' stands for the identity of *caitanya*, for which 'I' stands with the body with all its attributes, for which 'man' stands. There can be no idea of identity unless there is the mutual superimposition of *ātman* and *anātman*. 'Ātman is not

the subject of experience in the waking and dreaming states, because it is pure, for instance the fact that it is not the subject in the state of sleep'. This is a case of *anumāna*. It determines *ātman* as being not a subject. *Ātman* is pure. Just as it is not the subject it is not determined. The fact that it is the subject is the result of the mutual superimposition of *ātman* and *anātman*. In the same way the fact that it is not the subject is the result of superimposition.

'*Ātman* is pure. It appears to be the subject of experience. Both these are facts. But they contradict each other. In order to remove contradiction we have to presume the mutual superimposition of *ātman* and *anātman*.' This is a case of *arthāpatti*. Further the fact of superimposition is itself the result of superimposition. For *ātman* is pure. To suppose that it is superimposed is to superimpose superimposition on it.

'A Brahmin should perform sacrifice' is a passage of the Veda. The thought contained in this passage is the result of superimposition. Unless the Brahmin caste, and so on are superimposed on *ātman*, the command of the Veda cannot take place.

Upamāna and *anupalabdhi* also are the results of the mutual superimposition of *ātman* and *anātman*. Otherwise we cannot make the judgments 'there is *gauṛaya*'s resemblance in the cow' and 'the jar is not on the ground'. Resemblance and absence appear because they are superimposed on *ātman*.

THE REAL (PRAMEYA)

A *prameya* is that which is revealed by a *pramāṇa*. It is *satya* (real). There are two types of *prameyas*. Some *prameyas* are *vyāvahārika* in the sense that they are real from the standpoint of usage. They are jar, and so on. All these *prameyas* are superimposed on *caitanya*. *Caitanya* is *pāramārthika*. It is absolutely real. Some *pramāṇas* reveal the *vyāvahārika* *prameyas*. Therefore they are *vyāvahārika* *pramāṇas*. Some other *pramāṇas* give rise to the knowledge of the *pāramārthika* *prameya*. Therefore they are *pāramārthika* *pramāṇas*. A *vyāvahārika* *pramāṇa* is not sublated from the standpoint of *vyāvahāra*. It is sublated from the standpoint of the *pāramārthika*. A *pāramārthika* *pramāṇa* is never sublated. *Pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *āgama*, *upamāna*, *arthāpatti*, and *anupalabdhi* that reveal the *vyāvahārika* things are *vyāvahārika*. The *pramāṇa* that reveals the *pāramārthika*

is *pāramārthika*. The Vedānta or the *Upaniṣads* are *pāramārthika*, because they give rise to the knowledge of *caitanya*. For instance we may take the passage in the *Chāndogya* beginning with 'There was only *sat*, O Somya! before this [the world] began' and ending with 'That thou art' which tells that the individual soul in its essence is nothing but *caitanya*. So we may conclude that *caitanya* is absolutely real; and the things that are other than *caitanya* are relatively real. Of these two types of the real *caitanya* is the ground of all that appears different from it. To imply this truth *caitanya* is called Brahman.

BRAHMAN

Brahman is *pāramārthika*. It is *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda*. It is the ground of all that appears. The whole world is superimposed on It. As the ground of all It is called *adhiṣṭhāna*. In this sense It may be regarded as the cause of the world. As such It is called *adhiṣṭhāna kāraṇa*. Everything in the world being superimposed on It, appears as though it participates of Its aspects, *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*. This is evident in the fact that it is, appears, and is liked. It is said to 'be', because it seems to participate in the *sat* aspect of Brahman. It is said to 'appear', because it seems to participate in the *cit* aspect of Brahman. It is supposed to be 'liked', because it seems to participate in the *ānanda* aspect of Brahman. Of the things of the world misery does not participate in the *ānanda* aspect of Brahman. It is and it appears; but it is not liked.

The World

The world is *vyāvahārika satya*. Left to itself it is devoid of *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*. *Nāma* and *rūpa*, name and form are its natural properties. Everything in the world has these characteristics. It is said to be there when it obtains a fresh name and form. There is a piece of clay with a particular form and a particular name. If the same assumes another form and another name, it is said to be another thing, say, a jar. A thing assumes a particular name and form owing to the operation of other things on it. The things, the operation of which brings about a fresh name and form, are said to be the causes of the thing. Just as a thing has its causes, the world also has its causes, because it has name and form.

The Causes of the World, Nimitta, Upādāna and Adhiṣṭhāna

The efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) of the world:

A thing comes to have a fresh name and form by the influence of an efficient cause. A piece of clay obtains a fresh name and a form and as a result it is called a jar. This is due to the operation of the pot-maker with his implements. In this illustration the clay is the material cause, the pot-maker is the efficient cause and the jar is the product. As it is with the jar, so it is with the world. The world is a product because it has a name and a form. Brahman is not a product, because it has neither name nor form. The world as a product must have an efficient cause. The efficient cause of the world is called the Creator. Even as the pot-maker has the knowledge of the name and the form of the jar he produces, the Creator of the world must have the knowledge of the name and the form of the world, consisting of its manifold aspects. This is why an individual soul cannot be the Creator of the world. It has no full knowledge of the world. The Creator of the world must know all the details of the world. He must know when and where a thing is to happen and under what conditions. So He must be omniscient. But by the mere knowledge of the world He cannot produce the world. He must have sufficient power to do it. Things of the world are of diverse character. Some are normal. Some are abnormal. Some are ordinary. Some are extra-ordinary. Some are just what we expect them to be. Some are wonderful. In each case things exhibit different degrees of character. To create all these things the Creator must possess wonderful powers. So the Creator must be omnipotent.

Everywhere in the world at every moment the work of creation is going on. To suppose that the Creator stands outside the creation and directs it makes the creation impossible. In order to be the Creator of all the details of the world, He must be inside the universe and so is omnipresent. To imply these three ideas the Creator is called *sarvajña*, *sarvalakṣa* and *sarvasvāpta*.

Brahman as Sarvajña and Sarvalakṣa is the Efficient Cause of the World

It is already explained how *aśāna* evolves into the world. So all products of the world are the different forms of *aśāna*. *Aśāna* is superimposed on Brahman. So it has the reflection

of Brahman. Brahman as reflected in *ajñāna* is called *sarvajña*, and *sarvalakṣa*.¹ So Brahman as reflected in *ajñāna* is regarded as the efficient cause of the world.

Brahman by Itself is the Adhiṣṭhāna Cause of the World

Ajñāna is superimposed on Brahman. The world is the product of *ajñāna*. So the world is superimposed on Brahman. In this sense Brahman is the *adhiṣṭhāna*² cause of the world. Without undergoing any change Brahman is the basis of all.

The Manner in which Advaita Vedānta Forms the Conception of Brahman

The *Brahma Sūtras* teach that Brahman is known only through the Veda. The implication of this teaching is that Brahman is not known by reasoning. The non-Vedānta thinkers adopt different types of arguments to establish God as the creator. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas suppose that the world is a product on the basis that it consists of parts. Their idea is that whatever has parts is a product. From the fact that the world is a product they deduce that it has a Creator. They suppose that the Creator must know all the details of the world and have the necessary power to create the world. Hence they regard the Creator as omniscient and omnipotent.

Their position is not sound. The world may be a product. But it does not follow that it has a single Creator. The world may be the result of the activity of many creators. If this is so the creators need not be omniscient and omnipotent. It is enough if each individual knows as much as he creates and has the power to create as much.

The *Yoga Sūtras* offer a different type of argument to prove that there is a God. It is as follows: Persons possess the properties, knowledge, power and so on in different degrees. One

¹ V.P.S., pp. 201-16.

² V.P.S., p. 52.—*Tadevam svayamprakāśamāno niraṃśo pratyātmā mithyābhimānātirohitah Brahmatattvākāreṇūgrhīta ityākāre bhedenā sāmānyagrahaṇavileśagrahaṇayoh sambhavāt adhiṣṭhānasvāmavirud-dham.* (Therefore the self-evident and partless ātman is obscured by delusion and is not realised as Brahman. In this manner there is difference in the form, and there is a possibility of apprehending It in general and special manners, and therefore the fact that It is the ground is not impossible.)

man's knowledge is more than that of another man. Some other man's knowledge is much higher. Likewise there are different orders of power, and so on. This implies that these properties are perfect somewhere. The individual who has perfect knowledge, power, and so on is God.

In criticising this view we may note that it proves nothing. This view is based on the supposition that the gradation in good properties implies their perfection in some entity. This supposition may not be correct. If the gradation of good qualities implies perfection, then the gradation of bad qualities also must imply the fullness of badness somewhere. The entity in which the bad qualities are full must be the same in which the good qualities are perfect. So the entity that is supposed to be an embodiment of all perfection must be an embodiment of all imperfection. That is absurd. So the very conception that seems to prove God disproves Him. Further, for the sake of argument we may suppose an entity that has all perfections. Even then, it is impossible to conceive how it is the Creator of the world. There is no reason why a perfect being must be the Creator.

Similar arguments that are advanced to prove God may be criticised in the same manner. So we may conclude that no *anumāna* can prove the Creator. But *anumāna* is not useless. Though it is not by itself conclusive, if it is helped by the teaching of the Veda the validity of which is self-evident, then it proves conclusively the existence of the Creator. The *anumāna* that is supported by the teaching of the Veda cannot be refuted. The arguments that seem to refute it become falsified by the Veda.

So the *anumāna* that deals with the Creator of the world is determined to be a *pramāṇa*, only when it is supported by the Veda. Hence from the standpoint of *prāmāṇya* the Veda is more important than the *anumāna*. This is the special feature of the Vedānta system. This system is called Vedānta because it is distinguished by this feature.¹

To understand the real significance of the special feature of Vedānta, we must note the following considerations. To hold that the Veda has to support *anumāna* is not to deny the importance of *anumāna*; nor is it to dispense with *anumāna*

¹ I.P.S., pp. 212-13.

since the Veda itself gives rise to the knowledge we want to have. The meaning of the Veda must be such that it is not contradicted by the other *pramāṇas*. So it is to be interpreted so as to make it consistent with the other *pramāṇas*. The determination of the Vedic meaning is the work of *anumāna*. This is why though the Veda teaches Brahman, the system of Advaita Vedānta is necessary. Without this system the Veda is useless.

Brahman as Established by Vedānta is Nirguṇa (Propertyless)

Brahman is the ground of the universe. As the ground of all It is propertyless. It is *aḥanda*. It has nothing to limit It. Nothing external limits It, because everything is superimposed on It. Nothing limits It internally, because as *aḥanda* It is free from all distinctions. It has no property.

To suppose that Brahman has properties leads to contradictions. If Brahman has properties, then It must either be different from or identical with them. In either case It remains propertyless. We may suppose that the properties are different from It. In this case they must qualify It. But what is it that is qualified by them? The only answer is that it is that which is propertyless. We may even suppose that it has properties; and that they are identical with it. But this supposition involves contradiction in terms. If it has properties, then they are not identical; and if they are identical with it, then it has not properties. So we may conclude that Brahman is propertyless (*nirguṇa*).

The non-Advaita thinkers imagine that a propertyless thing is inconceivable. They are wrong.¹ We may qualify a thing by certain properties and regard it as a qualified entity. But what about the properties themselves? Either they must be propertyless or they must have other properties. In the former case the thing that is propertyless is conceived. In the latter either we must attribute properties to properties endlessly or we must consider that some properties are propertyless. In the former case we cannot arrive at the final conception of the thing in question, since each entity is explained by another entity endlessly and consequently no entity is determined. In the latter at least some property is conceived to be propertyless. On this analogy it is easy to conceive of Brahman as propertyless.

¹ V.P.S., pp. 217-22.

Brahman as the Creator is described as omniscient, and so on. It is already indicated that It is so described because It is supposed to be conditioned by *ajñāna*. So the properties by which Brahman is described do not belong to the nature of Brahman. They are external to It. Therefore they are superimposed on It. They are not real (not *pāramārthika*).

The Material Cause of the World

It is clear from the previous ideas that *ajñāna* is the matter from which the whole universe evolves. *Ajñāna* is the material cause of the world. The subjective and the objective factors are only different forms of *ajñāna*.

The Process of the World Creation

Just as the world is the result of *ajñāna*, the Creator also is in a sense the result of the operation of *ajñāna*. Though in both the Creator and the created there is *ajñāna*, it is not of the same character. The Creator is omniscient and omnipotent. Whereas the created is not so and it is either inert or deluded. This means that the functions of *ajñāna* in both are not the same. To indicate this distinction the *ajñāna* that conditions the Creator is called *māyā*, and that which forms the matter of the world is *avidyā*. *Māyā* and *avidyā* are only the different aspects of the same *ajñāna*.

The Creator is called *Īvara* or *Paramatvara*. He knows all the details of the world. He also knows what is due to every individual soul. He creates things according to the *karma* of the individual *jīva* for its enjoyment.

Before the creation of the world there is only *Īvara* with *ajñāna*. He wills the creation of the world. There appear from *ajñāna* the five *tanmātras* (elements in their subtle form). They are subtle space, subtle air, subtle fire, subtle water and subtle earth. From them appear the five elements, space, air, fire, water and earth. Sound is the quality of space. Sound and touch are those of air. Sound, touch and colour are those of fire. Sound, touch, colour and taste are those of water. And sound, touch, colour, taste and odour are those of earth. *Ajñāna* as *māyā* is the material cause of all the *tanmātras* and elements. *Māyā* consists of three *guṇas* (triple aspects), *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Each of the five elements, being in combination of *satva*, forms, in order, the material cause of the sense

organs, ear, touch, eye, tongue and nose. The *śaśva* aspect of space combined with *śaśva* *guṇa* gives rise to *antahkāraṇa*. Each of the five elements, being in combination of *rajas*, forms in order the material cause of the five motor organs (*kārmendriyas*), speech, hand, feet, the organ of excretion and the organ of sex. The same elements with the same *guṇa* also form the material cause of the five vital breaths, *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*. The five elements, being in combination with *tamas* give rise to the elements that are described as *pañcikṛta*. The *pañcikṛta* elements are those that are the results of the process called *pañcikāraṇa*. This process is as follows. First, each element is divided into two halves. One half is kept apart. The other half is divided into four parts. So under each element as the result of two-fold division there are five portions—one half and four one-eighth portions of the whole element. Next, the half portion of each element is mixed with the four one-eighth portions of the other elements. Four one-eighth portions make a half. This half together with the half of an element gives us one whole. The whole is named after the element whose half it includes. For instance the *pañcikṛta* space may be taken. Before the process of *pañcikāraṇa* there is pure space. It is divided into two halves. Next, one half is divided into four equal parts. So, as the result of the two-fold division, there are five portions of space, one half and four one-eighth parts. The other four elements also are similarly divided. Further, to the undivided half of space there is added the one-eighth of each of the other four elements. As a result of this addition there is one whole consisting of two halves. Though there is found a portion of each of the five elements in this whole, the whole is named after that element which forms the major portion of it. The whole in the present case consists of half of space. So it is named space (*ākāśa*). The original space is pure but the space which stands for the whole in question is of mixed character. In this sense the latter is called *pañcikṛta* space. Corresponding to the five pure elements, there are five *pañcikṛta* elements.

The original elements are *apañcikṛta* i.e. not *pañcikṛta*. They give rise to the subtle body (*linga śarīra*), of a *jīva*. This body consists of the five pure elements, *manas*, *buddhi*, five sensory organs and five motor organs. This body is responsible for the individualisation of a *jīva*. Though a *jīva* is in essence

Brahman itself, owing to the presence of the subtle body it becomes subject to experience and appears as a finite being.¹

The *pañcīkṛta* elements being in combination with *tamo-guṇa* give rise to the gross bodies of all creatures. There are four kinds of bodies, *jarāyuja*, *aṇḍaja*, *svedaja*, and *udbhija*. The body of a man is *jarāyuja* in the sense that he comes from the uterus. The bodies of the creatures that come out of eggs are *aṇḍaja*. The bodies of insects that take rise from perspiration are *svedaja*. The bodies of plants that come out of the earth are *udbhija*.²

Brahman and Māyā Together Form the Ground of the World

It is already indicated how the world consists of five aspects—it is (*asti*), it appears (*bhāti*), it is liked (*priya*), it has form (*rūpa*) and name (*nāma*). Of them the first three are of Brahman; and the last two are of *māyā*. An object appears to have these aspects because both Brahman and *māyā* form the ground of the world.³ Different followers of Sankarācārya offer different suggestions to explain how both Brahman and *māyā* form the ground of the world. Some hold that Brahman and *māyā* are the material causes (*upādāna kāraṇas*) of the world even as two threads are of a rope. Others suppose that Brahman and *māyā* are the material causes of the world in different senses. *Māyā* is the direct material cause and is the power of Brahman. So Brahman is the material cause of the world only through *māyā*, which is its power. Some others hold that *māyā* is the material cause of the world. It is superimposed on Brahman. It

¹ On the basis of the Vedic teaching Advaita thinkers hold that *Hiraṇya* himself creates the five *tanmātrās*, *lingaśatru* and the gross body of *Hiraṇyagarbha* and through the medium of *Hiraṇyagarbha* creates the rest of the world.

² Indian thinkers classify trees also along with creatures.

³ V.P.S., p. 196.—*Vimutani yugat abhinnaṇimittopādānakam. Prekṣācūṭpūracaritatat. Āmagatārukḥadukḥarāgadvēdīvat.* (The world under discussion is that which has the same entity as efficient and material cause, because it is produced by one who has knowledge, for instance pleasure, pain, attachment, hatred, and so on, which are in *ātman*.)

V.P.S., p. 197.—*Adṛṣṭopahitāya ātmana eva rūkḥādinimittatvam draṣṭavyam.* (It must be seen that *ātman* itself which is qualified by *adṛṣṭa*—merit, and so on—is the efficient cause of pleasure, and so on.)

has no being (*sat*) other than that of Brahman. In this sense Brahman also is the material cause of the world. In all the positions one thought is however common; it is that *māyā* is the material cause of the world in the primary sense of the term and Brahman is said to be so only in the secondary sense as the ground of *māyā*.

Pralaya

The things of the world are said to be destroyed when they disappear in their cause. Their disappearance is called *pralaya*. There are four kinds of *pralaya*, *nitya*, *naimittika*, *prākṛta* and *āsyantika*. Deep sleep is *nitya pralaya*. During sleep there are no products. Even merit, demerit and the other *samskāras* (dispositions) of the individual are in the causal form. Of course others who are in the waking state perceive the inhaling and exhaling activities in the sleeping man. But it is only their *bhrānti* (illusion). The individual who sleeps has none of these activities. For, then his *antahkaraṇa* which is the source of all activities has disappeared in its cause, *ajñāna*.

All products of the world disappear when *kārya Brahma* disappears. This disappearance is called *prākṛta pralaya*. It is so called because the elements together with their products disappear in *māyā* which is also called *prākṛti*.

If the four periods (*yugas*) *kṛta*, *trētā*, *dvāpara*, and *kālī* repeat themselves a thousand times, then it is a day for *kārya Brahma*. The completion of the day is called *naimittika pralaya*.

An individual's final release from bondage is *āsyantika pralaya*. It is also called *mukti*. This happens if an individual realises Brahman.

Jīva (an Individual Soul)

The system of Advaita presents two theories of *jīva*. (1) There is only one *jīva* (*ekajīva vāda*). (2) There are many *jīvas* (*bahujīva vāda*). The former holds that *jīva* is the *caitanya* that reflects in *avidyā*.¹ The latter holds that it is the *caitanya* that reflects in *antahkaraṇa*. There are several *antahkaraṇas* and therefore there are several *jīvas*.

¹ V.P.S., p. 48.—*Ata cinmātrāśritamajñānaṁ jīvapakṣapātīśvājñāna-
tritamityucyate.* (Therefore though *ajñāna* is in pure *cū*, it is partial
to *jīva* and therefore it is said to be in the *jīva*.)

A *jīva* is evident as 'I'. In essence it is *caitanya* itself. Its life consists of three states, waking, dreaming and sleeping. In the waking state it has the experience caused by the external sense organs and *antahkaraṇa*. In dream it has the experience caused by only *antahkaraṇa*. In sleep it has the experience caused by *avidyāyukti*. If it realises that all that is is *caitanya*, then it is free from individuality and is Brahman itself.

THE DISCIPLINE REQUIRED FOR REALISING BRAHMAN

If Brahman is the sole Reality, then It is to be realised as such by a *jīva*. If a *jīva* cannot realise the truth, then that Brahman is the only Reality becomes a mere supposition and loses all practical value. The Advaita thinkers consider that it is quite within the reach of every *jīva* to realise its own self as Brahman. On this ground they believe that in the past there were many who realised Brahman. Similarly they hold that even at the present and future time there may be *jīvas* who can realise Brahman.

To realise Brahman a *jīva* requires to be fit. A *jīva* who is much attached to the things of the world cannot be in a position even to conceive of Brahman as the sole reality, and realising Brahman is out of the question.¹

The first step towards realisation consists in clearly discriminating between abiding and evanescent entities (*nityānitya vastu viveka*). This discrimination really checks a *jīva's* attachment to the things of the world.

Detachment is the result of discrimination. As the latter becomes more and more intensive the former also becomes more and more intensive. With complete detachment (*vairāgya*) a *jīva* comes nearer realisation. This is the second stage.

The significance of detachment is not negative. It helps the growth of positive virtues in the man. One who has detach-

¹ P.P.S., p. 170.—*Yatūktasādhanaśatpadvirahepi daivaavalāṭ kūtūhalādṛā bahirvṛttatubuddhyā tatra pravartate sa pravṛttopi anantarmukhaś cetah bahirevābhiniṣīṣamānāḥ nirvicikīṣam brahmatve-nānugantum na lakṣṇatī.* (He who, being devoid of fitness by chance or curiosity or by the thought that he knows much, makes enquiries after Brahman, cannot surely know the self as Brahman because his thought is not directed inwardly and he is attached to externality.)

ment has little or nothing to fear. As a result of this the *jīva* obtains perfect equanimity of mind, complete self-control and so on (*śamadamādi*). This is the third stage.

A *jīva* which is distinguished by such virtues is fit to realise what is really its own and to get rid of all that is not its own. Now its desire for freedom is completely justified. The desire is called *mumukṣā*.¹ This forms the fourth stage.

So there are four things that make a *jīva* fitted to realise Brahman. They are discrimination between the abiding and the evanescent, detachment, the virtues such as equanimity of mind, and desire for freedom.² At this stage by reflection

¹ V.P.S., p. 174.—*Naca vācyaṃ Brahmanyavagate anavagate vā na jñānecchā prasajyate iti. Parokṣatvena apratiṣṭhītaparokṣatvena vā avagate niscalāparokṣāvagataye tadicchopapattēh.* (It cannot be said that the desire for knowledge is not possible in either case whether Brahman is known or not. It is possible to have the desire for stable immediate knowledge of that which is known mediately or known immediately in an unstable way.

² V.P.S., p. 102.—*Yadyapi Brahma svaprakāśam. Śabdāśca tatāparokṣajñānanajane sarnarthaḥ. Tathāpi dūritair cittaikṣṛta viparītapravṛtteḥ viśayāsambhāvanayā dehendriyādiviparītabhāvanayā ca pratibandhaḥ sambhavati. Tato niscalā parokṣānubhavo na-jyāyate. Tatra āśramadharmañuṣṭhūnāt dūritāpaganah. Samādisevanāt cittasya viparītapravṛttayo nirudhyante. Mananātmakena takena jīva-brahmaikyalaṅkāṇāṃ viśayasya āsambhāvanā nirasyate. Nididhyāsa-tena viparītabhāvanām āśaśkurvaṣi suksmārthanirddhāṇasamarthā-cittauṣṭerekāgratā sampadyate. Tataḥ śabda-janitamāparokṣam jñānanā niscalam pratiṣṭhāti.* ('Brahman' is however, self-evident. The verbal testimony can produce the immediate knowledge of It. Yet, owing to sins, the activities of the *citta* that are not conducive to knowledge, the thought of the impossibility of the truth and the thought of the identity of the body, senses, and so on, there is obstruction. So there is not the stable, and immediate knowledge. Such knowledge happens in the following manner. By the practice of the duties of *āśrama* the sins are removed. By the practice of equanimity of mind and so on, the activities of *citta* in the wrong directions are obstructed. By reasoning, which is the same as enquiry, the thought of the impossibility of the truth which is no other than the identity of *jīva* and 'Brahman' is removed. By meditation there is the stability of *citta* which consists in the removal of all wrong thoughts and in grasping the profound truth. Next there is the stable and immediate knowledge as a result of the correct understanding of the *Upaniṣads*.)

(*manana*), meditation (*nididhyāsana*), and the right understanding of the truth as given by *śruti* (*śravaṇa*),¹ in order, the *jīva* realises Brahman. It is the same as Brahman. This is *mukti* (*Brahma bhāva*).

Jīvanmukti (Freedom in Bondage)

A *jīva* realises Brahman through its *antahkaraṇa*. The realisation is called *antimasākṣātkāra*. This term stands for the idea of *pratyakṣa* which brings about freedom. This *pratyakṣa* happens to a *jīva* when it is in the body. Even after this *pratyakṣa* a *jīva* may remain in the body for a certain time, but then it is not subject to bodily conditions. For in this case the *ajñāna* that was responsible for its bondage is already destroyed by the *jīva's* realisation of Brahman. But there lingers an aspect of *ajñāna* which is the cause for the appearance of the body. This is evident by the fact that the *jīva* can realise Brahman only through its *antahkaraṇa* which is in its present body. This aspect of *ajñāna* continues so long as the *jīva's* *kaṃsa*, that by the influence of which *ajñāna* appears as the body, continues. When the *kaṃsa* is over *ajñāna* is completely destroyed. Till then though the *jīva* is in the body it is entirely free. This stage is called *jīvanmukti*.² It stands as an evidence for the fact that there is going to be complete freedom. *Mukti* is made evident by *jīvanmukti*.

MUKTI (FREEDOM)

A *jīva* as *mukta* is Brahman itself. *Jīva* is *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*. By nature it is ever *mukta*. Its sense of bondage alone is *mithyā*. By the destruction of *ajñāna* its *mithyā* sense of bondage is removed and all that remains is *akhaṇḍa* Brahman devoid of all distinctions.

¹ *Śravaṇa* is not mere hearing of verbal testimony nor is it mere instruction. It is the determination of the intention of the Vedānta by means of inquiry. V.P.S., p. 5.—*Śravaṇaṃ nāma vedāntavākyāṇi vicāryopakramādibhiḥ lingavākyatātparyanirṇayaḥ*.

² V.P.S., p. 104.—*Tattvavākyatātkāre jīve api aprārabdhakāya-maridyāleśanurūpā jīvanmuktīḥ*. [Though there is the realisation of the truth till there is the disappearance of the *prārabdha* *kaṃsa* (that is responsible for the life of the individual) as there is a veil of a little *avidyā* there is *jīvanmukti*.]

At this stage there appears a difficulty. Brahman as devoid of all distinctions must be distinguished from the *mithyā* world. If It is so distinguished, then to hold that It is devoid of all distinctions becomes meaningless. In order to avoid this difficulty, if It is not so distinguished, then It becomes the same as the *mithyā* world. The Advaita thinkers get rid of this difficulty in the following manner. Of course Brahman as *akṣhaṇḍa* must be distinguished from all that which is relative. But this does not mean that the distinction of Brahman from the relative world is as much a fact as Brahman is, for it is sublated from the fact that Brahman is *akṣhaṇḍa*. So distinction (*bheda*) is not a fact (not *pāramārthika*). This does not mean that identity is a fact. Like distinction identity is also relative. It is meaningless unless it refers to two phases of the entity that are supposed to be identical. So the implication of identity is in a sense the same as that of distinction, and therefore identity is a case of distinction. This is the reason why in this system Brahman is not represented as one (*eka*) but as devoid of distinction (*advaita*).

With a view to prove that distinction or difference is not at all a fact the Advaita thinkers show that it is neither presented by any *pramāṇa* nor is its conception justified.

Difference is Not Presented by any Pramāṇa

It is ordinarily supposed that *pratyakṣa* apprehends its object as a particular 'one'. In doing so it apprehends it as being different from the other particular objects. To apprehend it as different is to apprehend its difference from the other things. So to hold that *pratyakṣa* presents an object is to hold that it presents its difference and difference is as much a fact as the object is. This is the common sense view. But this view does not stand examination. A careful enquiry into the nature of difference and how it is apprehended shows that it is only an appearance having no reality in it. Such an enquiry may be summarised in the following manner.

Pratyakṣa does not present difference. The supposition that it presents it does not stand. Supposing that *pratyakṣa* presents difference, does it apprehend the bare difference without the object that is different or does it also apprehend the thing that is different? The former alternative is not supported by experience. The idea of difference is relative to that of the things

that are different. It is represented as 'This is different (has difference) from that'. So the *pratyakṣa* that apprehends difference must also apprehend both the thing to which it is attributed and the thing from which it is different. The alternative that *pratyakṣa* apprehends difference along with the things that are different remains to be examined.

Supposing that *pratyakṣa* apprehends both difference and the things that are different, does it first apprehend the difference and then the things or first the things and then the difference or all together? The first alternative that it apprehends first the difference and then the things does not hold good; for as it is already noted difference which is by nature relative to things that are different cannot be apprehended independently of them. The second alternative that it apprehends the things first and then the difference also does not hold good. The things with difference form the objective content of a single piece of knowledge. So it is not correct to distinguish between the earlier and the later parts in the same content. It is not possible to hold that the same piece of knowledge first apprehends a part of the object and then after an interval apprehends another part. Nor is it correct to hold that the things as well as difference are all apprehended together. The idea of difference differs from that of the things. The former is relative to the latter and the latter is the cause of the former. Therefore they are not apprehended together. But it is already made clear that to attribute any order to the apprehension is opposed to experience. So *pratyakṣa* does not present difference. Similar is the consideration with regard to the supposition that it is presented by other *pramāṇas*.

The Conception of Difference Involves Self-contradiction

It is ordinarily supposed that there is difference between two things, say a jar and a car. But the supposition is self-contradictory. Supposing that there is difference between them, the difference must be either identical with or different from the things to which it is attributed. For instance the expression, 'The jar is different from the car' may be taken. In this expression the difference is attributed to the jar. If difference is identical with the thing to which it is attributed, then in the present case it must be identical with the jar. If it is so, then the nature of the jar must be the same as that of

difference. The word, jar, and the word, difference, ought to mean the same thing. By the word, difference people ought to understand jar itself. None of these suppositions is correct. Therefore difference is not identical with the jar.

Supposing that difference is different from the jar, we have attributed difference to difference. What is the nature of the second difference? According to the present supposition it must be different from the difference in question. This means that another difference is attributed to it. The case of this third difference is again the same. In this manner, in order to explain the original difference we have to assume differences endlessly. In this endless series no difference can be taken to be the last and without such difference the earlier differences cannot be justified. So the explanation of the original difference is impossible.

Further, the idea of difference is expressed either as 'This is different from that' or 'There is difference between the two'. If, in the manner explained just now, the idea of difference itself is impossible, then to point to a thing as 'this' or 'that' itself becomes impossible. To know 'This is different from that' requires the idea of 'this' or 'that'. To know a thing as 'this' or 'that' is to know that it is different from the other things. But it is made clear how the idea of difference cannot be explained.

Similar is the consideration with regard to the difference as expressed in 'There is difference between the two'. To know the difference between two things presupposes the knowledge of the two things as different. To know that they are different is to know the difference between the two. To know this is impossible unless they are already known as different from each other and so on *ad infinitum*. So in the endless chain of difference no particular difference can be justified.

Further, to know that there is difference between two things requires the knowledge of the two things as different, and to know the two things as different requires the knowledge of difference. So the conception of difference begs the question.

Granting that difference makes the thing in question different from the other things, it is impossible to justify the position. The difference in order to make the thing different must be in it. It can be in it only when it is already different from the other things. To hold that it is already different is to

attribute another difference to it. But in order to have this difference the thing must already be different from the other things, and so on *ad infinitum*. So to hold that there is difference in a thing means that the thing has innumerable differences. Now the question is, do these differences occupy the thing all at a time or in order, one by one? To hold that they enter simultaneously into the thing does not solve the problem, since before they enter into the thing the thing needs to be already different. But to suppose that they enter into the thing, in order, creates unnecessary difficulties. The differences as innumerable are beginningless and endless. If they are to enter into the thing, one by one, the thing also needs to be beginningless and endless. This means that every different thing is beginningless and endless. The absurdity of this position is evident. Further, even supposing that innumerable differences enter into a thing in order, it is obvious that at no point of time can it have all the differences and therefore it cannot be regarded as different, for, to hold a thing to be different is, according to the present consideration, to hold that there are innumerable differences in it.

So difference is neither given nor justified, and for this reason to talk of Brahman as different is meaningless. Nor is there any *pramāṇa* to reveal Brahman as different. Brahman is self-evident and It is not revealed by any *pramāṇa*, and therefore there is no *pramāṇa* which enables us to talk of Its difference.

From the absolute point of view there is no difference. It seems to be there only from the practical point of view. It is only *vyāvahārika* and therefore *mithyā*. It does not therefore affect the nature of Brahman. Brahman as *ākhaṇḍa* is devoid of all distinction and in this sense it is *Advaita*. *Advaita* is the ultimate.

CHAPTER III

VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA VEDĀNTA

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Rāmānujācārya, the Founder of Viśiṣṭādvaita

Rāmānujācārya is the founder of the Vedānta system called Viśiṣṭādvaita. He was born in Perambudur in A.D. 1027. Even as a young man he was very learned. After some time he became a *sanyāsin*. In a very short period of time he became very popular as a thinker. He travelled throughout India preaching Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta and Vaiṣṇava religion and many people became his followers. He regenerated many Vaiṣṇava temples in his travels.

Long before Rāmānujācārya there were thinkers who did not subscribe to the Advaita system. Bhāskara taught that Brahman Itself becomes the world and the world is real. Yādevaprakāśa held that Brahman Itself changes into *cū*, *acit* and *liṅga*, but It is one, pure and complete. Rāmānujācārya took up these ideas, modified them and expounded Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta.

The Development of Vaiṣṇavism

Vaiṣṇavism believes in the supremacy of Viṣṇu. Viṣṇu is mentioned in the *Rgveda* as representing an aspect of the sun. In the same Veda *Bhaga* is represented as an auspicious god; and *Vaṇṇa* is said to be the supreme. In course of time these three ideas were combined and Viṣṇu was regarded as supreme and auspicious. His auspicious nature was called *Bhaga*; and as a result he became *Bhagavān*. The religion that believes in these ideas is called Vaiṣṇava as relating to Viṣṇu, and *Bhāgavata* as relating to *Bhagavān*. Before Rāmānujācārya some of the followers of Vaiṣṇavism were called *Ālvārs*. Among the works they composed four thousand were collected and called *Nālāyar Prabhanda*. After the *Ālvārs* some teachers tried to justify the Vaiṣṇava religion by means of reason. Among such teachers Nāthamuni and Ālavandār are important. Ālavandār is also called Yāmunācārya. He composed several works, *Āgama prāmāṇya*, *Mahāpuruṣa Nirṇaya*, *Siddhīrṇaya*, *Gītārtha Sangraha*, *Catulloki* and *Stotraratna*. These works formed the basis of the later Viśiṣṭādvaita. The *Nālāyar Prabhanda* is in the Tamil language. Following it there were composed some Tamil works. The other works are in Sanskrit.

So the literature of *Vaiṣṇavism* is in both Tamil and Sanskrit. For this reason this system is called *Ubhaya Vedānta*. Rāmānujācārya said that his aim was to uphold the position of the *Ālōṅs* and the *Ācāryas* against Advaita. On the basis of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Gītā* he expounded *Vaiṣṇava* philosophy which he called *Vīśiṣṭādvaita*.

Some Important Works of Vīśiṣṭādvaita

Rāmānujācārya composed *Śrībhāṣya*, a commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*, *Gītābhāṣya*, *Vedāntasāra*, *Vedānta Sangraha* and *Vedānta Dīpa*. Some time after his departure some of his followers who came from southern India regarded Tamil, their native language as more important. They considered the *Nāliyar Prabandha* as the most important authority. They emphasised some Āgamas like *Pāncarātra*. And after such Āgamas they believed that the worship of God in the form of an image and *prapatti* were the best means of salvation. *Prapatti* is complete self-surrender of a devotee to God. The others who traced their native place to northern India inclined more towards Sanskrit. They thought that the Sanskrit works such as the *Sruti*s and the *Smṛti*s were the most important. They believed, after the Veda, the performance of *karma* as declared in the Veda and knowledge to be the best means of salvation. Owing to the difference in view the southern followers were called *Tengale* and the northern ones *Vadagale*. Pillai Lokācārya is the leader of the *Tengale*. He taught that *bhakti* and *prapatti* bring about the grace of God which in its turn brings about salvation, and that a student must be completely obedient to the teacher. He wrote eighteen secrets. Among them *Ārthapancaka* and *Tattvatraya* are important. Vedānta Deśika or Venkaṭanātha is the leader of the *Vadagale*. He is the most important teacher after Rāmānujācārya in *Vīśiṣṭādvaita*. He composed works that belong to many systems. On *Vīśiṣṭādvaita* he composed works in both Tamil and Sanskrit. Of them *Paramata-bhanga* and *Rahasyatrayasāra* are in Tamil. The others are in Sanskrit. *Pāncarātra rakṣā* and *Saccaritra rakṣā* follow *Pāncarātrāgama*. *Tattvaśikṣā* is a commentary on *Śrībhāṣya*. *Tātparyā candrikā* is a commentary on the *Gītābhāṣya*. *Śeṣvaramimāṃsā* teaches that the *Pūrva* and *Uttara Mīmāṃsā* systems represent the different aspects of the same Truth. *Nyāya Siddhānta* and *Nyāya Parituddhi* refute *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa kṛhāḍya* of Advaita and establish difference (*bheda*) to be ultimate. *Tatramuktā kālāpa* with *Sarvārthasiddhi* establishes the position of *Vīśiṣṭādvaita* against all the other systems. *Sata-dīpaṇi* refutes Advaita. Venkaṭa Deśika lived in the thirteenth century A.D. In the seventeenth century A.D. *Caṇḍamāruta*, a commentary on *Sata-dīpaṇi*, and *Yatīndramatadīpikā* were written. In

the eighteenth century A.D. Ranga Rāmānujācārya commented on the *Upaniṣads* following Viśiṣṭādvaita.

ANALYSIS

Knowledge as a rule apprehends a real object. Even the so-called *bhṛānti* apprehends a real object. In this sense *bhṛānti* is called *Yathārtha*. Knowledge is a property of a knower. In this sense it is called *dharmaabhūtajñāna*. Its proximate cause is *pramāṇa*. The *pramāṇas* are three: *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama*. Knowledge is called *pramā* when it leads the knower to successful activity. Otherwise it is considered to be *bhṛānti*. An object consists of many entities which it resembles. In a given object some aspects help usage and others do not. If knowledge apprehends the aspects that help usage, then it is *pramā*; otherwise it is not. *Prāmāṇya* is *svataḥ*. The object of knowledge is as a rule a qualified entity.

Pramāṇas reveal three types of things, *cit*, *acit* and *Īvara*. *Cit* is a self-conscious entity. It is called *jīva*. There are many *jīvas*. *Acit* consists of *kāla*, *prakṛti*, *nityavibhūti* and *dharmaabhūtajñāna*. Both *cit* and *acit* form the body of *Īvara*. He is the lord of all. He is both immanent and transcendent. The world of *cit* and *acit* exists because *Īvara* is immanent in it. *Īvara* is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. He is at the same time different from the world. The world is real. It is as real as *Īvara*. But it is not independent of *Īvara*. For this reason the world is called *apṛthaksiddha*. *Cit*, *acit* and *Īvara* possess properties called *adṛśya*. The properties are different from them but not independent of them.

An individual *jīva* becomes free through the grace of *Īvara*. To obtain the grace it must observe *karmayoga*, *jñānayoga*, *bhakti yoga* and *prapatti*. After it becomes free, it enjoys perfect *ānanda* with *Īvara*. *Nityavibhūti*, an aspect of *acit*, assumes the form of the objects enjoyed by a free soul. It is of pure *satva* character. All free souls are equal. Freedom is possible because a *jīva* is by nature knowledge (*jñāna*) and bliss (*ānanda*).

VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA

(The following exposition is mainly based on the *Sribhāṣya*, *Sarvārthasiddhi* and *Yatindramotadīpikā*.)

The previous thinkers are correct in holding that a true understanding of the nature of knowledge and its implication helps the determination of the nature of reality. But they have all arrived at wrong conclusions. They have all started from wrong points of view. They not only confuse our ideas of reality but also make all our ethical and spiritual activities impossible. These confusions are nowhere so explicit as in Advaita. The subtle analysis of knowledge in Advaita misleads many; and the false logic applied in the analysis seems to attract even thinking men! So there is a need for examining the nature of knowledge to see if it really leads to the Advaitic conclusions.

KNOWLEDGE (*JÑĀNA*)

Knowledge is always of an object. Without an object there is no knowledge. Knowledge happens to a knower. An object is known to a knower through knowledge. But knowledge itself is known to the knower without the help of external entities. Knowledge in this sense may be regarded as self-evident (*svapra-kāśa*). We must not suppose that knowledge is self-evident under all circumstance. It is self-evident only when it reveals an object. Even then it is evident only to the knower. It is not self-evident to all. The knowledge of a knower is known to others through inference. A person knows in his own case that he can explain a thing to others only when he has the knowledge of it. Explanation is the result of knowledge and it consists of external activities such as the use of language, the activities of mouth, and on so. When he observes similar activities in others he understands that they have knowledge. So the knowledge of others is an object of inference. Similarly a person knows his past knowledge through his present memory. So the past knowledge is the object of present knowledge. In these instances knowledge is not self-evident, because

it is revealed by the entities external to it. The inference that reveals another's knowledge is external to knowledge; and the memory that reveals the past knowledge of the same man is external to knowledge. These considerations falsify the suppositions of Advaita that it is the very nature of knowledge to be self-evident, and that the entity that is not self-evident is no knowledge at all.

Knowledge is an Object, but It is Different from the Common Objects

The present knowledge of a knower is known by others. The past knowledge of a knower is known through his present memory. If a teacher's knowledge is not known to his pupils, then there would be no understanding of his teaching. If one's past knowledge were not known to one, then there could be no mental activity; because one's present knowledge is often based on knowledge of one's past knowledge. So knowledge is an object. It is the object of other knowledge.

Though knowledge is an object like common objects, it can be distinguished from the latter. Knowledge, when it is present, is evident to the knower in the sense that it presents itself to the knower. From the knower's point of view it is self-evident, and from the others' point of view it is an object and not self-evident. The common objects are not so. They are always objects, and never self-evident. They do not reveal themselves when they are present. They are revealed only by knowledge. So while in no sense are objects self-evident, knowledge is self-evident to the knower. Hence a common object is inert (*jada*), and knowledge is not so.

Knowledge has Beginning and End

In Advaita it is said that knowledge as eternal is the presupposition of all mental activities, and that this idea is made clear by the fact that knowledge is self-evident. This is wrong. We have explained in what sense knowledge is self-evident. The self-evident character of knowledge in this sense means that knowledge happens only on particular occasions. Further that knowledge as eternal is the presupposition of all mental activities may be true; but it is never true as it is explained in Advaita. Having assumed that knowledge as eternal (*nitya*) is the necessary presupposition of what we know as knowledge,

Advaita holds that what we know as knowledge is no knowledge at all, concludes that knowledge which is eternal alone is knowledge and calls it *cit*. It is wrong. *Cit* of Advaita is a myth. And the knowledge which is said to be no knowledge in Advaita is the real instance of knowledge. It is knowledge because it does the function of knowledge. The function of knowledge is to reveal objects. What we know as knowledge reveals objects. So it is knowledge. *Cit* does not reveal objects. Therefore it is not knowledge. Hence it is not the presupposition of knowledge.

Knowledge in the real sense of the term is that which reveals objects. Such knowledge is produced by *pramāṇas*. It ceases to be when its function is over. So it has both beginning and end.

We cannot hold that knowledge is eternal. If it were eternal, then it ought to reveal both the past and the future objects at the present time when it is actually there. Knowledge, say the present knowledge of a knower, reveals only a present object. This means that knowledge is only present. It is neither before it is produced nor after it ceases to be. Further if knowledge were really eternal, then there ought to be no difference of opinion regarding the fact that knowledge is eternal. Just as the fact that knowledge reveals an object is known without any effort, the fact that it is eternal also must be understood without any discussion. We have seen that knowledge is not eternal; and the discussion to prove that it is eternal is found to be useless.

Knowledge is of an Object

We have seen that knowledge is of an object. To hold that it is eternal is not consistent with the fact that the objects are transient. If knowledge were eternal, then it ought to be there even though the objects are not there. This is not correct. Objectless knowledge is impossible.

In Advaita it is said that there is knowledge during sleep and it is objectless. The view that there is knowledge in sleep is correct. But that it has no object is wrong. Knowledge is never without object. In sleep its object is the self itself as 'I'. The self is the substratum of knowledge. It is revealed as such during sleep. This is why when the sleep is over the individual has the memory 'I slept happily'.

Knowledge is Limited

Except the self-evident knowledge, the object of knowledge is as a rule external to it. Each instance of knowledge is different from the other instances of the same. Different pieces of knowledge grasp different objects. Each knower has his own series of knowledge. A knower knows his own knowledge by *pratyakṣa* and others' knowledge by *anumāna*. It is obvious that these instances of knowledge are different from each other. Though the knower may be the same his knowledge of a particular object is different from that of a different object. If knowledge were identical, then the objects ought to be identical. But the objects are different. So the knowledge of each object is different. Hence knowledge is one of the innumerable entities in the world. It is not partless (*akhaṇḍa*).

Knowledge is Different from 'I'

From the supposition that knowledge is partless (*akhaṇḍa*), it is deduced in Advaita that that knowledge has not even the substratum. The supposition and the deduction are both incorrect. Knowledge is relative. It is of an object. Without object-it is not. It happens to a knower. Without a knower it is not. So it is a property of a knower.

Knowledge is of the character of illumination. It illumines an object to a knower. If there is no agent to whom an object is illumined, then knowledge ceases to be of the character of illumination.

The fact that knowledge is relative to both an object and a knower is evident in all instances of knowledge. We may take for example the knowledge 'I know a jar'. The object of this knowledge is jar. 'I' is the knower. Without these two, there is no knowledge.

The knower cannot be the same as knowledge. He is permanent. This is evident by recognition. In every case of memory there is the recognition 'I am the same knower that knew the object in question'. If the knower were not permanent, then there would not be recognition or memory. Knowledge is transient. This is evident by the thought of the knower 'The particular knowledge of mine has disappeared'.

So the knower and knowledge are different. The knower as permanent is *pratyakṣa* (immediately apprehended) and know-

ledge as transient is also *pratyakṣa*. Therefore the fact that knowledge is not the knower is also *pratyakṣa*.

'I' is not a product: It is Ātman

It is said in Advaita that 'I' is a product of *cit* and *ucit*, and therefore 'I' is not *ātman* or *cit*. This is not correct. We may take for instance the knowledge 'I know'. This knowledge attributes knowledge to 'I'. 'I' is self-evident.¹ It is given as the substratum of knowledge. So it is *ātman*. If it were not *ātman*, then it would not be self-evident. *Cit* or *caitanya* is only the property of 'I'. *Cit* or *caitanya* is the same as knowledge. So the identification of *cit* and *ātman* in Advaita so as to deny 'I' as *ātman* is wrong.

We may illustrate that *cit* is the property of 'I' in the following manner: There is a light. Illumination is its property. It reveals both itself and its objects through its illumination. Without it there is no illumination. Illumination is the property of light because it is in the light and it is dependent on the light. Illumination and light cannot be identified, for if they were identical, then that the objects are illumined must mean that light itself goes in parts to the objects and reveals them. If the parts of the light are constantly leaving it, then it must come to an end very soon. This is to admit that a light is destroyed by its own illumination. This conclusion is not true to experience. Light appears when its cause operates. When the causal operation ceases, light with its illumination ceases. So illumination is a property of light. In the same way knowledge is the property of 'I' (*ātman*).

Knowledge reveals objects. It is for the enjoyment of *ātman*. So knowledge is a means. The enjoyment of *ātman* is the result. This means that knowledge is not the same as *ātman*.

Knowledge is a property of *ātman*. So it is dependent on *ātman*. Its illuminating character also is dependent on *ātman*. It may be asked, if knowledge as a whole is the property of *ātman*, How is the latter revealed? The following is the answer.

¹In the works of this system the same term, *svaprakāśa* or *svayāṃprakāśa* is applied to both 'I' and knowledge. But in each case the meaning is different. As applied to 'I' the term means that 'I' is conscious for its own sake and as applied to knowledge it means that knowledge is conscious for the sake of 'I'. Keeping this idea in mind we can follow this discussion easily.

Ātman is self-evident. This is clear in self-consciousness as 'I'. If *ātman* were not self-evident, then there would be no self-consciousness. The self-evident character of *ātman* is the source of the illumination of knowledge. If knowledge illumines object, *ātman* illumines knowledge.

Knowledge is not self-evident, i.e. it does not present itself to itself, because it is revealed as 'this'. A self-evident entity is given as 'I'. Knowledge is not given as 'I'.

In Advaita 'I' is said to be superimposed on knowledge. It is not correct. If 'I' were not a fact and if it were superimposed on knowledge, then the form of knowledge ought to be 'This is "I"' in the place of 'This is mine' or 'I know'. This may be explained by taking the case of the shell-silver-illusion for example. Shell is. Silver is not. The latter is superimposed on the former. The resultant knowledge is 'This is silver' and not 'This belongs to silver' or 'Silver has this'. So when silver is superimposed on a shell it is presented as being identical with the shell represented as 'this', but it is never given as being separate from 'this'. If it is given as separate from 'this', then there is no superimposition. Similarly if 'I' were given as being identical with knowledge, then it would be supposed to be superimposed on knowledge. But it is always given as being separate from knowledge. It is never given as 'Knowledge is "I"' but either as 'I know' or as 'knowledge is mine'. 'I know' stands for the idea 'I have knowledge'. This means that knowledge is a property and 'I' the substratum. So their difference is clear. 'Knowledge is mine' stands for the idea 'knowledge is a property of mine'. In this idea also the difference between knowledge and 'I' is clear. So 'I' is not superimposed on knowledge.

'I' is self-evident. Therefore it is *ātman*. So *ātman* is the substratum and knowledge is its property. This means that *ātman* is knower. In Advaita, knowledge is attributed to *antahkaraṇa* and *ātman* is said to be partless (*akhanda*). Both the positions are incorrect. *Antahkaraṇa* is inert. It cannot be the knower. The knower is necessarily non-inert (*cetana*). The knower is that which has knowledge. This is to say that knowledge gets its character of illumination from the knower. If the knower is to give illumination to knowledge, then he must himself be of the character of illumination. So he must be self-evident. We have seen how knowledge is the property of 'I',

and 'I' is self-evident. In this sense 'I' is called *cit* or *cetana*. It is the same as *ātman*. *Ātman* is not *akṣhaṇḍa*. That *ātman* is *akṣhaṇḍa* means that it is not relative to any other thing. To describe a thing in this manner is a contradiction in terms. *Akṣhaṇḍa* is relative to *sakṣhaṇḍa*. Partless is relative to part. Without the idea of part there is no idea of the partless. Without the idea of *sakṣhaṇḍa* there is no idea of *akṣhaṇḍa*. So *akṣhaṇḍa* that is not relative to any other thing is not real. The term *akṣhaṇḍa* is also made to mean that which is devoid of properties. This is also a contradiction in terms. The term *akṣhaṇḍa* itself ascribes the property *akṣhaṇḍa*-ness to the entity described as *akṣhaṇḍa*. Unless there is *akṣhaṇḍa*-ness in the thing, it cannot be regarded as *akṣhaṇḍa*. So *ātman* is not *akṣhaṇḍa*. It is knower. It is relative to the known. It has knowledge. It is not propertyless.

Ātman is known as 'I'. *Ātman* is not a product. So 'I' is not a product. *Ātman* endures in sleep. So 'I' endures in sleep. This is why there is the memory after sleep 'I slept happily, and I knew nothing'. In these judgements 'I' is said to be *pratyakṣa* in Advaita so as to indicate that there was no 'I' in sleep. It is not correct. Memory reveals the fact of sleep. If 'I' were not in sleep, then the form of memory ought to be not as 'I slept' but as 'There was no "I" till now'. This is not the case. Therefore 'I' endures in sleep. During sleep 'I' does not know the external objects. In the other states it knows them. In sleep as a self-evident principle it knows itself. The same idea is remembered after sleep, in the form 'I knew nothing'. This knowledge stands for the idea that I knew no other thing. So it is identical with 'I knew myself'. (*Abhāva* is not a separate entity in this system. It is in a sense *bhāva* itself. The absence of the jar on the ground is the ground itself. So the knowledge of the absence of the jar is the same as the knowledge of the ground. In the same manner the knowledge of the absence of the knowledge of external objects is the same as the knowledge of 'I'. So "'I" knew nothing,' is the same as "'I" knew myself'.)

In Advaita the memory 'I knew nothing' is said to prove positive nescience (*bhāvarūpajñāna*) during sleep. This is wrong. There can be no nescience (*ajñāna*) in the self-evident 'I'. To attribute nescience to 'I' is to deny its self-evident character. Even according to Advaita the conception of nescience is not

possible. If there were nescience it must be either in *jīva* or in Brahman. It is not in *jīva* because *jīva* is the product of nescience according to Advaita. *Jīva* is there if there is already nescience. So nescience must reside elsewhere if it is to produce *jīva*. So it must be in Brahman. Even this is not possible. Brahman is self-evident. So It cannot be the substratum of nescience. In Advaita there is the supposition that Brahman is obscured by nescience. This is to deny the self-evident nature of Brahman. If Brahman is self-evident, then It has not nescience. If It has nescience, then It is not self-evident.

The relation of nescience to Brahman is said to be *mithyā* in Advaita. The term *mithyā* is interpreted as *sadosadvilakṣaṇa*. To describe any thing as *mithyā* is wrong. It has not the support of experience. Nothing is given as *mithyā* in the world. Everything is given either as real or unreal.

In Advaita there is the supposition that the silver that appears in the shell-silver-illusion is given as *mithyā*. It is not so. At the time of illusion silver is given as real. When the illusion is over the silver is determined to be unreal. So silver is not *mithyā*. From the standpoint of life, it is unreal. Therefore the other supposition of Advaita that the silver is produced by the nescience superimposed on the *viśaya caitanya* that is the ground of the shell is not correct. In the first place the self-evident *cit* has not nescience in it; and in the second place the unreal silver does not need production. Supposing that the silver is really produced, there is no reason why the thought of silver should be said to be illusion. It is said in Advaita that the defect of the sense organ is responsible for the production of silver. It is irrelevant. The defect is in the sense organ; the production of silver is in the shell; and there is no relation between the two. If the defect can really produce silver, then the silver is real and the knowledge is correct. In Advaita there is the supposition that the silver is not real though it is produced. To imply this idea it is said that the silver is *prātibhāsika* in the sense that it exists only so far as its knowledge continues. The supposition is wrong. If the silver is not real and is only *prātibhāsika*, then there is no reason why it should be regarded as silver. If it is silver then it is not *prātibhāsika*; and if it is *prātibhāsika*, then it is not silver. In either case there is no illusion of silver. It may be said that the *prātibhāsika* silver is silver because it resembles silver. Even

this is not correct. If it were correct, then there must be the thought 'This resembles silver' in place of 'This is silver'. The actual form of illusion is 'This is silver'. Therefore silver is not *prātibhāsika*. So silver is not the product of nescience. It is not *mithyā*. Hence nescience or its relation to Brahman cannot be proved to be *mithyā*. If it is not *mithyā*, then it must be real. As real it cannot be with Brahman, because Brahman is self-evident. So there is no nescience; *Ātman* is 'I'; 'I' is not the product of nescience; 'I' is self-evident; and knowledge is the property of 'I'.

So far, the result of enquiry is negative. We have only seen how the conclusions of Advaita are wrong. Now we may have a positive theory of knowledge and through it the theory of the universe.

A CORRECT THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Under this head we study the nature of knowledge, the way knowledge appears, the way knowledge is given, and the relation between knowledge and its object.

The Nature of Knowledge

Knowledge is of an object. Without an object knowledge does not exist. The object of knowledge is real. Every instance of knowledge grasps its object as it is. In this sense every instance of knowledge is called *yathārtha*. No knowledge presents an object that is not real. Even the object of the so-called illusion is real. Therefore the so-called illusion also presents the object as it is. We may take for instance a case of so-called illusion and see how it presents a real object.

The So-called Illusion is Yathārtha

We talk of shell-silver-illusion. It is supposed by the previous philosophers that the shell is and silver is not and the latter is superimposed on the former. The supposition is not correct. A correct understanding of how the so-called illusion happens gives us an idea that the silver is as real as the shell and the so-called illusion is *yathārtha*.

In popular parlance there is the supposition that in the so-called illusion one thing is mistaken for another. The so-called mistake can take place only when there is similarity between the thing that is mistaken and the thing for which it is

mistaken. We may suppose that a shell is mistaken for silver. The mistake would be impossible if there were no similarity between the shell and silver. Now the question is what do we mean by similarity? In answer we may note that one thing is similar to another because it is in some manner or other in the latter.¹ Silver is similar to a shell because there is actual silver in the shell. Otherwise there can be no similarity between the two. The question may arise, If there is actual silver in a shell, then why is a shell called shell and not silver? In answer to this we may note that the portion of silver in the shell is too small to enable us to call it silver. We name a thing from the standpoint of its usefulness. Though there is silver in the shell the shell is useful as shell and not as silver. Hence we call it a shell and not silver. Whether we call it silver or not, that there is silver in a shell is a fact.

At times owing to a certain condition in the cause of knowledge, when the shell is given the knowledge grasps the silver-part and leaves out the shell-part. There is a defect in the eyes of a percipient. These eyes are in contact with a shell. Owing to the defect, the shell is not grasped. There is only the knowledge of silver. The actual object that lies before the percipient consists of both shell and silver. Of these two entities shell has a greater portion in the thing than silver. This is why the thing is called a shell and not silver. Owing to the defect in the eyes there is however the knowledge of silver only. This knowledge continues till there is closer observation. When the percipient observes the thing carefully he realises that it is a shell. Now there is the knowledge 'This is a shell' in place of 'This is silver'. He obtains this knowledge because he is practically interested. What he means by his knowledge 'This is a shell' is that the object is useful only as a shell. At this stage he may realise that the object is not useful as silver. But he never means that the silver is not at all real; because even though he knows that what is given is a shell he sees the similarity of shell and silver. So silver is a fact and the knowledge 'This is silver' is *yathārtha*. From the standpoint of

¹ This idea that similarity means actuality is based on the doctrine of the *pañcīkaraṇa* of the five elements. According to this doctrine every product consists of the five elements and this accounts for the similarity of things.

the portion of silver the percipient may continue to have the knowledge 'This is silver' even though he has the knowledge 'This is a shell'. So silver is not sublated.

So all knowledge is correct. It is faithful to its object. To imply this idea the so-called illusion is called *Saṅkhyāti* or *yathārtha khyāti*.

The so-called Illusion can be Distinguished from the so-called Correct Knowledge from the Standpoints of Practical Interest

Whatever the nature of knowledge in itself may be, we want knowledge to help us in life (*vyavahāra*). So from the standpoint of life we have to distinguish between shell and silver that are given in the same object. Though the object consists of both the things it is useful only as a shell and not as silver. So from the standpoint of usefulness we want the knowledge of the object as shell and not as silver. Owing to certain conditions even if we have the knowledge of silver, we like to replace it by the knowledge of shell.

From the standpoint of practical interest knowledge can be divided into two groups—(i) The knowledge that grasps an object that is practically useful; and (ii) The knowledge that grasps an object that is not practically useful. The former may be called right knowledge (*pramā*); and the latter wrong knowledge (*bhrama*). Of the two pieces of knowledge the knowledge of the shell is *pramā*, because its object is practically useful. The knowledge of silver is *bhrama*, because its object is not practically useful.

Wrong Knowledge (Bhrama)

There are three kinds of wrong knowledge. (i) Doubt (*samśaya*). This knowledge grasps (the so-called) contrary or contradictory properties with reference to the same thing. For example: Is this a man or a stump of a tree? Here the knowledge grasps the contrary properties, the 'manness' and the 'stumpness' with reference to the same thing. The same doubt may be expressed in a different form, as 'Is this a man or not man?' Here the contradictory properties 'manness' and not 'manness' are grasped with reference to the same thing. (ii) The knowledge that attributes a wrong property to a thing. For example—the knowledge, that *ātman* is not the doer. This knowledge attributes the negation of doing to *ātman*. But in

fact *ātman* is a doer. So the negation of doing is a wrong property. As attributing this property to *ātman* the knowledge is *bhrama*. This is called *viparīta khyāti*. (iii) The knowledge that grasps one thing as another. For example the knowledge that grasps a shell as silver. This is called *anyathā khyāti*.

RIGHT KNOWLEDGE (*PRAMĀ*)

Right knowledge is that knowledge which is consistent with the actual usage (*yathāvasthitavyamahārūnuguna*). Every case of right knowledge is produced. Its proximate cause is called *pramāṇa*. There are three *pramāṇas*. They are *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama* or *śabda*. From the standpoint of the three *pramāṇas* we may hold that there are three kinds of right knowledge. They are *pratyakṣa*, *anumiti* and *śabdabodha*. We may determine the nature of each kind of knowledge by the knowledge of the corresponding *pramāṇa*.

PRATYAKṢA PRAMĀṆA

Pratyakṣa is that which produces the right knowledge of an immediate character (*sākṣātkāri pramā*). The sense organs are *pratyakṣa*. Including *manas* there are six sense organs. Of them eyes and sense of touch grasp substance (*dravya*). Ears, nose and tongue grasp non-substance (*adrasya*). The relation between a sense organ and substance is called *samyoga*. The relation between a sense organ and a non-substance is *samyuktāśraya*. This relation stands for the idea that the non-substance is in a substance that has *samyoga* relation to the sense organ. A substance is the substratum of non-substance.

Two stages may be distinguished in *pratyakṣa*, *nirvikālpakā* and *savikālpakā*. Both the *pratyakṣas* happen with reference to the same object. First there is the *nirvikālpakā pratyakṣa* of the object. Next follows the *savikālpakā pratyakṣa* of the same. At the *nirvikālpakā* stage the object is grasped without any reference to other objects. But even at this stage it is grasped along with its properties. At the second stage there is the reference (*anusandhāna*) of other objects. At this stage the object is grasped with its relation to other things. So both the kinds of *pratyakṣa* are determinate. They are distinguished only from the standpoint of logical priority.

Pratyakṣa Knowledge

The knowledge produced by the external senses and the knowledge of the internal objects such as pleasure, pain, and so on, are *pratyakṣa*. Likewise memory, guess (*ūha*), indeterminate knowledge (*anadhyavasāya*), intuition (*pratibhā*), and the apprehension of the absence of an entity are all *pratyakṣa*. Memory is caused by *saṁskāra*. *Samskāra* is produced by *pratyakṣa*. So memory also is *pratyakṣa*. It is an aspect of the *pratyakṣa* which produces *saṁskāra*. Guess (*ūha*) is the knowledge in the form 'This must be a man'. This knowledge is produced by the activity of a sense organ. So it is *pratyakṣa*. Indeterminate knowledge is 'What is this'. This knowledge also is due to the activity of a sense organ. So it is *pratyakṣa*. Intuition (*pratibhā*) is the immediate apprehension of great men. It is *pratyakṣa*. The apprehension of the absence of a thing is caused by the activity of sense organs and it is *pratyakṣa*. The absence of a thing in an entity is not different from the entity. It is an entity itself looked at from a particular point of view. The absence of a jar on the ground is not different from the ground. It is the ground itself looked at from the standpoint of the jar.

In *Advaita* it is supposed that *pratyakṣa* knowledge is produced by a verbal testimony. For example, there is given the knowledge 'I am the tenth' produced in a man who really stands tenth and to whom it is said 'You are the tenth'. The supposition is not correct. The knowledge 'I am the tenth' consists of two elements. Of them 'I' is *pratyakṣa*, and the knowledge of its being the tenth is caused by the verbal testimony and it is not *pratyakṣa*.

In *Advaita* *pratyakṣa* knowledge is said to be the identity of *citanya*. We have seen how *cit* is a myth. So the whole position of *Advaita* with reference to *pratyakṣa* is untenable.

ANUMĀNA

Anumāna is the knowledge of a proof (*hetu*) as a *vyāpya*. To know a *hetu* as *vyāpya* is to recognise that it is invariably related to the *vyāpaka* (the proved). This knowledge gives rise to the knowledge of the *vyāpaka*. The knowledge of the *vyāpaka* is *anumiti*. *Anumāna* is the proximate cause of *anumiti*. The invariable relation between *vyāpya* and *vyāpaka* is *vyāpti*. It is

determined by observing the *vyāpka* every time along with the *vyāpaka*.

Of the three kinds of *anumāna* that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas accept, *kevalānvayi*, *kevalavyatireki* and *anvaya-vyatireki*, *kevalavyatireki* is not possible. *Kevalavyatireki* is that which admits of no *anvaya-vyāpti*. This means that the *vyāpaka* is not familiar to one who has to have the *anumāna*. 'The living bodies have souls, because they have life activities. The body which has no soul has no life activity, for instance a stone.' This is supposed to be a case of *kevalavyatireki*. In this case *anvaya-vyāpti* is not possible because there is no instance to illustrate the *vyāpti* if it is expressed as 'if there is life activity then there is soul'. We cannot illustrate it by taking the example of any living body because the existence of soul as such is in question. It has been nowhere established. So till there is this *anumāna* there is complete ignorance of soul. So the *vyāpti* 'The body which has no soul has no life activity' cannot be formulated. Further the thought of no soul involves the thought of soul. If there is the thought of soul, then the *anumāna* ceases to be *kevalavyatireki*. If there is no thought of soul, then there is no *vyāpti* and therefore no *anumāna*. So there are only two kinds of *anumāna*, *kevalānvayi* and *anvaya-vyatireki*.

Anumāna may be for one's own use or for the use of another. In the latter case, it is expressed in the form of propositions. We cannot restrict the number of the propositions. Different persons may employ different numbers of propositions.

Upamāna and Arthāpatti are not Independent Pramāṇas. They are Aspects of Anumāna

Upamāna is Anumāna

According to the Naiyāyikas *upamāna* is the knowledge of resemblance that gives rise to the knowledge of the relation between a word and its object. By the knowledge of a cow's resemblance to a non-cow one obtains the knowledge that the latter is called *gauṇya*. This is a clear case of *anumāna*. It can be expressed as 'The animal in question is called *gauṇya*, because not being a cow it has the resemblance to a cow. That which is not cow and resembles a cow is called *gauṇya*. This

vyāpti is determined by the information of a forester that *gavaya* resembles a cow.

According to the Mīmāṃsakas *upamāna* is the knowledge of resemblance that produces the knowledge of another resemblance. A person sees a *gavaya*. He observes a cow's resemblance in it. From this observation he obtains the knowledge that there is *gavaya's* resemblance in cow. This is also a clear case of *anumāna*. It can be expressed as 'There is *gavaya's* resemblance in a cow, because there is cow's resemblance in *gavaya*. Of two things, if one resembles the other the latter resembles the former. Resemblance is a common feature. If it is in one, then it is in the other.

Arthāpatti is Anumāna

'Devadatta is out, because he is not at home though he is alive' is supposed to be a case of *arthāpatti*. In its very form it is clear that it is *anumāna*. The person in question knows that living Devadatta is not at home and from this he obtains the knowledge that he is outside. The *vyāpti* is illustrated in his own case. He is alive. If he is not at home, then he is out.

SABDA OR ĀGAMA

Sabda pramāṇa or *āgama* is a verbal testimony that does not come from an unreliable person. The *prābhākara* Mīmāṃsakas suppose that *śabda* is *pramāṇa* because it reveals a *kāryārtha*, i.e. something to be accomplished. They are wrong. *Sabda* is found to be a *pramāṇa* even though it reveals a *siddhārtha* i.e., a thing that is already there. For instance the *śabda*, 'Your father is happy', reveals the happiness of father, which is a *siddhārtha*.

There are two types of *śabda pramāṇa*, *apauruṣeya* and *pauruṣeya*. The Veda is *apauruṣeya*. The Upaniṣadic portion of the Veda teaches Brahman; and the other portions *karma*. The *pauruṣeya śabda* is the composition of an author, who is reliable.

The relation between a word and the object which it represents is called *vytti*. There are two kinds of *vyttis*: primary and secondary. There are three kinds of primary *vyttis*: *yoga*, *rūdhī* and *yogarūdhī*. There are two kinds of secondary *vyttis*: *lakṣaṇā* and *gouṇī*. *Yoga* is the literal sense. *Rūdhī* is usage or the whole sense. *Yogarūdhī* has reference to both. *Lakṣaṇā* is a

word's relation to a meaning which is accepted because the primary meaning is impossible, for example: 'The village on the river'. *Gouṇī* is a word's relation to a meaning which is based on the similarity of a quality in view, for example: 'Devadatta is a lion'. This expression stands for the idea that Devadatta is as brave as a lion.

THE REAL (PRAMEYA)

The *prameyas* are those that are revealed by *pramāṇas*. The *prameyas* are always specified (*savišeṣa*). A specified *prameya* is distinguished from other things. The *prameyas* are given in the form of the knower, knowledge and the known. The knower is given as distinguished from knowledge and the known. Knowledge is distinguished from the knower and the known. The known is distinguished from the knower and knowledge. They are distinguished because they are specified by properties. They are *savišeṣa vastus*. There is nothing that is propertyless, because there is nothing that is not distinguished from other things. In Advaita it is supposed that knowledge is propertyless. The supposition involves a contradiction in terms. If knowledge as propertyless is not distinguished from other things, then there is no knowledge at all. A thing that is not distinguished from other things is impossible, because it is inconceivable. If knowledge as propertyless is distinguished from other things then it is no longer propertyless.

The fact that what is revealed by *pramāṇa* is specified by properties may be illustrated in the following manner.

Sabda Pramāṇa Reveals a Specified Entity

Sabda is in the form of a sentence. It is the result of the combination of certain words. A word is the result of the combination of a root, and suffix or affix. Owing to this combination the thing represented by the word is specified. Such words form a sentence. So what is represented by the sentence is also specified. Even apart from combination a word signifies a definite entity. So what is revealed by *śabda pramāṇa* is specified.

Anumāna Reveals a Specified Entity

Anumāna reveals only that thing which can be revealed

by *śabda* or *pratyakṣa*. The entity that is revealed by *anumāna* is qualified, because it is revealed as being So-and-so.

Pratyakṣa Reveals a Qualified Thing

It is evident that *saṁkīrṇapaka pratyakṣa* reveals a qualified entity. We may note that *nirvikālpaka pratyakṣa* also reveals a qualified entity. No knowledge can grasp a thing that is devoid of attributes. Every piece of knowledge reveals its object as 'This is So-and-so'. Here, 'So-and-so' stands for the attribute and 'this' for the substantive. From this point of view knowledge is always *saṁkīrṇapaka*. Yet it is possible to distinguish between two stages in *pratyakṣa* knowledge. The *pratyakṣa* knowledge at the first instance grasps the particular with its properties. And at the succeeding instants it grasps the same object with its reference to other things. We may take for instance the *pratyakṣa* of a cow. At the first instance the cow is grasped as a particular with its distinguishing features. At the second it is grasped as having 'cowness' which is common to all cows. Just to indicate the distinction between the two stages of knowledge the *pratyakṣa* knowledge at the first instance is called *nirvikālpaka* and at the second *saṁkīrṇapaka*. In both the cases the cow is however grasped as having attributes, such as 'cowness.' At the *nirvikālpaka* stage the 'cowness' is known only as a property. And at the *saṁkīrṇapaka* stage it is known as being common to all cows. If *pratyakṣa* at the first stage were to grasp either only the substantive or only the attributive, then even at the second stage there ought to be no apprehension of the qualified object. For, all that is given is in that case only the substantive or attributive without their relation, and the knowledge of the unrelated is not the cause of the knowledge of the related.

The Substantive and the Attributive are Not Identical

The substantive and the attributive are always seen together. From this we must not conclude that they are identical, for, in both the stages of knowledge the substantive is grasped distinctly from the other things. We may take for example a cow. As a substantive it is always given as different from other things including the other cows. But the case of the attributive is different. We may take for instance the attributive, 'cowness.' At the *saṁkīrṇapaka* stage it is grasped as being common to all cows.

So the attribute, 'cowness' is not the same as cow. Knowledge presents an attribute as being common to many particulars. But it grasps the substantive as an individual. So it grasps them as different entities. From this it follows that in grasping an object knowledge grasps its difference from other things. So difference is as much a fact as the entities are.

Difference is a Fact

We have seen how difference is presented by knowledge along with the entities that are different. In Advaita it is said that knowledge, for instance, perception, does not present difference. Perception according to Advaita consists in the identity of *viśaya caitanya* with *pramāṇa caitanya* and therefore the object of perception is the *sat* aspect of *caitanya*, but not the thing that is different. It is evident that the previous considerations falsify this position. Granting that perception is *caitanya* itself and its object is the *sat* aspect of *caitanya*, we cannot account for the well known difference between one *pratyakṣa* and another, the difference between the activities that are caused by different perceptions, and the difference between the blind and the non-blind. These differences are real. The different entities are real. Knowledge is given as presenting different entities. The perception caused by each sense organ is different. The object of each sense organ is different. These facts would be meaningless if *sat* alone were the object of *pratyakṣa*. Nor is it consistent with Advaita to hold that *sat* is the object of knowledge. *Sat* is *cit* itself and *cit* is *akṣaṇḍa* in Advaita. So *sat* cannot be the object of knowledge.

Another argument of Advaita against difference is that the conception of difference involves self-contradiction. One important implication of the previous considerations is that there cannot be any contradiction. It is said in Advaita that the knowledge of difference is relative to that of many things, the idea of which it is not possible to justify. This is not true. Difference is the same as the particular which is different. The knowledge of the particular is not relative to any other knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of difference also is not relative to any other knowledge, for the knowledge of object and that of difference are not different. If there is a particular it is given as different. Otherwise it is not at all. If there is no

particular, then there is no knowledge at all, because knowledge is that of a particular.

Difference is the Form of the Particular (Vastusamsthāna)

A particular is a particular because it has a distinguishing feature of its own. This feature is the form of the thing. It is called *vastusamsthāna*. We may take for instance a cow. The cow as the substantive is a particular. Its form is 'cowness'. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas suppose that 'cowness' is a *jāti* (universal). They hold that it is identical in all cows. They are wrong. Different entities cannot have an identical feature. If they can have such a feature, then they cannot be different. So the 'cowness' in each cow is different from that in the other cow. Though it seems apparently to refer to the particular cow, yet it does in fact enable us to compare the particular cow with the other particular cows and this comparison enables us to form the class conception of cows. So 'cowness' is the same as a complete resemblance of cows to one another. A cow may resemble many other animals and other things from the standpoint of many properties. But such resemblance is not complete. It has a complete resemblance only to the other cows. Its feature that is responsible for such resemblance is called 'cowness.' In order to indicate that it is responsible for a cow's complete resemblance to other cows it is called *sausādrīya*.

Sausādrīya is not the same as *jāti* in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika sense. It is different in every particular. A particular is a particular owing to *sausādrīya* in it. This means that *sausādrīya* is the same as a particular's distinction (*bheda*) from the other particulars. The fact that every thing, as a particular entity and therefore as being different from the other particulars, is necessarily qualified by *sausādrīya*, substantiates the previous conclusion that every thing is necessarily qualified (*saviśeṣa*).

The Implication of the Fact that Every Thing is Qualified

To illustrate the implications of a qualified entity the example of a cow may be taken. A cow is perceived as 'This cow'. 'This' refers to the substantive aspect of the cow. 'Cow' refers to the 'cowness' in it. Under a different circumstance the object may be perceived as 'This is white' where the meaning of 'this' is the same and 'white' refers to its colour. In this connection the use of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terminology makes

the point clearer. 'Cowness' may be called a *jāti* in the sense of *sauśādrīya*, and the colour *guṇa*. Both these are only attributes and they are in the same substance, cow. This is illustrated by the perception 'This cow is white'. These attributes cannot exist apart from the cow. To imply this idea an attribute is called *apṛthaksiddha-viśeṣaṇa*. *Prakāra* is another name of the same. On the strength of this observation, it may be concluded that *jāti* and *guṇa* are *prakāras* or *viśeṣaṇas* and they are connected with a substance (*dravya*) by means of *apṛthaksiddhi* relation.

The similar consideration holds good with reference to all things in the world. This may be illustrated by taking for instance an individual self. The organism of a self is not perceived apart from the self. It decays if it is bereft of the self. This means that the organism is an attribute (*prakāra*) of the self.

Further an attribute is not even known apart from its substance. To illustrate this any word may be taken. For instance, the word, cow, stands for the idea of a particular cow with its attributes, *jāti* and *guṇa*. This means that the attributes are not known apart from the substance. This points to the fact that the attributes are not independently of a substance.

Further, in support of the same view it may be noted that the words that are taken ordinarily to represent attributes have also a reference to the substance to which they belong. Without such reference they are meaningless. The word, 'cowness,' is meaningless unless it has a reference to a cow. So such words also denote in a sense substances. It is only in the interest of pointing out the distinction between substance and attributes that some words are taken to denote only substances, such as cow, while others, to denote only attributes, such as 'cowness'.

Similar considerations may be applied even to the case of a material cause and its product. A product does not exist independently of its material cause. This is suggested by the fact that a particular product has only a particular material cause. To hold that a product is identical with its material cause is wrong, for in case they are identical, the fact that a product is produced becomes meaningless. In Advaita it is held that a product is superimposed on its basic cause (*adhiṣṭhāna*). It is

wrong. We have seen how superimposition is impossible. Further, it may be noted that this position is founded on a wrong view of cause and effect. Of them, cause and effect both are real. Therefore their relation also is real. An effect is only a state of its material cause. As a state it is different from the latter. This conclusion is justified by the fact that the same cause may under different conditions give rise to different effects. These effects are different from one another. But their material cause is throughout the same. To indicate this idea the material cause is called *parināmi-kāraṇa*.

By way of concluding the present considerations it may be noted that between two things of which one cannot be separated from the other the relation is *apṛthaksiddhi*. Such is the relation between substance and attribute, soul and body and a material cause and its effect.

The Facts of Experience

Having clearly understood the scope of *apṛthaksiddhi*-relation, if we examine the facts of experience we arrive at the following conclusion about their nature. The facts of experience are only effects in the sense that they are all produced. So they must have a material cause. This cause must have the same nature as the effects because it is responsible for the nature of the latter. So the nature of the latter gives a clue to the nature of the former. What is the nature of the effects? In answer to this question, we may, leaving aside the other details, classify the facts of experience into two broad divisions, those that know themselves for the sake of themselves and those that are for the sake of others. They are respectively called *cis* and *acis*. We do not observe directly anything as forming the material cause of them. Yet it is possible to consider that as being opposed to each other they must each of them have a separate cause which very much resembles each. So the cause of *cis* must have the nature of *cis* and the cause of *acis* must have the nature of *acis*. The *cis* as cause and the *cis* as effect and *acis* as cause and *acis* as effect may in a sense be distinguished from each other. Of the two, cause and effect, the nature of effect is explicit in the sense that it is directly observed. But the nature of the cause is not so observed and therefore it is not explicit. What is implicit in the cause becomes explicit in the effect. So the cause is implicit and the

effect explicit. In other words the cause is subtle and the effect gross. To imply this idea the cause is called *sūkṣma* and the effect *sthūla*. The effect is the gross form of the cause and the cause is the subtle form of the effect. The gross *cit* is *sthūla*. Its cause, the subtle *cit*, is *sūkṣma*. Likewise the gross *acit* is *sthūla*. Its cause, the subtle *acit*, is *sūkṣma*. In the light of these considerations, if the world of effects is described as *sthūla-cidacis*, then the world of causes may be described as *sūkṣma-cidacis*. The former cannot be separated from the latter. They are related by means of *apṛthaksiddhi*.

BRAHMAN

The Sūkṣma-cidacis is Not the Whole Cause of the Sthūla-cidacis

In the world of gross *cidacis* nothing acts of its own accord. Every thing is dependent. This implies that its material cause, the world of subtle *cidacis*, is also dependent. If it were independent, then the same independence ought to have been observed even in the gross world. So the world of *cidacis* as such is dependent. This means that its very reality is dependent. To make its reality possible it must involve a principle which is different from it. Such a principle as the source of the reality of all must be self-explanatory. As the source of the *cit* aspect of the world it must be knowledge (*jñāna*). As the first principle it must have an unconditioned reality (*sattā*). As the source of all it must be perfect (*ananta*). For the same reason it must be of the character of bliss (*ānanda*). As the source of all it must know all about the creation and the created. It is therefore omniscient (*sarvajña*). As perfect it must form the source of all without any effort on its part. It is therefore omnipotent (*sarvasakṛta*). It is present in the world at every state of it. It is immanent (*antaryāmi*) in all. It is subtle in the subtle world and gross in the gross world.

These are the main lines of reasoning on which the conception of the ultimate reality is based. This reasoning is amplified by the Vedic teaching. In this connection a reference may be made to the following *Upaniṣadic* passages. *Taittirīya* calls the first principle which forms the source of all, Brahman. *Chāndogya* says that the knowledge of this principle involves the knowledge of the whole world and names this principle as *sat*. This statement requires an interpretation. If the knowledge

of *sat* is to involve the knowledge of the whole world, then it follows that it is not an ordinary cause of the world. It must be the material cause of the world, because it is only the knowledge of the material cause that involves that of the effect. The full knowledge of the clay involves the knowledge of the effects made up of it. Without the latter knowledge the knowledge of the clay is not complete. This is because the clay is the material cause of the effects in question. There may be ever so many other causes for the same effects. But the knowledge of them does not necessarily involve that of the effects in the same sense as the material cause does. The first principle in order to be the material cause of the whole world must be the ground of even subtle *cidacit*. This means that it forms the material cause of the world of products being immanent in the subtle *cidacit*. So the material cause of the world of products is subtle *cidacit* with Brahman in it. When the *Upaniṣad* names the material cause of the universe, what is meant is that Brahman as being in the subtle *cidacit* is the material cause of the same. As such Brahman is called *sat*. The whole idea may be represented in another form as *Sūkṣma-cidacidviṣṭa-Brahman* is the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) of the product-world. A later passage of the same *Upaniṣad* says that it made itself. In this passage 'itself' stands for the world of products. This means that it is itself that world. It can be so only when it becomes the latter. But we have seen how it is not identical with the world of the gross *cidacit*. So as standing for that world the expression 'making itself' means that it becomes gross like *cidacit*. So in making subtle *cidacit* gross it also becomes gross. This means that it is subtle in the subtle *cidacit*. The implication of all this is that the world is in both the states real because of its immanence in it. So it is the change in the aspect of its reality (*satyatva*) that is responsible for the change of the subtle into the gross. Another passage says 'It desired to be many'. This means that it is also the efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) of the world of products. As perfect it has no strain whatever in creating the world. This together with the idea that its desire is responsible for the appearance of the world indicates that it is the efficient cause of the world through its aspects of knowledge and bliss (*jñāna* and *ānanda*). This is suggested also by another fact. In the world only its reality is reflected but not its perfection. This suggests that it is the material cause of the universe only through

the aspect of being (*satya*) and not through the aspects of knowledge and bliss (*jñāna* and *ānanda*). This explains how its changelessness can be justified even though it is taken to be the material cause of the world.

Brahman as the ultimate source is the soul of the universe. Just as an individual body is an adjunct or attribute of the individual soul, the world in both its states is an adjunct of Brahman. To indicate the truth of the foregoing considerations this system of thought is called *Vīṣṭādvaita*. This term signifies four things. In this term '*vīṣṭa*' means 'qualified', and '*advaita*' means identity. This is a compound term. It can be split up in two ways. (i) *Vīṣṭayoh advaita*—This means the identity of two qualified entities; and (ii) *Vīṣṭasya advaita*—This means the identity of a qualified entity. With reference to the former the whole term stands for three ideas. (i) The identity of a qualified effect with a qualified cause. For instance the effect, jar, and its material cause, clay, may be taken. The jar is qualified by its own *jāti* and *guṇa*. The clay also is similarly qualified by its own *jāti* and *guṇa*. In the sense that the former is not without the latter there is identity between the two. The same idea may be applied to the subtle *cidacit* and the gross *cidacit* and their identity may be explained. The fact of their identity only means that without the subtle the gross is not. (ii) Brahman whether it is the material cause or the efficient cause is in both cases qualified. In the former case it is qualified by reality (*satā*), and in the latter by knowledge and bliss (*jñāna* and *ānanda*). Because there is ordinarily difference between a material cause and its efficient cause, Brahman as the material cause must not be considered to be distinct from Brahman as the efficient cause. To indicate this idea the term may be applied to Brahman so as to mean that Brahman is in both the aspects identical. And (iii) The whole universe consisting of even Brahman may be viewed as having two factors—the ground and the derived. The former is Brahman and the latter is the world. Both are qualified. The world is not apart from Brahman for it has only a derived reality. To indicate this idea it may be said that there is identity between the world and Brahman. And with reference to the latter case of the splitting up of the compound term an important idea may be noted. Brahman in the causal form is qualified by subtle *cidacit* and in the effect form by the gross

cidacit. These adjuncts may in a sense be distinguished, because the one is subtle and the other gross. Though Brahman is qualified by different adjuncts there is no distinction in It. It is in both instances identical.

The important implications of all these considerations are (i) That Brahman is in no sense *nirguṇa*. (ii) That the world is in no sense *mithyā*. (iii) And that the term, *advaita* does not imply either that Brahman is *nirguṇa* or that the world is *mithyā*.

So far, by both reason and the Veda, Brahman as the ultimate source of all is established. Brahman is also called *Iśvara*. *Iśvara* is the supreme lord of all. He is the ground and the creator of everything that exists. Except Himself and His knowledge all else is His body, because He is its soul. As being qualified by subtle *cidacit* He is the material cause of all. As qualified by desire and so on He is the efficient cause. As having knowledge, power, and so on and as being in things, like time He helps the creation (*sahakāri-kāraṇa*). He is by nature changeless. He is the material cause of the universe only as qualified by subtle *cidacit*. So all change belongs to *cidacit*, not to Him. To imply this idea He is called *Nirvikāra*. The idea that He is changeless and is at the same time the material cause of the universe may be illustrated by taking the example of a spider. Though a spider produces its thread it is changeless. Similar is the explanation with *Iśvara*.

Following the Vedas He is called *Nārāyaṇa*. He is the prime subject matter of the whole Vedic teaching. All words Vedic or secular ultimately stand for Him, because He is the soul of all. Of the two main portions of the Veda, *Karma-kāṇḍa* and *Jñāna-kāṇḍa* the former teaches *karma* and the latter *jñāna* (knowledge). Both are the means to obtain His favour. His favour alone is the ultimate Good that an individual self can have. He is all perfect. He is full of all good qualities. He is all pervading through His self, knowledge and form. He is infinite. He is conditioned neither by time, nor by space, nor by things. He is the master of all. Everything, however insignificant it is, happens because He desires it.

THE WORLD OF CIT AND ACIT

The world of *cit* and *acit* consists of two items, substance (*dravya*) and non-substance (*adravya*). A substance is the

material cause (*upādāna*) or it is the substratum of change (*avasthā*). There are six substances: *Īvara*, *jīva*, *dharmabhūta-jñāna*, *buddhasatva* or *nityavibhūti*, *prakṛti* and *kāla*. The first two are *cit* and the last four are *acit*. Further the first four are conscious (*ajada*) and the last two are unconscious (*jada*). Of them *Īvara* is already explained. The explanation of the other five is as follows:

The Cit Aspect of the World

Cit is individual soul. It is also called *jīva*. It is characterised by self-consciousness. It is the substratum of knowledge. It is the doer of things and the enjoyer of results. It has an infinitesimal size. It is the body of *Īvara*. It is therefore dependent on Him. It has in the empirical state its own *manas*, sense organs and body. It is different from them all. Its difference from them is illustrated by the experiences such as 'My *manas*, my sense organs, and my body'. It is also different from the knowledge that happens to it. This is the implication of the experience 'I have knowledge'. If it were identical with these things, then the forms of the experiences ought to be such as 'I am *manas*, the sense organs, the body or the knowledge' and there should be no occasion for the experiences that imply its difference from them. The fact that its size is only infinitesimal is implied by the facts of its birth and death. It is different from those *jīvas* that occupy different bodies that are contemporary with its body. It has no beginning and no end. It is supposed to have birth and death owing to its relation to a fresh body and separation from it respectively. The course of its births and deaths is called bondage (*saṁsāra*). Bondage is really external to it and it is due to its beginningless *karma*. *Jīva's* body is *acit* and its soul is *Īvara*. A *jīva* is naturally of the character of bliss. It is therefore defectless by nature.

The Acit Aspect of the World

The *acit* aspect of the world consists of four items: *dharmabhūtajñāna*, *nityavibhūti*, *prakṛti* and *kāla*. The former two are conscious for the sake of *cit* and the latter two are unconscious. The former are non-inert (*ajada*) and the latter inert (*jada*).

Dharma-bhūta-jñāna

Like *jīvas* *Ivara* also is a variety of *cit*. They are all self-conscious. They have also the knowledge that is only a property of them. This knowledge in each is different from that in the others. This knowledge is in every instance self-conscious (*svayam-prakāśa*). But it is not of the nature of *cit*, because it is not conscious for its own sake. Though both itself and *cit* are self-conscious entities their distinction consists in this, that while the latter is conscious for its own sake the former is so for the sake of the latter. (*Cit* is *svasmaiprakāśamāna*, while *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* is *parasmaiprakāśamāna*.) This knowledge is eternal in every case. It is always full in *Ivara*. It is not so in *jīva*. While *jīva* is in bondage it is obscured. When the *jīva* is liberated it shines in its fullness. In the case of *jīvas*, though it is always there, it unfolds itself under favourable conditions. Under unfavourable conditions it is not explicit. When it is explicit it is commonly taken to be just produced, and when it ceases to be so, it is taken to be destroyed. In the case of perception it is actually in contact with its object. When a sense organ is in contact with an object it goes out through the organ to the object and reveals it. By its very nature it is valid i.e., it comprehends its object as it is. But it does not require itself to be revealed, because it is self-evident. Though it is a property of a *jīva*, it is in itself a substance, because it is subject to ever so many changes. To indicate the idea that it is a property of *jīva* though it is a substance it is called *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*.

The internal states such as pleasure, pain, desire, hatred and effort are only the different manifestations of the same *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*, because the assumption that they are different from it is not supported by any *pramāṇa*. All types of knowledge and the good dispositions such as devotion (*bhakti*) of an individual self together with the undesirable dispositions are all various states of its *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*. Similar is the idea with regard to the knowledge of *Ivara*. All His auspicious qualities are different expressions of His *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*.

Nitya Vibhūti

Nitya vibhūti is characterised by pure *satva*. Pure *satva* means pure illumination, happiness and lightness. In the sense

of having this *satva* it is also called *buddha satva*. It is conscious but not self-conscious. Its consciousness is for the sake of *cit*, the self-conscious principle. Like *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* it is non-inert but not *cit*. It is devoid of nescience. According to the desire of *Ivara*, it assumes the form of the things and instruments for the enjoyment of the liberated *jīvas*.

Inert Substance (Jada-dravya)

A *jada-dravya* is that substance which is devoid of consciousness. There are two such substances, *prakṛti* and *kāla*.

Prakṛti

Prakṛti is characterised by the three *guṇas*—*satva*, *rājas* and *tamas*. *Akṣarā*, *avidyā* and *māyā* are its other names. It is eternal. It is the material cause of the material universe. It gives rise to the latter owing to the combination of the three *guṇas* with one another. This combination is caused by the desire of *Ivara* to create the world of products. Before creation the *guṇas* are not combined. At this stage the world of products is latent in *prakṛti*. To indicate this idea *prakṛti* at such stage is called *avyakta* (unmanifested). When there is *Ivara's* desire to create and the consequent combination of the three *guṇas*, *prakṛti* changes into a state called *mahattatva* with its three divisions, *sātvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*. *Satva* predominates in the *sātvika*, *rājas* in the *rājasa* and *tamas* in the *tāmasa*. Owing to the same cause *mahattatva* changes into *ahamkāra-tatva* with its three divisions, *sātvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*. These divisions are called respectively *vaikārika*, *taijasa* and *tāmasa*. The *rājasa* is of the nature of motion. This with the *sātvika* gives rise to the eleven sense organs—the five motor organs, five sensory organs and *manas*. The *rājasa* with the *tāmasa* gives rise to the five *tanmātras* (the elements in the subtle form), and through them to the five elements. The *tanmātra* of an element is the subtle form of the same which immediately precedes its gross form. It is the *tanmātra* that changes into the gross element. The following is how the *tanmātras* give rise to the respective gross elements. The *tanmātra* of an element is named after the special quality of the element. The elements are space, air, fire, water and earth. Sound, touch, colour, taste and odour are respectively their special qualities. Space-*tanmātra* is called sound-*tanmātra*, air-*tanmātra* is called touch-*tanmātra*, fire-

tanmātra is called colour-*tanmātra*, water-*tanmātra* is called taste-*tanmātra* and earth-*tanmātra* is called odour-*tanmātra*. *Tāmasāhamkāra* gives rise to sound-*tanmātra* and from this there results space. From space there arises touch-*tanmātra* and from this there results air. From air arises colour-*tanmātra* and this gives rise to fire. From fire arises taste-*tanmātra* and from this water. From water arises odour-*tanmātra* and from this earth. All these elements are perceived with their special qualities. Each element is closely connected with a particular sense organ. The sense organs are not made of the elements. They are only enriched by the respective elements so as to be able to discharge their functions. Space enriches ear, air the organ of touch, fire the eye, water the tongue and earth the nose. Of the five qualities space has sound; air has sound and touch; fire has sound, touch and colour; water has sound, touch, colour and taste; and earth has sound, touch, colour, taste and odour. Air also appears in the form of five vital breaths *prāṇa*, *apāṇa*, *vyāṇa*, *udāna* and *samāna*. These are characterised by their special location in the body. *Prāṇa* is in the heart, *apāṇa* helps excretion, *samāna* is in the stomach, *udāna* in the neck and *vyāṇa* in the whole body. Darkness is an aspect of earth. Next the elements undergo the process of *pañcikarāṇa*, and give rise to the objects of experience. In the whole course of the change of *prakṛti* twenty-four stages may be distinguished. They are *prakṛti*, *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, eleven sense organs, five *tanmātras* and five elements. They are called *tattvas*.

Time (Kāla)

Time is an inert substance. It is eternal and all-pervading. It has three aspects, past, present, and future. These divisions are not eternal. Everything happens in time. *Ivara* also follows the time order in creating the world. Time is perceived in such perceptual experience as 'Now this has happened'. In this experience 'now' stands for time.

Non-substance (Adṛavya).

This is the distinction between a substance and non-substance. A substance can be related to another substance by means of *samyoga* relation. But a non-substance cannot be so related.

There are ten non-substances, *satva*, *rajas*, *tamas*, sound, touch, colour, taste, odour, *samyoga* and power. *Satva* is the cause of illumination, pleasure and lightness. It cannot be perceived. In some cases it is by itself, without being mixed with *rajas* and *tamas*. To imply this idea it is then called *suddhasatva*. Being mixed with *rajas* and *tamas* it is the cause of *jīva*'s bondage. *Rajas* is the cause of greediness and action. This also cannot be perceived. *Tamas* causes delusion and ignorance. It is also not perceived. These three, *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* constitute the properties of *prakṛti*. Before creation they are in the state of equilibrium. When *Īvara* wills creation they become combined with one another, and give rise to the things of different varieties. Their actions are sometimes manifest and sometimes not. *Rajas* and *tamas* can in a sense be distinguished from *satva*. They bind *jīva* while *satva* liberates it.

Sound is apprehended by the sense organ, ear. It is in all the elements. Two types may be distinguished in it, articulate and inarticulate. Touch is apprehended by the sense organ of touch. Three types of touches may be distinguished, cold, hot and temperate. Water is cold. Fire is hot. Air is neither cold nor hot. Temperate touch may be found in earth also. But there it depends on certain conditions to which the earth in question is subject. Colour is apprehended by the eye. There are four colours, white, red, black and yellow. White colour may be bright or not bright. It is bright in fire, but it is not so in water and earth. Taste is apprehended by the tongue. There are six kinds of taste, sweet, sour, salt, pungent (*kaṣu*), bitter (*kaṣāya*) and astringent (*tiṣṭa*). Odour is apprehended by the nose. There are two kinds of it, fragrant and non-fragrant. These qualities are more or less conspicuous in accordance with the nature of the mutual combination of elements.

Samyoga is a quality which makes the knowledge 'These are conjoined' possible. It is eternal if it is the relation between eternal substances, or non-eternal if it is between non-eternal substances. The *samyoga* between *Īvara* and time is eternal, and that between a jar and a car is non-eternal. Separation is the absence of *samyoga* and therefore it is not a separate quality as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas suppose. Power is that which makes a thing do its function. For instance, a cause may be taken. A cause is a cause because it has the power to cause something. Fire burns because it has the power to burn. If its power is by

any means obstructed, then it does not burn. Power is in all substances.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are wrong in holding that there are twenty-four qualities. They hold that intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, effort, and impression are different qualities. It is not the case. They are only the different aspects of knowledge. To hold them to be different is opposed to the law of economy of thought. Merit and demerit also are not different qualities. Merit is the grace of God, and demerit is its absence. So they are the aspects of His knowledge. Velocity is the substance itself to which it is attributed. A piece of rubber, to take a modern example, expanded by force comes to its original position when the force is taken away. This coming to its original position is considered to be a separate quality by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. It is not so. It is only a case of *samyoga*. The state of being other (*prithaktva*) is only a case of the absence of *samyoga*. The state of being distant or near, old or new, is also an aspect of *samyoga* of space and time. Number, quantity, liquidity and viscosity are identical with the substance to which they are attributed. Heaviness is an aspect of power.

The Ultimate Truths

Cit and *acit* represent the whole world that is other than *Ivara*. They are His attributes in the sense that they are dependent on Him. In the same sense they are together considered to form His body. *Ivara* is the soul of the world. In this sense He is the ultimate. He is also called Viṣṇu. This is the fundamental teaching of this system. The same is the teaching of Bādarāyaṇa, in his *Brahma Sūtras*. The knowledge of this philosophy consists in the realisation of Him as the ultimate. And through this realisation His grace and freedom are obtained.

THE DISCIPLINE LEADING TO THE REALISATION OF THE ULTIMATE

A soul is in bondage because it does not know the truth that Viṣṇu is the Ultimate. The knowledge of this truth leads to His grace and through it to freedom from bondage. This knowledge in order to occur requires a certain fitness on the part of the soul. The fitness is the result of undergoing a course of discipline consisting of several stages.

I. The first stage is called *Karma-yoga*, the way of action. At this stage the individual obtains the knowledge of his own self and of *Īvara* by means of studying the sacred literature (*śravaṇa*). In accordance with his capacity he acts disinterestedly, avoids bad actions and observes only good actions such as worshipping God, meditating on His nature and giving charity in His name. The knowledge and action purify the soul and make it fitted for the next stage, and its final aim is *bhaktiyoga*.

II. The second stage is called *Jñāna-yoga*, the way of knowledge. At this stage the individual has the conviction (*cintā-viśeṣaḥ*) that he is dependent on God and different from *prakṛti*. This leads him directly to the next stage, *bhaktiyoga*.

III. The third stage is called *Bhaktiyoga*, the way of devotion. At this stage the individual is required to have incessant thought of God. Such thought happens when the eight-fold condition (*aṣṭāṅga*) is satisfied. Those conditions are (1) *Yama*, consisting of non-injury, veracity, avoiding theft, and celibacy, (2) *Niyama*, consisting of purity, contentment, meditation, study and devotion to God. (3) *Āsana*, consisting of various postures of body that help concentration of intellect. (4) *Prāṇāyāma*, consisting of control over breath. (5) *Pratyāhāra*, consisting of control over sense organs, so as to make them follow only the *manas* (*citta*) but not the external objects. (6) *Dhāraṇā* consisting of fixing the *citta* on the object of meditation. (7) *Dhyāna*, consisting of incessant meditation. (8) And *Samādhi*, consisting of full stability of concentration.

Bhaktiyoga is due to a seven-fold discipline. (1) *Viveka*—purity of the body obtained by abstaining from impure food—impure from the standpoint of *varṇāśramadharmā*. (2) *Vimokṣa*—abandoning desires. (3) *Abhyāsa*—repeated application. (4) *Kriyā*—performance of sacrifice according to one's capacity. (5) *Kalyāṇa*—truth-speaking, kindness to all, right disposition, charity and non-injury. (6) *Anavasāda*—abandoning cowardliness and (7) *Anuddharṣa*—absence of satisfaction. Too much of satisfaction is not good.

The *bhakti* strengthened by the fulfilment of these conditions continues till the realisation (*antimapratyaya*—last knowledge) which happens at the time of the death of this or the next body. The expressions, knowledge, meditation, and so on, stand for this *bhakti*. In some cases *bhakti* happens by the mere grace of

God. *Bhakti* in its complete form leads to the stage of *prapatti*.

IV. The next stage is *prapatti*. *Prapatti* is the same as complete self-surrender to God (*śaraṇāgati*). It is a disposition of knowledge. It happens once at the death of the body. It puts an end even to *prārabdha karma*. With it the self is immediately liberated. Every *jīva* is fit to have it.

The Liberated Jīva

The liberated *jīva* goes finally to *vaiṣṇava*, the abode of God, sees Him, admits that it is His mode (*prakāśa*), obtains His grace, and enjoys the pleasure of His service (*hainkariya*). Its enjoyment (*bhoga*) is the same as that of God. Though it is equal to God in this respect, it does not partake of God's activities in connection with the creation and so on of the world. It becomes independent in its movements according to the desire of God. (Various kinds of *jīvas* are mentioned in the works of this system. Only the most important things that are relevant to us, human beings, are taken into consideration in this exposition.)

CHAPTER IV
DVAITA VEDANTA

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DVAITA VEDĀNTA

Madhvācārya, the Exponent of Dvaita Vedānta

Madhvācārya is the exponent of Dvaita Vedānta. He was born in a village called Sivarupya near Udupi in A.D. 1199. His father was Madhyageha Bhaṭṭa. Madhvācārya was exceptionally brilliant even as a boy. He used to repeat the whole Veda and to give correct interpretations of the obscure passages even before he received any instruction, and used to tell people that he learnt all that is to be known in his previous birth. After he became a *Brahmacārin* he became a *sanyāsīn* with the permission of his parents. He received *sanyāsa* from Acyutaprekṣācārya who belonged to the family of Vaisnava *sanyāsīns*, like Paratīrtha. Before *sanyāsa* Madhvācārya was called Vasudevācārya. Afterwards he was named as Ānandatīrthācārya. The term Ānandatīrtha stands for one who expounds the system the knowledge of which leads one to perfection. He was also called Madhvācārya. This term also means the same thing. *Madhu* means perfection. *Va* means teaching. The whole term is applied to that which brings about perfection.

Madhvācārya used to say from his boyhood that the teaching of the Veda and the *Brahma Sūtras* is entirely different from what is expounded by the previous thinkers. After some time he expounded the teaching of these works and this teaching is given the name, Dvaita Vedānta. He established the truth of his teaching and made it popular. He travelled all over India and made many thinkers his followers. When he thought that his work was over he told his pupils that he would go to Badari, where Bōdarāyaṇa, the author of the *Brahma Sūtras* was living, and disappeared from sight.

Some points with regard to the life of Madhvācārya may be mentioned. His life was strictly consistent with what he taught. Unlike other teachers he laid great stress on both the intellectual and the physical development of man. According to him the body of man is not a sign of bondage but it is really the means for liberating man from evil both here and hereafter. For this reason he calls the body *sādhana śarīra*. In place of yogic tortures he taught sound philosophical and spiritual outlook on life and the practice consistent with that outlook. While the previous teachers when explaining the importance of knowledge seem to have given room for the thought that a *jñānīn* can lead a life that is free from moral restrictions,

Madhvācārya emphatically said that without a life that is morally pure, the knowledge of the so-called *jñānin* is incomplete and he can never enjoy perfection (*mukti*) in its fullness.

The distinguishing feature of his philosophy is the following: As a true philosopher he perceived great truth in what is called normal experience. He saw clearly that to condemn normal experience of men does not lead to sound philosophy and that the highest truth is never opposed to normal experience. His idea is this. A philosophy, the starting point of which is the belief that there is no truth in normal experience becomes unchecked, loses practical value and embodies imagination of all sorts. Experience must be the starting point of philosophy. Reasoning must be strictly consistent with experience. The spiritual experiences that are really consistent with normal experience and that enrich the same must be duly recognised. And the philosophical conclusions must not negate normal experience. They must in fact give a fresh meaning to normal experience and enrich it. Madhvācārya's philosophical reflections are thoroughly consistent with these ideas.

Further a true philosophy, according to Madhvācārya is the highest kind of *śāpas*. He says that even gods need philosophy. Without philosophy even a god cannot fully appreciate the Truth. So Madhvācārya asks a student of philosophy to be completely free from all prejudices. He respects only that philosophy which leads to *tattva-nirṇaya* (the determination of truth).

Philosophy before Madhvācārya

When Madhvācārya commenced his career the state of philosophy in India was this. Apart from the Vedas and the *Smṛtis*, the materialism of the Cārvāka, the nihilism and the half-hearted nihilism of the Bauddha, the absolute relativism of the Jaina, the pluralism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Mīmāṃsakas, the dualism of the Sāṅkhyas and the Yogins had practically ceased to attract thinkers. The Vedānta systems on the whole presented two currents of thought: (1) If the *Upaniṣadic* Brahman is really one, then It must be propertyless and the world must be in some sense or other unreal; and (2) If the world is in any sense real, then Brahman must be the material cause of it. The former made the Reality practically a non-entity and the latter did not bring out the full significance of the *Upaniṣadic* absolutism. And on the practical side, in spite of the pure and simple *Upaniṣadic* discipline, the discipline of the *yoga* seemed to have a very great influence on the Vedānta thinkers. It was for Madhvācārya to see the relative merits of these ideas and to present a philosophy that is really sound and useful.

The Works on Dvaita Vedānta

According to Indian tradition the literature on any Vedānta system is said to consist of three aspects called *Prasthānas*—*Sūtra-prasthāna*, *Upaniṣad-prasthāna* and *Śāstra-prasthāna*. Madhvācārya composed works belonging to these *Prasthānas* and some other works that amplify the teaching of the *Prasthānas*. His works on the *Sūtrāprasthāna* are: (1) *Brahma Sūtrā Bhāṣya*: this elucidates that the *Brahma Sūtras* ask a philosopher to reflect on Brahman as the real ground of the world consisting of *cetanas* and *acetanas* and show how the philosopher who has really understood Brahman in this manner goes to Brahman and becomes *mukta*. And in explaining this truth, this work shows how Brahman is *Santantra* and the world is *asantantra* and how both Brahman and the world are equally real. (2) *Amṛt Bhāṣya*: this is a very brief summary of the same teaching. (3) *Anu Vyākhyāne*: this presents a philosophical justification of the teaching of the *Brahma Sūtras*. And (4) *Sanyāsa viveka*: this clearly explains the principles involved in the teaching of the *Brahma Sūtras*. His works on the *Upaniṣad-prasthāna* are: (1) *Āitareyaopaniṣad Bhāṣya*: this explains that *Āitareyopaniṣad* teaches that Brahman is infinite, transcendent and full of auspicious qualities. (2) *Taittirīyopaniṣad Bhāṣya*: this elucidates that *Taittirīya* teaches that Brahman is the real basis of the world and as such Brahman is *satya*, *jñāna*, *śānta* and *ānanda*, being omnipotent and being the final object of the real philosophical approach. (3) *Bṛhadāraṇyakaopaniṣad Bhāṣya*: this maintains that *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* teaches that Brahman is the very soul of all the principles of life, It is of the character of transcendent peace and It is pure, defectless, the immanent principle of all, infinite, eternal, the source of all, in Itself transcendent, omniscient, omnipotent and the creator and the aim of the whole world. (4) *Iśāyopaniṣad Bhāṣya*: this shows that *Iśa* explains that Brahman is the basis of the eternal and non-eternal aspects of the world and Brahman is eternal, spiritual, infinitely perfect, the realisation of which is the only aim of all religious observations. (5) *Kāṇḍopaniṣad Bhāṣya*: this explains that *Kāṇḍaka* teaches that Brahman transcends all, It is the soul of the soul in a body and It is the dearest of the dearest. (6) *Chāndogyaopaniṣad Bhāṣya*: this reveals that *Chāndogya* justifies that Brahman is infinitely perfect and is the source of the creation, existence, destruction, direction, knowledge, non-knowledge, bondage and freedom. (7) *Atharvanopaniṣad Bhāṣya*: this maintains that the *Atharvanopaniṣad* teaches that Brahman is peace, unchanging, eternal, beginningless, endless, changeless and limitless and that being the most supreme It has omnipotence, and omniscience. (8) *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad Bhāṣya*: this shows that the *Māṇḍūkya* maintains that Brahman is of the essence of infinite bliss, knowledge and power, that with Its four-fold form, *śiva*, *Taijasa*, *prajña*

and *Turiya* causes the four-fold *avasthā*, waking, dream, sleep and freedom of the *jīva* and that It is absolutely devoid of distinction in Itself. (9) *Śatprāśnopaniṣad Bhāṣya*: this explains that *śatprāśna* elucidates that Brahman gives life and activity to every thing in the world. And (10) *Talavakāropaniṣad Bhāṣya*; this explains that *Talavakāra* illustrates that Brahman is the very presupposition of experience with all its aspects but yet It transcends knowledge. His works on the *Gītāprasthāna* are: (1) *Gītā Bhāṣya*: this maintains that the Bhagavadgītā is absolutely consistent with the *Upaniṣads* and it maintains and justifies that Brahman is *Svatantra* and the world is *asvatantra*. And (2) *Gītā Tātparya*: this maintains that the teaching of the Bhagavadgītā represents the final position of the whole *Śāstra*, the sacred literature devoted purely to philosophy. Unlike the other Vedāntins Madhvācārya realised that the great epic, the *Mahābhārata* expounds, illustrates and justifies the highest philosophical, ethical and religious truths and to explain this fact he composed *Mahābhārata Tātparya Nirṇaya* and *Yamaśa Bhārata*. With similar interest he also composed *Bhāgavata Tātparya Nirṇaya*, which explains that Bhāgavata represents the essence of the teachings of the *Śruti* and *Smṛti*. He also perceived that the whole Veda, if it is rightly understood, stands for a single idea of truth that Brahman is Independent and the world dependent and to illustrate this idea he composed *Rg-Bhāṣya*, an interpretation of the opening portions of the *Rgveda*. (This is considered to be the fourth *Prasthāna*.)

To amplify the positions that he maintains in interpreting the different works mentioned above, Madhvācārya composed ten treatises which are philosophically specially important. These treatises are called *Dala Prakaraṇas*. (1) *Kaṭha Lakṣaṇa*: this presents the right manner in which a real philosophical discussion must be conducted. (2) *Pramāṇa Lakṣaṇa*: this determines the nature of correct knowledge and its sources. (3) *Prapañca Mithyātva-numāna Khandana*: this shows the fallacies in the *anumāna*s employed by Advaita to prove that the world is *mithyā*. (4) *Upādhi Khandana*; this explains that the position of Advaita that *ajlāna* conditions Brahman is wrong. (5) *Māyāvāda Khandana*: this elucidates that the doctrine of *Māyā* in Advaita is wrong. (6) *Tattva Saṅkhyāna*: this explains that the world of reality consists of two main categories—*Svatantra* and *Asvatantra*. (7) *Tattva Viveka*: this presents the distinguishing features of the categories of reality. (8) *Tattvodyota*; this justifies the reality of the same categories. (9) *Viṣṇutattva Vinirṇaya*: this elucidates that to accept the Veda as valid is a philosophical necessity and amplifies that Viṣṇu, the Absolute is *Svatantra* and the world consisting of *cetana* and *acetana* is *asvatantra*. (10) *Karma Nirṇaya*: this explains that the only aim of the whole Veda is to reveal Brahman and that

Brahman is the only object of all religious observations and in this connection this work determines the fact that the Vedic teaching, if it is rightly interpreted, is an expression of faultless philosophy.

Madhvācārya composed also works that embody the highest philosophical, ethical and religious insight. (1) *Sadācārasmṛti*: this gives the daily duties of man which can be spiritually justified. (2) *Kṛpāmrta Mahārṇava*: this explains that Brahman being worshipped, remembered, praised, meditated and taught gives immortality to *jīva*. (3) *Tantvārtha*: this expounds the spiritual discipline leading to the realisation of Brahman, shows that the whole world is the abode of Brahman, and explains how exactly Brahman can be worshipped in idols, in fire, in the very heart of the worshipper himself and in every thing that exists. (4) *Yatiprasaṅgahatya*: this explains that Brahman as Viṣṇu, the most supreme as expounded in the *Puruṣasūkte* is the real meaning of *prasaṅga*, Om. (5) *Dvādaśa-Stotra*: this is in the form of praise to Brahman and it is the highest expression of the application of philosophy to life in general. (6) *Narasimha Nakṣa Stotra*: this shows that Brahman in the form of Narasimha is the highest good and the destroyer of all evil. And (7) *Jayanti Nīṇaya*: this is the expression of the truth that Brahman in the form of Kṛṣṇa appeared before men as their highest good and taught the highest truth and practice consistent with it to save mankind from evil and bring it to perfection.

In interpreting a work this is how Madhvācārya proceeds. He clearly states the position and the significance of the work, supports what he says by the statements of similar works the meaning of which does not give room for any difference of opinion, justifies his interpretation purely philosophically and examines the positions accepted by the other commentators in order to point out where exactly they have gone wrong. It may be noted that many of the works he quotes are now lost.

After Madhvācārya some of his immediate followers wrote commentaries on his works. They are not so important as those that are written by Jayatīrthācārya who is also known as Tīkācārya. Tīkācārya was a pupil of Akṣobhyatīrtha, a pupil of Madhvācārya. Tīkācārya was born in a family which was famous for its contempt of learning. He had therefore no occasion to learn anything. According to his family traditions he became a good soldier. When he was just approaching his youth, having a sudden enlightenment he had *śaśpara* from Akṣobhyatīrtha and began to write commentaries on the works of Madhvācārya. He was a younger contemporary of Vidyāraṇya and Vedāntadeśikācārya. Tīkācārya wrote the following works: *Prameya Dīpikā*, a commentary on the *Gīṭābhāṣya*; *Tattva Praṭīkṣā*, a commentary on the *Brahma Sūtrabhāṣya*; *Nyāya Sūdhā*, a commentary on the *Anuśaṅkhyāna*; and the commentaries on the other principal

works of Madhvācārya. *Pramāṇa Paddhati* and *Vādānālī* are his independent works. Several followers of Dvaita Vedānta wrote commentaries on the works of Ṭikācārya. Among them the works of Vyāsaraṇāśvāmin and Rāghavendrasvāmin are the most important. The former wrote *Candrikā*, a commentary on *Tattva Prakāśikā*. This is a very elaborate and learned work. He also wrote commentaries on several works of Ṭikācārya, and some independent works, *Bhedojjivana*, *Nyāyāmṛta* and *Tarkaṭāṇḍava*. *Bhedojjivana* establishes that *bheda* (difference) is real. *Nyāyāmṛta* is an elaborate work. It is famous for its telling criticisms against Advaita. *Tarkaṭāṇḍava*, which is also an elaborate work, refutes *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* in all its details. Rāghavendrasvāmī wrote commentaries on almost all the previous works. His *Prakāśa* on *Candrikā*, *Parimāṣa* on *Nyāya Sūdhā*, *Tantra Dipikā* on the *Brahma Sūtras* and *Vīrti* on the *Gītā* and *Maṇḍārthamanjari* are the most important. Rāmācārya wrote a commentary called *Taraṅgiṇī* on *Nyāyāmṛta*. This work is an answer to *Advaitasiddhi*. After Vyāsaraṇāśvāmin Vadirājasvāmī wrote *Yuktimallikā*. There are several other important works some of which are independent ones and others are in the form of commentaries. On the basis of this system many works in Kannada are composed which are very popular among the Kannada-speaking public. Among the most important of these works the poems of Purandaradāsa and the *Harikāśhāmṛta sara* of Jagannāthadāsa may be mentioned.

ANALYSIS

Knowledge is relative to its object. The relation between knowledge and its object is natural. The truth of knowledge is *svataḥ*. It consists in grasping its object as it is. There are two types of knowledge, *svarūpa-jñāna* and *vyttijñāna*. The former is a property of the knower. The latter is a property of *manas*. The former is generated by *sākṣi*, and the latter by the external sense organs and *manas*. The former is as a rule true, and the latter is true or untrue according to the conditions. The falsity of knowledge consists in grasping the real as unreal and the unreal as real. True knowledge is generated by *pramāṇas*. There are three *pramāṇas* *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama*.

The object of knowledge is as a rule a qualified entity. It consists of having substantive-attributive aspects. The attributes of a thing are identical with it. Yet they are distinguished as attributes owing to *vilepa*. *Vilepa* is in all things including even Brahman. In each thing its number is infinite. The world is real. It consists of different entities. Difference is real. The entities of the world may be brought under two heads, *cetana* and *acetana*. *Cetana* is that which knows. There are many *cetanas*. There are three kinds of them, good, bad, and of doubtful character. *Acetana* is

that which does not know. There are three kinds of *acetana* things, eternal, eternal-non-eternal, and non-eternal. The Veda is eternal. Space, time and *prakṛti* are eternal-non-eternal. The products of *prakṛti* are non-eternal. A product has two kinds of causes, material and efficient cause. The relation between a product and its material cause is identity in difference. Non-existence also is real. The world is dependent and points to an Independent Reality as its source. The Independent is Brahman and It is the ground of all that is dependent. The world being dependent is different from Brahman, the Independent.

The bondage of a *cetana* is caused by its ignorance of the truth that Brahman is the sole ground of all including itself. It becomes free with the realisation of this truth. The course of the discipline that leads to this realisation presupposes moral perfection and it consists of, in order, the study of *śāstra* (*śravaṇa*), philosophical reflection (*mānana*), and the application to and the teaching of philosophy (*vidiśhyāna*). With this discipline a *cetana* realises Brahman as its ground (*āśraya*) and with the fulness of its devotion (*bhakti*) to Brahman obtains the grace of Brahman and with it the *cetana* has the enjoyment (*bhoga*) of perfection according to its capacity (*yogyatā*). This is its *mukti*.

DVAITA VEDĀNTA

[The following exposition is mainly based on the *Nyāyasūdhā*, the *Tīkṣā* on the ten *prakarṇas*, *Nyāyamṛta* and *Tantrasāra*.]

Madhvācārya considers that all the previous philosophers started from some preconceived ideas and consequently arrived at wrong conclusions. As a Vedantin he thinks that the whole Veda with the *smṛti* literature that follows the Vedic teaching stands for one idea of truth: that the world consisting of spirit (*śeṭana*) and non-spirit (*śeṭana*) is real and it is dependent on *Iṣvara*, who being an embodiment of all perfections is the real and independent source of the very reality of the world. He urges that all the previous philosophies missed this point, because all of them were misguided by some dogmatic assertions. He passes the following remarks on the previous philosophies.

Cārvāka dogmatically denied the truth of the knowledge other than perception and arrived at the conclusion that there is nothing beyond the perceivable world. Buddhism pressed the impermanent character of the world too far, considered every thing to be momentary, and ultimately arrived at *Sunya-Vāda*. In the enthusiasm of asserting the permanent character of the world, Jainism emphasised that every entity has contrary aspects each of which is relative to others; and as a result denied the possibility of a thing's having an absolute background and in spirit supported *Sunya-Vāda*.

At the next stage a host of *Āstika* thinkers appeared. But they shone no better than their predecessors. Though they all professed that they were only expounding the views of the Veda they were all biased in favour of one view or the other, read their views into the Veda, emphasised particular passages of the Veda which seemed to support their views, and expounded system after system according to their ideas. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* were too much inclined to the analysis of thought, and carried it to the world of reality. They thought that they were supported by the Veda by emphasising such passages as 'One who knows the bliss of Brahman. . . .' (*Anandam*

Brahmano vidvān . . . Tai, Upaniṣad.) They believed that this passage holds that bliss is different from Brahman and supports that the property of a thing is different from the thing itself. The Sāṅkhyas developed a distaste for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika analysis and considered the whole world to be an expression of a single principle, which they called *prakṛti*, and reduced *Puruṣa*, the spiritual principle almost to a non-entity. This school had its starting point in an extreme emphasis on the *Sāṅkhya* elements found in the *Upaniṣads*. *Yoga* is mainly a restatement of *Sāṅkhya* with certain minor details and imaginary theories of *yoga* practices. The *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* made much of the *Karma*-portion of the Veda at the cost of the *jñāna*-portion of it, and consequently lost all spirituality.

Even the Vedānta Systems did not much improve upon the previous schools. Two of them are the most important. They are Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita. Advaita emphasised the apparent meaning of certain Upaniṣadic passages which it called *mahāvākyas* (great statements). They are 'That thou art' (*Tat-samasti*), 'I am Brahman' (*Aham Brahmasmi*) and so on. And consequently this system ignored the other Vedic *vākyas*. Taking the lead of those passages in which it had too much interest it held *Nirguṇa* Brahman to be the only reality and denied, in fact, the reality of the world. Though Viśiṣṭādvaita altogether abandoned the Advaita point of view, it emphasised the immanent aspect of Brahman so much that it was unable to account for anything in the world unless it attributed, at least in spirit, a corresponding change to Brahman, which is described to be perfectly changeless by ever so many Upaniṣadic passages.

As a thinker Madhvācārya asserted that a true philosophy is not influenced by any kind of authority. And as a champion of the Vedic thoughts he remarked that a true Vedic thinker is he who looks upon the whole Veda as a single piece without laying too much emphasis on certain passages in which he is in some way interested. He emphatically said that it is better to confess that one is not the follower of the Veda if one is to dismiss any part of the Veda by one's exclusive interest in other matters. On his part he found that his philosophical conclusion was identical with the teaching of the Veda as a whole. In order to show this to the world he began a fresh examination of the world of knowledge.

KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge is Not¹ Partless and Attributeless

In Advaita two varieties of knowledge are recognised. They are named as *Svarūpajñāna* and *Vṛtijñāna*. The former is considered to be real and the latter to be not real. Therefore the former alone is said to be knowledge in the real sense of the term. It is called *cit*. And it is described as partless (*akhaṇḍa*) and attributeless (*nirviśeṣa*). The whole position of Advaita rests on this supposition. So any close study of knowledge requires a careful examination of this supposition.

At the outset of our examination of this supposition, we have to answer the question, is there knowledge that is partless and attributeless? Any attempt at finding an answer to this question leads us to the consciousness of the obvious contradiction that the Advaita position involves. To describe a thing as partless and attributeless, though, of course, the description seems to deny all parts and attributes with reference to the thing in question, implicitly asserts parts and attributes in the thing, because without attributing 'partlessness' and 'attributelessness' to the thing, a thing cannot be described as partless and attributeless. To hold that there are the attributes, 'partlessness' and 'attributelessness,' is to hold that there are parts in the thing. So the conception that a thing is partless and attributeless denies its own truth, and in fact implicitly asserts the truth that every thing is necessarily with attributes and therefore with parts. Hence the very conception that *cit* is *akhaṇḍa* and *nirviśeṣa* is impossible, because in the very conception *cit* is determined to be *sakhaṇḍa* and *saviśeṣa*.

Further we need not even refer to the implication of the description of *cit*, in order to see that *cit* is *sakhaṇḍa* and *saviśeṣa*. The very conception that *cit* is *cit* gives us an idea that it is not what Advaita supposes it to be. Something is something because it is distinct from other things. *Cit* is *cit* because it is distinct from other things. It can be distinct from other things only if it has its individuality in it. To have individuality is to be *sakhaṇḍa* and *saviśeṣa*. So in calling *cit* *cit* Advaita has made it *sakhaṇḍa* and *saviśeṣa*. And to describe it next as *akhaṇḍa* and *nirviśeṣa* is meaningless.

¹ N.M., 430-35; 489-96. T.D.T.

This difficulty is felt by the Advaita thinkers also. In support of their view they say that to describe *cit* as *aṅhanda* and *nirviteṣa* also denies the implications of calling *cit* *cit* and of describing it as *aṅhanda* and *nirviteṣa*. This view does not carry us far. We may illustrate the failure of this conception by taking an example. If a man cannot talk we call him dumb. If a mere verbal denial of talking can make a man dumb, even the man who says 'I am dumb' should be taken as dumb. If any one says that the man in question is not dumb, because he is able to make the statement 'I am dumb', then it is possible to assert against one, following the Advaita line of argument, that the statement denies even the talking power presupposed by it. This line of argument is unsound, and it is not supported by experience. With all the assertion that the statement makes, the man is given as one who is actually speaking. In the same manner with all the assertion that the statement, '*cit* is *aṅhanda* and *nirviteṣa*' makes, *cit* remains as *aṅhanda* and *nirviteṣa*. So we may conclude that knowledge is never partless and attributeless.

Knowledge is Objectively Real

In Advaita it is said that knowledge is self-evident and therefore it is not the object of any knowledge. This supposition is incorrect. Knowledge may be self-evident in the sense that it is not given by anything outside it. But it is the object of itself. Unless it is the object of itself it cannot be given as self-evident. So it is both subject and object. As the giver of its own self it is the subject, and as given by itself it is the object. Following Kumārila, Advaita holds that the same entity cannot be both subject and object. Against this rule we must note that we have to make the case of knowledge an exception. If knowledge were not an object we can never know that it is. We do know that it is. This is evident by such experiences as 'I have knowledge'. Unless I know knowledge I do not know that I have knowledge.

Knowledge is of an Object

Knowledge is relative to an object. Without an object there is no knowledge. Whatever we know as knowledge has an object. Advaita holds that knowledge in the real sense of the term is *cit*, and it is *aṅhanda* and therefore it has no object.

This position is not supported by experience. Nobody knows what an objectless knowledge is. The only proof that Advaita could give for objectless knowledge is that it is *akṣhaṇḍa* and it has nothing outside it. This argument begs the question. That knowledge is *akṣhaṇḍa* can be conceived if it is given as objectless. And it can be determined to be objectless if it is given as *akṣhaṇḍa*. So the position of Advaita refutes itself.

Knowledge may be of an external object, or it may be of another piece of knowledge. The knowledge, 'This is a jar' is of an external object. The knowledge, 'I have this knowledge' is of another piece of knowledge.

We must note another point in this connection. Knowledge is self-conscious. While revealing an object it reveals itself. So it is an object of itself. In this sense it may be regarded as self-evident. Advaita defines the term, self-evident in a different manner. According to it the self-evident is that which is not an object of knowledge, but at the same time is capable of immediate usage (*avedya* and *aparokṣa vyavahāra yogya*). This position involves a self contradiction. If the self-evident thing is not known, then it must be a non-entity. An entity is that which is known (*prameya*). If it is not at all known it ceases to be an entity. Further the very fact that the self-evident (*svapraṁśā*) entity is capable of immediate usage means that it is known. If it is not at all known it cannot be described in any manner. So the self-evident is not what Advaita says; but it is a self-conscious entity.

The Relation¹ between Knowledge and Its Object

The function of knowledge is to reveal an object, and the function of an object is to be revealed by knowledge. The relation between the two is that which is found between the revealer and the revealed. It is called *viśaya-viśayibhāva*. The fact that there is this relation is proved by the fact that there is the knowledge of an object. The relation between knowledge and its object is considered to be impossible by the *Viśāṇa-vāda* and on the basis of the impossibility of this relation this school denies the objective world as such. Following the same line of argument Advaita holds that the relation between knowledge and its object is that of superimposition (*ādhyāśika*). In this con-

¹ N.M., 187-215.

nection Advaita refutes the idea that the relation is *samyoga* or *samavāya* and finally arrives at the conclusion that it is superimposition. Against this position we may note that it is irrelevant to refer to *samyoga* or *samavāya* when we are to explain the relation between knowledge and its object. The argument of Advaita amounts to saying that the relation in question is not one of those that are recognised by a particular philosopher, and therefore it is superimposition. This is evidently unsound. There are as many types of relations as there are types of the related entities. Knowledge and its object, as related have their own peculiarity, and they presuppose a definite relation between them. This relation cannot be anything but *viśaya-viśayī-bhāva*.

The Fact of Knowledge Presupposes the Reality of Its Object

Knowledge is relative to its object. Knowledge is real, because it is self-evident. So its object also is real. It is as real as knowledge. The relation between knowledge and its object also is equally real.

Vijñāna-vāda holds that the object is not real. Against this position we may note that if the object as such is unreal, then there could be no thought of object. The absence of the thought of object is followed by that of knowledge.

Advaita holds that of the three entities, knowledge, its object and the relation between the two, knowledge alone is real and the other two are *mithyā*. By *mithyā* is meant *sadasadvilakṣaṇa*. The conception of *mithyā* in this sense involves self-contradiction. *Sadasadvilakṣaṇa* is that which is neither *sat* nor *asat* nor *sadasat*. To apply this term to anything is impossible. A thing either is or is not. If it is, then it is *sat*. If it is not, then it is *asat*. Nothing is *sat* and *asat* simultaneously. And there is nothing that is neither *sat* nor *asat*. Following the Jaina thought we cannot hold that the same thing is *sat*, *asat* and so on. In order to be described in many ways mentioned by Jainism the thing must first be *sat*. If it is given as *sat*, then it can be described as *asat* and so on, from several points of view. If it is not given as *sat*, then there is nothing to be viewed from different standpoints. So a thing must be *sat* before it is judged. After it is known as *sat* it may be viewed as *asat* and so on from other points of view. But it does not cease to be *sat* when it is so viewed. If it ceases to be *sat*, then it cannot be viewed at all.

So from whatever standpoint it is judged the *sat* aspect of it persists. Hence the *sat* aspect of a thing is unconditioned.

Further the real and the relative are the different expressions of the same truth. Each is implied in the other. Each must be conceived consistently with the other. But Advaita and the *Jaina* hold that the real and the relative are inconsistent with each other and as a result Advaita dismisses the relative and the *Jaina* the real. These positions are not supported by experience. According to experience the real is relative and the relative is real. Of the two things, knowledge and its object, each is relative and each is real and the relation between the two also is real.

Knowledge is the Property of a Knower¹

Knowledge is not substantive. It is attributive. It is a property of an entity. This entity is what is presented as 'I'. So knowledge is a property of 'I'. This is proved by the experience 'I know this or that thing'. This experience is equivalent to 'I have the knowledge of this or that thing'. If knowledge were all and there were no 'I', then there would be no experience at all. Without knower there is no knowledge.

If knowledge itself were the knower, then it would not be of an object. The knower is 'I'. 'I' is not relative to any object. It is independent of objects. In self-consciousness there is no idea of any object. But there is 'I'. In the same way during deep sleep there is no idea of objects. But 'I' persists then. If 'I' were not then, then there would be no idea of sleep at all. So 'I' endures at all times. It is there even though the objective world is negated. But the case of knowledge is different. Knowledge is relative to object, because without object knowledge is impossible. This means that knowledge is different from 'I'.

But 'I' is not without some kind of knowledge. Though the objective world is not experienced, for instance in sleep, there is the knowledge of 'I'. 'I' is not without the idea of 'I'. This idea is the same as self-consciousness. At times self-consciousness is in a very clear manner, and at other times it is not clear. It is clear when 'I' is consciously distinguished from other objects. For instance we may take the experience 'I

¹ N.M., 370-86.

know this jar'. In this experience 'I' is the knower, 'jar' is the known, and they are distinguished from each other. So the consciousness of 'I' is clear. In the state of sleep, there is no consciousness of objects, and therefore the consciousness of 'I' is not very clear. But the fact that there is the consciousness of 'I' is revealed as the basis of the later memory or recognition of the identity of the self. For instance after the sleep is over there is the memory 'I had a good sleep' or recognition 'I am the same that slept'. If during sleep there is no consciousness of 'I', then there would be no possibility of the later memory or recognition. So 'I' is not without consciousness. Its essence is consciousness. Consciousness is *caitanya*, 'I' is *cit*.

Buddhism accepts, in place of 'I', four *skandhas*—*Vijñāna* (*nirvikalpa* knowledge), *Smijñā* (*saṃkalpa* knowledge), *Samskāra* (impression) and *Vedanā* (feeling of pain). This position does not explain the experience of personal identity. This experience cannot be explained unless we consider that 'I' is a unitary substance. The so-called *skandhas* are only its properties. Buddhism considers the thought of the unity of 'I' to be an illusion. It has no right to do it. If it has admitted anywhere a unitary substance and the correct thought of it, then it could easily make use of it in the present connection. According to its theory of knowledge the present illusion is made impossible. An illusion presupposes the right knowledge of the thing known in illusion. Without this knowledge there is no illusion at all. One can never think of the thing that is experienced at no time, in any sense of the term, experience. Even in wild imagination we connect only those things which we have actually experienced. We may take for instance the imagination of a centaur. A centaur is supposed to have a human head on a horse's trunk. This is a case of imagination and it resembles illusion, because its object is not given. It is possible because a right experience of real things forms its basis. The person who imagines a centaur has previously experienced a real trunk of a horse's body, a real head of man, and the unity of a head and a trunk. In the present case he makes use of these three elements, and by connecting them mentally imagines a centaur. So the unity of a human head and the trunk of a horse's body is possible because the person has already experienced the unity of a head and a trunk. So also in the present case, if Buddhism had accepted a unitary

substance as real, then the four *skandhas* would have been mistaken for a unitary soul called 'I'. Substance is not a real entity in Buddhism. So there should be no thought of substance or 'I' according to it. But even the Buddhist thinkers experience 'I' as well as any other thinkers do. They somehow take interest in *Nairātmya-Vāda* (the theory that denies *ātman* as a unitary substance) and consider any thing that seems to oppose their view to be imaginary (*vikalpa*). They cannot justify their position. So the only implication of experience is that 'I' is a substance and the so-called *skandhas* are its properties.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers hold that knowledge is not an essential property of 'I'. They consider knowledge to appear in 'I' owing to the relation of 'I' to the *manas* and the body. If their position is correct, then 'I' cannot be *cit*, and it must be the same as inert things. Next we have to solve the same difficulty which we have with reference to the position of *cūrvāka*. If all that is is only inert, then there can never be the appearance of knowledge. So if there is to be knowledge then 'I' must be *cit*. Otherwise there can be no knowledge at all. Knowledge is a fact. So 'I' is *cit*.

The Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Mīmāṃsā thinkers differ on account of the same difficulty from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers. They all hold that the source of knowledge is the entity which is of the character of *caitanya*, and they call this entity *ātman*. There is a point of difference between the Sāṅkhya and Yoga on the one hand and the Mīmāṃsā on the other. The former hold that *ātman* is *cit* and the latter that it has the power of *cit* (*jñāna lakṣi*). The position of the former is not consistent with the nature of knowledge. We have already seen how knowledge is relative to object. But they hold that *ātman* as *cit* or *caitanya* is objectless. Similarly the position of the latter is not consistent with the self-evident character of *cit*. If the power of *cit* is self-evident, then it is not different from *cit*. In this connection we have to make a difference between the two Mīmāṃsā thinkers, Prabhākara and Kumārila. Prabhākara holds that knowledge is self-evident and Kumārila that it is only inferred as the source of 'knownness', a property which an object acquires when it is known. Against the former we may note that *ātman* which is not self-evident cannot have the property that is self-evident. And against the latter we may note that if knowledge is not self-evident then it cannot be known. (We have noticed in our

study of Advaita that to explain the consciousness of one piece of knowledge from another leads to the process of infinite regress.) So we may conclude that *ātman* or 'I' is of the nature of *caitanya* and it is self-evident.

In Advaita it is said, "'I' is not in sleep, and it is produced by *ajñāna* at waking. The ground of "I" is *cit*. *Cit* is knowledge. So it is not the property of "I". In examining this view we may first note that 'I' endures even in sleep and therefore it is not a product. If it were a product then there would be no idea of personal identity. Advaita holds that the source of this identity is the ever ready identity of *cit*. If it is so, then all things of the world must be felt to be identical by the same knower, because the ground of all is the same *cit*. Further to say that 'I' has in it both *cit* and *ajñāna* is not sound. If it is a product of *ajñāna*, then it is never possible for it to have knowledge. And to say that *cit* is an accompaniment of *ajñāna* denies the very nature of *cit*. *Cit* is knowledge. It is opposed to *ajñāna* or non-knowledge. If it is with the latter, then it is not opposed to *ajñāna* and therefore it ceases to be knowledge.

So we may conclude that 'I' is *cit* and knowledge is its property. So far the truth that 'I' is *cit* is mainly based on the fact that knowledge is its property. This position requires further elucidation. If knowledge is the essence of 'I', then it must be enduring even as 'I' is. If it is not enduring, then it becomes only an accidental property of 'I'. There are various kinds of knowledge—self-consciousness, the knowledge produced by the sense organs and so on. Of them self-consciousness explains how 'I' is *cit*; and we have noted how it is as enduring as 'I' is. We may now study the other instances of knowledge with a view to find out which knowledge is enduring and which is not.

Different Types' of Knowledge

Knowledge happens to an individual knower under different states. The states in the normal life are three. They are waking, dreaming and sleeping. In the waking state the individual has different types of knowledge. He has the knowledge produced by the five external sensory organs. This knowledge has always the form, 'This is so and so', 'This is called so

and so', or 'This is the same that was before'. In the latter two cases the sense organ presents the object in its relation to something that goes beyond what is given. In the knowledge, 'This is called so and so' the object is presented in its relation to its name. And in the knowledge, 'This is the same that was before', the object is presented as identical with itself at a past time. In producing these pieces of knowledge, the bare sense organ is not enough. In order to produce them, the sense organ requires the help of the impression of the name in one case and that of the identity of the past object in the other. Memory is another kind of knowledge that happens in the waking state. Memory is the knowledge that is made possible by impressions. It is not produced by the external sense organs (*indriyas*). As a piece of knowledge that is produced it requires an instrument that would cause it with the help of impressions. Since this instrument is not one of the five external sense organs it must be inside the body. It may be called *manas*. It is an *indriya*. Some Advaita thinkers do not hold that it is an *indriya*, because they fear that if it is an *indriya*, then it cannot be the abode of *virtu* knowledge. Their position is not sound. They follow the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers and hold that an *indriya* is necessarily infinitesimal in size and therefore it is not the abode of knowledge. Both are wrong. *Manas* is an *indriya*, because it produces knowledge, i.e. memory. The external *indriyas* are so named because they produce knowledge. So anything that is an instrumental cause of knowledge is an *indriya*. There is no reason why *manas* should be exempted from this rule. *Manas* may be an abode of knowledge, and yet be an *indriya*. We need not define an *indriya* in terms of infinitesimal size.

'I' cannot be the abode of knowledge that is produced, because it is of the essence of knowledge. Knowledge being its essence needs to be as enduring as 'I' is. So to attribute the knowledge that is produced to 'I' takes away its essential nature from it. The position of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that 'I' is the abode of all knowledge suffers from this difficulty. So the abode of produced knowledge must be different from 'I', and it must be inside the body. There is economy of thought in considering *manas* itself to be the abode of knowledge that is produced. Being the abode of knowledge it is also that of impressions. To say that it is the abode of produced knowledge is to hold that it itself assumes the form of that knowledge. In this very fact

it is implied that it is not *cit*. If it were *cit*, then it would not be the abode of produced knowledge. Further the fact that knowledge is produced reveals the character of that knowledge. This knowledge cannot be *svāntarya*, because it is not enduring. It is a form of *manas*. In this sense it is called *vyatijñāna*. Since it is a state of *manas* it is inert (*jada*). In this connection we may refer to the thinkers of Buddhism, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, and *Mīmāṃsā* systems. They do not believe in knowledge as forming the essence of the self. What they call knowledge corresponds to *vyatijñāna*. We have seen how this knowledge is inert. From this point of view all these thinkers resemble materialists (*cārvākas*).

In the dream state the external sense organs do not function. Then there is the function of *manas* with its impressions. The knowledge that is produced then is not memory. If it were memory, then it follows that in dream there is only knowledge and no object. This position obliterates the actual distinction between waking and dreaming. If a dream is nothing but memory, then it is the same as the waking state at that time when there is memory. Further to hold that there is only memory in the dream state denies the individuality of dream experience. Dreaming has a unique feature. It is quite different from waking though it resembles it. In dream there is the experience of actual objects. So far as the actuality of the objects is concerned there is no difference between the objects of dreaming and those of waking. In dreaming the knower experiences objects as he does in the waking state. When there is waking he realises the distinction between the dream objects and the objects of the waking state. The objects of dreaming are real so far as the dream goes. They are different from the objects of waking. So we must not judge them from the standpoint of waking. The dream experience grasps its object as it is, just as the experience of waking grasps its object. Both the types of knowledge are equally true. So both objects are equally real. The objects of dreaming do not belong to the external world. They are as internal as their knowledge is. So their material cause must be something internal. In dreaming there are three things to function. They are the self, *manas*, and the impressions of previous experience. Of these three, the self is not the material cause of anything, and it does not cause the objects. *Manas* may be the cause. But it can only cause the objects through the impressions

that are in it. This is proved by the fact that a dreamer does not experience anything new that he has not experienced previously in some manner or other. So the dream objects are produced by impressions; and they are perceived through the agency of *manas*.

In the state of sleep even *manas* does not function. The self is then left to itself. The self is *cit*. It is self-conscious in all states. So there is self-consciousness even in sleep. Likewise there is the feeling of happiness occasioned by sleep. If there were no feeling of happiness in sleep, then nobody would go to sleep. Further there is also the consciousness of duration in sleep. This is the experience of all. This fact also is implied in the later memory that happens to the individual when there is waking. Every man who has a good sleep remembers after sleep that he slept happily for a length of time. We have seen how there is 'I' in sleep. This means that during sleep there is self-consciousness. The experience of pleasure in sleep points to the *ānanda* aspect of the self. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas say that the feeling of pleasure in sleep is only that of the absence of misery and not of positive pleasure. They are not correct. If what we call pleasure is the same as the absence of misery, then the form of the memory after sleep ought to be 'I had no misery'. We have also to note that the feeling of the absence of misery is an inevitable consequence of the feeling of pleasure. But the reverse is not true. A piece of stone for instance has no misery and has no pleasure. So the memory of pleasure unconditionally points to actual pleasure in sleep. Obviously there is no pleasure derived from the experience of external things then. Further the feeling of pleasure is an aspect of self-consciousness. So it follows that the pleasure is an aspect of the self. So the self presented as 'I' is in sleep, it knows itself, and it experiences its own pleasure. It is *saccidānanda*. (Thus the *saccidānanda* character of Brahman in Advaita is relegated to the world of the selves also in this system. Each self is a brahman. This is also the teaching of the *Śruti*, '*Brahmāṇi jīvāsarvepi*'. (All *jīvas* are brahmans).]

There is also the consciousness of time during sleep. Each sleeper knows how long he slept. This would be impossible if there were no knowledge of duration in sleep. Time is external to the self. To hold that there is the knowledge of the external does not in any way deny the character of sleep. It is supposed

by the thinkers, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Mīmāṃsakas, and Advaitins that to have knowledge of external entities is to have misery. They are not correct. Knowledge as such is not the cause of misery. It is the knowledge of inconvenience that causes misery. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas define pleasure as that which is felt to be convenient. They are correct. But it is a surprise how the same thinkers could say that knowledge as such is misery. One of their arguments for their proposition is that pleasure is as a rule preceded or followed by pain. Their argument is not sound. We have of course experienced pleasure and pain as following each other; but this may be due to various other conditions. There is nothing to tell us that it is the very essence of them to follow each other. In fact the understanding of their nature reveals a different truth. Pleasure consists in knowing a thing to be convenient. If the same knowledge continues or is followed by similar knowledge, then there is no reason why it should be regarded as necessarily being followed by pain. Further in so far as there is the thought of pleasure, there is no thought of misery. So the thought of pleasure is absolute in so far as it goes. In sleep there is pleasure because there is the thought of it. So thought as such is not opposed to pleasure. And the idea that the thought of time brings about misery is not sound. We have also to note another point in this connection. As it will be noted, the conception of time is the very condition of thought. There is no thought that has no reference to time. Thought is not opposed to pleasure. So its condition, the conception of time, is not opposed to it.

So far we have seen the scope of knowledge with reference to the various states of an individual life. Having the whole field of knowledge in mind we may divide it into two classes. (1) The knowledge caused by *manas* with or without the help of the external sense organs. (2) The knowledge that belongs to the very nature of the self. Corresponding to the Advaita terminology, the former may be called *vṛtti-jñāna* and the latter *svarūpa-jñāna*. The former presents the objects of the senses—five external senses and *manas*. The latter presents the self and its properties and certain external objects. The former is generally correct though it is occasionally wrong. One generally knows a shell as shell. But under special circumstances, when one's eye is defective, one may mistake a shell for silver. But the latter is as a rule true. Under all circumstances it grasps its

object as it is. For instance we may take the knowledge of the self as 'I'. No man at any time has any illusion about the 'I-ness' of 'I'. None thinks that one is not one, i.e. 'I'. So the knowledge of 'I' grasps 'I' as it is. When once we have found this type of knowledge to be as a rule true, we may relegate to its field all knowledge that is as a rule true in the sense that it grasps its object as it is. In this connection we may mention the knowledge of pleasure, pain, fear, knowledge, and so on, which are the properties of *manas*. These things are not grasped when they are not there. No one thinks that one is happy when one is not so. Similarly one does not think that one has the knowledge of an external object when one does not really have it. So the knowledge of the entities that are mentioned is as a rule correct. On the basis of its invariable truth we may conclude that its origin is the same as that which is the origin of self-consciousness. If the origin of this knowledge is that of the knowledge only of the external objects, then the thorough-going distinction between the knowledge of the external objects and that of the self and so on would be meaningless. The same consideration shows how the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are wrong in viewing the self as revealed by the perception of *manas*. In sleep there is no *manas*, but the self is revealed.

The fundamental character of the distinction between the two types of knowledge points to the fact that they are caused by the operation of different instruments. We have seen how the instrument of one type of knowledge consists in the six sense organs—five external and *manas*. The source of the other type of knowledge is different. The fact that it is the source of self-consciousness gives a clue to its nature. The instrument of self-consciousness must be an aspect of the self itself. It cannot be any thing else. To imply this idea it is called *sākṣi*. This term literally means witness. It is witness because it witnesses all that happens to the self.

So far we know that there are two types of knowledge. (1) The knowledge that is produced by the external senses and *manas*. (2) The knowledge that is produced by *sākṣi*. We observe the function of *sākṣi* in the whole of individual experience consisting of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep. In the waking state the individual has the experience of particular objects. With regard to every experience we can observe the work of the two types of the organs. We may take for instance the

knowledge 'I know this jar'. We may analyse it into its constituents. In it 'I' represents the idea of the self; 'know' the idea of knowledge, and being a verb in the present tense it stands for time; and 'this' presents the jar as a particular, and in doing so it refers to the spatial and temporal points, which it occupies, as well as to its distinction from the rest of the world. Of these ideas the idea of the particular jar alone is caused by the external sense organ and *manas*. The other ideas are not caused by them. This may be illustrated by taking the case of the idea of the self. It is evident that an external sense organ does not comprehend the self. *Manas* also is impotent to comprehend it. The knowledge of the self comes prior to that of *manas*. This is illustrated by the experience, 'My *manas*'. If *manas* were to apprehend the self, then this experience would be impossible. From this it follows that the self is evident to itself. As apprehending itself it is called *sākṣī*. The same is the case with reference to the idea of knowledge. This idea is not caused by the external sense organs. Nor is it the work of *manas*. This may be explained by taking for instance the knowledge of a memory. Memory may be right or wrong. So it is the work of *manas*. But the knowledge of memory is, as a rule, right. So it is the work of *sākṣī*. The knowledge produced by *sākṣī* as apprehending even knowledge must be self-conscious. To hold that it is apprehended by another piece of knowledge is never to arrive at knowledge, since every piece of knowledge is to be apprehended by another piece of knowledge. Similar is the consideration with regard to the idea of time and space. This idea is correct even though the object in question is not real. Therefore it is produced by *sākṣī*. We have to note a point with reference to the idea of the distinction of the object from the rest of the world. Though the distinction is given along with the object given, it has a reference to the rest of the world. The sense organ is in contact only with the particular object. It has nothing to do with the rest of the world. But unless there is the idea of the rest of the world the distinction of the object from it cannot be apprehended. But along with the object its distinction is given. This means that the idea of the rest of the world also is given. It is obvious that it is caused neither by an external sense organ nor by *manas*. Therefore it is caused by *sākṣī*. It occurs only in a general manner so as to help the idea of distinction. This is why it is not very explicit. Thus the

knowledge, 'I know this jar' is caused by the combined activity of both *sākṣī* and the other sense organs. Similar is the consideration with regard to all knowledge that generally occurs to a knower in the waking state.

It may be noted that the same is the nature of the knowledge in the dream state of a knower. For instance the knowledge, 'I know this to be so and so' may be taken. In dream the external sense organs do not function. *Manas* and *sākṣī* function. The knowledge of the self and that of knowledge are caused by *sākṣī*. The knowledge of the particular objects is caused by *manas*. The general idea of the other things from which the particular objects are different is also caused by *sākṣī*. With reference to time and space a distinction is to be noted. In dream there is a reference to time as day or night; and to space as an extension. These ideas are caused by *manas*, because they are only the aspects of things. But the ideas of time and space on whose basis the thought of day, night or extension appears are of course caused by *sākṣī*.

It is easy to understand the function of *sākṣī* during deep sleep. *Sākṣī* is an aspect of the self. It is therefore always active. It is never at rest. It is there so far as the knower is there. In the state of sleep even the *manas* of the knower is at rest. He has then only the knowledge caused by *sākṣī*. So the function of *sākṣī* is a matter of direct observation during sleep. This is the experience of all. When it is said that there is no knowledge during sleep what is meant is that there is no knowledge of the external objects as caused by *manas* with or without the help of the external sense organs. Without realising this fact some thinkers hold wrongly that sleep is characterised by the complete absence of knowledge. The fact that there is knowledge caused by *sākṣī* in sleep may be evidenced by taking for instance the memory, 'So long I slept quite happily' into consideration. This memory happens to the knower soon after sleep is over. Memory is impossible without the corresponding previous experience. In the present case the experience which forms the basis of memory must happen during sleep itself. In this 'memory 'so long' indicates time, 'I' indicates self, 'slept' indicates both time and sleep, and 'quite happily' stands for happiness. Unless there are the ideas of these things in sleep itself the memory would be impossible. These ideas in sleep must be caused by *sākṣī*, because

there is then nothing else to cause them. To deny the function of *sākṣī* during sleep is to deny the possibility of the later memory. So the state of sleep is not blank. Like the other two states it is a state of experience. Their difference is only this. While in the other states *sākṣī* functions along with the other sense organs, during sleep it functions alone.

So far it is determined that there are two types of knowledge, (1) The knowledge that is produced by *manas* with or without the co-operation of the external sense organs. And (2) the knowledge that is produced by *sākṣī*. Of them the former is true or false according to circumstances and the latter is, as a rule, true. In both cases true knowledge presents the object as it is. The nature of false knowledge will be considered later. So the possibility of knowledge is a test of the reality of the object.

The Object of Knowledge is Necessarily Real

Knowledge apprehends its object as 'is'. An object 'is' if it exists at a particular point of time and space. The knowledge of a jar may be taken for instance. The bare jar devoid of its spatial and temporal references is never apprehended by knowledge. The jar is apprehended as 'is' and in being done so it is presented as existing at a particular time and space. At times the absence of a thing may be apprehended by knowledge, as 'There is not a jar' and even then it is apprehended with its spatial and temporal relations. In the sense that an object apprehended by knowledge exists at a point of time and space the object must be regarded as real. So the object of knowledge is necessarily real.

The Definition of The Real¹

An object of knowledge is considered to be real because it is apprehended as existing at a point of time and space. Following the spirit of this consideration a real thing may be defined as that which exists at a particular point of time and space. This definition of the real is fundamental in the sense that to define the real by its other characters presupposes that it exists at a point of time and space. Without admitting its existence at a point of time and space no other consideration can be had

¹N.M., 93-98.

with reference to the real thing. Following Buddhism it is possible to define a real thing as that which produces some other thing. But unless it is held that the thing exists it is impossible to hold that it produces some other thing. So the existence of a thing at a point of time and space characterises the reality of the thing, and on the basis of its existence any other definition of its reality may be formulated.

To define the reality of a thing by its existence in time and space does not mean that it must, in order to be real, exist at all times and space. It is real if it exists at a point of time and space. A real thing may be eternal or non-eternal. In either case it is equally real, for in either case it exists at a point of time and space. In other words a real thing whether it is eternal or non-eternal is not that which does not exist in time and space. That which does not exist in time and space is unreal (*asat*). A hare-horn does not exist in time and space. It is unreal. Its absence is real. So we may conclude that what is presented by knowledge is real. It may be noted that by knowledge in this connection is meant right knowledge (*pramā*). The nature of wrong knowledge will be considered later on.

The Significance of Knowledge-object-relation as Real

In Advaita it is said that the relation between knowledge and its object is *mithyā*, *anirvacaniya* or *ādhyāsiḥ*. It is wrong. Knowledge is not without object and object is real. This suggests that the relation between knowledge and object is also real. To know an object is the very essence of knowledge. Likewise to be known by knowledge is the very essence of object. This means that there is a natural relation between the two. Without this relation they would be impossible. We can give any name to this relation. We may with convenience call it knowledge-object-relation. The essential point we have to note in this connection is that this relation is as much real as knowledge and object. On the basis of the supposition that the relation between knowledge and its object is impossible it is held by the Vijñāna-vāda that knowledge alone is real while the object is not. It is wrong. Without object knowledge cannot be given as being relative to object. If there is no object at all, then there is no reason why there is the thought of an object. A single piece of knowledge is different from the other pieces of the same because it is of a particular object which is

different from the other objects. If there are no objects at all, then the distinction between knowledge and knowledge cannot be had. If there is nothing objective, then it is not possible even to be conscious of knowledge. To be conscious of knowledge is to have the knowledge of knowledge. This means that knowledge is taken to be objective at least in so far as the consciousness is made possible. To regard anything as objective is impossible unless there is already a well defined conception of object. So without object knowledge is not; and the Viśṇāṇa-vāda contradicts itself.

The foregoing considerations show that it is the very nature of knowledge to present a real object without any condition. This fact leads us to the conception that knowledge is intrinsically true.

The Truth of Knowledge is Not Conditioned¹

Knowledge is intrinsically true. Its truth is not conditioned by anything external to it. If its truth were so conditioned, then the very fact of knowledge would have been impossible. We have noted that the very function of knowledge is to present that which is real. This means that it has an intrinsic capacity to do so. This capacity is no other than what is called truth. We can no longer persist in denying the intrinsic truth of knowledge, because in the very act of denial we are presuming that the knowledge of the denial at least is true by itself. To accept or reject this presumption is equally perilous to the denial.

The Meaning of the Intrinsic Truth of Knowledge

If knowledge by nature presents that which is real, then it inevitably follows that it presents its object as it is. From this point of view it may be called *yathārtha*. For instance the knowledge, 'This is a jar' may be taken. The jar is in a particular point of time and space and it has the property, 'jariness'. It is so apprehended by knowledge and the knowledge is consequently called *yathārtha*. It is this knowledge that is taken to be true.

Under Special Conditions Knowledge becomes Untrue (Ayathārtha)

Under normal conditions knowledge is as a rule true. But under abnormal conditions it is not true. Having true know-

¹ N.S., 209-20; N.M., 130-40.

ledge in view we have so far concluded that knowledge is relative to its object, that the object of knowledge is real and that the relation between knowledge and its object is also real. From all this it follows that knowledge appears only when the conditions both of itself and of the object are all right. The conditions of knowledge are the sense organs and so on; and the conditions of object are those that make the object correctly apprehended. In order to produce correct knowledge the sense organs and so on must be defectless, and in order to be correctly apprehended by knowledge the object must be in a position which enables the correct apprehension of it. If there is any defect in the sense organ, then the organ cannot produce correct knowledge. The colour blind eye cannot produce the correct knowledge of colour. If the object is too distant to come into proper contact with the respective sense organ, then it cannot be apprehended correctly. Defects in the sense organs and the inconvenient situation of the objects render the conditions of knowledge abnormal. Under these conditions the knowledge that is produced becomes incorrect.

From these considerations it follows that the proper conditions of knowledge naturally give rise to correct knowledge and if the conditions are affected by any defect, then they give rise to incorrect knowledge. Just as there is no knowledge which is devoid of both truth and untruth there is no condition of knowledge which is devoid of both merit and defect. The conditions of knowledge in the normal sense are defectless.

So far it has been explained how knowledge in order to be true does not require anything more than the natural cause of knowledge. For this reason the production of the truth of knowledge is called *svatah*. Under a particular circumstance knowledge may be untrue. The untruth of knowledge is caused by some condition such as the defect of a sense organ and so on. This condition is external to the natural cause of knowledge. A sense organ is by nature sound and a defect in it is external to it. For this reason the production of the untruth of knowledge is called *paratah*.

The consideration of the production of true or untrue knowledge leads us to the question of the apprehension of knowledge as true or untrue.

The Apprehension of the Truth of Knowledge

It is already determined how the truth of knowledge does not originate from anything other than the entities that are responsible for the rise of knowledge. From this it follows that naturally the truth of knowledge is evidenced by knowledge itself and it does not require to be proved by anything external. We have observed two types of knowledge—the knowledge that is produced by the sense organs including *manas* and the knowledge produced by *sākṣī*. And we have already noted how the former type of knowledge is apprehended by the latter and how the latter is self-luminous. The fact that the truth of knowledge is evidenced by knowledge itself needs to be understood in different senses with reference to these two types of knowledge. The knowledge produced by *manas* with or without the help of the external sense organs is apprehended by *sākṣī*. *Sākṣī* does not apprehend the bare knowledge. Along with knowledge it also apprehends its truth. So whenever it apprehends knowledge it apprehends it as true. The knowledge produced by *sākṣī* is self-luminous and so also its truth. So in the light of these considerations it is easy to see how the truth of knowledge does not require to be determined. So to talk of the determination of the truth of knowledge is not consistent with the nature of knowledge.

In formulating this conclusion one point is to be made clear. The truth of knowledge does not require to be determined under normal circumstances. Under these circumstances we do not doubt the truth of knowledge when the knowledge happens to us. Immediately after the appearance of knowledge we have the activities that naturally follow the fact of knowledge. On meeting our friends we greet them. Immediately on meeting our elders we show them respect. On these occasions we do not sit leisurely deliberating over the truth of our perception and to regulate our course of action in accordance with our decision. The activities 'without-doubt' that follow the occurrence of knowledge clearly indicate the self-evident character of knowledge with its truth.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that the truth of knowledge is determined by means of the consistency of the knowledge in question with the other intellectual activities and by means of the successfulness of the activities that follow the knowledge.

They are wrong. If consistency or successfulness is to determine the truth of knowledge, then what is it that determines the truth of the thought of consistency or successfulness? To accept some other consistency or successfulness as determining its truth never solves the problem, since the thought of the new consistency or successfulness needs to be determined. To hold that this thought is itself given as true invalidates the position that the truth of knowledge is determined by consistency or successfulness. This implies that the truth of knowledge is self-evident.

The fact that *sākṣī* apprehends knowledge with its truth is only a general rule. It has some exceptions. Under particular circumstances the truth of knowledge may be doubted. In this case *sākṣī* apprehends only the knowledge but not its truth. The truth of this knowledge needs to be determined by means of external agencies such as consistency and successfulness. In the conscious presence of these agencies *sākṣī* apprehends the truth of the knowledge.

Under peculiar circumstances the knowledge in question may indecisively be determined as true. But this determination is not the work of *sākṣī*. To hold that it is the work of *sākṣī* is not consistent with the nature of *sākṣī* whose work is always correct. So the indecisive determination is the work of *manas*. In this case of knowledge *sākṣī* comprehends only the knowledge and owing to the circumstances is indifferent towards its truth. For the same reason there is the indecisive determination of truth by *manas*. That the determination is indecisive is brought to light when the truth of knowledge is doubted on the basis of other considerations. This circumstance may be illustrated by means of the following example. Suppose a person is told that there is water at a spot near by. Then he doubts if the information is correct. Next he observes the effects of the presence of water such as cool air. He concludes that there is water. It may be supposed that he next somehow doubts the validity of his conclusion. He proposes to examine the thing. He goes to the spot where water was supposed to be. He perceives water. He drinks it. He gets satisfaction. Satisfaction is an aspect of happiness. It is enjoyed by *sākṣī*. This enjoyment consists in *sākṣī*'s knowing the satisfaction. Since this knowledge is produced by *sākṣī* there can be no doubt about its truth. From the truth of this knowledge it inevitably follows that the knowledge of water is true and therefore that the water is real.

When once the truth of knowledge is determined by *sākṣi*, afterwards there can be no doubt regarding the truth of any of these experiences. The knowledge of water produced by inference was first determined to be valid and subsequently its validity was doubted. This means that the validity of knowledge was then determined by *manas*. Thus from the beginningless time *sākṣi* has apprehended the unreliable determinations of *manas*. Therefore under particular circumstances *sākṣi* does not suddenly apprehend the truth of the knowledge produced by *manas*, unless it is helped by the external means such as consistency. In any case we have to note that the truth of knowledge is always apprehended finally by *sākṣi*. That the truth of knowledge is apprehended by *sākṣi* must be understood consistently with these ideas. Simply because consistency and successfulness help the apprehension of the truth of certain instances of knowledge one must not suppose that the apprehension of truth itself is conditioned by them. Consistency and successfulness remove the obstructions that stand in the way of *sākṣi*'s apprehending the truth. So in all cases truth is apprehended by *sākṣi*. For this reason the apprehension of the truth of knowledge is called *svataḥ*. No doubt the untruth of knowledge also is finally apprehended by *sākṣi*, but the fact that in apprehending untruth *sākṣi* necessarily requires the help of the absence of coherence and so on must not be forgotten. So *sākṣi*'s apprehension of untruth is conditioned by the absence of coherence and so on. For this reason the apprehension of untruth is called *parataḥ*.

In closing this topic a point may be noted. In Advaita it is said that the truth of a certain piece of knowledge may be determined at the present time, but there is no guarantee that the knowledge will not be sublated at a future time. This kind of argument involves self-contradiction, because the argument must be based upon the determination that at least the thought of the doubt is true. If every thing is doubted, then there is no reason why the fact of doubt itself is not doubted. If it is doubted, then there is no argument, because the doubt is illegitimate.

So far we have seen that knowledge is naturally true and it is normally given as true. By true knowledge we meant that which presents the object as it is. This explains that knowledge is the only key to the world of objects. So in understanding the world of objects we have first to note the details of true knowledge. The true knowledge is called *pramā*, and

to indicate that this knowledge alone is the key to the objective world and that the world presented by true knowledge is real, the world of objects is called *prameya*.

The self-evident character of knowledge and its truth, and the reality of its object are better understood by a correct idea of wrong knowledge and the nature of its object.

WRONG KNOWLEDGE (*BHRĀNTI*)

Wrong knowledge is called *bhrānti*. It is better understood by considering how it is contrasted with right knowledge. The following is a typical instance of *bhrānti*. There is a shell. A person mistakes it for silver. His mistake is embodied in the judgment, 'This is silver'. Under normal circumstance he ought to have the judgment, 'This is a shell'. Owing to some mistake or other he has the judgment, 'This is silver' in place of 'This is a shell'. Of these the latter is correct and the former wrong. The latter is correct because it presents the object as it is. The object that is presented is a shell, and the knowledge presents it as a shell. The former is wrong because it presents the object as it is not. The given object is only a shell and it is not silver and the knowledge in presenting it as silver presents it (the shell) as it is not.

The analysis of the two kinds of judgment, right and wrong, gives us the notion of truth and error. Truth is the property of that knowledge which presents the object as it is. Objects of experience are of two kinds—positive and negative. The objects such as a jar are positive and the absence of these objects is negative. That is positive which is apprehended at the very first instance of its apprehension as existent. A negative thing is apprehended at the very first instance of its apprehension as non-existent. Correct knowledge at the first instance, presents the positive as existent and the negative as non-existent, and wrong knowledge, at the first instance, presents the positive as non-existent and the negative as existent. The case of wrong knowledge may be illustrated as follows. Taking for example the wrong knowledge, 'This is silver' what is presented here is silver and it is in fact non-existent; but it is presented as existent. What is really given is only a shell. It is of course

existent; but in the presentation of silver it is implicitly taken to be non-existent. So in this judgment the non-existent is taken to be existent and the existent is taken to be non-existent, and therefore the judgment is wrong.

One important implication of this explanation of *bhrānti* is that *bhrānti* presupposes the reality of the objective world. For if nothing is real, then there would be no occasion for *bhrānti* at all. This means that the doctrines of *anātmyā*, *ātmaśūnyā* and *anirvacanīyākhyā* are wrong, because they aim at negating the very presupposition of *bhrānti*. The truth of this observation is further substantiated by the following considerations.

Wrong knowledge for instance, 'This is silver' does not occur to one who has not the *saṁskāra* of silver. To have the *saṁskāra* of silver is not possible unless there is previously a right experience of silver. Further the wrong knowledge, 'This is silver' does not occur to one who has not perceived some quality of the shell that is similar to the quality of silver. Shining is this quality. It is a quality of those things that shine. Both shell and silver have shining. Unless the percipient sees the shining of the shell, his *saṁskāra* of silver is not kindled. Further the person who has not seen the 'this' aspect of the shell cannot have the knowledge, 'This is silver'. Further the knowledge, 'This is silver' presupposes the non-apprehension of the shell as shell though the shell is seen as 'this' having the quality, shining. The cause of this non-apprehension may lie sometimes in the percipient himself or sometimes in the object itself or sometimes in both. In the present case the defective eye-sight of the percipient may be responsible for the knowledge. If his sight were defectless, then he ought to have the knowledge, 'This is a shell'. Owing to the defect, he apprehends the shell only as 'this' having shining but not as a shell. On account of the apprehension of shining, his *saṁskāra* of silver is kindled. That only the *saṁskāra* of silver is kindled but not the *saṁskāra* of some other shining thing is due to his particular *adṛṣṭa* or *karma*. With the influence of this *saṁskāra* there is finally the knowledge 'This is silver'. So the presuppositions of this knowledge are the *saṁskāra* and, with it, the right experience of silver, the right experience of shining, the right experience of the shell as 'this' and the non-apprehension of the shell as shell. Further though, 'This is silver' is wrong, it is not objectless. As it is caused by the eye, which is in contact with the shell, its

object is the shell itself. The shell is real as a shell; but as it is presented by this knowledge i.e. as silver it is unreal. Similar is the explanation of any other instance of wrong knowledge. To imply all that is explained this theory of wrong knowledge is called *abhinavānyathākhyāti*. This expression means *anyathākhyāti* in a novel form. *Anyathākhyāti* presents the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika explanation of wrong knowledge. Two ideas are presented in this explanation. (1) That which is presented by wrong knowledge is not given; and (2) That which is presented by wrong knowledge has its existence somewhere else. According to *abhinavānyathākhyāti*, the second idea, that which is presented by wrong knowledge has its existence elsewhere, is rejected on the ground that it is irrelevant to the fact of wrong knowledge and the first idea, that what is presented by wrong knowledge is not given, is retained.

If the significance of this position is rightly understood, it is easy to see how the recognition of this position is fundamental to any other explanation of wrong knowledge. With a view to illustrate this point, the several explanations of wrong knowledge presented so far by the previous thinkers may be examined.

The Mādhyamika starts from the idea that the thing, say silver, presented by wrong knowledge does not exist and in the interest of *Sūnyavāda* concludes from this that all that is presented by wrong knowledge including 'this' in its relation to space and time is unreal. For this reason he calls wrong knowledge *atasthāyati*. His idea is that if some one of the things that are presented by wrong knowledge is unreal, then all that is presented is unreal. The previous analysis of the presuppositions of wrong knowledge clearly shows how this is a wrong idea and how wrong knowledge necessarily presupposes the right experience of real things. Further even the Mādhyamika has to admit that what appears in illusion is presented as real at least in so far as the illusion continues. This is to admit tacitly that wrong knowledge presents the non-existent as existent and the existent as non-existent.

The Vijñānavādin holds that what we see in illusion is only the idea of silver and this idea for the time being appears to be an outside entity and to imply this position he calls wrong knowledge *ātmākhyāti*. This is to admit that which is unreal is presented as real in illusion, for idea as an outside entity is unreal and it is given in illusion as real.

The position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas is as follows: 'The unreal cannot be seen, so the thing that is presented in illusion is not unreal. This means that the thing presented is real. But the thing presented, say silver, is not at the place occupied by the shell. This means that it must be elsewhere, say, in the 'silver shop.' With reference to this explanation also, it may be seen that the silver as presented at the place of the shell is unreal, and it is presented as real by the wrong knowledge.

Prabhākara denies wrong knowledge and holds that every piece of knowledge is faithful to the object as it is given. Yet he has to account for the usage (*vyaśāhāra*) of illusion. The following is his explanation: 'The knowledge that is said to be wrong really consists of two instances of knowledge. Taking for example 'This is silver' it may be seen that 'this' is presented and 'silver' is remembered. 'This' is perception and 'silver' is memory. So they are different instances of knowledge. But owing to something wrong in the percipient, the difference between them is not apprehended. On account of this omission, there is the wrong usage "This is silver". Against this view, it may be noted that every usage, as a rule, presupposes the coresponding idea. If the idea is wrong, then the usage is wrong and if it is right, then usage is right. If 'This is silver' is a wrong usage, then it necessarily follows that the knowledge which causes it is wrong. Unless the two instances of knowledge that 'This is silver' is said to involve are apprehended as identical, there cannot be the usage 'This is silver'. If so it must be noted that the two instances of knowledge are unreal as identical and their unreal identity is presented as real by the knowledge that causes the wrong usage 'This is silver'.

The position of Advaita is this. The silver that is presented by wrong knowledge is not real, because it is sublated. It is not unreal, because it is known. Therefore it is *sadasadvitakṣaṇa*. Against this position it may be noted that the silver that is *sadasadvitakṣaṇa* is unreal as normal silver; but it is presented as normal by the wrong knowledge, 'This is silver'.

The position of Viśiṣṭadvaita is this. 'The so-called wrong knowledge presents silver in the place of a shell, because of the similarity between the two, a shell and silver. Similarity implies actual presence of the thing that is similar. That silver is similar to a shell means that there is silver in the shell. In the case of the so-called wrong knowledge the defective sense-organ

of the percipient apprehends only silver but not the shell and there follows the knowledge 'This is silver'. This knowledge is true, because that which it presents is actually given. But the silver that is presented is not practically useful and for this reason the knowledge is called wrong. The knowledge 'This is a shell' is right, because the shell that is presented is useful as a shell'. Against this view it may be noted that the silver that is presented by wrong knowledge is unreal as useful, but it is presented as useful.

So the fact that wrong knowledge presents the unreal as real and the real as unreal is implicit in the very conception of wrong knowledge. It has also been explained how wrong knowledge necessarily presupposes the correct knowledge of the things that make wrong knowledge possible.

RIGHT KNOWLEDGE (*PRAMĀ*)

So far, it is explained that knowledge by nature grasps its object as it is, and that it goes wrong if there is anything wrong in its conditions. We may now explain *pramā* as that knowledge which grasps its object as it is. From this point of view it is called *yathārtha jñāna*. *Pramā* as *yathārtha* is definite and it is different from doubt and wrong knowledge.

The fact that *pramā* grasps its object as it is, implies that the instrument by which it is produced also grasps the object as it is. Just as *pramā* is *yathārtha*, its proximate cause also is *yathārtha*. In the previous philosophies we are told that *pramā* is the knowledge caused by *pramāṇa*. The primary meaning of *pramā* cannot be anything other than the knowledge that grasps its object as it is. This explanation is consistent with the fact that the truth of knowledge is *svataḥ*. To define *pramā* in any other manner cannot be consistent with this fact. To prove this point we may examine the Advaita definition that *pramā* is the knowledge of an object which is not sublated. A definition helps the knowledge of the thing defined. The knowledge of the thing defined presupposes that of the definition. So according to Advaita definition we have first to know that the object of the knowledge in question is not sublated, and then we may consider the knowledge to be *pramā* because its object is not sublated. But this position makes the apprehension of the truth of knowledge *parataḥ*, because the apprehension of the truth, according to this definition, is conditioned by the

determination that the object, in question, is not sublated. That the object is not sublated follows from the fact that knowledge is *pramā*, but it does not condition the truth of knowledge.

To say that *pramā* grasps its object as it is is only a re-statement of the fact that truth is *svataḥ*. It simply stands for the idea that if knowledge is true, then it grasps its object as it is. So in this case we do not start from the idea that knowledge grasps the object as it is and then arrive at the notion that the knowledge is *pramā*. On the strength of the fact that truth is *svataḥ* we have the idea that the knowledge, in question, is true and this means that the knowledge grasps the object as it is.

In defence of Advaita, it may be said that to say that *pramā* is the knowledge of an object that is not sublated is a restatement of the fact that truth is *svataḥ*. But it is irrelevant. The function of knowledge is to present its object. To say that it is true is to admit that it presents its object as it is. It does not imply any other character of the object. So to define *pramā* by the unsublated character of the object is unwarranted. Further to explain *pramā* as *yathārtha* has no significance in Advaita. Advaita believes in two types of objects, *vyāvahārika* and *prātibhāsika*. Supposing that knowledge grasps the *vyāvahārika* as *vyāvahārika* and the *prātibhāsika* as *prātibhāsika* we have to admit that it is true. But according to Advaita, at the time of knowledge, the object is not known as *vyāvahārika* or *prātibhāsika*. That the object is either is only a later determination. The *prātibhāsika* is that which is sublated by the knowledge that occurs to the beings like ourselves; and the *vyāvahārika* is that which is sublated by the knowledge that apprehends Brahman as *akhaṇḍa*. It is obvious that no knowledge apprehends its object either as *prātibhāsika* or as *vyāvahārika* and there can be no knowledge that can be regarded as *yathārtha*. Further, even granting the validity of the Advaita definition of *pramā* as that knowledge the object of which is not sublated one sees that it is inconsistent with the main position of Advaita. According to Advaita there is no object that is not sublated and consistently with this position there can be no *pramā* in this system. Further that the *prātibhāsika* and *vyāvahārika* are sublated needs a careful examination. If the *prātibhāsika* is really an object, then it cannot be sublated and if it is sublated, then it cannot be an object. By sublation Advaita

means complete disappearance of the object in view. This is inconsistent with experience. There is nothing that disappears completely if anything is really given. A given thing can only be destroyed, and when it is destroyed there still subsist some traces of it. A jar may be destroyed but still there subsist the parts of it. So, that there is *prātibhāsika* and that it is sublated are unwarranted. Similarly that something is *vyāvahārika* because it is sublated by the knowledge that Brahman is *aḥhaṇḍa* is only an assumption. We have seen that Brahman is *aḥhaṇḍa* cannot be justified. Even supposing that it is justified and it is real, there can be no knowledge of it. If there can be the knowledge of it, then Brahman ceases to be *aḥhaṇḍa* because as the object of knowledge Brahman is *mithyā* according to Advaita. If the knowledge of Brahman as *aḥhaṇḍa* is not justified, then that this knowledge sublates something and this something is *vyāvahārika* can never be justified. So the Advaita distinctions as *pāramārthika*, *vyāvahārika* and *prātibhāsika* are not valid and the definition of *pramā* based on these distinctions is not correct. To deny *pramā* as such is impossible because the denial itself presupposes that the knowledge of the denial is true. Further that the *vyāvahārika* is sublated by the knowledge of Brahman as *aḥhaṇḍa* is inconsistent with the Advaita position that *prāmāṇya* is *svataḥ*. According to this position the truth of the knowledge of an object is revealed by *sākṣī* and truth is the property of knowledge the object of which is not sublated. So the theory that the object of knowledge is *vyāvahārika* makes the conception of *pramā*, the conception of *pramāṇa*, the doctrine of *prāmāṇya* as being *svataḥ*, and with them the conception of the Veda and Vedānta impossible. If *pramā* cannot be explained, there can be no conception of *pramāṇa* because *pramāṇa* is said to be the proximate cause of *pramā*. Without *pramā* and *pramāṇa* there can be no problem of *prāmāṇya* (truth). Without them the Veda as *pramāṇa* and Vedānta as philosophy lose their significance.

Similarly the Viśiṣṭadvaita definition of *pramā*, namely, knowledge which is consistent with the usage as it is, can at best be a description of *pramā* and it does not bring out the essence of *pramā*. One obvious defect in it is that it presupposes the correct knowledge of the usage as it is. This means that the definition of *pramā* presupposes the knowledge of *pramā*.

The Meaning of Pramā as Yathārtha

In the light of the foregoing considerations it can be seen how the essence of *pramā* consists in the knowledge being *yathārtha*. *Pramā* as *yathārtha* means that it apprehends its object as it is. Whatever the other forms of an object may be, it is primarily real (*sat*). That an object is a jar or something else is only an expression of that it is real. The knowledge, 'This is a jar or a pillar', involves the recognition that it is real. Unless it is recognised as real it cannot be apprehended as a jar or a pillar. So, that *pramā* is *yathārtha* means that *pramā* is the knowledge that apprehends its object as real and the object is in fact real. One important implication of this position is that the object of *pramā* can never be sublated, and this means that the Advaita position that the object of *pramā* is *mishyā* is unwarranted. (In contrast with the position that *pramā* is the knowledge that apprehends the real as real, *bhrānti* is defined as that knowledge which apprehends the real as unreal and the unreal as real.)

Pramā is Pramāṇa

So the essence of *pramā* consists in grasping its object as it is. In this sense it is called *yathārtha*. The *pramā* of all finite knowers is in some sense or other produced. So each instance of *pramā* presupposes the operation of some instrument. There may be many things to bring about *pramā*. Among them the proximate one is regarded as the instrument of *pramā*. It is called *karana* or *sādhana*. A *sādhana* is that in the absence of which there is no production of the effect even though the other conditions are there and with the presence of which there is the production if there is no obstruction. Most of the previous thinkers hold that the proximate cause of *pramā* is *pramāṇa*. They regard *pramā* as the result of the operation of *pramāṇa*. *Pramā* is not *pramāṇa* in their view. Their position is not true to the nature of *pramā*. We have seen how the true nature of *pramā* consists in grasping its object as it is. Something is considered to be the instrument of *pramā* because like *pramā* it also grasps the object as it is. For this reason it is called *pramāṇa*. So it is the fact that an instrument of *pramā* grasps its object as it is that is responsible for its being regarded as *pramāṇa*. It is *pramāṇa*, because it is *yathārtha*. For the same reason *pramā* also must be regarded as *pramāṇa*.

PRAMĀṆA

Following the previous considerations, we can define *pramāṇa* as *yathārtha*. *Pramāṇa* is that which grasps its object as it is. An object is so called because it is grasped by *pramā*. Both *pramā* and its instrument are seen to grasp the same object. The instrument is viewed as grasping the object, because it generates the *pramā* that grasps the same. So grasping the object is immediate in the case of *pramā*, and mediate in the case of the instrument. If *yathārtha* is *pramāṇa*, then it inevitably follows that *pramā* is *pramāṇa* in the sense of its being immediate, and its instrument is *pramāṇa* because it generates *pramāṇa* knowledge. The definitions of the previous thinkers suffer from the defect that they all exclude *pramā* from the field of *pramāṇa*.

So both *pramā* and its instrument are *pramāṇa*. The former is immediate. The latter is mediate. To indicate this distinction the former is called *kevalapramāṇa*, and the latter *anupramāṇa*.

Kevalapramāṇa

Pramā is *kevalapramāṇa*.¹ There are different kinds of *pramā*. They are the *pramā* that is produced by *sākṣi* including self-consciousness, the *pramā* that is produced by *manas* with or without the help of the external sense organs, and the *pramā* produced by *anumāna* and *āgama*.

Anupramāṇa

Anupramāṇa is the proximate cause of *kevalapramāṇa*. There are three kinds of *anupramāṇa*. They are *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama*. *Pratyakṣa* generally grasps a few objects that are near, present and not separated. *Anumāna* grasps the objects that are distant, past, future and separated. And *āgama* grasps independently all objects including even the transcendent (*atindriya*).

¹ According to this system there are four types of *kevalapramāṇa* belonging respectively to *Ita*, *Lakṣmī*, *yogin* and *ayogin*. An *ayogin* is a being like ourselves. Only the *kevalapramāṇa* of an *ayogin* is considered in this work. For details see P.L.T. 2-4; 16-17.

PRATYAKṢA

Pratyakṣa is a defectless sense organ (*indriya*). There are seven sense organs. They are the five external sense organs, *manas* and *sākṣi*. Of them the first six are external to the self. *Sākṣi* is the very nature of the self. The external sense organs produce knowledge in the real sense of the term, production. *Sākṣi* does not produce knowledge. The knowledge that results from the operation of *sākṣi* forms the very nature of the self. This knowledge is *caitanya*. It is eternal, because it is the very essence of the self. It is not produced. It is only made manifest by *sākṣi*. Otherwise it is in a state of non-manifestation.

The objects of *sākṣi* are the self, knowledge produced by *manas*, space, time, pleasure, pain, fear and so on. Each knower has his own *sākṣi*. *Sākṣi* is as a rule *pramāṇa*. The knowledge that results from it also is as a rule *pramāṇa*. *Sākṣi* is self-evident. Its truth also is self-evident. As an instrument of knowledge it is established by the fact that the knowledge that belongs to the nature of the self is at times non-manifest and requires an instrumental cause to make it manifest. In sleep the self enjoys the natural bliss. In the waking state this enjoyment is non-manifest. Its manifestation in sleep presupposes the operation of some instrument. The instrument is *sākṣi*.

Manas is a sense organ as well as the abode of *apīti* knowledge. It helps the external sense organs in generating the knowledge of their objects. This is clear by the fact that the mere contact between a sense organ and its object does not produce knowledge. If the sense is backed up by attention, then there is knowledge. This attention is the operation of *manas*. The knowledge that is produced by the sense organs must have an abode. We have seen how the self is not the abode, but *manas*. When the knowledge ceases to be it leaves its impression in *manas*. This impression is called *samīkṣā*. With the help of this *samīkṣā* *manas* generates the knowledge called remembrance. Just as the knowledge produced by an external sense organ is *pratyakṣa*, remembrance produced by *manas* is also *pratyakṣa*. The previous thinkers ignore this point. There is a great controversy in the previous systems about the inclusion of remembrance in *pramā*. It was originated by the Buddhists. They said that remembrance is the result of imagination (*vikalpa*), and therefore not *pramā*. The Nyāya-

Vaiśeṣikas definitely excluded it from the sphere of *pramā*. The Prābhākaras also held that *pramā* is necessarily different from remembrance. Kumārila and following him Advaita consider *pramā* to be the knowledge of a novel object. Their idea is that the object of memory is not novel and therefore memory is not *pramā*. Against these thoughts we have to note the following points. *Pramā* is *yathārtha*. We have seen that memory is also *yathārtha*. It grasps its object as it is. Therefore it is *pramā*. The object of *pramā* may not be novel. So memory, even though it grasps an object that is already known, can be *pramā*. If we insist on the novelty of the object of *pramā*, even then it is not difficult to see how the object of memory is novel. Memory grasps its object as something that was. This was not the manner in which the original knowledge grasped the same object. It grasped the object only as something that is. Now the whole thing is grasped as past by memory. 'Pastness' is a novel property. It qualifies the object and makes it as novel as the object of any other *pramā*. So even as the knowledge of a novel object memory is *pramā*.

Manas is inert. The knowledge it produces is also inert. Neither is self-evident. Both are illumined by *sākṣi*. *Manas* is also the abode of the various other things, such as the pleasure derived from the worldly things, pain, fear, courage, desire and so on. All these things are perceived by *sākṣi*.

The external sense organs are five. They are the eye (*cakṣus*), the ear (*śrotra*), the nose (*ghrāṇa*), the tongue (*rasana*), and the organ of touch (*śuk*). Each has its own object. Each produces the knowledge of its object only when it is in contact with it. Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Mīmāṃsakas, and Advaitins define the relation between a sense organ and its object in various manners. All their views are beside the mark. If a sense organ is near enough to perceive its object, then there is the knowledge of the object. The relation which is characterised by the nearness which is useful in giving rise to knowledge is neither *saṁyoga* nor any other relation. To indicate this idea it is called *pratyāsatti*.

The external sense organs and *manas* are inert. They are eternal in their subtle form. They are fed by *āhārikāra* and the five elements (*bhūtas*). In each sense organ there is the presence of the five *bhūtas*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that of the five sense organs each is the product of that element whose peculiar quality it grasps. They are not correct. If a thing

manifests a particular property of some other thing, then it does not follow that it is of the nature of the latter. Water manifests the odour of a piece of skin. But it does not belong to the element to which the skin belongs. Table salt manifests the taste of other things. But it does not follow that the salt is of the same nature of the things whose taste it manifests.

The knowledge of an external object appears when there is the relation between the self and *manas*, *manas* and the external sense organ, and the external sense organ and the object. Owing to the relation between an external sense organ and its object when the sense organ is in relation to *manas* there is produced the knowledge of the object in *manas*. This knowledge reveals the object and itself is illumined by *sākṣi*.

The *anishkharana* in Advaita corresponds to *manas*. *Anishkharana* is supposed to go to the object itself through the sense organ that is in contact with its object. The supposition is not supported by the law of economy of thought. Knowledge can be explained without attributing any movement to *manas*. Advaita attributes movement to *manas* (*anishkharana*) because otherwise it cannot account for the identity of *pramāṇa caitanya* and *viśaya caitanya*, which it supposes to be *pratyakṣa* knowledge. Its view of *pratyakṣa* knowledge is wrong. *Pratyakṣa* knowledge is a *vṛtti* of *manas*. *Pratyakṣa* is not *caitanya* unless it is generated by *sākṣi*. To hold that *pratyakṣa* is the identity of *caitanya* is not consistent with the view that *cit* is *akṣanda*. In explaining *pratyakṣa* as *cit* Advaita has inevitably to hold that *cit* is manifested under special circumstances. This means that *cit* has two states—the non-manifested and the manifested; and this sublates the fact that *cit* is *akṣanda*.

We have already seen how there can be nothing that is propertiless. Every object of knowledge is qualified (*saviśeṣa*). So at all stages *pratyakṣa* is determinate (*aviśeṣapaka*). It can be expressed in the form 'This is so and so'. The Prābhākaras and following them the Viśiṣṭādvaitins believe that at the first instance *pratyakṣa* has no reference to the things other than the object of *pratyakṣa*; and at the succeeding instances it refers to other things. On this ground they hold the *pratyakṣa* at the first instance to be indeterminate (*nirviśeṣapaka*) and at the succeeding instances to be determinate. They are wrong. At all stages the object of knowledge is a particular and it is grasped as a particular. Unless there is a reference to other things a

thing cannot be grasped as a particular. From this it follows that there is no indeterminate *pratyakṣa* at all. The Buddhists and following them the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that the *pratyakṣa* of an unqualified entity is *nirvikālpaka* and it is the basis of *savikālpaka*. Both are wrong. This is clear from the fact that at no time the object of knowledge is an unqualified entity. Advaita also holds that the *pratyakṣa* of an unqualified entity is *nirvikālpaka*. It illustrates its view by the knowledge produced by the statement 'This is the same man whom you saw before' made to one who actually sees the man in question. It considers this knowledge to be of pure identity that is independent of time relations, past and present. This is incorrect. There is no knowledge that does not refer to time. An object of knowledge is always grasped as referring to some time-relation. Further Advaita supposes that the intention of the statement 'This is the same man you saw before' is to give an idea of pure identity. It is not correct. The man who makes the statement naturally wants to say that the man who is seen at the present time is identical with the man who was seen at a past time. If he were to mean the pure identity of the man in question, there is absolutely no necessity for making this statement. In fact nobody wants to express pure identity. For pure identity is the self-identity of the man. It is ever there so long as there is the man. Further to see how the present man is identical with the past man, we may reduce the statement, 'This is the same man you saw before' to 'This is that' and consider the implications of 'this' and 'that'. 'That' does not merely mean a particular time-relation, but it also means the pastness of this relation. So the whole meaning of 'that' is that the man, in question had a particular time-relation. Similarly 'this' does not merely mean a particular time-relation, but it also means presentness of this relation. The pastness of the past relation is present, because it lives in the present. So the identity of 'this' and 'that' i.e. the identity of the present man with the past man is quite possible. This means that Advaita is wrong in abandoning this meaning and in accepting pure identity as the meaning of the statement.¹ So the *nirvikālpaka* of Advaita cannot be justified and *pratyakṣa* is, as a rule, *savikālpaka*.

¹ T.D.T., 28.

In order to produce *pratyakṣa-pramā* the external sense organs and *manas* must be defectless. If there is any defect in them the knowledge they produce is wrong. Likewise the object of a sense organ must be in a favourable position. The unfavourable position of the object may be regarded as its defect. So in order to enable its knowledge it should also be defectless. Further the relation (*pratyāsatti*) of a sense organ and its object is a necessary condition of *pratyakṣa-pramā*. From the standpoint of the importance of this relation *pratyakṣa* may be defined as the relation between a defectless sense organ and a defectless object.

The Jaiṇas hold *pratyakṣa* knowledge to be mediate, because it is mediated by the sense organs. They are not correct. The sense organs only cause knowledge. They do not come between knowledge and its object. The knowledge directly reveals the object. The relation between knowledge and its object is always immediate. But what we call *pratyakṣa* knowledge is distinct from the other kinds of knowledge because it is clear, vivid and definite.

Pratyakṣa knowledge is the basis of all mental activities. It gives the data on the basis of which alone other types of knowledge can be had. So the truth of *pratyakṣa* knowledge cannot be sublated by the other kinds of knowledge. If *pratyakṣa* sublates the other kinds of knowledge, then they are wrong. It is true that, at times, what is called *pratyakṣa* is wrong. A wrong *pratyakṣa* is caused by the abnormal conditions of knowledge. There are two varieties of wrong *pratyakṣa*. They may be illustrated respectively by: (1) 'This is silver' and (2) 'The moon has only about half a foot diameter'. The former is removed by the correct knowledge of the shell. But the latter is not removed even though we have learnt by astronomical science that the moon is a very huge body. The former is due to something wrong in the subjective conditions of knowledge. So when the condition is all right it ceases to be. The latter is due to the enormous distance by which the moon is removed from the percipient. The distance can never be removed for the percipient so long as he is on the earth. So the wrong *pratyakṣa* can never cease to be. We must not suppose that this *pratyakṣa* is at least theoretically sublated by the astronomical science which is nothing but reasoning and therefore that under some conditions reasoning is stronger than *pratyakṣa*. If we care-

fully analyse the source of this reasoning we do find out how the whole process of reasoning rests at some stage or other on a *pratyakṣa* whose validity is admitted. Without this *pratyakṣa* there is no reasoning. Therefore though in the present case *pratyakṣa* seems to be sublated by reasoning, we have to understand that it is not reason by itself that sublates *pratyakṣa* but it is the original *pratyakṣa* through the reasoning. So *pratyakṣa* has unconditioned priority to all the other kinds of knowledge. In this sense it is called *upajīvyā pramāṇa*.¹ *Anumāna* and *āgama* are dependent on it. They are called *upajīvikā*.

ANUMĀNA

Anumāna is a defectless proof (*hetu*). *Hetu*, *yukti*, *linga*, and *vyūpya* mean the same thing. In the very idea of these things there is involved the idea that *hetu* is along with its *sādhya* (the proved). Having this idea in mind, we may describe *anumāna* as the *hetu* which is along with its *sādhya*. From this it follows that the togetherness of *hetu* and *sādhya* is the necessary condition of *anumāna*. The togetherness is called *sāhacarya*. As a condition of *anumāna* it is called *vyāpti*. The reason for *sāhacarya* may be anything. It may be the causal relation between *hetu* and *sādhya*, or it may be something else. In all cases *sāhacarya* is *vyāpti*. To say that there is *sāhacarya* between a *hetu* and a *sādhya* means that without the latter the former is not. In this sense *sāhacarya* is also called *avinābhāva*.

It is possible to hold that there are two kinds of *vyāpti*, *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. *Anvaya* is between *hetu* and *sādhya*. *Vyatireka* is between the absence of *sādhya* and the absence of *hetu*. Of the two, *vyatireka* by itself is useless for *anumāna*. In every case of *anumāna* we have to obtain the knowledge of *sādhya* from the knowledge of *hetu*. To have this knowledge we require only the knowledge of *sāhacarya* between *hetu* and *sādhya*. Without this knowledge even though we have the knowledge of the *vyatireka vyāpti*, we do not have the knowledge of the *sādhya* from that of the *hetu*. So *vyatireka vyāpti* is useless independently of *anvaya vyāpti*. But it may be useful in so far as it helps the formation of *anvaya vyāpti*.

On the basis of *vyatireka vyāpti* the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that there is a separate class of *anumāna* called *kevala vyatireki*.

¹ N.M. 104-110.

For instance they cite the *anumāna*, 'The living bodies have souls, because they exhibit life activities. The body that has no soul does not exhibit life activities, for instance a piece of stone.' Against their position we may note that as *kevala vyatireki* this *anumāna* is not possible. For in this *anumāna* we have to obtain the knowledge that the living bodies have souls from the knowledge that they exhibit life activities. For this we require the *vyāpti* between the fact that the bodies exhibit life activities and the fact that they have souls. This is *anvaya*. Without this there is no *anumāna*. The same *anumāna* becomes possible if we make use of the *vyatireka vyāpti* in forming *anvaya vyāpti*.¹

The following is how the knowledge of *anvaya* is obtained from that of *vyatireka*. There is *vyāpti* between life activity and the existence of soul in the body. In other words life activity has *sādhacarya* with the existence of soul in the body, because it is the absence of the absence that follows from the absence of the existence of soul in the body. If we suppose that there is no existence of soul in the body, then it follows from this that there are no life activities in the same body. That there are no life activities in the body is the absence of life activities in the body. Whichever is the absence of the absence that follows from the absence of anything has *sādhacarya* with the latter. For instance we may take the example of smoke and fire. Smoke has *sādhacarya* with fire, because it is the absence of the absence that follows from the absence of fire. From the absence of fire the absence of smoke follows. The absence of the absence of smoke is smoke itself. Hence smoke has *sādhacarya* with fire.

If there is *vyāpti* between two entities, then one of them is *vyāpya* and the other *vyāpaka*. The knowledge of *vyāpya* gives rise to the knowledge of *vyāpaka*. The *vyāpti* between two entities means the *vyāpti* between two properties. Properties stand in various relations. Some properties imply the absence of each other, for instance the state of being produced and the state of being beginningless. If something is beginningless, then it is not produced. If it is produced, then it is not beginningless. Some properties are found to be together. Three types of these properties may be distinguished. (i) The properties, that are found together at times and not together at other times,

¹ With this modification the three classes of *anumāna*, *kevalānumāni*, *kevalavyatireki* and *anvayavyatireki* are accepted.

for instance, the state of being a man and the state of being a cook. They are found together in a male cook. They are separate in a female cook and in the man who is not a cook. (ii) The properties, one of which is at times found without the other and the other is always found together with the former. For instance the state of being smoke and the state of being fire. The latter is or is not with the former. But the former, as a rule, is with the latter. (iii) The properties each of which is, as a rule, together with the other. For instance the state of being produced and the state of being non-beginningless. Of them one implies the other. Of these four types of properties the former two do not make *anumāna* possible. The latter two do make it possible. On the whole the property which is not without the other becomes the *hetu* and the other the *sādhya*.

It is seen that *sāhacarya* is the necessary condition if the knowledge of the *hetu* is to give rise to the knowledge of the *sādhya*. This means that the *hetu* must be understood as having the *sāhacarya* with the *sādhya*. So after knowing the *hetu*, one must remember the *sāhacarya* and then understand that the *hetu* is qualified by that *sāhacarya*. Then only one can have the knowledge of the *sādhya*. There may be *sāhacarya* between *hetu* and *sādhya*, but if one does not know it, or one does not remember it, one does not have *anumāna*. Advaita holds that the knowledge of the *vyāpya* kindles the *saṁskāra* of *vyāpti* and then there is the knowledge of the *sādhya* or *vyāpaka*. It is not sound. Unless the *vyāpya* is understood to be qualified by *vyāpti*, there can be no knowledge of *sādhya*. The *hetu* is so understood if the *vyāpti* is remembered. So the remembrance of *vyāpti* is as necessary as the knowledge of the *hetu*.

The knowledge of the *sāhacarya* between the *hetu* and the *sādhya* is obtained as follows: The *sāhacarya* between two things is repeatedly observed by a person. As a result he realises that there is *sāhacarya* between every case of *hetu* and every case of *sādhya*. This is prior even to the determination of causal relation of two things. So *vyāpti* is *sāhacarya*.

From different points of view *anumāna* can be classified into different divisions. From the standpoint that *vyāpti* is *sāhacarya* there are three kinds of *anumāna*, *kāryānumāna*, *kāraṇānumāna*, and *sāmānyānumāna*. *Kāryānumāna* means the product (*kārya*) as proof (*anumāna*). For example, 'The mountain is on fire; because it has smoke'. In this case of

anumāna, smoke, the proof, is a product of fire, the proved. *Kāraṇānumāna* means the cause (*kāraṇa*) as proof. For example, 'That place is having rain, because it is covered by rain-bearing clouds'. In this case of *anumāna*, the rain-bearing clouds, the proof is the cause of rain, the proved. *Sāmānyānumāna* means that the proof (*anumāna*) is neither the product nor the cause of the proved. For example, 'This fruit has a colour, because it has a taste'. In this case of *anumāna*, taste, the proof, is neither the product nor the cause of colour, the proved.

From the standpoint of the nature of the things that are proved there are two classes of *anumāna* *dr̥ṣṭānumāna* and *sāmānyadṛṣṭānumāna*. In the former case, the person who has inference, is familiar with the proved while determining the *vyāpti* between the proof and the proved. For example, 'The mountain is on fire, because it has smoke'. While determining the *vyāpti* between smoke and fire, the person is familiar with fire, the proved. In the latter case the person is not directly familiar with the proved while determining the *vyāpti* but he is familiar with it in a very general manner. For example, 'Sacrifice leads to happiness in the other world, because it is a discipline like any other discipline that leads to a result'. In this case, the person is familiar with the idea of sacrifice leading to happiness, in a very general manner on the strength of the fact that it is a discipline. The proved, in this case of *anumāna* is not capable of being perceived.

From the standpoint of the persons who are benefited by *anumāna*, there are two classes of *anumāna*, *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna*. (These two classes are explained in Advaita.)

With reference to *parārthānumāna* we have to note one point. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that it consists of five members. Kumārila and, following him, the Advaitins hold that it consists of three members. None of them is consistent with experience. Men are of peculiar mental calibre. Some obtain the knowledge of *sūdhya* by the strength of the mere statement 'The mountain which has smoke has fire'. Others by the statement, 'The mountain is on fire; because it has smoke'. Some others require more propositions. So the number of the members is relative to the intellect of the man who has *anumāna*. There is no meaning in insisting upon any particular number of members.

The Fallacies¹ of Anumāna

There are two fallacies of *anumāna*. They are called *virodha* and *asangati*. There are three kinds of *virodha*. They are *pratijñā virodha*, *hetuvirodha* and *dṛṣṭānta virodha*. There are two kinds of *pratijñā virodha*, *pramāṇa virodha* and *svavacanavirodha*. There are two kinds of *pramāṇa virodha*, *prabala pramāṇa virodha* and *samabala pramāṇa virodha*.

Prabala Pramāṇa Virodha

For example we may take the *anumāna*, 'The world is *mithyā*, because it is an object of knowledge, for instance the silver that appears in illusion.' This *anumāna* is sublated by the *pratyakṣa* that grasps the world as real. Sublation is *virodha*. *Prabala* is stronger. Of the two *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, *pratyakṣa* is stronger.

Samabala Pramāṇa Virodha

The same *anumāna* is sublated by the *anumāna*, 'The world is real, because it is revealed by *pramāṇa*, for example, *ātman*.' Here the opposition is between two *anumānas*. They are *samabala* because they are equal, because both are the instances of *anumāna*.

There are two kinds of *svavacanavirodha*, *apasiddhānta* and *jāti*. *Apasiddhānta* is to contradict the position of one's teacher which one represents. *Jāti* is to contradict one's own position.

There are two kinds of *hetuvirodha*, *svarupāsiddhi* and *avyāpti*. *Svarupāsiddhi*: 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is the object of the eyes'. Sound is not the object of the eyes. So the state of being the object of the eyes is not in sound. *Avyāpti*: There are three kinds of *avyāpti*. (i) That which has the relation to both *sādhya* and its absence. 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is an object of *pramā*.' Against this we may note that even an eternal thing is an object of *pramā*. (ii) That which has no relation to *sādhya* but has relation to its *abhāva*. 'Sound is eternal, because it is produced.' An eternal thing is not produced. That which is produced is non-eternal. (iii) That which has no relation to *sādhya* or its absence. 'Everything is non-eternal,

¹ In this system various kinds of fallacies of *anumāna* are mentioned. But in this work only a few of them are summarised. For more information see P.L.T., 9-16.

because it is.' Here everything is under consideration. So the *hetu* cannot be known to have the relation to *sādhya* or to its absence.

There are two kinds of *dṛṣṭānta virodha*, *sādhya vaikālyā* and *sādhana vaikālyā*. *Sādhya vaikālyā*: 'Manas is non-eternal, because it is active, for example, a *paramāṇu*. *Paramāṇu* is not non-eternal. *Sādhana vaikālyā*: 'Manas is non-eternal, because it is active, for example, *karma*. Here the *hetu* is activity. It is not in *karma*, because *karma* itself is activity.

Asaṅgati

It is to use an *anumāna* to prove nothing fresh. Example—'The world has the creator, because it is a product' used to convince one who believes in the existence of the creator.

ĀGAMA

A defectless verbal testimony is *āgama*. The defects of a verbal testimony are—not to mean anything, to mean a thing that is nulated by other *pramāṇas*, to mean a thing that is already known, to mean a thing that is useless, to ask one to do impossible things, to teach difficult means to obtain a thing when it can be obtained by easier means and so on.

Āgama is in the form of a word or a sentence. A word is in a case (*vibhakti*). A sentence consists of words that fulfil three conditions, *śikṣakṣā*, *yogyatā* and *sannidhi*. (The meaning of these conditions is the same as it is in Advaita.)

This is how an *āgama* gives rise to knowledge. *Āgama* is clearly known. The object for which each word stands is remembered. Next the knowledge caused by the whole sentence is obtained.

There is much dispute regarding the meaning of a word among thinkers. Some hold that a word means a universal (*jāti*). For instance, the word cow is taken to mean the universal 'cowness'. Others hold that a word means a particular with its universal. For example, the word, cow is taken to mean a cow having 'cowness' in it. They mean by universal that property (*śabdaprasavṛtti nimitta dharma*) to signify which the word is formed. Some others hold that a word like jar means the universal, 'jariness', a proper noun like Devadatta means the particular called Devadatta, a word like *sānd* (dew-lap) means the form of the object and a word like cow means all the three—

the universal, particular and form (*jāti*, *vyakti* and *ākṛti*). None of these thinkers give us the correct knowledge of the function of a word. None of them is supported by experience. Without taking experience into consideration, they unnecessarily restrict a word to the things which they favour. If our starting point is experience we can say this much in this connection. The meaning of a word is that which is the object of the idea that is caused by the word. When we know a word we get a certain idea. The idea has an object. This object is the meaning of the word. When we know the word, jar, we get the idea of both 'jariness', the property, and the jar, the particular. So the meaning of the word, jar, is a particular qualified by 'jariness'. With regard to Sanskrit Language a peculiarity is observed. The word, *śukla* gives rise to the idea of both whiteness and a white thing. So both are its meaning. A particular meaning is determined according to the context. The word, *gata* means both the act of going and the thing that is gone. The context gives the idea of a particular meaning. So we have to mean things from words according to experience.

The relation between a word and its meaning is called *śakti*. Its knowledge is obtained by teaching and so on. If a parent points out to the child that a particular thing is called so-and-so, the child understands the relation between the word and the meaning. By using the same word in different contexts it knows the definite meaning of the word. As the child grows older it is acquainted with different means of learning this relation. These means may be all those that are enumerated by different thinkers, such as grammar, dictionary, and usage. The Prābhākaras restrict the means to the knowledge of *kāryatā*. The following is their position: 'The relation between an expression and its meaning is called *vyutpatti*. A boy obtains *vyutpatti* in the following manner. There are two elderly persons. They have *vyutpatti*. One of them says to the other, 'Bring the cow'. The other brings the cow. The boy observes all this; and thinks as follows: 'The other man has the activity that is necessary in bringing the cow. His activity is dependent on his will, even as my activity is. I will my activity only when there is the knowledge of the thing that causes the activity. So it is with the man. The cause of his activity is the knowledge that is similar to mine. The same kind of knowledge brings about activity in both of us. So the object

of knowledge must be the same. The difference between us lies only in how we obtain the knowledge. The manner how I have knowledge is not how he has the same. He has the activity after hearing the statement (*śabda*), "Bring the cow". Hearing the statement is the cause of his knowledge. Hence, what is stated must be the same as the object of my knowledge which leads me to act. Now it is easy to find out that which is stated. I may take the following example. Sucking is one of my activities. I do not have this activity merely because I know that there is such a thing as sucking, that it leads to a particular result, or that there is a particular relation between sucking and its result. I have the activity because I know that it is to be had. Whenever I have an activity to have something the activity is the result of my thought that the thing in question is to be had. I feel hunger. I have to get rid of it. I realise that I can do so only if I have sucking. This is the thought that sucking is to be had. By this thought I have the activity, sucking. Similar is the consideration with regard to all my activities. The cause of all my activity is the knowledge that the thing in view is to be had. (This knowledge is called *kāryatā jñāna*.) So it is in the case of the man. The cause of his activity is *kāryatā jñāna*. He has *kāryatā jñāna* by hearing the statement "Bring the cow".

So far the boy is aware that the statement gives rise to *kāryatā jñāna*. Next he hears another statement 'Remove the cow'. He realises that the cow is the object of both bringing and removing. Now he understands which word is responsible for giving rise to *kāryatā jñāna* in the statement 'Bring the cow'. He knows that the cow is the object of the activity, bringing. So he concludes that *kāryatā jñāna* is caused by the word, bring, which is in the imperative mood, and that the other words in the statement are needed only to make *kāryatā jñāna* definite. Thus he concludes that the function of all statements consists in giving rise to *kāryatā jñāna* and that therefore *kāryatā* is the meaning of all statements. When the principal meaning of *śabda* is known to him, it is easy for him to know the meaning of other words. As his experience grows he realises that the statements that do not lead to *kāryatā jñāna* are not complete, and that their meaning must be made complete by connecting them with a word which gives the idea of *kāryatā*. This is the position of the *prabhākara*s. This position is not consistent

with the disposition of children. It is too much to expect from a child that it should hear a sentence, remember it, observe the action of a man that follows from the knowledge of the sentence, connect his knowledge and action, realise the sentence as the cause of the knowledge, and when the action is over remember the whole process, and interpret it in the light of the later experience. A child is by nature forgetful.

There are two kinds of relation between a word and its meaning, primary and secondary (*mukhya vṛtti* and *amukhya vṛtti*). In either case the relation is the cause of the remembrance of the meaning of the word. The primary relation is called *lakṣi*. There are three kinds of *lakṣi*, *yoga*, *rūdhi* and *yogarūdhi*. A word consists of different parts. We may take, for instance, the word, teacher. This word comes from the root, to teach. Teaching is the meaning of the root. In the present form it is applied to a person who teaches. So the root with a particular form stands for this idea. The root and the form are the parts of the word. Each has its *lakṣi*. The root means teaching. The form means the substantive. The meaning of both together is a man who teaches. The *lakṣi* that is the cause of the memory of this meaning is called *yoga*. *Rūdhi* is the *lakṣi* if the meaning results from the power of the combination of various parts of a word. For example we may take the words, *ghaṭa*, *paṭa* and so on. These words are formed from suitable roots and forms. Their meaning is not restricted to what their parts mean. It is something more and it is understood through the combined force of the parts. *Yogarūdhi* is the *lakṣi* if a word means a thing by both *yoga* and *rūdhi*. We may take for instance the Sanskrit word, *pañkaja*. By *yoga* it means that which has its rise in muddy water, and by *rūdhi* it is applied to a lotus. So lotus is the meaning of the word, *pañkaja* by *yogarūdhi*. These *lakṣis* have two varieties. They are *yoga*, *mahāyoga*, *rūdhi*, *mahārūdhi*, *yogarūdhi* and *mahāyogarūdhi*. In these pairs the former does not require the perfection of the meaning and the latter does. We may use the same word, knowledge with reference to both *jīva* and *Īvara*. Knowledge is the property of both. If the word means the property of *jīva*, then it is applied to knowledge even though it is imperfect. If it means the property of *Īvara*, then it is applied to perfect knowledge.

The secondary relation is called *lakṣaṇā*. It presupposes the relation between the primary and the secondary meaning of a

word. There are three kinds of *lakṣaṇā*, *jahallakṣaṇā* and *ajahal-lakṣaṇā* and *lakṣistalakṣaṇā*. (These are explained in Advaita.) We have to note one point in this connection. In the case of *jahallakṣaṇā* the speaker has a particular intention in choosing the secondary relation. In making the statement 'The village is on the Ganges' he intends to imply that the village is very near the Ganges. For this reason this *lakṣaṇā* is called *kevalalakṣaṇā*. But in the case of *ajahal-lakṣaṇā* the speaker follows the usage. He has no special intention. For this reason this *lakṣaṇā* is called *rūḍha lakṣaṇā*. If there is any difficulty in accepting the primary meaning we have to accept the secondary one. *Gouṇī vṛtti* is another type of secondary relation. For instance, 'Devadatta is a lion' may be taken. Devadatta is a man and he is not a lion. Therefore the statement stands for, 'Devadatta is like a lion in point of boldness.'

There are two types of *āgama*. They are *pauruṣeya* and *apauruṣeya*. The Veda is *apauruṣeya*. The term *apauruṣeya* stands for the idea that the order of the words and the sentences of the Veda is the same from the beginningless time. It is not so in the case of *pauruṣeyāgama*. The order in it has a definite beginning. The Veda is repeated from the beginningless time following the order in which it is already repeated. In determining that the Veda is *apauruṣeya* we may follow the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* thinkers to a great extent.

The Veda and the System of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā is enquiry. *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* is an enquiry into the nature of *dharma* (duty). *Dharma* is taught by the positive injunctions and prohibitions of the Veda. By an enquiry into the nature of *dharma* the *pramāṇa* that reveals it, the manner in which it is obtained and the ultimate significance of it are known.

The Veda alone is the *pramāṇa* in *dharma*. So in order to understand the nature of *dharma* we have to study the Veda. The teaching of the Veda is systematised by Jaimini in his *Sūtras*. The system of *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* is based upon these *sūtras*. The *Mīmāṃsaka* looks upon the teachings of the Veda as representing a systematic whole where no contradictory statements are possible. If any passage seems to contradict any other, then the presumption is that the real meaning of the passage is not understood. He thinks that if one is to obtain the real meaning of any

passage, then one is to follow a certain discipline. He formulates this discipline by laying down certain principles called the *Mīmāṃsā Nyāyas* (the Canons of *Mīmāṃsā*). If the interpretation of any passage of the Veda satisfies these principles, then alone it is valid; otherwise it is not. They are as follows:

1. *Upakrama*: the meaning of a passage that occurs in a bigger passage that deals with a certain topic must be consistent with how the exposition of that topic begins.

2. *Upasamhāra*: the meaning of a certain passage must be consistent with how the exposition of the topic ends.

3. *Abhyāsa*: the meaning of a passage must be consistent with what is repeatedly observed in the exposition of the topic. The literal meaning of *abhyāsa* is repetition.

4. *Apūrvatā*: the meaning of a passage must be that which is not made familiar to us by any other *pramāṇa*. The literal meaning of *apūrvatā* is unfamiliarity.

5. *Phala*: what is known by a passage must lead to a definite result. The literal meaning of *phala* is result.

6. *Arthavāda*: the meaning of a passage must be consistent with what is commended, or made important.

7. *Upapatti*: the meaning of a passage must have the support of reason. The literal meaning of *upapatti* is reason.

The *Mīmāṃsika* holds that there are two kinds of duties—*laukika* (secular) and *śāstrika* (scriptural). The secular duties are determined by man according to his experience. But experience is silent with regard to the scriptural duties. It is these duties that are called *dharma*. They are known only through the Veda. They are of two kinds—*nitya* and *naimittika*. The *nitya* duties are unconditionally obligatory for all time. The performance of *sandhyā* is one of these duties. It is a prayer that should be offered in the morning, mid-day and evening, without fail. Bathing in holy water on particular occasions such as solar or lunar eclipse is *naimittika* duty. This duty is called *naimittika* because it requires a particular occasion to do it. Like the *nitya* duty it is also unconditionally obligatory. We cannot doubt the ethical value of these duties. Their ethical value is absolute, and it does not alter at any time. But the value of secular duties is not absolute. It differs under different conditions. The secular duties do not bring about man's salvation. His salvation depends on the performance of the scriptural duties. They are

ordained in the Veda in the form of *vidhi*—positive injunction and *nijedha*—prohibition. 'The *sandhyā* must be performed every day' is a positive injunction. 'No animal must be hurt' is a prohibition.

Against the *nāstika* thinkers the Mīmāṃsaka asserts that the Veda must be accepted as valid at least in the interest of the scriptural duty. Without the Veda this duty is not known and consequently man can never have salvation. Consistently with his starting point that the scriptural duty is known only through the Veda, he explains how it is not known through anybody's perception or inference. So he holds that the Veda is the work of no author, human or divine. In this sense he calls the Veda *apauruṣeya*.

To prove that the Veda is *apauruṣeya* is not an easy thing. The reasons are as follows:

1. The Veda is in the form of sentences. A sentence is made of words, and words are made of articulate sounds. The articulate sounds are produced by the activity of the human mouth. So the combination of them into words and of words into sentences are all produced by human agency. From this it follows that the Veda which is nothing but the combination of sentences is also produced. This means that the Veda must have an author; and it can not be authorless.

2. The meaning of a word is fixed by convention. But convention has a beginning. So the meaning has also a beginning. If so, the Veda which is supposed to be authorless and therefore to have no beginning must have no meaning, since there is no convention to fix its meaning. If the Veda has no meaning, then to hold that it is authorless is irrelevant.

3. Words denote particulars. Particulars have a beginning and an end. This means that words also have a beginning and an end. The Veda is composed of words; and hence it must have a beginning and end.

4. If the teaching of the Veda does not make experience richer, then it is useless.

5. If the Vedic teaching is sublated by experience, then it is not valid.

6. We know that a verbal testimony has an author. So the Veda also must have an author. The truth of a testimony depends on the merits of the author. If he has doubt or delusion regarding the things he says, then his testimony is not valid.

We do not know the author of the Veda, and therefore we do not know that he has no defects. So the validity of the Veda cannot be established.

The Mīmāṃsaka meets these objections as follows:

1. The articulate sounds are beginningless and endless. They are only manifested by human activity. This is why however differently we may pronounce an articulate sound it is recognised to be the same. 'Ga' may be pronounced differently; but it is the same 'ga' for all. In the case of common language the articulate sounds are woven into words and sentences by the activity of the human mind. The case of the Veda is different. Just as there are articulate sounds from the beginningless time there is the Veda without beginning.

2. There is a natural relation between a word and its meaning. Their relation is not conventional. If it were so, then each man will have to make his own convention before he learns language. If any statement is made to a beginner, then since he is entirely ignorant of the convention, he must think 'This statement may mean something to the man who makes it; but what have I to understand by it?' If we understand that the meaning of a word and the word are naturally related then it is not difficult to hold that the Veda is beginningless.

3. The words do not mean particulars. They mean only universals. The word 'cow' does not mean a particular cow but the universal 'cowness'. 'Cowness' has no beginning and no end. So the word as denoting universal must have no beginning and no end.

4. The teaching of the Veda enriches the world of experience. It says things that are consistent with experience. For instance we may take the teaching that soul is immortal. By experience we know that so much of an individual's action is without its fruit in the present life. If the physical death were the end of soul, then the action that did not yield its fruit now would be meaningless. If the immortality of the soul is a fact, then room is made for an action to yield its fruit; for if not in this life at least in the next life the action may yield its fruit. But the immortality of soul is not revealed either by *pratyakṣa* or *anumāna*. The *anumāna* that seems to prove it may not be decisive. The Veda as teaching the immortality of the soul really enriches our experience; because it is thoroughly consistent with experience. Hence the Vedic teaching is not useless.

5. The teaching of the Veda is not sublated by experience, *pratyakṣa* or *anumāna*. If it teaches that a piece of stone floats on water then it is sublated by experience. This is not the teaching of the Veda. It only teaches Scriptural duties. These duties are not given in experience. Hence the Vedas as teaching things that are not sublated by experience is valid.

6. The Veda has no beginning. Therefore it is authorless (*apauruṣeya*). Its validity is not vitiated by the defects of the author.

That the Veda is Apauruṣeya is further Determined as follows.

The Veda as scripture is different from the other scriptures. The authors of the other scriptures are generally known. There may be some scriptures the authors of which are not known. But it does not disprove the supposition that they are from some authors. In the case of the Veda no such supposition is valid. From the beginningless time the Veda is presented as authorless. The attitude of the various thinkers supports this fact. Even the *nāstika* thinkers were familiar with the *āstika* position that the Veda is *apauruṣeya*. The majority of the *āstika* thinkers hold that the Veda is authorless. The attitude of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is different. He believes that the Veda is composed by God. He agrees however with the other *āstika* thinkers in so far as he holds that the Veda is not composed by a human author. In tracing the Veda to a divine origin he supports the *āstika* thinkers to a great extent.

The fact that the Veda is authorless is also supported by its own expressions. The Veda says that its different portions are taught by different persons. But it does not give the implication that those portions are composed by those persons. It names those persons as *draṣṭṛs* (seers). They are only supposed to have discovered the Veda that was already there. This is the real meaning of the term *draṣṭṛ*. The use of this term suggests that even at the periods when the Veda is said to have been discovered the idea that it was authorless was in vogue. So we may conclude that it is traditionally held that the Veda is authorless.

The bare fact of tradition may not prove that the Veda is authorless. But there is no difficulty in holding that the tradition is supported by the other circumstances, that the Veda

is necessary for the knowledge of the scriptural duties, that it enriches experience without being sublated by it, and that there is no difficulty in holding it to be authorless. This determines that the Veda is authorless.

The Mīmāṃsaka has still to explain how the Veda which is supposed to be authorless is valid. For *pramāṇas* are *pramāṇas* only when they are sound. A verbal testimony is *pramāṇa* because it is sound. We know a verbal testimony gets its soundness by the merits of its author. If the author of a testimony is reliable, then only, his testimony is *pramāṇa*. It is difficult to conceive how the testimony that has no author can be *pramāṇa*.

The Mīmāṃsaka meets this difficulty by means of his doctrine of *prāmāṇya svataṣṭva*. He means by this doctrine that the truth of knowledge is produced and given along with the knowledge itself and therefore it does not need to be determined by anything external. Applying the same idea he explains that the truth of the knowledge produced by the Veda is given along with the knowledge and it is not conditioned by the merits of an author.

*The Veda and Dvaita Vedānta*¹

So far, the Mīmāṃsaka position that the Veda is *apauruṣeya* is briefly stated. In accepting this position Dvaita Vedānta carefully considers all the points connected with this problem and presents corrections or modifications in so far as they are necessary. The main spirit of the position of this Vedānta may be noted. We can of course distinguish between two aspects of *dharma*, secular and scriptural. But the difference between them must not be too much emphasised. With correct interpretation both are equally spiritual. This is the significance of *karma-yoga* taught in the Bhagavadgītā. Every act done with the thought of God as the sole director of all and of the individual self as completely depending on Him is as sacred as any scriptural act. As the real nature of God or of the individual self is understood only through the Veda, the Veda alone is the *pramāṇa* with regard to *dharma*. So the belief in *dharma* necessarily requires the belief in the Veda. With the rejection of *dharma* philosophy loses its true significance. A philosophy is

¹ V.T.V.T.; N.S., 195-227 and 237-278.

justified only in so far as it helps the spiritual advancement of man. The philosophy of the *cārvāka* gives no room for spiritual advancement and it becomes therefore a waste. The Buddhists and the Jains believe that the Buddha or Jina is omniscient and can therefore teach *dharma*. But one must see that after all men are men and omniscience cannot be attributed to them. Even supposing that someone has omniscience one cannot understand what it is and therefore one cannot rely on it too much. Nor can one determine *dharma* in its final form however best one takes one's self, because after all one cannot understand from what conscious or unconscious prejudices one is suffering. Further to follow the real path of spirituality presupposes so much of self-sacrifice and the abandonment of worldly comforts. Without a definitely sound view of reality and a correct outlook on life the life of *dharma* is impossible. To have all these qualifications one must rather depend on a *pramāṇa* the truth of which is self-established. Such a *pramāṇa* can be only the Veda. Its teaching has a universal application. It is not sublated by experience and in fact it enriches experience. Accepting the validity of the Veda, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas deny that it is *apauruṣeya* and hold that God is its author. But without the help of the Veda how can they know that there is God? Mere reasoning does not establish God. That the world requires a creator is itself a problem. So if the existence of God is itself doubtful, the validity of the Veda is not justified. And if the Veda were to be valid, then, under the circumstances so far explained, it must be *apauruṣeya*. As *apauruṣeya* the whole Veda stands for one idea. This idea must be found out by interpreting the Veda in accordance with the canon of interpretation (*Mīmāṃsā Nyāyas*). In interpreting a passage of the Veda one thing must be kept in mind that no vedic passage loses the sight of Brahman, the highest truth (*sarve vedā yarpadamāmananti*). There are three main portions of the Veda—*Mantra*, *Brāhmaṇa* and *Upaniṣad*. The *mantra* portion reveals the dependent nature of the several aspects of the inert world with the deities presiding over them and thereby arrives at the truth of God, the Independent principle of all. The *Brāhmaṇa* portion makes a reference to various *karmas* and finally arrives at the truth of God, the principle and the aim of *karma*. The Upaniṣadic portion presents the essence of the Vedic teaching—and it reveals directly the truth of God (Brahman). Each portion of the Veda is equally

pramāṇa with the others. Without realising this truth some previous thinkers divide the Veda into *karmakāṇḍa* and *jñānakāṇḍa* and try to reconcile these two divisions. In the right sense the whole Veda is devoted to *jñāna* and to interpret a passage without reference to *jñāna* is not sound. And by *jñāna* in this connection is meant the knowledge of God, the Absolute. Advaita holds that the *Upaniṣadic* statements that teach Advaita alone are *pramāṇa*. It is not so. Either all portions of the Veda are *pramāṇa* or not at all. That they are *pramāṇa* is the implication of the fact that they are *apauruṣeya*. So we cannot be partial to any particular statements. Their one teaching is that Brahman is perfect in every sense of the term. The perfection of Brahman is the source of the world. (*Tait*). The reality of the world is implied in the perfection of Brahman. The reality of all is traced to Brahman. In this sense Brahman is the Absolute and the world is Its expression. Brahman is one independent Reality. The *Upaniṣads* describe It as *Advaitīya*. This means that It has no other, that is equal to or better than It. It does not mean that there is no world. For to deny the world is to deny Brahman, because Brahman is no other than the real source of the world. The world has a dependent reality. It is as real as Brahman. So it is different from the latter. Here the difference is the difference between the Independent and dependent. As the source of all Brahman is immanent in all. Its mere immanence directs the process of the world. The world consists of *jīvas* and inert things.

Advaita holds that the essence of the *Upaniṣadic* teaching consists in the identity of *jīva caitanya* and *Brahma caitanya*. It is not true. There is not even a single statement in the *Upaniṣads* that teaches the identity of *jīva caitanya* and *Brahma caitanya* as interpreted by Advaita. There are of course some *Upaniṣadic* statements, such as, 'That thou art' that seem to teach the identity of *jīva* and Brahman. If we understand the real significance of these statements with their contexts, then we naturally come to the conclusion that these statements never intend to teach the identity of *jīva* and Brahman. We may illustrate this point by taking for example the statement, 'That thou art'. This statement teaches the similarity between *jīva* and Brahman. To be similar is to be different. This meaning is required by the context. The purpose of this context is to humble down the spirit of *Svetaketu* to whom the teaching is

made. Consistently with the context the greatness of Brahman and the littleness of *jīva* and therefore of *Svetaketu* are taught in this passage. Further to read the statement as 'That thou art' is misleading. If the apparent meaning of the statement is emphasized, then it is not consistent with the context. To get rid of this difficulty we can as well read the statement as '*Asatvamasi*. Thou art not that'.¹ We may consider another statement, 'I am Brahman' in this connection. This statement also does not mean the identity of *jīva* and Brahman. In the light of the context it must be interpreted from the standpoint of the ground as 'my ground is Brahman'. Similar is the consideration with regard to all the statements that appear to teach the identity of *jīva* and Brahman.

We have to note that the Veda is never *pramāṇa* if it teaches that which is sublated by *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* that has the support of *pratyakṣa*. The difference of *jīva* from Brahman is revealed by the *sākṣi* of a *jīva*. If the Veda teaches identity it becomes untrue. The teaching of the Veda must be consistent with the other *pramāṇas*. Advaita overlooks this consistency.

The Vedas generally teach that which is not revealed by the other *pramāṇas*. But their teaching is as a rule consistent with the latter.

According to the *Upaniṣads* Brahman is the efficient cause (*nimitta*) of the world. The source of the world is the overflow of the perfection (*pūrṇa*) of Brahman. Viśiṣṭādvaita considers Brahman to be the material cause of the world. This means that Brahman undergoes change along with the change of the world. But the *Upaniṣads* hold that Brahman is absolutely perfect (*pūrṇa*) and absolutely changeless (*nirvikāra*). Further there is no statement in the *Upaniṣads* that holds that Brahman is the material cause (*upādāna*) of the world. The basis for the Viśiṣṭādvaita conception that Brahman is the *upādāna* is a questionable interpretation of a statement in the *Chāndogya*, VI, that by knowing Brahman all else is known. Viśiṣṭādvaita infers from this that Brahman is the *upādāna*. This inference is sublated by

¹ The *Upaniṣadic* passage is '*Sa ātmāsatvamasī*' (Ch. VI). This can be read either as *sat, ātmā, satvamasī* or as *sat, ātmā, asatvamasī*. In either case the reading and its meaning must be justified by the context.

the Upaniṣadic position that Brahman is *nirvikāra* and *pūrṇa*. In fact there is no necessity for this inference. The true Upaniṣadic position is that Brahman is the very source of the reality of the world and as the source of all Brahman is *pūrṇa* and *nirvikāra*. Consistently with this idea the *Chāndogya* holds that to know Brahman is to know all. This means that the true aim of the knowledge of anything else is the knowledge of Brahman, because Brahman is the ground of everything in the world. The idea is that with the knowledge of Brahman the aim of all other knowledge is realised. To realise the result is to fulfil the conditions the fulfilment of which leads to the result. Further even supposing that Brahman is the *upādāna* the theory that the knowledge of Brahman means the knowledge of all else must be justified in the same manner. For, to know *upādāna*, a piece of clay, for example, does not involve the knowledge of all products that come out of the clay. Wonderful things may be produced from a piece of clay. How can the knowledge of the clay involve the knowledge of these things? The things may be produced from the same clay, but they have particular properties which the clay has not. To insist upon such knowledge of the clay that involves the knowledge of all those things that are produced from the clay is, in other words, to insist on omniscience. But this is to go beyond the point. For we started with the idea that to know the clay is to know all the products that come from the clay; and ended with the idea that to have omniscience is to have the knowledge of all products. The position that to know the *upādāna* is to know the products is not, however, justified.

Further the *Chāndogya* by way of illustrating that the knowledge of Brahman is the true aim of the whole knowing process simply states that in knowing a product as coming from clay similar products are known as coming from clay. This means that to know the cause of one thing is to know the cause of other similar things. Applying this idea to the knowledge of Brahman the *Upaniṣad* holds that by knowing Brahman as the ground of the world the aim of all other knowledge is realised.

That Brahman is *pūrṇa*, *nirvikāra* and the *mūla* (ground) of the world suggests that it is not the *upādāna* but the *nimitta* of the world. That Brahman is the ground of the world does not merely mean that Brahman is prior, in time, to the world. As the ground of all Brahman is the ground of time also. Time

is eternal (*nitya*) and many other things of the world are eternal. Brahman is the ground of even the eternal things of the world. With this idea the *Upaniṣads* explain Brahman as the *nitya* of the *nitya*. This means that Brahman is the ground of the *nitya* just as It is the ground of the *anitya* (non-eternal).

So the Vedas teach that Brahman is perfect, independent and the efficient cause of the world. This is also the implication of experience. The previous and the following studies of experience confirm this truth.

There are No Other Pramāṇas

Advaita holds that there are six *pramāṇas*. It is not true, *Upamāna*¹ and *arthāpatti* are not different from *anumāna*. (This has been noted in Viśiṣṭādvaita.) *Anupalabdhi* comes under *pratyakṣa* or *anumāna*. If we suppose that a man perceives the ground which has the absence of a jar, he may obtain the knowledge of the absence in two ways. He may have it immediately after he perceives the ground; or after he perceives the ground he may have the idea that the jar is not perceived though it is capable of being perceived if it were there, and then on the basis of this idea he may understand that there is the absence of the jar. In the former case the knowledge of the absence is *pratyakṣa*; and in the latter *anumiti*.

Advaita holds that there is a variety of *pratyakṣa* called *labda pratyakṣa*. It is illustrated by the knowledge 'I am the tenth' produced by the statement 'You are the tenth' made to one who actually perceives one's body. It is not correct. A statement can never give rise to *pratyakṣa* knowledge. The *pratyakṣa* knowledge is due to the operation of a sense organ. The knowledge that is not due to the operation of a sense organ is not *pratyakṣa*. In the knowledge 'I am the tenth' there are involved two pieces of knowledge, the *pratyakṣa* of the body, and the knowledge produced by the statement as expressed in the predicate of the judgment 'I am the tenth'.

¹ Some cases of *upamāna* are included either in *pratyakṣa* or in *āgama* as the case may be.

THE QUESTION OF THE PRIORITY OF PRAMĀNAS¹

The *pramāṇas* are consistent with one another. If any *pramāṇa* is not so, then it ceases to be *pramāṇa*. Of the three *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa* and *apauruṣeyāgama* are independent of the other *pramāṇas*. *Pratyakṣa* reveals its object independently of *āgama* and *anumāna*. *Apauruṣeyāgama* can reveal its object independently of the other two *pramāṇas*. *Anumāna* and *pauruṣeyāgama* reveal their objects, depending only upon either *pratyakṣa* or *apauruṣeyāgama*. *Pratyakṣa* presents the objects of the world. *Apauruṣeyāgama* presents the things that lie beyond the scope of the *pratyakṣa* of common men. But neither sublates the other. In fact, one supplements the other. *Pratyakṣa* gives the point from which *āgama* can start. *Āgama* brings the finite world of *pratyakṣa* to completeness. Both together present the whole world with all its aspects. *Anumāna* that follows *pratyakṣa* enriches the world of *pratyakṣa*. Following *āgama* it enriches the world of *āgama*. *Pauruṣeyāgama* also has the same function.

If there seems to be an opposition between *pratyakṣa* and the Veda, the teaching of the Veda must be made consistent with *pratyakṣa*, by abandoning the interpretation with which it is opposed to *pratyakṣa*. If *anumāna* and *pauruṣeyāgama* go against *pratyakṣa*, then they are wrong. So *pratyakṣa* has the unquestionable priority,² in rank, to the other *pramāṇas*. At times what is called *pratyakṣa* may be sublated by another *pratyakṣa*. Then that which is sublated is wrong. This is the true implication of the doctrine that *pramāṇya* is *svataḥ*. We have to interpret the whole world of thought consistently with *pratyakṣa* experience.

¹ V.T.V.T.

² This idea is made more significant by K.N.T., 26, 'That the Veda is *apauruṣeya* is accepted both by ourselves and by the others (Advaitins). But we accept that the whole Veda is taught by *Īvara*, but the others do not.' This passage occurs by way of illustrating the idea that the Veda is consistent with the intention and *pratyakṣa* of *Īvara*. *Īvara* teaches the Veda following the same order (*krama*) as the order in which the Veda was already taught in the previous cycles (*kālpas*). That the order of the Veda is not altered explains how the Veda is *apauruṣeya*. It may be noted that the whole position is an expression of the strict uniformity of the laws of existence in the creation of God.

We have to distinguish between two stages of philosophical enquiry. We have first to prepare the means of enquiry and next we may commence the enquiry. For this we have to understand definitely the nature and the scope of *pramāṇas*. In this connection the help of logic (*anumāna*) is immense. Without the help of logic the nature and the scope of *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama* as they have been till now studied cannot be understood. From this it follows that logic is the soul of philosophical enquiry.

To hold that logic is the soul of enquiry is not to make the other *pramāṇas* dependent on it. Our understanding of the *pramāṇas* may be dependent on logic, but not the *pramāṇas* themselves. For the logic that is helpful in our understanding must not be sublated by the other *pramāṇas*. If it is sublated then it ceases to be *pramāṇa* and therefore to be helpful. So from the standpoint of our understanding, logic is the most important of the *pramāṇas*; but as the facts go it is the most dependent (*upajīvaka*) of the *pramāṇas*. When it is said that *pratyakṣa* and *aparokṣeyāgama* are prior to *anumāna* what is meant is that *anumāna* cannot be a *pramāṇa* independently of them. But it does not in any way minimise the unquestioned importance of *anumāna* in philosophy.

From these considerations it follows that the Advaitic conclusions can never be the teaching of the *Upaniṣads*. If they were their teaching, then they would cease to be *pramāṇa* as they are sublated by *pratyakṣa* which reveals the reality of the world.

The results of these considerations are summarised in the following pages.

THE WORLD OF PRAMEYA (ONTOLOGY)

The Nature of the Object Revealed by Pramāṇas

We may take *pratyakṣa* as a representative of other *pramāṇas*. The character of the object of *pratyakṣa* is the same as that of the objects of other *pramāṇas*. Every instance of *pratyakṣa* reveals its object as 'This is so and so'. Here 'so-and-so' refers to the property of the object which is revealed as 'this' as a substantive. So the object of *pratyakṣa* is a substantive qualified by a property. No *pratyakṣa* reveals a property independently of the substantive, or a substantive independently of property.

The object of *pratyakṣa* under all circumstances is a qualified entity (*vīṭiṣṭa vastu*).

Further the object of *pratyakṣa* is a particular distinguished from all the other things of the world. So along with the object its distinction from other things is also given.

In this connection we have to answer two questions: (1) If a substance and its property can never be known independently of each other what is the relation between the two? Is it identity or difference? If it is identity, then there is no meaning in saying that the object of *pratyakṣa* is as a rule qualified. And if it is difference, then each must be known independently of the other. And (2) If a particular object is given along with its distinction from the rest of the universe, then is the idea of the rest of the universe involved in the *pratyakṣa* or not? If it is involved what is the meaning of holding that the *pratyakṣa* is of a particular object? If it is not, then how can it involve the idea of the distinction which refers to all things from which it makes the thing in view different? We may answer these questions in order.

The Relation¹ Between a Substance and Its Property

This relation is determined in the following manner. Let us take a piece of white cloth for instance. The cloth is the substance and whiteness is its property. But they are not different. If they were different, then they ought to have been observed separately even as two mountains are observed. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that the cloth and its whiteness are different. They say that they are not observed separately because they are related in such a way that the property is not without the substance as the latter is the substratum of the former. They are not correct. If the substance is the substratum of whiteness and therefore the latter is not found separately from the former, then the property must at least be observed as different in so far as it is in the substratum and to that extent it is not the same as the latter. We may take for instance a vessel in which some fruits are kept. The vessel is the substratum of the fruits in so far as they are kept in it. Yet the fruits are observed to be separate from the vessel. In the same manner whiteness ought

¹ N.S., 105-107.

to be observed to be different from the cloth. But it is not observed to be different. So it is not different from the cloth.

Further to a natural mind which is not prejudiced in favour of any view, whiteness itself seems to be the cloth. Accordingly there is the experience 'This whiteness is the same as the cloth'. The identity of the whiteness and the cloth is implied in this experience. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that this experience is an illusion. It is not an illusion. If it were, then it ought to be sublated by another experience that reveals a clear difference between the two entities. But there is no such experience. So the identity between the two is a fact.

We have to note one point in connection with the identity between a cloth and its whiteness. Though it is a case of identity it admits of usages that point to the difference between them. The word cloth stands for a substance. The word whiteness stands for a property. The words cloth and whiteness are not synonymous. If one hears the word cloth one does not have the idea of whiteness. If one hears the word whiteness one does not have the idea of cloth. The cloth serves a definite purpose. Whiteness does not serve this purpose. It serves a different purpose. If one asks another to bring a cloth the latter need not bring a white cloth. The expression, 'cloth is not cloth', involves self-contradiction. But the expression 'cloth is not white', is quite correct. A blind man can recognise a cloth, but he cannot recognise the whiteness in it. It is possible to spot out a cloth in darkness, but it is not possible to see whiteness in it. Darkness affects the whiteness and not the cloth. These experiences or usages point to the difference between a cloth and its whiteness. None of them is an illusion. They are as true as the experience that tells us that cloth and its whiteness are identical. So we cannot deny any one set of experiences in the interest of the other. We have only to draw the implication of both of them with a view to removing the apparent contradiction between them.

The cloth and its whiteness are given in one sense as identical and in the other as different. If they were either alone then there would not be two sets of experiences each contradicting the other. But to say that they are both identical and different is a contradiction in terms. To remove the contradiction we must keep one and explain the other. At this stage there seem to be two types of solutions. We may hold that cloth and

whiteness are different and somehow explain how they seem to be identical. Or we may hold that they are identical and somehow explain how they seem to be different. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas accept the former solution. They hold that whiteness does not exist without its substratum, cloth. And they say that it is this fact that is responsible for their seeming to be identical. On the basis of this solution they regard the experience that tells us that the two things are identical as illusion. We have seen how their view is incorrect. For this reason and on the strength of the following considerations we have to hold that cloth and its whiteness are identical, and explain the fact that they seem to be different in the following manner.

The Doctrine of Vileśa

The cloth and its whiteness are identical. Yet they are given as different. This suggests that there is a peculiarity in them. This peculiarity enables us to talk and think as if the two things are different. So this peculiarity acts the part of difference. The peculiarity is not the same as difference. If it were difference, then there would be no room for the experience of the identity of the cloth and its whiteness. The peculiarity is called *vileśa* and this implies that it causes the idea of difference in an identical thing.

This kind of solution is inevitable for all thinkers. We may refer to the position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. They say that though whiteness is different from cloth it is not observed differently, because the cloth is its substratum. We may ask them a question. Of all the different things in the world why should whiteness alone be inseparable from its substratum? The only relevant answer to this question is that it is the peculiarity of whiteness. If it is so, then it is better to hold that the two things are identical and that the idea of difference is the result of peculiarity.

With Kumārila one may suppose that cloth and its whiteness are both different and identical (*bhinnābhinna*). To suppose so is to attribute identity and difference to them. Identity and difference are properties. Now the question is this. What is the relation between these properties and the thing? To say that it is identity and difference leads to infinite regress. So we have to abandon the position that these properties are different from the things. If, on the other hand, a property is identical

with the thing, then the question is, how it causes the idea of difference. The only answer to this is that it is the peculiarity of the property.

The acceptance of peculiarity (*vīśeṣa*) is inevitable even for Advaita, though it has ignored it. Advaita regards Brahman as partless. This implies that partlessness is a property of It. It is *akhanda*. So partlessness is not different from It. Then the question is, 'How can there be the thought that partlessness is a property of Brahman?' If Advaita is to maintain its view it must hold that it is the peculiarity of partlessness to be the property of Brahman without being different from it. This observation is from the standpoint of a non-Advaita thinker. Even from the standpoint of Advaita the acceptance of *vīśeṣa* is inevitable. Advaita holds that the identity of *jīva* and Brahman is *caitanya* itself. *Caitanya* is *svaprahāsa* (self-evident). Yet it is not so manifest during the life of an individual. How are we to reconcile these two positions? Further, *caitanya* is signified not only by the word *caitanya*, but also by various other names, as *Brahman* and *āman*. Has each name its own significance or not? If it has, then Brahman must have various properties corresponding to the various significances of various names. If it has not, then there is no point in calling the same entity by different names. Further Advaita says different things about Brahman. *Caitanya* is self-evident. It is not opposed to the beginningless *ajñāna*. It is one. It is *satya*. It is *jñāna*. It is *ananta*. It is *ānanda*. It is *akhanda* and so on. Has each expression here its peculiarity or not? If it has not, then it is useless. If it has, then it is to attribute different properties to Brahman. If these properties are identical with Brahman, how can there be the thought of the properties of Brahman, which points to their difference from Brahman? Advaita must either admit that all its teaching is useless, or maintain the oneness of Brahman by means of *vīśeṣa*.

So *vīśeṣa* is the core of reality. Everything is what it is by means of *vīśeṣa*. Owing to its presence in the thing, the thing is said to have many aspects, properties and so on. To explain various properties and aspects of a thing, there must be as many *vīśeṣas* in the same thing. To hold that there are many *vīśeṣas* in the same thing is not to attribute fresh properties to it. The *vīśeṣas* are those that explain the presence of the properties of the thing without making them different from it. The fact that

they are, is the necessary implication of the fact that a thing is qualified. So they maintain themselves. To try to explain them by means of other *vīśeṣas* is to ignore the very starting point.

So we may conclude that there is the idea of different properties with reference to the same thing owing to the presence of *vīśeṣa* in it. We may now answer the original question, 'What is the relation between a substance and its properties?' as follows. The relation between them is that of identity. But this identity admits of the idea of difference. The reason for this is the presence of *vīśeṣa* in the thing. From this point of view we may characterise the identity as the identity conditioned by *vīśeṣa*. It is called in Sanskrit *sa-vīśeṣābheda*. It is simply an expression of the idea that a substance is a unity in diversity, in so far as it exists. Even the diversity in it is the expression of its unity.

So every object of experience is unique in itself. This cannot be understood unless the other question is answered, 'If a particular object is given along with its distinction from the rest of the universe, then is the idea of the rest of the universe involved in the *pratyakṣa*, or not?' In answer to this question we have to consider the following.

The Problem of Distinction (Bheda)

A particular thing is particular because it is different from other things of the world. So there is difference in a particular thing from other things. The difference in a thing is as much a property as the other properties of the thing. Like other properties it is also identical with the thing. Advaita denies distinction as follows: 'The knowledge of a thing is not relative to that of any other thing, but the knowledge of distinction is relative to that of other things, because it is distinction from other things. So distinction is not identical with the thing. If it is different from the thing, then there must be another difference between itself and the thing, and so on *ad infinitum*. So in either way distinction is not justified.' In reply to the Advaita view we may refer to what we have studied so far. We may note that on the strength of *vīśeṣa*, difference, though it is relative to other things, can be identical with the thing.

So difference is a fact. It is difference of a thing from the rest of the things of the world. It is identical with the thing. So when the thing is known the difference is also known.

To hold that difference is known along with the thing gives rise to a fresh problem. It is this. The knowledge of difference is relative to the knowledge of the things from which it differentiates the thing in question. If there is not the latter knowledge, then the knowledge of difference does not exist. So in the knowledge of difference the knowledge of the other things is involved. The knowledge of a particular thing is the same as the knowledge of its difference from other things. So it must involve the knowledge of other things. How is this possible? The knowledge of a particular thing is generated by a particular sense organ or some other *pramāṇa*. The sense organ or a *pramāṇa* is in contact with a particular entity. It is not in contact with other things. It cannot therefore generate the knowledge of other things. Without this knowledge the knowledge of the particular is impossible. So under this circumstance knowledge itself seems to be impossible. Now the question is how to remove this difficulty.

In answer to this difficulty we may note the following considerations. In the very denial that knowledge is impossible the fact, that knowledge is, is implied. If there were no knowledge, then there would be no occasion for denying it. Knowledge is of an object. This implies that the object is as a rule a particular. Otherwise it cannot be described as an object. So the knowledge of a particular object is a fact. This implies that it somehow involves the knowledge of the other things from which the thing in view is different. Now we have to find out how there can be this knowledge.

Before giving an account of how there can be the knowledge of other things, we would do well to answer one question: Can finite beings have the knowledge of all things? Any answer to this question serves as an answer to the present problem. Before answering this question we have to make the sense in which the term 'knowledge of all things' is used definite. If by it the detailed knowledge of the whole universe is meant, then finite beings do not have it. If by it is meant knowledge in a very general manner, then all beings that have knowledge have it. If it were not so, then there would never have been the idea of 'all'. The expression 'all' points to the idea of 'all'. It is of course vague and general. Yet it is enough to help us in the present case.

How do we have the general idea of 'all'? An external

sense organ does not cause this idea, because it can have no relation to what lies beyond a particular object. For the same reason *manas* cannot give rise to this idea. But the idea is a fact. This implies that it is the function of the remaining organ, *sākṣī*. *Sākṣī* knows in a very general manner all, and helps the knowledge of a particular as particular. We may now illustrate it by giving a concrete example. The eye is in contact with a jar. At the same time *sākṣī* grasps all in a general manner and helps the eye in grasping the jar as a particular. Then there is the knowledge of the jar as a particular as 'This is a jar'. So all our knowledge is the result of the combined activity of *sākṣī* and a particular *pramāṇa* in question. The *pramāṇa* gives rise to the knowledge of the thing to which it is related. The ideas of those things to which the *pramāṇa* is not related are caused by *sākṣī*. This has been made clear in the previous pages.

So the objects of experience are particulars, each of which has its own unique feature. Experience as *pramā* is *yathārtha*. Its object is real. We may now study what types of objects there are in the world.

THE WORLD AND ITS CONTENTS

Two types of objects can be distinguished in the world.¹ Some objects are knowing entities. They are called *cetana*. Others are not-knowing entities. They are called *acetana*. Both are the objects of knowledge. This is why we make an attempt to study them.

CETANA

The word *cetana*, is literally applied to one who knows. The knower is *cetana*. A knower is in a body. Without him there is no body. As the principle of the existence of his body he is called a *jīva*. Each body has its own *jīva*. Bodies are many. *Jīvas* also are many. Each body having a *jīva* in it is capable of a unique experience. So the experience of each *jīva* is unique. A body consists of the organs of action and those of knowledge. Through them a *jīva* has the experience of the world and is consequently called a knower.

¹ This exposition is based on T.S.T and T.V.T. M.S.S. gives certain details and according to it *prameya* consists of ten categories—*dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya*, *vīśeṣa*, *vīṣiṣṭa*, *anāśa*, *lakṣi*, *sādṛśya* and *abhāva*.

Knower

A knower has his experience through his *sākṣi*. He perceives the bodily functions through *sākṣi* and has the consequent enjoyment. He is evident as 'I'. Knowing is his nature. He is awake under all conditions, though the particular aspects of the body may or may not function. This points to the fact that he is different from the body.¹

The experience of pleasure or pain is the enjoyment of a knower in a body. This experience is conditioned by the particular disposition of the knower. If he is too much attached to the things of his experience, then he has the experience of all pain and no pleasure. If he is not, then he has less pain and more pleasure. This explains how most of his feelings are more subjective than objective.

He has No Beginning and No End

The fact that a knower's experience in the body is more subjective throws light on the history of his experience. Body is the common cause of experience. It causes experience according to the conditions of knowledge. But it does not characterise experience in any particular manner. Experience is considered to be good or bad according to the particular dispositions of the knower. Now the question is, 'How can a knower have particular dispositions?' We have seen how the body cannot explain it. So we have to find an answer to this in the knower himself. He has particular dispositions. As a result, he has particular types of experience.

The fact that his dispositions characterise his experience leads us to the idea that he has them even before he has obtained the present body. This points to the fact that he had experience even before the experience in the present body. For disposition is the result of experience. This experience again presupposes particular disposition, and so on *ad infinitum*. This means that

¹ By body in this connection is meant the gross body. This Vedānta distinguishes three kinds of body—*svarūpa*, *linga* and *sthūla*. *Sthūla* is gross. It has birth and death. *Linga* is subtle. It is *anādi* and it subsists till the *jīva* is liberated. These two bodies are different from the *jīva*. *Svarūpa* forms the very nature of the *jīva* and it is immortal.

there is no first beginning to his experience. To have beginningless experience he must also be beginningless. If there is nothing to bring about his beginning, then there should be nothing to bring about his end. So he is eternal (*anādinītya*).

His Capacities

The present experience of a knower throws light on his general disposition. Just as experiencing is his quality, a particular type of disposition is also his native quality. Though it is difficult to define it clearly in the case of an individual at a given time, on the whole we have to admit that the experience of a knower is ruled by a general disposition of his. A deep insight into the behaviours of different individuals placed under the same external conditions reveals this fact. Whatever the circumstances may be, men are guided by their natural inclinations. To expect from all the same dispositions is impossible. In the presence of a particular disposition it is impossible to make a man conscious of other possibilities. Individuals of certain dispositions look upon the world as containing nothing but misery, injustice, and evil. Under whatever conditions they may be put, they characterise everything as bad and add confusion to confusion. Thus their life is nothing but a hell. For this reason they are called *tamoyogyas*.

There are other individuals of unreliable temperament. They are neither here nor there. Their dispositions change as circumstances change. They have no faith in any thing. These are called *mitrajīvas* or *nityasamsārins*.

There are yet others who have dispositions quite reverse to those of the *tamoyogyas*. They have faith in the world, in its bright side, justice and goodness. However bad their circumstances are in the eyes of others, they are not dispirited, they are not confused, and they do not lose faith. Circumstances make them better. If they come to know that there is anything bad in the world, if they have capacity, they try to correct it. Under all circumstances they make themselves happy, and add happiness to the world. They are called *mukhyogyas*.

To know that there are different types of knowers does not in any way mar the attempts of a good soul to improve the world. What is so far stated is only the general character of the knowers. Over and above them there are temporary dispositions caused by ignorance. We observe that teaching and kindness

have their good effects on the world. They are at times useless or misplaced. One who has understood the nature of the world must not be discouraged. As one who knows the truth one must rather expect disappointments. If a knower is still better, then he must never make much of the results of his work. He must do good things as the spontaneous expression of his self. To satisfy these conditions is the test of a *mukṣiyogya*.

Philosophy is for the upliftment of the world. We may therefore characterise the *mukṣiyogyas* in a more detailed manner. This indirectly gives us an idea of the other knowers.

The Character of Mukṣiyogyas

To have good dispositions by nature, the knowers must have certain good qualities. To be naturally inclined to truth, they must be of the nature of truth. The knowledge that is natural to them must always be correct. So they are of the nature of correct knowledge. In order to be naturally optimistic, there must be peace in them. They must have it independently of external things. So they are of the nature of *ānanda*. They are external. So they are of the nature of *sat*. The *Upaniṣads* describe them as *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda*.

These characters are obscured when they are conditioned by external entities. The conditions are brought upon themselves owing to their exclusive interest in the things that are not natural to them. This fact is revealed by an insight into a behaviour of a really good man in which his natural goodness is not fully expressed. We have to admit the truth of these considerations, if we are faithful to experience, which is our starting point.

The perfection of a knower consists in abandoning what is not natural to him. This is the ideal in life. Though perfection is natural to every knower, it is not his unless he consciously realises it.

The Native Individualities (Yogyatās) of the Jīvas

A knower's life is his own making. He does things according to his innate dispositions. Owing to his interest in the things external to him, his action is not directed to his improvement. So it binds him to the things external to him. Whatever the result of his action may be, it is in a sense an expression of his innate capacities. The capacities are the presuppositions

of his action. The conception of the capacities of the knowers is the implication of the doctrine of *Karma*.

The following considerations make this idea clear. The experience of each *jīva*, in life, has its own individuality. So far, all thinkers have agreed that the experience of each *jīva* is the result of the *harma* of the same and by *harma* they mean *apūrvā*, *adṛṣṭa*, *punya* or *pāpa*, but somehow they have not gone further and they have concluded hastily that each *jīva* is by nature pure or perfect and the life of experience is brought upon it owing to its *harma*. It is necessary to examine this conclusion. *Karma* affects only a *cetana* but not an *acetana*. This means that there is something in the very nature of *cetana* that makes it affected by *harma*. Further, supposing that many individuals do the same act, the same act generates a particular *harma* in each individual. The *harma* generated by a *jñānin's* act, say worship, must be much more effective than that generated by the act of an *ajñānin*. Further the same *harma* affects each *cetana* in a unique manner. After experiencing the fruit of a *pāpa*, as the result, a particular *cetana* may develop *vairāgya* and such other virtues, but another *cetana* under the same predicament may develop a sort of stubbornness and add *pāpa* to *pāpa*. This implies that the influence of a *harma* on a *cetana* presupposes a natural disposition (*yogyatā*) of the same *cetana*. Applying the same thought to the beginningless history of the *harma* of a *cetana*, it can be seen that the natural disposition of a *cetana* is the logical presupposition of the course of the *harma* of the same *cetana*. If the truth of these considerations is accepted, then it goes without saying that the theories of *jīva* propounded by the previous thinkers need a good deal of correction or modification as the case may be. So the logical implication of the doctrine of *harma* is the native individuality of each *jīva*. Though *harma* influences *jīva*, that *jīva* makes *harma* possible must not be forgotten. From the standpoint of the native individualities or the natural dispositions (*yogyatās*) of the *jīvas*, the *jīvas* are classified into three main types—*sātvika* (*mukṣiyogya*), *rājasa* (*mītra-jīva*) and *tāmasa* (*śamoyogya*).

ACETANA

Acetana is that which does not know. There are two kinds of *acetana* things, positive, and negative (*bhāva* and *abhāva*).

A positive entity is that which is grasped as that which is, at the very first instance of its knowledge. We may take for instance a jar. It is a positive entity. At the very first instance of its apprehension it is known as that which is. A negative entity is that which is known as that which is not, at the very first instance of its apprehension. We may take for instance the absence of a jar. At the very first instance of its apprehension it is known as that which is not.

The Sāṅkhyas, Prābhākaras and following them Viśiṣṭādvaitins deny negative entities. We may note against them that if they were correct their very denial would have been impossible. Their denial points to the fact that there is at least the absence of negative entities. Further negative entities are given by experience. They are as the positive entities are. Hence they cannot be denied. Just as there is the experience, 'There is a jar' there is the experience, 'There is not a jar'. Each of these experiences is equally significant. The absence of the jar as much determines the place where it is as the jar determines the place where it is. Advaita dismisses this truth in its conception of Brahman as *nirguṇa*. It is not correct. The absence of *guṇas* as much determines Brahman as *guṇas* would determine it. This means that Mandana Miśra's *abhāvādvaita* that absence does not determine Brahman is only an assumption.

Negative Entities (*Abhāva*)

There are two kinds of negative entities, *anyonyābhāva* and *sāmsargābhāva*. The former is the same as difference. It is identical with the thing that is different. There are three kinds of *sāmsargābhāva*, *prāgabhāva*, *pradhvaṁsābhāva* and *atyantābhāva*. *Prāgabhāva* has an end but no beginning. Example—the absence of a jar that precedes the production of the jar. *Pradhvaṁsābhāva* has beginning but no end. Example—The absence of a jar that follows the destruction of the jar. *Atyantābhāva* is eternal. Example—the absence of a hare's horn. The thing which is denied eternally is not revealed by any *pramāṇa*. It is *asar*.

The World of Positive Entities (*Bhāva*)

There are three types of positive entities, eternal (*nitya*), eternal-non-eternal (*nityānitya*) and non-eternal (*anitya*).

The Eternal Positive Entity (Nitya)

The positive thing that has no change either in part or in whole is *nitya*. The Veda is *nitya*. This is explained by the fact that it is *apauruṣeya*.

The Eternal-non-eternal Positive Entity (Nityānitya)

The positive entity that is eternal as a whole and non-eternal in parts is *nityānitya*. Space, time and *prakṛti* are *nityānitya*.

Space (Ākāśa)

It has been already said that space is grasped by *sākṣi*. In order to make this position clear we have to examine the views of the other philosophers.

Kumārila holds that space is grasped by the eye. He is not correct. The eye can grasp only those positive things that have colour. Space has no colour. Therefore it is not the object of the eye.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that space is established as the substratum of the quality, sound. If they were correct, then a man born deaf ought to have no idea of space. He does not know by *pratyakṣa* that there is sound in the world. So he has no means of knowing space as the substratum of sound. But we do find that he has the idea of space, for like others he says 'It is here'. This statement is impossible unless he has the idea of space. The fact that even he has this idea strengthens the position that space is grasped by *sākṣi*.

Further, there are two types of sound, articulate and inarticulate. An articulate sound is not a quality. It is beginningless and endless. It undergoes no change. So it is independent of the thing that manifests it.

Inarticulate sound is a quality. But there is nothing to help us in asserting that it is a quality of space. It may be a quality of the thing that produces it. Or it may be a quality of air.

There are two types of space, *avyākṛtākāśa* and *bhūtākāśa*. *Avyākṛtākāśa* is room (*avakāśa*). All things exist in it. *Bhūtākāśa* is a manifestation of *prakṛti*. It is one of the *bhūtas*. *Avyākṛtākāśa* is the presupposition of *bhūtākāśa*. For *prakṛti* itself is in *avyākṛtākāśa*. Without the latter nothing can exist. So the thinkers that hold that *ākāśa* is one and that it is a product of *prakṛti* make its very existence impossible. The Buddhists hold that *ākāśa* is the absence of a moving entity. They are

not correct. The absence of a moving entity is as much an entity as the moving entity itself. A moving entity exists in a point of space. So its absence also exists in a point of space. So space is the presupposition of the absence of moving entities.

Avyākṛtākāla is eternal as a whole. Owing to the relation of things it is divided into several parts, as *ākāla* contained in a jar or in a house and so on. If the things are removed the divisions of *ākāla* disappear. So the divisions in *ākāla* have both beginning and end. From the standpoint of these two aspects, this *ākāla* is described as eternal-non-eternal.

Time (Kāla)

Time is known to us as past, present or future. It has been previously explained that time is the object of *sākṣi*. Every instance of knowledge, whether it is true or untrue, is based on the conception of time. There is no knowledge which is independent of time. A piece of knowledge is in the form 'It was so and so', 'It is so and so' or 'It will be so and so'. In every case it is based on time in one way or the other. So time is the very presupposition of knowledge and it is apprehended by *sākṣi*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that time is only inferred as the cause of experiences such as 'This is older than that'; but they do not notice that time is the very presupposition of the inference itself.

An important point must be noted with regard to time. Time is not a passive entity in which things are supposed to exist. It is the very principle of existence. It determines the nature of particular events. This is implied in the fact that particular events occur only in particular periods of time, but not in other periods.

Time as a whole is eternal. But as a particular period it is non-eternal. As a result of these two ideas it is described as eternal-non-eternal.

Matter (Prakṛti)

The material products originate from *prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* is the root matter. It is characterised by the properties, *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The Sāṅkhyas hold that *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* themselves are *prakṛti*. Their position is contradicted by the fact that everything consists of the relation between the substantive and the attributive. Between *prakṛti* and the proper-

ties there is *saṁśeṣābheda*. From *prakṛti* originate, in order, *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra*, *manas* and five motor organs and five sensory organs, five *tanmātras*, and five *bhūtas*. Of them each is distinct from the others. For this reason they are called *asamśṛjta*. From the combination of the five *bhūtas* appear several products.

The fact that *prakṛti* gives rise to various products leads us to the problem of the relation between *prakṛti* and its products. In the previous systems we have met with three leading ideas of this relation. (i) The *asatkārya vāda* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas; (ii) The *satkārya vāda* of the Sāṅkhyas; and (iii) The *āropita kārya vāda* of the Advaitins. None of them represents the relation in question correctly.

Asatkārya Vāda Denies the 'Causeness' of the Cause

According to the *asatkārya vāda* a product is not before it is produced. The thing out of which it is produced is entirely different from it. For this reason the thing as the cause is called *samavāyi*. This term means that the thing is related to the product by *samavāya* relation. This view separates the product from the cause. The separation denies implicitly any necessary relation between the two entities. Without this relation the cause ceases to be the cause. The fact that there is a necessary relation between a cause and its effect is implied in the fact that it can give rise to a particular product and not to all sorts of things.

The Satkārya Vāda Denies the 'Effectness' of the Effect

The *satkārya vāda* identifies an effect with its cause. This means that there is only one thing in place of two entities, cause and effect. If this is admitted, it is easy to see how there is no meaning in calling the same thing by names that can be applied to different entities. With all their *satkārya vāda* the Sāṅkhyas distinguish between a cause and effect, by holding that the former is non-manifest while the latter is manifest. If they are faithful to this distinction, then they must modify *satkāryavāda* as it means complete identity between cause and effect.

The Āropita Kārya Vāda Denies Both Cause and Effect

Advaita holds that the world of products is *āropita* (superimposed) on Brahman. It says that the former is *mithyā* and the latter *satya*. According to it a product is that which involves substantive-attributive-relation. In considering this view we may

note that this position results in the denial both of the world and of Brahman. We may illustrate this by taking the example of the superimposition of silver. It has already been seen how the entity that is superimposed is not real and how the superimposition of one entity on another presupposes the similarity between the two. It is possible to superimpose silver on a shell because the latter is similar to the former. The silver that is superimposed is unreal, because it is so revealed by the later experience. Similarly the world that is superimposed must be unreal. If it is superimposed on Brahman, then the latter must be similar to the former. In order to satisfy this condition, like the former, It also must involve the relation of the substantive and the attributive. If It involves this relation, then even according to Advaita It must be unreal.

So the relation between cause and effect is neither identity nor difference nor superimposition. Then what is the relation between the two?

The Relation Between Cause and Effect

It is a fact that a particular cause makes a particular effect possible. This means that the effect has an intrinsic relation to the cause. From this point of view the relation between cause and effect is identity. That an effect has a form which its cause has not is also a fact. Otherwise there is no reason why one thing is called cause and another thing effect. From this point of view the effect must be considered to have a *vīśeṣa* in it, which the cause has not. To express these two ideas we may call the relation between cause and effect *sa-vīśeṣābheda*.

Further, we have to note that an effect is produced and destroyed. The cause may not be so. *Sa-vīśeṣābheda* may be the relation between the two when the effect is actual. Before it is produced or after it is destroyed, there can be no *sa-vīśeṣābheda* between itself and its cause. From this point of view there is difference between the two. To indicate all these ideas the relation between cause and effect may be regarded as *bhedābheda*, where *abheda* stands for the idea of *sa-vīśeṣābheda*.

The products are those of *prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* subsists in all products. From this point of view it is eternal. It is also in the form of products. The products have a beginning and an end. From this point of view it is non-eternal. To express these ideas it is called *nityānitya*.

The Non-eternal (Anitya)

A product has a beginning and an end. It is non-eternal. It is produced out of matter. The matter out of which a product is produced is the material cause of the product. A material cause is so called in the sense that it becomes the product. *Parīṇāmi Kāraṇa* is the Sanskrit name of a material cause and this name signifies that the product in question is the *parīṇāma* (change) of the cause in question. A product is for the enjoyment of *jīvas*. So its production is necessitated by the *karṇa* of the *jīvas* for whose enjoyment it is made to appear. Its appearance is not possible if there were *prakṛti* and nothing else. *Prakṛti* is inert. It does not act by itself unless it is made to act by an external agent with the necessary implements. This agent and implements are *nimitta* in the production of the product. So there are two causes of a product, *upādāna* (*parīṇāmi*) and *nimitta*.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that a product has three causes, *samavāyi*, *asamavāyi* and *nimitta*. The conception of these causes is based on the supposition that the property of a thing is different from it and that the relation between them is *samavāya*. We have seen how the property of a thing is identical with the thing itself. This makes *samavāya* unnecessary. Further, *samavāya* as a relation must be different from the thing with which it connects another entity. If so there must be another relation between itself and the thing. If this relation is admitted, then it also must be related to the thing by means of some other relation, and so on *ad infinitum*. Consequently we can never arrive at the first relation, i.e. *samavāya*. So in order to avoid this difficulty we must abandon *samavāya*, and to avoid further inconsistencies we must hold that the properties of a thing are identical with it.

With the removal of *samavāya* the conception of *samavāyi* and *asamavāyi* causes falls down. We have also noted how an effect is not different from its cause. This explains how the supposed *samavāya* relation is useless in this connection, because it has nothing to connect. Hence *samavāyi* and *asamavāyi* are unreal. In their place we can have material cause (*upādāna*). This term suggests that the effect is identical with the cause without losing its individuality.

The Divisions of the Padārthas as Made by the Previous Thinkers are Not True to the Nature of Things

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Mīmāṃsakas consider the properties of a thing to be different from the thing itself, and divide the universe into many categories. Against them we have to note the following points. We have seen how quality (*guṇa*) and motion (*karma*) are identical with the thing in which they are found. In this connection we have to note one thing. If a quality or motion persists so long as its substratum exists, then it is identical with the latter. If it is not in its substratum at any time, then from the standpoint of that time it is not identical, and it is different. Knowledge is the property of *ātman*. It exists as long as the latter exists. Hence it is identical with *ātman*. The greenness of a mango ceases to be at a certain stage. While it is in the mango it is identical with the mango. After it ceases to be it is different from the latter. Similarly when a cloth moves, the motion is identical with it. If the cloth does not move, then motion is different from it. *Sāmānya* (universal) is not a fact. An object of knowledge is a particular and as such it is different from the rest of the other things. All its properties are peculiar to it. Hence there is nothing that is identical in many individuals. Things are classified not because they possess identical properties, but because they are similar. The 'potness' of a pot is different from the 'potness' of another pot. But all pots are similar, because they have similar properties. We have seen how *samavāya* is not a fact. *Vīṣeṣa* is not different from the thing which it differentiates. Similarity, power, number and so on are properties of things and therefore they are not different from the things. The five categories of Advaita represent the different aspects of *jīvas*. Each *jīva* is *sat*, *cit* and *ananda*. Each has also name and form. The world of *acetana* is characterised by name, form and *sattā* (existence).

THE WORLD IS REAL¹

The self-evident nature of the truth of *pramā* implies that that which is revealed by *pramā* is real. The world as it is described so far is revealed by *pramāṇa*. It is therefore real. It is real in the sense that it is not non-existent.

¹ T.D.T.; N.S. and N.M.

Advaita holds that the world is *sadasadvilakṣaṇa*, because it is sublated. Against it we may note that the world is revealed by *pramāṇa* and is therefore not sublated. Advaita also holds that the world is superimposed and therefore not real. We may note against it that the superimposition of a thing requires the reality of the same thing together with the reality of something else. If silver is to be superimposed, then there must be two things given. The individual who superimposes must have experienced real silver, and he must have a real thing like a shell to mistake it for silver. So without real silver and real shell the superimposition of silver is not possible. In the same manner without two real worlds the superimposition of the world is not possible. So to deny the reality of the world is impossible.

Jainism holds that the world has no unconditioned reality. This is inconsistent with the implication of its own position. Even to be described as having a relative reality, the world must be given as having an unconditioned reality.

So the world with all its aspects is absolutely real.

The World is Dependent (Asvatantra)¹

The world consisting of *cetana* and *acetana* is dependent. Its reality is in every sense of the term dependent. A thing can be real in three senses. If it has existence of its own, it is real. Existence is called *sattā*. So *sattā* is reality. If it has any function, then it is real. A function is called *prāvṛtti*. So *prāvṛtti* is reality. To have knowledge is to be real. Knowledge is called *pramiti*, so *pramiti* is reality. If a thing has no existence, has no function, and has no knowledge, then it is not real.

Everything in the world has reality in a dependent way. We may take for instance, a jar. Its existence has to be given by an outside agent. It is made to have a function by an outside agent. Similar is the consideration with regard to all *anitya* things. The *acetana* things that are *nitya* are subject to the changes of attributes caused by the things that are external to them. Time for instance is considered to be the time of creation or of destruction owing to the appearance or disappearance of products. Further, that a thing is *acetana* is itself an expression of dependence. The same is the condition with regard to a knower. Much against his desire a knower has changes of state

¹ T.S.T. and T.V.T.

(*avasthā*) characterised by the presence or absence of particular types of knowledge. When he wants to have knowledge he does not have it. When he does not want to sleep, sleep overcomes him. When he wants to sleep he is troubled by his own mental activities and so on. So nothing in the world is independent.

From the Dependent to the Independent

The fact that every thing of the world is subject to changes imposed on it by the things that are external to it implies that it is not self-established or self-sufficient. This means that it has only a derived reality. That the reality of the world is derived points as its source to a principle the reality of which is underived. The world having derived reality is *asvatantva* (dependent) and the principle whose reality is underived is *Svatantra* (Independent). The dependent is the proof of the Independent. Without the Independent the dependent cannot be explained. The mutual interaction of the dependent things without the direction of the Independent is inconsistent with the fact that the things are dependent. The Buddhists, the Jainas and the Mīmāṃsakas hold that *ṛkarma* explains the process of the world. But *ṛkarma* is *acetana* and is itself in need of direction. The Sāṅkhyas trace the world into two principles—*prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, each being independent of the other. They suppose that each by itself is unable to explain the process of the world and assume that the combination of the two makes the world possible. They illustrate this idea by taking for instance the function performed by the combination of a lame man and a blind man. Of the two men each by himself is unable to walk. But if the lame man sits on the blind man and directs him the way, then it is possible for both to walk. In the same manner *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, though each by itself is unable to do anything, each with the help of the other can perform its function. This view is based on the assumption that there is somehow contact between the lame and the blind and in the same way between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. This is the very problem we have to solve now. Of the two men each by himself cannot walk and there is no contact between the two. There must be a third entity to bring about contact. Similarly there must be a third entity to bring about the contact between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. Without this entity the whole world is motionless and therefore there can be nothing.

THE INDEPENDENT REALITY (SVATANTRA)

In connection with the study of the Independent it is necessary to emphasise certain points. Having observed that the world has only derived reality, as the source of this reality we have accepted the Independent. As the source of all, the Independent must be self-established, self-sufficient, infinite and perfect. If It were not so, then It cannot be the source of all. This truth must be kept steadily in view in considering the Independent and Its relation to the dependent. The same is the spirit of the teaching of the *Taittiriya* that Brahman is that from which the whole world has its existence and so on. The Sāṅkhyas ignore this truth and dismiss the Creator. Their argument is this: The Creator must be perfect and therefore He has nothing to obtain from the creation. And if He has to obtain anything from the creation, then He is not perfect and therefore He cannot be the Creator. The Sāṅkhyas feel this difficulty because they start from the idea of the Creator and try to explain the creation. If they had started from the fact that the world is dependent and arrived at the conception of the Creator as the Source of the world, then they would not have felt this difficulty. The attributes of the Creator are those that explain the creation and they do not negate creation. They must therefore be conceived consistently with the creation. All our considerations of the nature of the Creator must amplify that He is the source of the world; otherwise they are not sound. Further questions such as, 'Why did not God create a better world?' are irrelevant. We can explain only what is given and to think of what ought to be given does not help us. Further that the Independent is the Creator signifies that It is the very ground of the world. It is presupposed by the world. It is not the Creator of the world in the sense that a pot-maker makes a pot. As the ground of the world It justifies the reality of the world and the world makes It significant. The position of Advaita that the world is *mithyā* and Brahman is *nirguṇa* overlooks this truth and is consequently unable to reconcile the world and Brahman. The position of Viśiṣṭādvaita that Brahman as the ground is necessarily accompanied by *sūkṣmadācit* does not bring out the full significance of the truth that Brahman is the very source of the reality of the world in both its states *sūkṣma* and *sthūla*. Brahman as the ground of all is essentially one,

Advaitya. Further that Brahman as perfect is the source of the world signifies that the overflow of Its perfection makes the world possible. We are familiar with a similar fact in the world also. One who has an overflow of joy sings, dances and so on. Similarly the overflow of *ānanda* from Brahman has its expression in the reality of the world. Brahman with all Its characteristics is *nitya* and for this reason the world which is an indication of Brahman also is *nitya*. Brahman as the ground is omnipotent and this enables us to present Brahman in different senses—personal and impersonal. Brahman, the Independent as the ground of the world is ever distinguished from the dependent world. This means that the Independent, the dependent and the distinction between the two are equally real.

These are the general lines of reasoning on which the conception of the Independent is based. This reasoning is substantiated by the teaching of the Veda. For this reason the Independent is characterised as *Sāstrayoni*, *Vedāntavedya* and so on.

With these preliminary remarks the considerations of the nature of the Independent may be briefly mentioned.

The Independent is that which has *sattā*, *pravṛtti* and *pramiti* independently of other things. This is implied in the very idea of It as Independent. It is the sole director of all in the universe. It is everywhere. It is immanent in the world. It is not affected by the changes of the world. So It is not the material cause of the world. Its mere immanence directs the world process. In this sense It is the efficient cause of the world. It gives the world *sattā*, *pravṛtti* and *pramiti*¹. It is *svatantra*. So It is perfect. It has nothing to obtain by helping the world process. It directs the world, because to do so is the spontaneous expression of Its perfection. It directs the world in accordance with the *ḥarma* of the *jīvas* which are benefited by the world. By Its direction of the world, the *jīvas* enjoy the fruits of their *ḥarma*, exhaust it, transcend it, and realise themselves more

¹ N.S., 1. 2. 5. *Na rūpādivat niyāmaḥatvamāstram antaryāmitvam. Api tarhi sattādipradatvamityuktaṁ bhavati*. The central idea of this passage is that the Independent is the source of the very reality of the world. P. 166. The Independent is Brahman. This explains how this Vedānta is Brahmadvaita. From the standpoint that Brahman is characterised as *Svatantra* this Vedānta may also be called *Svatantrādvaita*.

and more, and in course of time become perfect according to their capacities. So Its direction of the world is for the benefit of the *jīvas*. This points to the overflow of Its kindness. In directing the world It follows the *karmas* of the *jīvas* and this gives a confidence to the *jīvas* so that they may safely rely upon It. It is called Brahman, *Īvara* (God) and so on and these names imply the same ideas.

On the basis of these thoughts the following considerations are developed. Brahman is perfect in every sense of the term. Its perfection has no limit. It is the embodiment of all auspicious qualities. Each of Its qualities is perfect. It has no defect. Otherwise It cannot be *Svatantra*. As the sole director of all It has none equal to or better than It. It is in all. It has all. It is in the world. It is out of the world. It knows all. It is all powerful. It is capable of doing any and every thing. Nothing is impossible for It. It favours good *jīvas*. It puts down the bad ones. If It likes It can make the bad good. It does not do so because that would not be to maintain the order in the world. Everything—however bad it may be is the means for the perfection of the world. In the *acetana* things *satva* is good and *rajas* and *tamas* are bad. But the last two help the realisation of the first. Even so the presence of the bad *jīvas* help the realisation of the goodness of the good *jīvas*. *Rajas* and *tamas* are inevitable for the sustenance of the world. Even so bad *jīvas* are inevitable if there is to be any spiritual advancement in the world. Conflict is the way to growth. Badness is the way to goodness.

Brahman's perfection is Its body. It creates the world. It maintains it. It destroys it. It controls it. It binds the *jīvas*. It gives them knowledge. It enlightens them. It frees them. It gives them perfection. It is not bound to do anything. Yet what It does is for the good of the world. If anything is favoured by It, then it becomes good. Without Its favour nothing can be good. Good is good because it has Its favour. Though It is in all It favours certain things, and they are good. The *jīvas* are in bondage because they have so far not had Its favour. For the same reason the *jīvas* have false knowledge (*avidyā*) and false attachments and the result is bondage. They must earn Its favour by their *karma*. By Its favour they have correct knowledge and correct estimation of things. They are then completely attached to It and they have realised themselves.

This is the teaching of all the Vedas and of all the *Āgamas* that follow the Vedic teaching. A dispassionate interpretation of them yields this idea. We have seen how it is the result of reasoning. To express these ideas the system that embodies these considerations is called Vedānta. In this system reason without the help of the Veda gives this idea, and the Veda without the help of reason can give the same. Each is amplified and confirmed by the other. The function of reason is not subordinated to the Veda. So its conclusion is sound. The interpretation of the Veda is consistent with reasoning. It is correct.

Following the Veda the *Svatantra* is called Brahman. The world according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is not *asvatantra* and their *Īvara* is not *Svatantra* and He has nothing to do with the reality of the world. The *Īvara* of Yoga is as unimportant as a *jīva*. In making Brahman *nirguṇa* Advaita makes It unreal. Viśiṣṭādvaita makes Brahman the material cause and renders It *asvatantra*. Brahman has Its true place in this system. Viṣṇu, Nārāyaṇa and so on are the other Vedic names of Brahman.

In closing the considerations of the nature of *Īvara*, a point may be noted. By means of reason His general nature is understood and by means of the Veda as a whole, the conclusions of reason are substantiated and the details of His greatness (*māhātmya*) are known. The Veda mainly consists of three divisions, the *mantra*, the *Brāhmaṇa* and the *Upaniṣad*. The *mantra* teaches, in the primary sense, the divinities that control the world and in the super-primary sense (*paramamukhyavṛtti*) *Īvara*, the immanent principle of all. The *Brāhmaṇa* explains the position of the *mantra*. The *Upaniṣad* directly reveals the nature of *Īvara*, the Independent. So God (*Īvara*), the Independent, is the subject matter of the whole Veda. As Independent, God is ever distinct from the world and the world is ever dependent. Here and there some passages of the *Upaniṣads*, such as 'That thou art', seem to teach the identity of the Independent with the dependent. Their apparent meaning is obviously inconsistent with the teaching of the rest of the Vedas. With the idea of removing this inconsistency, it is held in Advaita that the passages that teach identity are alone *pramāṇa* and the passages that teach difference between Brahman and the world are useful in so far as they create an occasion for the teaching of identity. The idea is that unless there is the suggestion of difference, the teaching of identity is not effective.

This view of Advaita is not convincing. To be partial to the passages that teach identity is unwarranted. It is held in Advaita that the thing taught by the Veda must be unfamiliar (*apūrvā*) and such a thing can be only identity and not difference because difference is an aspect of the empirical world. It may be observed against this position that even this distinction is unwarranted. If it is rightly understood the difference between Brahman and the world is as much unfamiliar as identity. Because Brahman is unfamiliar, Its difference is also unfamiliar. Further even in Advaita the identity is not accepted as it is apparently taught in the passages. Taking for example 'That thou art', the apparent meaning of the passage is the identity of 'That' (*īśvara*) and 'thou' (*jīva*). This identity is taken to be absurd in Advaita since the two are not identical in spite of the Upaniṣadic teaching and therefore taking the secondary sense of the terms into consideration, the identity of pure *caitanya* is accepted to be the meaning of the passage. So the apparent meaning of such passages is under all circumstances rejected and the passages are interpreted as it suits the purpose. If so, there is much propriety in interpreting such passages consistently with experience, philosophical reflection and the other passages of the Veda. As the identity of Brahman and the world is impossible, all passages that seem to teach identity need correct interpretation. To hold that a passage, say 'That thou art' really means the identity of pure *caitanya*, as it is done in Advaita does not carry us far. The identity of pure *caitanya*, if it is real, is not disputed and the passage teaches us nothing fresh. And in fact, there can be no such thing as pure *caitanya* in the sense of *nirguṇa* as accepted in Advaita. The reason for this has already been noted. So the identity taught in these passages must be taken to mean independence (*svātantrya*), supreme nature (*vīṣṭatva*), identity of place occupied (*sthānaikya*), harmony in the outlook (*matyākya*) and similarity (*sādrśya*) as the case may be.¹ The Sanskrit word *aikya* is used also in these different senses. The identity taught in 'That thou art' may be taken to mean identity of the place occupied, harmony in the outlook and similarity. As the result of this interpretation there follows the idea that Brahman, as Independent, is the meaning of the whole Veda in an uncondi-

¹ N.S., 66-67.

tioned manner. Any other meaning that can be attributed to a passage, such as minor deities, is conditioned because every passage ultimately has a reference to Brahman, the Independent principle of all. This idea is further substantiated by the fact that Brahman as the principle of all must be the final object of all expressions. In this sense It is characterised as *sarvasabdavācya*. By *śabda* in this term is not only meant the articulate sound, but also the inarticulate. The articulate sounds are of two kinds, those that belong to the Veda and those that belong to the ordinary usage. We have seen how the whole Veda teaches Brahman. The words of the ordinary usage also mean Brahman if the full sense is taken into consideration. 'King' is ordinarily applied to a human king. In its full sense it cannot be applied to a human being, and in that sense it only means God. Similarly the inarticulate sounds also signify particular qualities of God. For instance, the sound produced by a powerful stream signifies the awe-inspiring quality of Him. So God is *Sarvasabdavācya*. From this it follows that He is perfect with all auspicious qualities and this substantiates His independent nature.

(The inauspicious expressions such as misery, stand for the dependent character of misery and so on and thereby signify the independent nature of God.)

The lesson that a knower is expected to have from the foregoing considerations is that his ground is God, he is by nature dependent on God, he is similar to Him, his true outlook is consistent with the truth of Him, he can feel the presence of Him in everything that he experiences, he can know Him through every sound he hears, and the whole world is sacred as it is filled with Him. The fact that he does not so far know this truth is the cause of his imperfection and bondage.

THE IDEAL OF JIVA AND THE DISCIPLINE LEADING TO ITS REALISATION¹

Consistently with the nature of the *prameyas* that are so far defined the ideal of a *jīva* in life consists in realising Brahman as the ground (*bimba*) of its own self and thereby, through the grace of Brahman, obtaining *mokṣa* which is no other than the realisation of its own nature. The realisation of Brahman pre-

supposes a definite course of discipline. The following is the course: The first stage of this course is called *śravaṇa*, the study of philosophy (Dvaita Vedānta). By this study one becomes familiar with the *prameyas*. The knowledge of these *prameyas* is purified by one's own philosophical reflection. This stage is called *manana*. The next stage is *nididhyāsana*. *Nididhyāsana* is also called *upāśanā*. It means two things—(1) the application to the study of philosophy (*viśṇuśāstrāvamarśanam*) and (2) meditation (*dhyāna*). Of these two, meditation (*dhyāna*) presupposes the fulfilment of four conditions—*yama*, *niyama*, *āsana*, and *prāṇāyāma*. *Yama* means *ahimsā*—injuring no creature in action, thought or speech, *satya*—doing good to creatures, *asteya*—the non-appropriation of others' properties in action, thought and speech, *brahmacarya*—the abandonment of sexual happiness under all conditions, in action, thought and speech, and *aparigraha*—detachment from things that are secular. With regard to *brahmacarya* a few points may be noted. Sexual contact has eight aspects—memory, speech, observation, secret dealing, desire, interest, determination and action. In all its eight aspects it must be abandoned by those that are in the *Āśramas*, *brahmacarya* and *sanyāsa* and those that live in forests. The *brahmacarya* of a householder (*gṛhastha*), a king and a *vaiśya* consists in being each strictly faithful to his wife. Service is the *brahmacarya* of a *śūdra*. *Niyama* means *śauca*, *tapas*, *tuṣṭi*, *svādhyāya* and *Haripūjāna*. *Śauca* means the external and internal purity. External purity is obtained by means of bathing and so on. Internal purity means the purity of the heart. *Tapas* consists in repeating sacred formula, sacrifice, playing the part of a host, visiting the sacred places, and directing one's activity to the good of the others. *Tuṣṭi* consists in retiring from the secular interests. *Śvādhyāya* consists in the study of the sacred literature and pleasing the teacher. The teachers (*ācāryas*) are four, the mother, father, instructor and father-in-law. Of them the first three are more important. Among them the instructor who knows the Truth (*Paramārtha*) is the best. *Haripūjāna* is the worship of God consisting in sixteen services (*upacāra*)—*āvāhana*, praying God that he might make himself the object of one's worship, *āsana*, offering a seat, oblation and so on. *Āsana* is a particular posture of the body and it helps the concentration of *manas*. *Āsanas* are many—*virāṭasana*, *padmāsana*, *svastikāsana* and so on. *Prāṇāyāma* consists in the control of

breath. It has three aspects, *recaḥa*, *pūraḥa* and *kumbhaka*. *Recaḥa* consists in sending out the breath through either of the two nostrils closing at the same time the other nostril with the fingers. *Pūraḥa* consists in filling the body with air from outside. *Kumbhaka* consists in holding the breath in the body itself. *Prāṇāyāma* may or may not be accompanied by the thought of God. If it is not accompanied by it, then it is only a case of *niyama* and if it is accompanied by it, then it is called *dhyāna* or *nididhyāsana*.

Of the disciplines, *āsana*, *śauca*, *prāṇāyāma*, *aparigraha*, *ahimsā*, *satya*, *asteya* and *brahmacarya*, those that follow are better than those that precede. *Sravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* are better than all of them and they are the most important of the disciplines. If one has no knowledge then the best that one can do is to have it from a teacher. If one has doubts, then the best that one can do is to get rid of them by means of reflection. Reflection is superior to reception of instruction. If one is free from ignorance, doubt and illusion, then the best that one can do is to have meditation and application to the study of philosophy. Of the two, meditation and application to the study of philosophy, the latter is ten times¹ superior to the former. Meditation has a reference only to a limited number of qualities of God but the application to the study of philosophy has a reference to many more qualities. Further meditation gives little scope for improvement and this defect is removed in the application to the study of philosophy. Application to the study of philosophy means two things—(1) The state of one applying oneself to the study, and (2) the state of one teaching the subject to the others. Of these two the latter is a hundred times better than the former. Teaching is necessary even in the case of one who has realised Brahman. God is best pleased by teaching. So teaching is the most important of the disciplines. Further *dhyāna* or meditation is an aspect of memory. It has three stages, *dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi*. *Dhāraṇā* is the

¹ Madhvācārya uses at times the term *daśa* (ten) or *śata* (hundred) when he really means *ananta* or *pūrṇa* (infinite). He follows the tradition 'Daśeti śatamuddiṣṭam śatam pūrṇamihocyate.' (*Daśa* stands for *śata* and *śata* means infinite.) This idea may be further supported by a passage which he quotes from *Karmaviveka*, 'karma as such is infinitely inferior to *dhyāna* and *dhyāna* is infinitely inferior to *jñāna*.' (K.N.)

memory with intervals. *Dhyāna* is continuous memory. And *samādhi* is the continuous memory without any effort on the part of the individual who has it. *Samādhi* conducted for a sufficient length of time leads to the realisation (*aparokṣa*) of God. Further realisation also results from the consistent application to the study and teaching of *śāstra*, philosophy. This application must necessarily be accompanied by devotion (*bhakti*) to God. *Bhakti* is one's firm attachment to God accompanied by the correct knowledge of His greatness. It is not only the means for realisation, but also for liberation (*mokṣa*) and enjoyment (*bhoga*) after liberation. Without *bhakti* discipline loses its value.

So far the ideal of a *jīva* in life and the discipline leading to the realisation of it have been explained. With reference to this presentation two points may be noted. (1) For the first time after the appearance of *Darśanas* the real merit of the study and teaching of philosophy is fully recognised and the study and teaching are in fact made the best part of the course of discipline. The significance of this position from the social and spiritual standpoints is really immense. Though in Advaita *śraavana*, the correct understanding of the meaning of the principal position of the *Upaniṣads* is taken to be the last phase of discipline, yet meditation (*dhyāna*) is made the necessary presupposition of it in so far as it is required to remove wrong notions about Truth. And in fact, according to Advaita, the object of *dhyāna* is *mithyā* and the meditation on it is somehow supposed to remove wrong notions and thereby help the correct understanding of Truth. Dvaita is not satisfied with this position, first, because, according to Advaita, Truth (Brahman) is self-evident (*svaprakāśa*) and with reference to it the distinction between right and wrong knowledge cannot be justified unless its self-evident character is denied; and next, because, that the meditation on a wrong thing, i.e. the thing that is *āropita*, removes wrong notions about Truth and leads to the correct understanding of it is not convincing. The position of Dvaita is that it is as a rule the meditation on a real thing that leads to the realisation of it and in this case the right understanding of the thing is obviously the presupposition of the meditation. Further according to Dvaita meditation is not a necessity. It is in fact a lower type of discipline. Discipline in the higher sense consists in application to *śāstra*, and this pre-

supposes no meditation. This position is a definite contribution to Vedānta in particular and philosophy in general.

(2) Realisation (*aparokṣa*) may not mark the fullness of discipline. This is the implication of the position that without sufficient *bhakti*, realisation does not lead to liberation. This means that after realisation the individual must continue to study and teach the *kāstra* and develop *bhakti* till the discipline is full and the liberation is obtained. During this period, i.e. after realisation and before liberation, the individual is called a *jīvanmukta*, i.e. a *mukta* though he is yet in bondage. This means that *jīvanmukti* is due to the incompleteness of the discipline. This position is in contrast with the conception of *jīvanmukti* in Advaita. According to Advaita after realisation the individual ought to have liberation, but he does not have it because his *kaṛma* called *prārabdha* is not destroyed. Under this circumstance he must exhaust the *kaṛma* by enjoying the fruit of it and this period of enjoyment is the period of *jīvanmukti*. So *jīvanmukti* according to this idea is due to *kaṛma*. This means that though on the part of the individual the discipline is full, he is prevented from having *mukti* because of *kaṛma*. It may be noted that this position is not accepted in Dvaita, for this position involves the recognition of the helplessness of discipline against *kaṛma*. To hold that the discipline is full but that there is no result owing to something that is *mithyā*, is to ignore the real significance of discipline.

According to Dvaita, realisation is not the final phase of discipline and there is therefore nothing wrong in holding that it may be incomplete. The final phase of discipline is the grace (*prasāda*) of God. One has this grace when one's discipline is complete and through it one obtains *mukti*. It may also be noted in this connection that 'one has grace when one's discipline is complete' does not mean that one is so far devoid of grace. In the study of the relation between the Independent and the dependent *tattvas*, it has already been seen how everything in the world is the result of the desire of the Independent (God). If it is rightly understood, His desire is His grace. So the completeness of one's discipline and His grace mean in fact the same thing. Through this discipline or grace there is liberation.

MUKTI

Mukti is liberation. It consists in abandoning one's unnatural appearances and fully realising one's nature. With this realisation one is perfect according to one's capacity. That one is of a particular capacity is implied in the fact that the qualitative merit of one's discipline is not the same as that of another. One's discipline is said to be full, not in the absolute sense of the term, but relatively to one's capacity. So one's perfection is in accordance with one's capacity. The realisation of perfection in every case consists in the realisation of one's self as *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* according to one's capacity. From this it follows that the liberated *jīvas* may be many, but they are never the same. Each has perfection according to its individuality. Therefore they are different from one another even in *mukti*. It is obvious how they are different from God, the Independent, for they are dependent even in *mukti*, as God, the Absolute is the ground of all, including the liberated. In *mukti*, a *jīva* rests in God, its ground, and this explains its perfection. To signify these ideas, this system is called Dvaita Vedānta. It is not Dvaita in the ordinary sense of the term, but it is Dvaita as Vedānta and it stands for the idea of God as Independent (*Svatantra*).

This view of *mukti* is formulated consistently with the nature of the actual life of an individual here, his real capacities, the nature of the world order, the nature of the ultimate things, his relation to them and the final success he can hope to obtain. Each of the previous philosophies has ignored the importance of the study of these facts and consequently has arrived at a defective view of *mukti*.

Buddhism speaks of complete annihilation of desire in connection with *mukti*. The complete annihilation of desire is impossible as there subsists still the desire for such annihilation. Desire has two aspects, one that binds and the other that frees. The desire for the worldly attainments binds man and the desire for *mukti* frees him. Desire is an aspect of consciousness and consciousness is self-conscious. There is desire so long as there is a principle of self-conscious; the self is this principle and we have seen how there can be no end to it. Further, Buddhism speaks of *mukti* as *śūnyabhāva*. This is based on the view that *śūnya* is the ultimate principle of all. This view is

wrong. *Sūnya* is negative and it cannot be the source of anything positive. The world is given as being positively real. Buddhism holds that the appearance of the world is due to nescience (*samvṛti*). But when everything is really *sūnya* how nescience comes cannot be explained and, unless it is explained, the theory that every thing is ultimately *sūnya* cannot be justified. A careful study of experience shows how the world is positively real and how its origin and end must also be positively real. So *mukṭi* is not *sūnyabhāva*.

Vijñānavāda holds that *mukṭi* consists in the succession of self-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*). That there is self-consciousness in *mukṭi* may be a fact, but that it is necessarily momentary and that there is nothing else cannot be justified. In the first place self-consciousness is necessarily a case of continuity, because otherwise there is nothing to recognise the succession of consciousness and without this recognition it is impossible to speak of succession. In the second place the argument that there is nothing else in *mukṭi* is an expression of *sūnyavāda* and we have seen how it is not justified.

Jainism holds that the self is by nature perfect as the embodiment of perfect faith, perfect knowledge and perfect conduct and the realisation of this nature is *mukṭi*. This view is not consistent with experience. If every self is really perfect, then how its perfection is obscured in life cannot be justified. Jainism holds that it is obscured by *kaṃsa*, an aspect of matter. This is to give undue importance to *kaṃsa*. If an aspect of matter can obscure perfection that is spiritual, then one can never regain perfection. According to this view the spiritual principle is really made helpless against matter.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that knowledge is the cause of bondage and that to get rid of knowledge as such is to obtain *mukṭi*. This position is based on a wrong view of knowledge. Wrong knowledge binds the self and right knowledge frees it. Further the position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contradicts itself. That knowledge as such is the cause of bondage is a case of knowledge and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has tacitly assumed that it frees the self. Further we have seen how the self is the principle of consciousness and therefore the position that it becomes devoid of consciousness in *mukṭi* is not true. In fact the so-called self that is really devoid of consciousness is no self at all. So the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in his doctrine of *mukṭi* has practically

denied the self itself by holding that the self is *mukṭi* is devoid of consciousness.

The Sāṅkhya holds that *mukṭi* consists in the aloofness of *puruṣa* from *prakṛti*. *Puruṣa* according to him is pure consciousness (*caitanya*) and this consciousness is not relative to any object. Against this position the following points may be noted. In the first place how *puruṣa* that is pure consciousness becomes subject to the condition of *prakṛti* cannot be satisfactorily explained. The Sāṅkhya says of course that *puruṣa* is neither bound nor released but it is only *prakṛti* that is bound and released. This is irrelevant. That *puruṣa* is bound is our experience and we are concerned with the release of *puruṣa* but not of *prakṛti*. And in the second place to define *puruṣa* as pure consciousness is wrong. As it is already explained consciousness is self-conscious and the self is what is presented as 'I'. And there is no case of consciousness that does not involve subject-object relation.

The position of *yoga* is similar to that of Sāṅkhya.

The *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* holds that the self is characterised by the power of consciousness (*jñānaśakti*). Against this position we have to note that to make a sharp distinction between the power of consciousness and consciousness is unwarranted. The power of consciousness cannot be different from consciousness and consciousness is self-conscious. This means that the self which is characterised by the power of consciousness is really a self-conscious principle and in this case there is nothing specially gained by holding that the self has only the power but not consciousness.

Advaita holds that the self is in reality Brahman Itself and to realise this is *mukṭi*. To account for this the world of experience with all its aspects is said to be *mithyā* and Brahman is considered to be *nirviśeṣa*. Against this position we have already noted how the self is not Brahman, how the world of experience cannot be *mithyā* and how Brahman is not *nirviśeṣa*. In the light of these considerations it follows that the so-called *mukṭi* of the self, according to Advaita, is the complete annihilation of the self; such annihilation is impossible. Further, in emphasising that the world of experience is *mithyā* Advaita has unconsciously admitted that its view of *mukṭi* is not consistent with the actual experience of the self whose *mukṭi* is in question.

Against the position of Viśiṣṭādvaita one important point is

to be noted. It is said that the enjoyment of a self in *mukṣi* is as perfect as that of God. This position has obviously ignored the real position of a self in the world of experience. The selves as they are given in experience have not the same capacity and they cannot have the same discipline. Their realisations cannot therefore be the same. If so there is much less reason to hold that their enjoyment is as perfect as that of God. Supposing that it is the same as that of God there comes the difficulty of explaining how this perfection is obscured in the world of bondage. In solving this difficulty one must hold either that the world of bondage is unreal (Buddhism) or *mithyā* (Advaita) or that each self has perfection according to its capacity (*yogyatā*) and it is never identical with the perfection of God (Dvaita). Viśiṣṭādvaita itself does not accept the first two alternatives and it must therefore make its position sound by accepting the last alternative which is the position of Dvaita Vedānta.

According to Dvaita Vedānta the perfection of each self is, to start with, in the form of capacity (*yogyatā*). God, the Independent creates an environment for the self to give it a full expression. By making the full use of this environment the self realises its own perfection. This conclusion alone is consistent on the one hand with the actual experience of a self in bondage and on the other with the nature of God, the Independent, the Principle of perfection.

With this doctrine of *mukṣi* Madhvācārya has not only given a meaning to the life of bondage, the actual course of discipline that a self can have and the thought of God as the Independent Principle of all, but has also made bondage (*bandha*) and freedom (*mokṣa*) consistent with each other. With this consistency he has given a touch of *mukṣi* to the so-called bondage. By most of the previous thinkers life here is condemned as nothing but misery or evil. Madhvācārya points out that it is misery or evil only in the case of those that have not understood God as Independent and the world as dependent and have not moulded their lives consistently with this truth. For one who has understood this truth and made life consistent with one's understanding the whole world is sacred with God as the Soul in it and everywhere in the world even in the meanest and the worst of the things God's real greatness is realised and enjoyed. With this realisation and enjoyment the whole world becomes the abode of God instead of being the abode of evil.

With this truth and outlook to improve one's self is to help society, because much is taught by practice (*ācāra*) rather than by mere teaching without practice. This outlook is open to all without any special reference to a particular creed or class. With this outlook man is not too ambitious, he knows his limit, tries to improve himself and the world in so far as he can, and makes himself and the world happy. Madhvācārya with his philosophy of the Independent as the real source of the dependent and with the emphasis on the reality and the spirituality of life here has made life worth living because ultimately it leads one to freedom.



CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION



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After a careful study of the three systems of Vedānta in their historical order one may naturally come to the conclusion that the philosophical reflection in India has reached its culmination in Dvaita Vedānta. For this reason this system forms the most important aspect of Vedānta thought. This truth may be understood more clearly if we note the real significance of a Vedānta system according to the philosophical traditions of India, how fully Dvaita Vedānta justifies this significance, how the best of Indian thought is preserved in this system and how this system was needed to bring the Vedānta teaching to its perfection.

The Real Significance of Vedānta as Philosophy

In the very fact that a system is called Vedānta there lies apparently something that goes against its philosophical merit, for, the term, Vedānta, is taken to mean the position that is based on the teaching of the Veda. For this reason modern writers on Indian Philosophy feel that the Vedānta systems are religious and theological rather than purely philosophical. Whatever may be the value of such criticisms, a note on the real significance of the terms Vedānta and Vedānta systems may not be out of place.

If the term, Vedānta, is taken to signify anything religious or theological that is distinct from, or opposed to, philosophy, then from the philosophical standpoint there is not much to justify it. If on the other hand the significance of this term is an expression of pure philosophical spirit, then, in case it is a philosophical necessity, it is desirable to retain it. Whatever the shortcomings of a particular Vedānta system may be, the spirit of each system supports the idea that in Vedānta there should be nothing that is non-philosophical. Consistently with this idea, in every Vedānta system there is an earnest attempt to make its position philosophically sound. In this connection,

one may see that this by itself does not justify a Vedānta system as pure philosophy. For, after all, philosophically to justify a position is one thing, and to arrive at a position purely as a result of philosophical enquiry is quite another thing, because in the former case there is still lurking the idea of a preconceived notion with regard to which there is a philosophical justification later on, and in the latter case there is no such preconception. How far this latter idea can be applied to each Vedānta system can be determined in the light of the following considerations.

From the very start in Indian philosophy there is a thorough-going attempt to determine the valid sources of correct knowledge and that is considered to be real which is revealed by this knowledge. From the standpoint of the Vedānta systems as a whole three such sources are distinguished and they are *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama*. Though in Advaita three more sources, *upamāna*, *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi* are mentioned, one may see that after all they are varieties of *pratyakṣa* or *anumāna*, as the case may be. It is further pointed out that though the sources of knowledge are different, they are not inconsistent with one another. *Pratyakṣa* is the basis of *anumāna* and *anumāna* gives a meaning to *pratyakṣa*. Two stages in *pratyakṣa* are distinguished—normal and supernormal. The normal is common to all and the supernormal is the experience of those that are capable of seeing the ultimate significance of things. The distinction between the two forms of *pratyakṣa* is more or less the same as the distinction between common sense *pratyakṣa* and scientific *pratyakṣa*. To be partial to one and to deny the truth of the other is to over-emphasise the distinction between the two. The two may be distinct but they are not inconsistent. The normal is the basis of the supernormal and the supernormal supplements the normal. The things revealed by the supernormal are known to those that have only the normal *pratyakṣa*, only through the verbal testimony of those that have had the supernormal experience. This verbal testimony is called *āgama*. In the very idea of *āgama*, in this sense, it is implied that it is consistent with *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, that it presents things that are not presented by *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* in the normal sense, and that it makes *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* fuller and richer. The term, *āgama*, with these qualifications stands for *śruti* and *smṛti*. *Śruti* is *apauruṣeya* and *smṛti* is *pauruṣeya*. The latter is necessarily

consistent with the former. The idea that *āgama* is necessarily consistent with the other sources of knowledge makes the question of interpretation very prominent. From this it follows that a case of *āgama* cannot be taken to be of any value unless it is interpreted consistently with the foregoing ideas. Owing to these ideas, namely, that that is real which is revealed by the valid sources of knowledge, and that the sources of knowledge are consistent with one another, there are in a Vedānta system both philosophy in the modern sense and the interpretation of *āgama* consistently with the Indian ideas. In the course of detailed development of these ideas, although the different thinkers arrived at different conclusions, yet it is never forgotten that the different sources of knowledge are necessarily consistent with one another. The conclusions of reason are further substantiated by *āgama* and the teaching of *āgama* is given fuller significance by the application of reason. With these ideas in mind one has to observe in this connection that though in a Vedānta system there are, of course, from the standpoint of modern interest, different elements—philosophy and interpretation of the Veda—yet from the Indian point of view these two are the necessary elements of philosophy proper, that is of philosophy which has in view things that are revealed by different sources of knowledge (*pramāṇasiddha*). So long as this view is philosophical a Vedānta system does not suffer as philosophy. To emphasise a particular source of knowledge at the cost of other sources is wrong from the Indian point of view. A particular source of knowledge, such as reason, has its fuller significance in its relation to the other sources. Independent of other sources a particular source is unchecked and does not help man in obtaining a sound view of reality. To isolate *pratyakṣa* does not help the distinction between right and wrong *pratyakṣa*. The distinction between the two is made by means of reason, (*anumāna*). To isolate *anumāna* involves self-contradiction, because without a reference to *pratyakṣa*, directly or indirectly, a valid case of *anumāna* cannot be distinguished. To isolate *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* is to deny higher types of realisation that are philosophically consistent with human experience, and with this negation the spiritual advancement of man is made difficult. These are the ideas in general which mark the starting point of a Vedānta philosophy; and these are the ideas given by the *Brahma Sūtras* like *Kāmācchānumānāpekṣā*, *Tarkā-*

pratiṣṭhānāt, and so on. The common idea of these *sūtras* is that *anumāna* by itself is unreliable. This is not the denial of philosophy, but the giving to philosophy of its proper significance. This tradition is started by the Veda itself, e.g., 'One who does not know the Veda cannot understand Brahman, the Infinite (*nāvedavīnmanutedambhāntam*)'; 'Mere reason does not help the right view and it is only the Veda that helps it (*naiṣāstarkṣa matirāpaneyā proktānyenaiva sujñānāya*)' and so on. Following these ideas the *Gītā* says, 'So in discriminating between the right and wrong *lāstrā* is your *pramāṇa*. (*Tasmāt lāstram pramāṇante kṛyākṛya vyavasthitau*)', and it adds 'One who abandons the teaching of *lāstrā* . . . does not obtain success. (*Yalīlāstrā vidhi mutsryya varitate . . . na sa siddhi mavāpnoti*)'. Consistently with this tradition the *Brahma Sūtra* explains how isolated reasoning may not have finality, but reasoning consistent with the other *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa* and *āgama* is conclusive and helps the spiritual advancement of man (2.1.12). So on the whole the contribution of Indian thought to philosophy in general consists of two ideas—(1) that reasoning must necessarily be consistent with the other *pramāṇas*; this means that only that reasoning is valid that is consistent with the other *pramāṇas*; and (2) that a sound philosophy is that which necessarily leads to the spiritual advancement of man. Of these two the former is an expression of intellectual consistency and the realisation of this is the characteristic of spirituality. (This position is very explicit in Dvaita Vedānta.) The philosophical value of Indian thought rests on the philosophic value of this contribution. Indian thinkers entertain no doubt with regard to the philosophical importance of this position, because they are convinced that isolated reasoning contradicts itself. Man's mental power is so rich that what is argued out by one man is easily disproved by another. This idea is best illustrated by the Sophists of Greece. That isolated reason does not help man's spiritual advancement is substantiated by Kant's negative conclusion regarding the worth of metaphysics. The Indian thinkers with their insistence on the consistency of reason with the other *pramāṇas*, especially with *pratyakṣa*, readily see the defects of such positions that imply the denial of the reality of experienced things. Supposing they were familiar with Zeno's arguments against motion, that motion is impossible as the thing that is supposed

to move must be at rest at a point of space at every given point of time and so on; and with Bradley's arguments against relation, that the conception of relation involves self-contradiction as the supposed relation between two entities, being different from the entities themselves, presupposes another relation between itself and the entities and so on, they would meet them in the following manner. Whatever may be the other defects of these arguments at the very outset they are sublated by the perception of motion and of relation. Further, these arguments contradict themselves. Motion is a case of succession. Unless Zeno's mind has succession in perceiving that a distance from a particular point to another point presupposes a number of intervening points, he cannot formulate the argument that the thing that is supposed to move must be at rest at a point at a given point of time. So his argument against motion presupposes the truth of succession, i.e. motion. Similarly Bradley's argument against relation as such presupposes at least the truth of the relation between the proof and the proved. To grant this relation is self-contradiction and not to grant it is to make the proof against relation impossible. So isolated reason is defective and the reason that is consistent with perception alone is sound.

In India also there were some thinkers who could not appreciate this position. The most prominent among them were the *Mādhyamika* thinkers and certain Advaita thinkers like Sriharṣa of *Khaṇḍana khaṇḍakhādyā*. *Mādhyamika's* very idea of *śūnya* as *catuḥkoṭivivirmukta* involves self-contradiction. He holds that an object is not real, because it has a beginning and an end, and in this expression he clearly accepts by way of implication that the real is necessarily beginningless and endless. But in contradiction of this implication, in the same breath he says that the object is not unreal because it has a beginning and end, and in this expression he implies that the object is real in the sense that it has a beginning and end. The Jaina thinker rightly points out self-contradiction in *Mādhyamika's* position and holds that to have beginning and end is rather the sign of enduring reality and supports this idea by perceptual experience. Sriharṣa's position is similar to that of *Mādhyamika*. For instance, his criticism against time may be taken. He notes that time must be presented as past, present, or future. But it is impossible, he says, because to recognise time as past, present and

future presupposes the recognition of the object as past, present or future. This line of argument is evidently sublated by his own recognition of the previous step of his argument as past, and the present step as present, and his object in view as future. Similarly his entire position involves self-contradiction.

In Indian philosophy these are extreme cases. But the general position of the Indian philosophers, including even many Advaita thinkers, is epistemological realism. Indian thinkers in general are not convinced of the truth of epistemological idealism. If a thinker like Berkeley or a *Vijñānavādin* holds that what is perceived is only an idea and has nothing corresponding to it in the external world, they readily point out the defect in that position. If there is nothing external and all that exists is only the idea, then how can there be the thought of externality? Though there is no idea that cannot be said to involve finally a reference to the external world, it is possible to distinguish between two types of ideas. Imagination and a normal case of perception may be taken as examples. Though imagination may finally be traced to the external world, yet, as imagination, and when the subject knows that it is only a case of imagination, it is recognised to be purely internal without any direct reference to the external world. A man who consciously imagines a centaur knows that his imagination does not directly refer to any external object. But the case of a perception is different. A perception like 'this is a table' directly refers to an external object, table. If we keep this distinction in mind, it is easy to see the defect of the idealistic position. If there is only idea and nothing else, then how can there be this distinction between perception and imagination? As the content of imagination is taken to be internal, the object or the content of perception must also be taken to be internal. But this is never done and in fact all men, including even the idealists, know that perception refers to an external object. If the external object is denied and the so-called object is taken to be only an idea, then how can there be the idea that it is external, but not that it is internal as in the case of imagination? Further, *Vijñānavāda* concludes that that which is perceived is a mere idea, since there can be no relation between the idea which is mental and an external object which is non-mental. What is meant by 'non-mental' here? The meaning that it is opposed to the mental is unwarranted. There is only the experience that presents the so-called non-

mental and there is nothing in experience to say that the so-called non-mental is opposed to the mental. So the only sense in which 'non-mental' can be understood is that it is different from the mental. The mental now stands for the idea, i.e. the perception. So the whole position is that perception cannot present that which is different from it. But to accept this position is to deny the mental history. Just as there is the idea of an external entity, there is the idea of a past idea. Memory, for example, is an idea which presents a past idea. The latter idea is different from the former idea. If an idea cannot present that which is different from it, then how can memory present a past idea which is different from it? If it can present it, where is the difficulty in holding that it can also present the external which is different from it? Further the idealistic position finally makes it impossible to accept anything other than an idea; and in this case there can be nothing else to measure the truth of this position since the standard of measurement falls outside the idea. Even to hold that in the Absolute these deficiencies are squared up is no more than a standard and as such it falls outside the idea. To say that this is the way of discursive thought is to cut the root of philosophy, for who has experienced the thought that is non-discursive? Further the whole mischief is due to the expression, 'external'. By first calling the presented object external, and then taking hold of the implication of the expression, external, all sorts of difficulties which are not true to experience are imagined. The object is only presented and it is not necessary to characterise it as external, if this characterisation necessarily creates difficulties. To hold that it is presented implies that there is a natural relation between that which presents and that which is presented. That which presents is knowledge or idea (*viśayi*) and that which is presented is the object (*viśaya*). To indicate this idea the object is called *prameya* and this word means 'that which is presented by right knowledge'.

So the mutual consistency of the several *pramāṇas*, with a clear recognition of it, is one of the distinguishing features of Indian thought. This recognition is responsible for the appearance of the so-called theological or scholastic discussions in a Vedānta system.

Further we may take note of another point in this connec-

tion. Even a modern philosopher after justifying or establishing a position, may further substantiate it by showing how a similar position is held by a philosopher of great reputation, say Kant. This must not of course be taken to mean that a position is sound only because Kant held it. It is just the same when a Vedānta philosopher quotes a passage from the Veda in support of his position or under the same circumstance interprets the Vedic position. It must also be noted that a reference to the text of *Sūti* invariably presupposes that the position in question is justified independently of the text, whatever the order in which these things are put. Further in India from the very beginning the Veda and the works consistent with it are so much respected for their profound philosophical implication that in some philosophical literature it is difficult to find the difference between the two aspects.

How Dvaita Vedānta Justifies the Philosophical Significance of Vedānta

So far the general principles underlying the Vedānta systems have been stated. But how far the respective thinkers are consistent with these principles remains to be seen. In some cases particular thinkers are unable to satisfy these principles on account of certain positions of their own creation. This point may be clearly illustrated by taking the position of Advaita and contrasting the position of Dvaita with it.

The position of Sankarācārya is indicated in certain passages of his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. In *jijñāsādhikaraṇa* (1.1.1) he says, 'jijñāsā means the desire to know (*jñātumicchā jijñāsā*). The knowledge culminating in *aparokṣa* is the object of desire (*Avagatiparyantam jñānam . . . icchāyāḥ karma*.)' What is the cause of this knowledge? The answer to this question is given in the *Navilaṅkānotoṣādhikaraṇa* (2.1.11), 'with regard to the thing revealed by an authority base reasoning cannot be depended upon. . . . It is therefore established that only the knowledge that is produced by the *Upaniṣad* is true. No other knowledge can be true. . . . Therefore through authority and reasoning that is consistent with authority it is proved that Brahman which is a spirit is the efficient and the material cause of the world. (*Nāgamagamyerthe kevalenātārkeṇa pratyavasthātavyam . . . Atah siddhamaryaveaupaniṣadasya jñānasya samyajñānatvam. Atonyatra samyajñānatvānupapattih. . . . Atah Āgamavaśenā-*

gamānusāritakavalenaca cetanam Brahma jagatahkāraṇam prakṛtiḥ ceti sthitam..)' It may be noted that Brahman considered here is lower. It is qualified (*saḡuṇa*) for it is the cause of the world. But Brahman that is ultimate is *nirguṇa*. To know how this Brahman is known is more relevant to the present discussion. As an answer to this demand the author says, 'The identity of Brahman and Ātman as revealed by "That thou art" cannot be understood without scripture. (*Tatvamasi iti Brahmātmabhāvasya lāstramantareṇa anavagamya mānatvāt* 1.1.4)'. So what is meant on the whole is that philosophy is impossible in connection with the knowledge of the ultimate Truth.

We shall see what Madhvācārya says. He clearly explains his position in the V.T.V. 3-4, S.M. 261-262 as 'Though āgama is more decisive than *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, it cannot have truth if it is opposed to them on which it depends. . . . If there is the opposition of *anubhava* (*pratyakṣa*) āgama cannot have truth, because there is untruth in the *anubhava* of the truth of āgama also. (*Pratyakṣāderāgamasya prābalyepi nopajīvyapramāṇa-virodhe prāmāṇyam. . . . Nacānubhavavirodhe āgamasya prāmāṇyam, āgamapramāṇyanubhavasāpi aprāmāṇyaprapṛtḥ.*)' Consistently with these ideas Tīkācārya explains the position of Madhvācārya in the *Nyūyasudhā* 2.1.4 in this way, 'With regard to Īśvara, reasoning as such is not refuted by the author of the Sūtras, but only the reasoning that is not supported by scripture (Veda). The reasoning supported by scripture is certainly a proof in establishing Īśvara. Otherwise with regard to the teaching of the Veda an enquiry which is no other than the application of reasoning could not have been started. (*Nasarvathūpītvare anumānasya prāmāṇyam sūtrakṛtā nirākṛtam. Kinnāmūgamānanugrhitasya. Āgamānugrhitātvanumelītare mānāmevūbbhimatā. Anyathā vedavākyaṛthe yuktyanusandhānarūpa-jijñāsām nārabheteti.*.)' This is on the whole an expression of the idea that philosophy is possible and is in fact indispensable in obtaining the knowledge of the Absolute. It may be noted further that such a position as this has no place in Advaita, because *nirguṇa* Brahman transcends all conception. The same idea is further illustrated by the meaning of the term, *jijñāsā*, according to the two systems. Sankarācārya means by the term desire to know and this desire has knowledge in view. But Madhvācārya notes that this interpretation is wrong, because

desire is spontaneous and cannot be the subject of a command, and the case of knowledge is the same; and he understands by the term, *jijñāsā*, philosophical enquiry which comes between desire and knowledge. (*Tasmāt jñāneccāntarṇito vicāro jijñāsā-padena lakṣyate*, 1.1.1). By enquiry (*vicāra*) he means *Mīmāṃsā*, application of reason (*yuktyanusanadhāna*). His final position is that without *jijñāsā*, i.e., *Mīmāṃsā*, the Veda is useless. He says that when there is much dispute about the nature of Truth, in spite of the fact that the Veda reveals Truth there is no knowledge of it; and so with a view to removing the dispute and determining the true meaning of the Veda, enquiry must be made (*Anekān vipratipattiṣu satīṣu tattvajñāna-kṛanādapi vedāntadanutpattau tadapodanadvāreṇa vedetīkarta-vyatārūpā jijñāsā kṛtavyeti*, 1.1.1). Thus according to him sound philosophy and the teaching of the Veda finally mean one and the same thing. The same spirit is echoed by Tīkēcārya when he says, 'Only that meaning of the Veda which is really consistent with reason must be taken to be true. Otherwise . . . there ought to be no commencement of philosophical enquiry. (*Upapātyaviruddhohi vedārthograhyaḥ. Anyathā . . . vicāra śāstrānārambhaprasaṅgāt*, N.S. 1.4.6., 207).' The same spirit is still more clearly illustrated by his several statements in the *Nyāyasūdhā* such as, 'That should be taken as representing the intention of the author of the *Bṛhmasūtra* which is not sublated by a *pramāṇa* and which is supported by a *pramāṇa*. (*Pramāṇāviruddhaḥ pramāṇānusārica sūtrakārasya abhiprāyaḥ kṣepanīyaḥ*, 2.2.7); 'Pratyakṣa is superior to all reasoning and verbal testimony. (*Pratyakṣameva akhilādanumānādāgamīceca-raram pramāṇam*, 2.2.8); 'As reasoning and verbal testimony are based on *pratyakṣa*, *pratyakṣa* is indeed superior to them. (*Anumānāgamayoḥ pratyakṣamūlatvena tataḥ pratyakṣa-meva varam pramāṇam*, 2.2.8); 'The Truth must be understood only in the light of experience, but not in any other manner, because reasoning based on normal experience alone is the means for understanding it. (*Lokānusāreṇaiva paramārtho boddhavyaḥ, nānyathā, lokānyāyasyaiva tadbodhopāyatvāt*, 2.2.8); and 'The distinction between *jīvātman* and *paramātman* is explained on the strength of the *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa* and so on. Therefore even a hundred *brūtis* like *Tatramasi* cannot produce the idea of the identity of the two. (*Jīvātmaparamātmā-bhedaśya pratyakṣādipramāṇabalena upapādītatvāt tatramasīyādi*

śrutīlatenāpi tadabhedapratipattiḥ utpattumalam. N.S. 2.3.14., 435.). It is interesting to note in this connection that these statements, with their full significance, have their first appearance in Dvaita Vedānta. The philosophical value of them cannot be overestimated. So in the Vedānta of Madhvācārya the true significance of philosophy is fully recognised and with this recognition it was possible for him to make philosophy (*tātrābhyāsa*) the main characteristic of the spiritual discipline that leads to liberation. He says that even the *Devas* (divinities) need philosophy. In interpreting this idea Ṭikācārya says, 'Even in the case of Brahmā and so on whose intellect is not vitiated by the *aśāna* caused by wrong philosophies philosophical enquiry is necessary in order to make the sword of knowledge sharp. (*Kusamayaiḥ anāhitāśānānām brahmādinām buddhimprati yuktinām tānatvasiddhaye yuktisāreṇa jñānūsevatinaitityasiddhyarthanitiyāvat . . . jñānavasādyaprayojanasya vidyamānatoṣṭai- rīdamādaraṇīyamiti bhāvah, N.S. 2.2.1.316.*)' With these ideas Madhvācārya has certainly opened a new chapter in the history of philosophy in India.

Some modern critics hold that Indian thought is not purely philosophical, because it does not insist on knowledge for its own sake and makes knowledge a means for *mukṣi*. Against this criticism the position of Dvaita Vedānta may be noted. Real spirituality is the sound philosophical knowledge and the full expression of spirituality is what is called *mukṣi*. So to insist on *mukṣi* is to insist on the fullness of knowledge. Fullness of knowledge presupposes the fullness of moral virtues and so on. Realisation of Truth is an aspect of the fullness of knowledge. The whole position is an expression of the truth that mediate (*parokṣa*) knowledge of Reality does not end in itself and it necessarily culminates in immediate (*apurokṣa*) knowledge and thus becomes full.

Madhvācārya distinguishes three types of philosophical discussion—*vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitandā*. Pure *tattvanirṇaya* (determination of truth) is the aim of *vāda*, and *tattvanirṇaya* may be for one's own use or for the use of others. Success, reputation and so on are the aims of *jalpa*. And to defeat the opponent without establishing one's own position is the aim of *vitandā*. Of these three, *vāda* is the presupposition of the other two, because without *tattvanirṇaya* *jalpa* and *vitandā* cannot be determined, and the aims of *jalpa* and *vitandā* do not help *tattvanirṇaya*.

Vāda is therefore the best form of philosophy. Further *vāda* presupposes the absence of *rāga* and *dveṣa* (likes and dislikes), the necessary intellectual equipment and devotion to the ultimate Truth (*viśṇubhakti*) and this devotion is an expression of spiritual perfection. This is why *vāda* is the best kind of *sāpas*. With this view Madhvācārya examines with much care those positions that stand in the way of *tattvanirṇaya*, points out their defects and prepares the way for *tattvanirṇaya*. That his entire philosophy is *vāda* does not need a restatement.

The Best of Indian Thought is Preserved in Dvaita Vedānta

Another notable point in Madhvācārya is his catholicity. Throughout the course of his system he recognises what is really valuable in other philosophies. This is indicated by the expressions, such as *iṣṭāsādhanaṭā*, *iṣṭāpastiḥ* and *siddhasādhanaṭā*. Though these terms may mean the fallacies of reasoning, one can see that after all they signify the acceptance of what is sound with reference to the other systems. After accepting such things he finds a true place for them in his system and thereby makes their meaning fuller. With the Cārvāka he agrees that life must be enjoyed fully, and he adds that life is not worth enjoying without a spiritual outlook. Though he commends real *sanyāsa* as an *āśrama*, he emphasises disinterestedness in action (*karmaphalatyāga*) that is consistent with Truth and its implications. That God is the principle of all, including action and its relation to its result, is the Truth. That one must act with the recognition of this Truth is its implication. With the Bauddha he recognises that things of the world are ever changing and he notes that change necessarily presupposes a substance that changes and God, the author of it. With the Vijñānavādin he holds that the real is not independent of its knowledge and he draws attention to the fact that the negation of the reality of the objective world does not follow therefrom. The denial of the world cannot be implied in the fact of knowledge which reveals it. With the Mādhyamika and Śaṅkarācārya, he grants that bondage is due to *avidyā* (*pramāḍātmaśatvāt bandhasya*) and points out that *avidyā* and bondage are facts, i.e. they are not illusion and their author is God who is the principle of all. With the Jaina he admits the relative character of things and asks one not to ignore the truth that the Absolute is the ground of the relative. With the Nyāya-

Vaiśeṣika and Rāmānujācārya he holds that things consist of the substantive and attributive aspects and concludes that they are only differences in identity. With the Mīmāṃsaka he accepts the force of *ḥarṃa* and subjects it to the will of God, the principle of all, including *ḥarṃa* and its force. He says that God is greater than our distinction between good and bad (*dharma* and *adharma*). His idea is that our distinctions must be consistent with the truth of God. With Sankarācārya he maintains that God (Brahman) is an identity devoid of distinctions and that He is the basis of the reality of the world, and concludes thereby that God is infinite and the world finite. His idea is that both are actual and to negate one is to negate the other. One may note in this connection the spirit of his teaching. Experience is the starting point of philosophy and God is established as the ground of experience and therefore we are incapable of thinking what God is independently of experience; for, thinking itself is an aspect of experience and God is considered only as its ground and as the ground He is relative to the world of experience. The *Upaniṣads* tell us nothing that is opposed to this truth. The *Taittirīya* says, 'From what these things are produced, by what these things that are produced are protected and in what they disappear and have rest, enquire into It, that is Brahman.' So to speak of God as He is in Himself, independent of the world, and to deny the reality of the world are unjustifiable. Throughout his *kāthakāvāda* in *Anuvyākhyāna* he insists on the truth that if philosophical enquiry is based on experience, as it cannot be otherwise, then the truth that is finally established never negates enquiry and experience. That is to say that experience and enquiry are as much facts as the final truth. He applies this idea to all the things he considers. If a Bauddha or Sankarācārya says that things cannot be considered to be real merely on the ground that they are observed to produce other things, and illustrates his point on the analogy of illusion or dream, where things are seen to produce other things for the time being, Madhvācārya corrects the position of the opponent by drawing his attention to the fact that what really causes things in illusion or dreams is really the knowledge in the form of illusion or dream but not the object of it. This point may be illustrated by taking the rope-serpent illusion. When an individual has this illusion there is fear created in him. The cause

of this fear is not the unreal serpent, but it is the idea of the serpent presented in illusion. What he means by this is that it does not follow that experience itself is unreal, merely because normal experience can be compared to illusion or dream from the standpoint of one thing or the other. Even as illusion is a fact though what is apprehended is unreal, experience is a fact and there is nothing to sublate experience and therefore what is given in experience is also a fact. Similar is the consideration with regard to dreams. With regard to dreams a point may be noted. The things that are given in dreams are mental and they are real in that capacity and our mistaking them for the external entities is a case of illusion. Similar is the case of imagination. And with Rāmānujācārya he accepts that God is the immanent principle of all and devotion (*bhakti*) to Him is the main feature of the spiritual discipline, and he rejects the idea that God is the material cause of the universe and shows that devotion and knowledge must mean the same thing and that they are therefore not different. Thus he safeguards the infinite nature of God and gives no room for blind faith in the name of devotion.

The Need for Dvaita Vedānta

The following circumstance created the need for Dvaita Vedānta. (1) In Advaita, philosophy is taken to have a negative function and Truth is supposed to be revealed only by the Veda. In Viśiṣṭādvaita, the soundness of reasoning is finally determined in the light of the interpretation given to the Vedic passages, *śatvidyā* and so on. But that these ideas themselves are in a sense the result of philosophy and that philosophy is therefore entirely independent of any authority are not noticed by these systems. (2) In Advaita, Truth (Brahman) implies the negation of the world. In Viśiṣṭādvaita, Brahman is practically taken to be one among many. Neither position helps the conception of Brahman as the real ground of all. (3) In Advaita, the world is practically denied. In Viśiṣṭādvaita, in some form or the other, the world is taken to be a necessary accompaniment of Brahman. To hold that the world is an *aprthaksiddhaviśeṣaṇa* of Brahman does not help the conception of Brahman, the real ground of all. To say that the world is *aprthaksiddha* is at best only the statement of the problem and it does not explain how and why the world is *aprthaksiddha* (inseparable or inalienable). If this question is answered, then that the world is a necessary accompani-

ment of Brahman loses its significance. It may however be noted that in these two systems the significance of Brahman, the ground, is lost sight of. (4) Advaita implies the annihilation of *jīva* and Viśiṣṭādvaita makes *jīva* practically equivalent to Brahman. Neither position is consistent with the nature of *jīva*'s empirical life. (5) In Advaita, Brahman as *svapraśāsa* makes the spiritual discipline leading to the realisation of Brahman meaningless. In Viśiṣṭādvaita, too much emphasis laid on *prapatti* ignores in a sense the spirituality of philosophical knowledge or modifies the spiritual value of knowledge. So neither position really justifies philosophy. For these reasons Madhvācārya feels that neither of these two systems really helps the spiritual outlook of man, and propounds Dvaita Vedānta, in which he justifies the enduring value of philosophy, establishes Brahman as the real ground of the real world, safeguards the individuality of *jīva*, and explains how true spirituality consists in a sound philosophical outlook.

The Dvaita Philosophy and Its Place in the Vedānta

In the light of all the previous considerations it may be concluded that Dvaita philosophy satisfactorily solves the problems raised by the previous Vedānta systems. This explains how this Vedānta is the most important aspect of Vedānta thought. Further taking the respective positions of Śaṅkarācārya, Rāmānujācārya and Madhvācārya into consideration, one feels that the former two are diametrically opposed to each other with respect to every item of their positions and Madhvācārya holds a balance between them. With all his opposition to Śaṅkarācārya in certain respects he seems to appreciate him more than he does Rāmānujācārya. This is perhaps the reason why he constantly refers to Śaṅkarācārya, examines the position, points out its defects and suggests his own correction. That he holds a balance between Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya may be illustrated by taking a few examples into consideration.

If Śaṅkarācārya holds that Brahman is one only and is devoid of all distinctions external and internal, then Rāmānujācārya asserts that Brahman necessarily consists of distinctions. According to the latter in what is called Brahman there are diverse elements. (1) The substantive aspect characterised by being (*satyatva*), the state of being knowledge (*jñānatva*) and the state of being bliss (*ānandatva*) and (2) the attributive aspects—

(i) *Dharmabhūtajñāna* as the principle of all the divine qualities such as knowledge, power, strength and so on, and (ii) the things called non-substance (*adravya*) as power (*śakti*) and relation (*sam-yoga*) to other substances such as time. So, in all, in what is called Brahman there are three varieties of things and they are different from one another. In addition to them a mode (*prakāra*) of Brahman is called *arcāvatāra* and it is said to be the form of God which is worshipped in particular temples. When God is in this form He is considered to take some material thing as His body. What is to be noted here is that God along with the body is taken to be a form of God and the name *Īśvara* is applied to it. No doubt the substantive element of the several aspects of Brahman is taken to be the immanent principle of all and therefore It is the principle of the other elements also. But having seen both the ideas one naturally feels that if the real significance of the position that the substantive (*prakāri*) element of Brahman is the principle of the other elements is rightly recognised, then there can be no reason why so many distinct elements should be introduced into It. After introducing these elements into It, what follows naturally is that Brahman stands for the aggregation of these diverse elements. Further if we concentrate only on the substantive element and call it Brahman, then according to Rāmānujācārya we have removed from Brahman many divine qualities, power, its relation to the world, knowledge and so on. If these qualities are attributed to the substantive element itself, then there can be no justification for introducing the foreign elements into It. Further, even this substantive element is not left undisturbed. For Brahman with *cis* and *acis* in subtle form is taken to be the material cause (*upādāna*) of the world; and by material cause is meant that which changes into product. So according to this idea Brahman is taken to be capable of change. But immediately the difficulty of attributing change to Brahman is perceived, because a passage of *Iti* says that Brahman is changeless (*nirvikāra*); and to remove this difficulty it is held that Brahman as the substantive aspect has no change. So one is finally left in bewilderment amidst these contradictory ideas.

So even as Rāmānujācārya himself admits, the *Upaniṣadic* Brahman is changeless. If this truth is really admitted, then according to him Brahman ceases to be self-sufficient since

many divine qualities are thereby removed from It, and he takes those qualities to be necessary to explain the world. This contradiction seems to be due to his enthusiasm to assert against Sankarācārya that Brahman is not *nirviśeṣa*.

Owing to these contradictions Madhvācārya rejects Rāmānujācārya's position and analysing this position notes in one sentence — 'It is Brahman, for me, that is changeless' and thereby implies that Brahman is the very presupposition of all changes and that the changing elements are really foreign to It. One naturally sees that in holding this position he recognises more truth in the position of Sankarācārya that Brahman is strictly one Being, devoid of distinctions. The *Upaniṣads* trace the world of manifold aspects to a single principle and call this principle Brahman. So this principle must be conceived in such a manner as to explain the manifold. In explaining it in this manner no foreign element should be introduced into it, for to introduce such elements into Brahman is implicitly to deny to that extent the self-sufficient nature of the principle. Further though by Sankarācārya the oneness of the principle is fully recognised, there are some implications in his position that cannot be justified from the standpoint that it is after all the principle of the world. The propertylessness (*nirviśeṣatva*) of Brahman and the unreality (*mithyātva*) of the world are the implications of Sankarācārya's position. With these implications he has ignored the very significance of the present standpoint. With these implications Brahman ceases to be the principle of the world. To be the principle, in the real sense of the term, it must be sufficiently rich to explain the world; and if it is the real explanation of the world, then it cannot presuppose the unreality of the world, in fact it must make the reality of the world more significant. Thus while Sankarācārya's insistence on the oneness of the principle is correct, the implications he draws from that principle are wrong. So these implications must be avoided and the principle must be interpreted so as to make it explain the thing of which it is the principle. This is exactly what Madhvācārya does in interpreting this principle. He considers that the principle is infinitely rich (*guṇapūrṇa*) and he does not make any distinction between the principle and its richness. Richness and principle are according to him identical and the distinction in their expression is only due to the peculiarity of the conceptions. This is exactly the truth we have to

understand in his doctrine of *viśeṣa*, according to which, *viśeṣa* is the peculiarity that makes particular conceptions appear to be different though they are identical. Further he draws attention to the fact that this is true with reference to every identical thing. If the truth of this position is understood one naturally sees that this explanation is inevitable even in Advaita. Granting for a while with Advaita that Brahman is only one and that It is therefore *nirviśeṣa*, the three things in this expression—*Brahman*, *one* and *nirviśeṣa* must be taken to be identical. But this identical thing is capable of being expressed differently as *Brahman*, *one*, and *nirviśeṣa*. Without this expression the identity of the principle is not explained. So it is inevitable to hold that it is the peculiarity of the conceptions themselves. If this is admitted, then Brahman ceases to be *nirviśeṣa* and It does not therefore necessarily imply the unreality of the world.

Similarly with reference to every other conception Madhvācārya goes to the fundamental truth implied in the very concepts and shows a full application of this truth in his philosophy. And his philosophy is self-consistent from the start to the end.

That Madhvācārya holds a balance between Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya may be illustrated by taking another example. While Śaṅkarācārya makes use of illusion in proving the unreality of the world, Rāmānujācārya denies illusion as such in his doctrine of *satkhyāti* or *yathārthakhyāti* and in this connection, with much ingenuity, argues that similarity of things means the actual presence of things in those that are similar to them. Madhvācārya notes against the latter that to hold that every thing is actually present in every other thing that is similar to it, is to negate similarity itself. His idea is this. There can be similarity between two things if the things are really different. And to hold that the things are different is to accept implicitly that one is not the other. If so how does it follow that one thing is in the other? Without dissimilarity between two things how can there be similarity between the two? Similarity is significant only with dissimilarity. There is no meaning in saying that silver is similar to silver; because there is no point in the statement. But there is a point in saying that silver and a shell are similar; for the two are by nature different and in spite of the difference, with regard to some aspect or the other,

say in point of shining, both are similar. To recognise the truth of this position supports the fact of illusion but not the absence of it. So Rāmānujācārya's position involves self-contradiction, and illusion is a fact. That Śaṅkarācārya recognises illusion deserves appreciation, but what he concludes from it is wrong. He holds that which is apprehended in illusion is *mithyā* and applies the same thing to the world of normal experience. This is not correct. The truth that underlies even his explanation of illusion makes his conclusion impossible. In illusion the real is mistaken to be unreal and the unreal real. So what is apprehended in it is unreal (*asat*) but not *mithyā* or *sadaradvilakṣaṇa*; so to reduce normal experience to the level of illusion is to hold that the world is unreal (*asat*) and this is to revive the old *śūnyavāda*.

Madhvācārya's method of discussion is this. He clearly knows what exactly is expected from him as a Vedānta philosopher. On the one hand he has to systematise the Vedic teaching and on the other he has to justify his systematisation as pure philosophy. In so far as his systematisation of the Vedic teaching is concerned he evaluates the canons of *Mīmāṃsā*, according to which the meaning of a passage is determined with reference to the beginning and close of the topic in the Veda, together with the various other circumstances which help the determination of the meaning of the passage. In this connection to support his interpretation he quotes similar teachings both from *śruti* and from *smṛti*. A point may be noted with reference to this idea. Of the several texts he quotes some are familiar to us and some are not. By some he is even accused of inventing *śruti* where there is none. In answer to this criticism one thing must be noted. In his quotations there is at times the mention of an unfamiliar text along with the familiar ones. This only means that the texts which are said to be unfamiliar are lost. Even in the absence of the quotations from the unfamiliar texts, the position in question is conclusively proved both with the aid of the familiar texts and independently of them by the sheer implications of the passage in question. So it is not right to make much of such quotations. Further in particular places he says that his explanation of things is based on the teaching of *Brahmatarka* which, he says, is the work of the author of the *Brahmasūtras*. Even this work is lost now. He however quotes several passages from this text. If the texts he mentions

are found, it goes without saying that the whole history of Indian philosophy will have to be rewritten. Even as it is, in the light of his teachings many points in the history of philosophy need thoroughgoing correction. Further, where he quotes passages from the different authorities he is very profuse in the number of passages he gives, and for this reason he is taken by some to support his position merely on the strength of scripture. To judge him in this manner is not correct. His rich quotations are connected only with the systematisation of the Vedic teaching. In this connection to be poor in quotation would rather be a defect. In closing this topic it may be noted that even Śaṅkara, the commentator on the *Jaimini Sūtra*, Sāṅkarācārya and Rāmāṇujācārya quote in particular places unfamiliar texts.¹ This only means that in the course of the very long history of cultural India, many things are lost. If it is possible we must try to discover such texts in the interest of the cultural greatness of India.

With reference to his system as pure philosophy this is the method Madhvācārya adopts. With regard to every position, he cites the whole history of philosophy, examines it, accepts the particular ideas if they are sound and if they are unsound he gives his correction. In doing this he fully justifies the *samanvaya* spirit of Bādarāyaṇa. *Samanvaya* stands for finding out the same truth in every position however opposed it may appear to be. He does this with a view to giving the world a universal philosophy.

With him the best philosophy is that which enriches man's experience here in this life, makes proper room for ethical and religious development of the individuals and paves the way for the perfection of the whole society. Anything that falls short of this demand is not accepted by him. This truth is plainly explicit in his realistic philosophy of the world. According to him to hold that the world is unreal is to take away men's interest in it. With the conviction that the world is unreal and that the real world lies elsewhere the best men are made useless from the standpoint of society. He cannot tolerate this and he rightly shows that to recognise the reality of the world is to recognise the reality of Brahman and that salvation lies only in the recognition of this truth.

Madhvācārya has thus fully reconciled Absolutism and realism

¹ Śb. B. *Andumbarādyaadhikāraṇa*: S.B. 3.2.18; and Sr. B. 1.1.24.

in his Dvaita Vedānta. By way of illustrating this point, he makes us familiar with two conceptions—*pancābheda* and *tārātamyā*. *Pancābheda* stands for the difference between *jīva* and Brahman, *jada* (the inert) and Brahman, *jīva* and *jada*, *jīva* and *jīva* and *jada* and *jada*. *Tārātamyā* means gradation of the *jīvas* and it stands for the idea that each *jīva* has its own individuality or capacity (*yogyatā*) that can never be annulled even in *mukti*. These conceptions are generally taken by the critics to mean that Madhvācārya upholds dualism or pluralism and is not in agreement with the equal or identical realisation of all the *jīvas*. That he upholds dualism or pluralism is further supported by them by the literal meaning of the term, *dvaita*. Though much is already said to indicate that this is not his position, for the sake of clearness, the following points may be noted. In many of his works he clearly says that there are two *tattvas*, *Svatantrā* and *asvatantra*—Independent and dependent (*Svatantra-masvatantram ca dvividham tattvamīṣyate*, and so on.). *Svatantrā* is Brahman and *asvatantra* is the world consisting of *cetana* and *acetana*—spirit and matter. The reality, i.e. existence, knowledge and function, of *Svatantra* is self-established and that of *asvatantra* is derived from the former. He says that these two are *tattvas*. By *tattva* he understands that which is revealed by *pramāṇa*. *Tattva* and *prameya* are the same for him. This means that *Svatantra* and *asvatantra* are philosophically justified (*pramāṇasiddha*). In understanding the philosophical significance of this position we have to consider the following points. In place of saying that there are two *tattvas*—*Svatantra* and *asvatantra* he never says that there are two *tattvas*—Brahman and the world. To hold that there are two *tattvas*—Brahman and the world, is misleading according to him, because this position does not signify that Brahman is the ground of the world. But to hold that there are two *tattvas*—*Svatantra* and *asvatantra* clearly signifies that the former is the ground of the latter. If the former is the ground of the latter and the latter has only a derived reality, then the two must naturally be different. Not to hold that they are different is to confuse one with the other and with this confusion neither can be justified with reference to the other. *Svatantra* is significant with its reference to *asvatantra* and *asvatantra* is significant with its reference to *Svatantra*. So *Svatantra* implies how its reality is self-established and how it gives reality to *asvatantra*. *Asvatantra* implies how its reality

is derived and thereby points to *Svatantra* as its ground. Though *asvatantra* has only a derived reality, it cannot be regarded as unreal or *mithyā*, for, if it is not real, i.e. if it is not recognised as real even though it has only a derived reality, then there can be nothing to justify *Svatantra*, because *Svatantra* can after all be established as the ground of *asvatantra*. So *asvatantra* is a mark of *Svatantra* and as such it is as significant as the latter is. Without disturbing this position, we can even hold that there is only one principle which has a self-established reality. This is in fact the teaching of the *Upaniṣad*, 'Brahman is only one without the other. (*Ekamevādviṭiyam Brahma.*)' From this standpoint this system may be called *Brahmādvaita*. But to retain this term alone does not bring out the distinguishing feature of this system, because in spite of this term the truth that the world is not unreal or *mithyā* is not made clear. To imply the truth of these considerations there is propriety in calling this system Dvaita Vedānta. This compound term stands for the following ideas—there is only one principle that is *Svatantra*; this principle is established as the ground of *asvatantra*; *asvatantra* is derived from *Svatantra* and it is therefore the mark of *Svatantra*; both as the mark of *Svatantra* and as derived from It it can never be unreal or *mithyā*; and each has thus its own individuality and is therefore distinct from the other.¹ This is an expression of how Absolutism and realism are not opposed to each other. Consistently with these ideas Madhvācārya speaks of *pancābheda* and *tāratamya*. *Pancābheda* is an expression of the distinction between *Svatantra* and *asvatantra* and *tāratamya* is an expression of the persisting individuality of a *jīva*. With these conceptions Madhvācārya asks one to concentrate on and develop one's individuality, abandoning at the same time the ideas of the false ideals, such as that one becomes Brahman Itself or that one becomes equal to Brahman. With this position if he has denied the ideals that are not within the reach of individual souls, he has made room for the full

¹ N.S., 1.4.6.223. *Yadīdam paramaiśvarasya advaitatvamca vīṭṭaṇa-nūktam natas dvitīyavasturāhityābhīprāpya. Kintu paramārthatah . . . Uttamamarthamabhipretyeti. 4.2.643. Dvaitasya asvāntantriyam abhipretya dvaitamivetyuktaṁ, natu dvaitābhāvamabhipretya. (The central idea of these passages is that Brahman is *advaita*, but this does not imply the unreality of the world.)*

expression of their individuality. The desirability of this position needs no further justification.

In this connection a note on how an individual who is *asvatantṛa* can develop his individuality seems to be necessary. The position that Brahman is *Svatantṛa* and all else is *asvatantṛa* seems to imply apparently that on the part of a self any attempt at developing his individuality is meaningless, because attempt is an expression of free will and freedom of will is inconsistent with the supposition that the self is *asvatantṛa*. In answer to this difficulty the position of Madhvācārya is this. *Asvatantṛa* does not imply the negation of free-will. An individual self is characterised by the mental states consisting of experience (*anubhava*), desire (*icchā*) and volition (*prayatna*). Of these the desire and volition that lead to the attempt at obtaining something (*sādhana-gocara*) are called will (*prayatni*). Will presupposes the determination of an end (*prayojana-niscaya*). Both will and the determination of an end involve selection or choice and this involves freedom. An individual self is given with all these states and with them all he is determined to be *asvatantṛa*. This means that even his free-will is *asvatantṛa*. It is *asvatantṛa* in the sense that its very nature (*svarūpa*) is derived from *Svatantṛa*.¹ So the freedom of a self in its selection of particular ends and of the means for realising them is not opposed to the truth that the self as a whole is *asvatantṛa*. Further the supposition that because a self is *asvatantṛa* it has no freedom to do anything involves self-contradiction, since the fact of this supposition itself is the result of free-will. So even though a self is *asvatantṛa*, it can improve its individuality to the fullest extent.² The complete improvement of its individuality consists in fully realising *Svatantṛa* as its ground and the state of this realisation is called *mukṣi*.

Having these ideas in mind, we may see how misleading it is to translate Dvaita Vedānta as dualism. Dualism stands for that view which seeks to explain the world by the assumption of two radically independent and absolute elements. We have seen how *asvatantṛa* is neither independent nor absolute. From the standpoint that *Svatantṛa* is one and that It is the source of the reality of *asvatantṛa*, this Vedānta is in fact a real example of

¹ *Svarūpa* is the same as *satva*. N.S., 2.2.2.

² For details see N.S., 2.2.1.327.

monism, i.e. the sense of one in many, and this stands for the idea of a single principle as the ground of the many.

The term, monism, is applied to Advaita. But this application is not free from difficulties. According to Advaita Brahman is *nirguṇa* and the world is *mithyā*. So the sense of 'one in many' cannot be justified with reference to it, for there is no 'many' and there is therefore no occasion for 'the sense of one'. Even granting that there is 'many' there can be no 'sense of one', because according to Advaita the world, i.e. 'many', is traced to two entities, Brahman and *māyā*. Even to hold that Brahman is the ground or *adhiṣṭhāna* of *māyā* needs a justification, because Brahman which is *cit* and *māyā* which is *acit* can never be brought together.

The term, qualified monism, is applied to Viśiṣṭādvaita. In so far as this implies the monistic character of this system some observations are necessary. With reference to this system, how far Brahman can be regarded as one, needs justification, because, as it has been already explained, the so-called Brahman in this system consists of elements that are distinct from It. Further, how far Brahman is the source of the reality of the world also needs a justification, because that It is the sole giver of reality to the world is not consistent with the position of this system that Brahman as *sūkṣmacidadivīṣṭa* gives rise to the world of experience. With reference to this position how the world of *sūkṣmacidacit* has its reality is to be explained. But to take Brahman as the source of this world makes the very position of this system that Brahman is necessarily qualified by either *sūkṣmacidacit* or *sthūlacidacit* unnecessary, because without this qualification Brahman can be the ground of the universe. What is implied in these considerations is that the Vedic or the Upaniṣadic monism is not fully worked out in these systems—Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita.

According to Dvaita Vedānta Brahman is the source of the reality of the world whether the world is in the form of cause (*sūkṣma*) or in the form of effect (*sthūla*). It has in Itself no distinction and It has nothing equal and nothing higher. This explains how Brahman of Dvaita Vedānta is a higher conception than *Nirguṇa Brahman* of Advaita and *Iṣvara* of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Thus the monistic or absolutistic thought started by the *puruṣa-sūkṣma* of the *Rgveda*, substantiated by the *Upaniṣads*, justified by the whole of the Vedic literature and illustrated by the

smṛtis like the *Mahābhārata*, has its clear expression and recognition in Dvaita Vedānta. The *puruṣasūkt* says that *puruṣa* is everything (*puruṣa evadam sarvam*) and following it the *Upaniṣads* hold that Brahman is indeed everything (*sarvam khalvidam Brahma*). These are the expressions that indicate how Brahman is in all as the source of the reality of all (*asvatantira*). They never imply the unreality of all. If the 'all' were unreal then there would be no occasion to find out Brahman. With these ideas the *Bhagavadgītā* explains that God is all because He is in all (*sarvam samāpnoṣi tatotsi sarvāh*, ch. 11). The same position is made fully significant in Dvaita Vedānta in consideration of all facts of experience. This explains how philosophical reflection in India has reached its culmination in this Vedānta and how without a study of this Vedānta one's knowledge of Indian thought is not complete. An appreciation of this truth gives a value to the history of Indian thought and means that a fresh outlook on the study of Indian philosophy is a necessity.

Glossary Abbreviations

- (A) *Advaita Vedānta*
- (B) *Buddhism*
- (C) *Connected ideas*
- (D) *Dvaita Vedānta*
- (G) *General meaning*
- (N-V) *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*
- (Pr) *Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā*
- (V) *Vaiṣṇavādvaita Vedānta*
- (V') *Vijñāna vāda*

GLOSSARY

A

Abādhitā. (G) That which is not sublated by a *pramāṇa*.

(A) That which endures without being subject to any condition, e.g. Brahman. Only from the standpoint of experience the term is applied to what is given as real in life as opposed to what is given as superimposed, e.g. silver is superimposed on a shell. The shell is *abādhitā* while silver is not.

(V) Primarily that which is given. Secondly it is opposed to that which is given and therefore taken to be practically useful when it is not really so, e.g. the silver given in the so-called illusion.

(D) That which is given by a *pramāṇa*. That which exists in time and in space. That which is real.

(C) This term has a great logical and ontological importance. The opposite term is *bādhitā*.

Abhāva. (G) Absence.

(A) That which is given by *anupalabdhi*, non-apprehension.

(V) Another form of presence, e.g. the absence of a book from a table is the same as the presence of the bare table.

(D) That which is apprehended as non-existent at the first instance of its apprehension.

(C) This term is peculiar to Indian thought. It has a great ontological importance. *Bhāva* is its opposite.

Abhinavānyathākhyāti. (D) The knowledge that apprehends the existent as non-existent and the non-existent as existent, e.g. the illusion, 'This is silver'. In this case silver is non-existent and it is apprehended as existent. The shell is existent and it is implicitly apprehended as non-existent.

(C) This term has a great epistemological importance in Dvaita Vedānta. It is coined to signify the theory of illusion according to this system. This is a compound term and it consists of three words, *abhinava*, *anyathā* and *khyāti*. *Anyathākhyāti* signifies the N-V theory of illusion and it means the knowledge that presents an object that has its existence in a

point of time and of space different from the point of time and of space in question, e.g. the illusion 'This is silver'. The silver that is apprehended in this case has its existence in some other point of time and of space and it is not in the time and space to which illusion refers. In the Dvaita Vedānta the theory that the silver given in illusion exists at a different time and different point of space is rejected and that it does not exist at the given time and space is recognised and, consistently with other ideas connected with illusion, a new theory is propounded. To signify this theory the same term *anyathākhyāti* is employed with the qualification *abhinava*. *Abhinava* means novel in the sense explained above.

Acetana. (D) That which is devoid of consciousness. *Prakṛti* and its products, *kāla*, *ākāśa* and *abhāva* are *acetana*.

(C) This term has a reference to the realism of (D). *Acit* is the corresponding term in the other Vedānta systems. *Cetana* is the opposite term.

Acit. (A) That which is different from *cit*. It is the same as *ajñāna*, *avidyā* and *māyā*. It is superimposed on *cit*. It is destroyed by the realisation of *cit*. It is *mithyā*. Empirical life is its expression.

(V) *Acit* consists of two aspects, inert (*jaḍa*) and non-inert (*ajāḍa*). *Prakṛti* and *kāla* are *jaḍa* and *dharmabhūtajnāna* and *nityavibhūti* are *ajāḍa*. *Acit* is not superimposed. It is real. With the exception of His *dharmabhūtajnāna* and with *jīva* it forms the body of *Īvara* in the sense that it is dependent on Him. It has two states, subtle (*sūkṣma*) and gross (*sthūla*). As subtle it is the cause and as gross it is the effect.

(C) The corresponding term in (D) is *acetana*. Its opposite is *cit*.

Adhiṣṭhānakāraṇa. (A) Brahman as the cause of the world in the sense that on It the whole universe is superimposed.

Adhyasta. (G) That which is superimposed, e.g. in the illusion 'This is silver', silver is superimposed on a shell.

(C) In the ontology of (A) this term has a great importance. *Acit* as such is superimposed on *cit* and the necessary implication of this fact is that it is *mithyā*. That it is *adhyasta* follows from the fact that it is sublated. The realisation of *cit* as *akhaṇḍa* sublates *acit* as such. Synonyms, *āropita* and *vivarta*.

Adhyāsa. (G) Superimposition.

(C) In (A) this term indicates the relation between *cit* and *acis*, Brahman and *jagat* (the world), *viśayi* (subject) and *viśaya* (object) and *satya* and *mithyā*. *Cit*, Brahman, *viśayi* and *satya* mean the same thing and *acis*, *jagat*, *viśaya* and *mithyā* stand for the world. Of them the latter is superimposed on the former and the relation between the two is *adhyāsa*. Synonym, *āropa*.

Adṛavya. (G) That which is not a *dravya* (substance). In (V) this term has an ontological importance. *Dravya* and *adṛavya* are the two categories of reality. *Dravya* is defined as *upādāna* or *guṇāśraya*. *Upādāna* means that which is capable of change. *Guṇāśraya* means the substratum of qualities. *Adṛavya* is defined as *samyogarahita* and this term means that which is devoid of *samyoga*. *Samyoga* is a relation between two substances.

(C) In (A) and (D) *Dravya* and *adṛavya* are not distinct. In (A) the relation between the two is *tādātmya*, identity, and in (D) it is *saviśeṣābheda*, identity qualified by distinguishability.

Advaita. The system of Vedānta founded by Sankarācārya. This term stands for the idea that Brahman as *akhaṇḍa* is the only reality.

(V) In this system the term *Advaita* means the identity of *upādāna* and its product; the identity of the substantive element though its attributes are changing; and the identity of the principle which is immanent in different things.

(D) *Advaita* as applied to *svatantra* means the oneness of It. This term is the same as *saviśeṣābheda* and it implies the reality of *arvatantra*.

Advītiya. (A) This term is applied to Brahman and it means that there is nothing similar or dissimilar to Brahman and that Brahman is devoid of internal distinctions. That Brahman is propertyless and that the world is *mithyā* are implied by this term.

(D) This term is applied to Brahman and it means that there is nothing equal to and higher than Brahman. That Brahman is infinite and that the world is real are the implications of this term.

Ahamkāra. (A) Egoism. It is an aspect of *antahkāraṇa*.

(A), (V) and (D) A stage in the change of *prakṛti*. At this stage *rajas* dominates. *Rajas* is one of the three *guṇas*: *satva*, *rajas* and *śamas*.

Ahamkāra Tattva. A stage in the change of *prakṛti*. See *ahamkāra*.

Ajāhallaḥṣaṇā. A secondary relation of a word to its meaning where the word without abandoning its primary sense implies much more as its meaning, e.g. 'Protect the corn from cows'. The protection of the corn in this expression primarily stands for protection from cows, but secondarily it has a wider application and it stands for protection from all animals that may eat away the corn.

Ajñāna. (G) Nescience. Non-knowledge.

(A) Nescience has no beginning (*anādi*). It is *mithyā* (*anirvācya*) and it is positive in character. It is not the absence of knowledge. It is removed by knowledge. Synonyms are *acit*, *avidyā*, *māyā*.

(D) *Ajñāna* is positive and beginningless. It is real. It is not *mithyā*. It is opposed to the knowledge of reality. It is removed from knowledge. There is a point to note in this connection. In this system every activity in the world is traced to Brahman, the Ultimate. Brahman is the author of *ajñāna*, It is also the author of knowledge and therefore It is naturally the author of the removal of *ajñāna*. In this sense it is said that *ajñāna* is removed from the grace (*prasāda*) of Brahman.

Akāryakāraṇānumāna. (G) The case of *anumāna* where the proof (*hetu*) is neither the product (*kārya*) nor the cause (*kāraṇa*) of the proved (*sādhya*).

Akhaṇḍa. (A) That which is partless and has nothing external to it.

(C) In (A) this entity is Brahman. It is infinite in the sense that it transcends all relations, temporal, spatial and objective. The very conception of this entity necessarily implies that all that is objective, finite and non-spiritual is *mithyā*. By the virtue of its very nature, this entity is one and the only reality.

Akhyāti. (Pr.) The non-apprehension of the difference between two cases of knowledge. This explains the nature of the so-called illusion according to this system. The idea is that in such cases only usage (*vyaṁhāra*) is wrong, but never knowledge. For example, 'This is silver'. This consists of two cases of knowledge. 'This' is perception and 'silver' is memory.

Owing to the defect in the sense organ the difference between the two is not apprehended and there is a wrong usage, 'This is silver'.

Akṣarā. That which is indestructible.

(V) It is a synonym of *prakṛti*.

Anadhigata. (G) That which is not so far familiar. .

(A) *Anadhigata* is an attribute of the object of correct knowledge (*pramā*). This attribute is given to the object of *pramā* to signify that *pramā* is the knowledge of that object (which is *abādhitā*, i.e. not sublated) which is not so far familiar. The implication of this qualification is that memory is not *pramā* because it is the knowledge of an object which is already familiar. With reference to this idea this system has followed Kumārila.

Anadhyavasāya. (V) Indeterminate knowledge, e.g. 'What is this?' This is an aspect of *pratyakṣa*.

Anādinīya. (G) That which is beginningless and endless.

Andaja. (G) That which comes out from an egg.

Anirvacaniya. (G) That which cannot be defined.

(A) That which is *mithyā*, i.e. *sadasadvilakṣaṇa*.

Anirvācya. The same as *anirvacaniya*.

Antahkāraṇa. (G) The cause of knowledge; it is inside the body.

(A) This is the abode of *vytti*-knowledge. It is a composite substance. It is of the character of fire (*tejas*) and therefore it has a very quick movement. All the mental activities of an individual self are its states. It is not therefore an *indriya* (sense organ). It is a product of *ajñāna*. Its production marks the beginning of waking state and its destruction the beginning of the state of sleep. It conditions *cit* so as to make it appear as the individual ego.

Antahkaraṇavṛtti. (A) A state of *antahkāraṇa*. It is generally used to mean what is ordinarily taken to be knowledge. This knowledge is of an object. From the standpoint of common sense it may be right or wrong. It is produced by the operation of particular causes. When its function is over it disappears. It is mediate (*parokṣa*) or immediate (*aparokṣa*). As a product

of *antahkaraṇa*, it is an aspect of *ajñāna*. It is *mithyā*. It is not knowledge in the real sense of the term. *Caitanya* is the real case of knowledge. *Antahkaraṇa* is superimposed on it and owing to this fact it comes to have the appearance as knowledge.

Antimasākṣātkāra. (A) It is the last immediate knowledge (*sākṣātkāra*). It is a case of *antahkaraṇavṛtti*. It is the knowledge of Brahman as *ākhaṇḍa*. This knowledge puts an end to *ajñāna* with all its products, and with the destruction of *ajñāna* the self is Brahman. This knowledge is the direct result of the correct understanding of the *śruti*, 'That thou art'. Philosophy and meditation help this understanding.

Anumāna—proof.

(G) It is the proximate cause of *anumiti*.

(A) The knowledge of *vyāpti* recognised as such produces *anumiti*.

(V) The recognition of *vyāpya* as *vyāpya* produces *anumiti*. *Vyāpya* is that which does not exist apart from *vyāpaka*. Smoke does not exist apart from fire. Smoke is *vyāpya* and fire is *vyāpaka*. To recognise smoke as *vyāpya* produces the knowledge of fire, *vyāpaka*.

(D) The knowledge of the defectless *hetu* produces *anumiti*.

Anumiti. (G) The knowledge of that which is proved.

Anupalabdhi. (G) Non-apprehension.

(A) It is the *pramāṇa* which causes the knowledge of the absence of a thing. In accepting this as a *pramāṇa* this system follows Kumārila.

(D) It is a case of *anumāna*. It may be noted that mere *anupalabdhi* does not prove the absence of a thing. For instance, there is the *anupalabdhi* (non-apprehension) of merit (*dharma*), but it does not necessarily follow that merit is not a fact. In order to avoid this difficulty *anupalabdhi* is qualified as that of a *yogyā* object. The idea is this. If there is the *anupalabdhi* of a thing that can be perceived if it is given, there follows the idea that there is the absence of the thing. Though merit is given, it is incapable of being perceived. So its *anupalabdhi* does not prove its absence. We may take the absence of the jar as an example. If the jar is given, then it can be seen; and if it is not seen then it follows necessarily that there is the absence of the jar. So far we have explained how there is the knowledge of absence

through *anumāna*. There may be the knowledge of it through *pratyakṣa* also and in this case it is immediately apprehended.

Anuparimāṇa. (G) Infinitesimal size.

(C) The *Vaiśeṣika* view is that a thing of infinitesimal size is indivisible.

(D) Everything that has a size is infinitely divisible.

Anusandhāna. (V) A conscious reference to other things involved in the perception of an entity. With this reference perception is called *saviśālpakṣa*.

Anvaya. (G) The invariable and unconditional concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the proof (*hetu*) and the proved (*sādhya*) e.g. the *vyāpti* between smoke and fire.

Anvayi anumāna. (A) The *anumāna* based on *anvaya*. This is the only case of *anumāna* accepted by this system. This position signifies that the Nyāya classification of *anumāna* as *kevalānvayi*, *kevalavyatireki* and *anvayavyatireki* is not true to experience. This classification is based on the idea of two kinds of *vyāpti*, *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. (See *anvaya* and *vyatireka*.) As in all cases of *anumāna* the knowledge of the proof is to give the knowledge of the proved, *vyatireka* is not useful and therefore the classification of *anumāna* based on *vyatireka* is wrong and as there is no universal property *kevalānvayi* is wrong.

Anyathājñāna. (V) The knowledge that attributes a wrong property to a substance. An aspect of the so-called illusion.

Anyathā Khyāti. (N-V) This is the name of wrong knowledge and it implies that wrongness consists in apprehending an object as having some property when that object has no such property. See *abhinavānyathākhyāti*.

Anyonyābhāva. (D) This is the same as difference, e.g. the difference between a table and a chair, expressed as 'The table is not the chair' or 'The chair is not the table' or 'There is difference between the table and the chair'. Difference is identical with the thing said to be different. The difference of the table from the chair is the table itself. The identity between the thing and its difference from other things is called *saviśeṣābheda* and this term stands for the idea that the identity in this case has a peculiarity (*viśeṣa*) and this peculiarity makes different

usages possible, as difference of the table and so on. Though the table and its difference are the same owing to *viseṣa* they are denoted by different names so as to make the difference appear as an attribute, the table as the substantive. Further, just like a positive entity, absence also is different from other things, so difference is positive or negative and so *anyonyābhāva* is positive or negative.

(C) In Nyāya *anyonyābhāva* is negative. It is a kind of *abhāva*. It is the denial of one thing with reference to the other, as 'The table is not the chair'.

Apancikṛta. (A) The elements (*bhūtas*) in their purity. As *apancikṛta* they are not mixed with one another. Their mixing is called *pancikaraṇa*. See *pancikaraṇa*.

Apariddhāna. (G) This is the fallacy of accepting a position that denies the truth of an established position that one has originally accepted.

Apauruṣeya. The verbal testimony that is not composed by any author, human or divine. The orthodox Indian thinkers with the exception of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas consider the Veda to be *apauruṣeya*. The significance of this position is that the validity of the Veda is self-established. This position implies that the whole Vedic literature stands for a unity of thought. A Vedānta system is an attempt to find out this unity as against the apparently different positions of the several branches of the Veda. The idea that the Veda is *apauruṣeya* is finally taken to mean the *nitya* character of the order (*ākrama*) of the Veda. Opposite, *pauruṣeya*.

Apauruṣeyāgama. This is the same as the Veda.

Apāna. The vital air that helps excretion in the body of an animal.

Aprithaksiddhi. (V) This has a great ontological importance in this system. It is a relation between two things one of which cannot exist independently of the other, e.g. the relation between body and soul, world and God, and non-substance and substance.

(C) This relation corresponds to *samavāya* in N-V; but it has a greater philosophical significance as it aims at establishing Brahman as the ground of all that exists.

Arthāpatti. (G) The knowledge of that which removes the apparent inconsistency between two facts.

(A) This is a separate *pramāṇa*.

(V) and (D) This is an aspect of *anumāna*.

(C) In (A) this is employed to prove the *miśhyātva* of the world.

Asamsṛṣṭa. Distinct.

(D) The elements in their pure form are called *asamsṛṣṭa*.

Asaṅgati. (D) This is a fallacy of *anumāna*. The *anumāna*, 'The world has a creator, because it is a product', advanced to convince one who believes in the Creator has this fallacy.

Asatkhyāti. (B) Wrong knowledge. That which is presented by it is unreal (*asat*) without any reference to real things.

Atyantābhāva. (G) The absence of a thing with reference to all the three aspects of time, past, present and future.

Avakāśa. (D) Room, space. Synonym, *avyākṛtākāśa*.

Avidyā. (A) In its general sense it is the same as *ajñāna*. In its special sense it is an aspect of *ajñāna* and it deludes the entity it obscures and such an entity is the individual soul. In this sense it is opposed to *māyā*, another aspect of *ajñāna*.

(V) It is a synonym of *prakṛti*.

(D) It is real and positive. It obscures the real nature of the individual soul and it is destroyed by the grace of God resulting from the knowledge of Him.

Avidyāvṛtti. (A) A state of *avidyā*. It apprehends the state of sleep and on this basis there is the memory of sleep in the waking state of an individual.

Avyākṛtākāśa. (D) It is the same as *avakāśa*.

(C) In (D) two kinds of *ākāśa* are distinguished—*avyākṛtākāśa* and *bhūtākāśa*. The latter is a product of *prakṛti* and it exists in the former.

Avyāpti. (D) A fallacy of *anumāna*. An *anumāna* which is not based on *vyāpti* has this fallacy.

Ācārya. Teacher.

(D) Service to *ācārya* is an item of spiritual discipline. There

are four *ācāryas*: father, mother, teacher and father-in-law. The teacher who knows the Truth is the best of them.

Adhyāśika. (A) That which pertains to *adhyāśa*.

Āgama. (G) A valid statement.

Āhāṅkāśā. (G) A condition of a valid statement. It consists in the fact that a statement has all those parts that are necessary to give a complete sense.

Āropa. (A) The same as *adhyāśa*.

Āropita. (A) The same as *adhyāśa*.

Ānti. (G) A condition of a valid statement. It consists in the fact that the parts of a statement are not separated by an undue interval.

Āstika. (G) That which is distinguished by the belief in the validity of the Veda.

(C) This term is applied to a person or a philosophical position.

Ātmaḥyāti. (V) Wrong knowledge. It consists in knowledge presenting itself as an external entity.

Ātmanyāśika. (A) Complete. It is applied to destruction (*pralaya*).

(C) In (A) this term indicates a variety of destruction. (*ātmanyāśika pralaya*). It means the complete destruction of *ajñāna* as such.

B

Bādha. (G) Sublation.

(A) The destruction of *vyavahāra* with its object. This is effected by right knowledge, e.g. the illusion 'This is silver'. This illusion with its object silver is destroyed by the correct knowledge 'This is a shell'.

(V) The determination that the object given in the so-called illusion and, on the basis that it is given, taken to be practically useful, is not practically useful. For instance, in the illusion 'This is silver', silver is given. In a sense, silver is actual in the shell and therefore it is real. But it is not practically useful,

though during the so-called illusion it is wrongly taken to be practically useful. This determination is called *bādha*. This is called *vyaavahārabādha*.

(D) It consists in determining that which is given as real in illusion as unreal and that which is given as unreal in illusion as real, e.g. the illusion 'This is silver'. The silver is given as real and when there is the correct perception 'This is not silver' the silver given in illusion is determined to be unreal. In the illusion, 'This is not a shell' shell is given as unreal. With the correct perception of the shell as 'This is a shell' the shell is determined to be real.

(C) The conception of *bādha* has a great epistemological and ontological significance. Many positions depend upon how it is formulated.

Bādhitā. (G) That which is sublated.

(C) With reference to the different systems this term must be understood according to the conception of *bādha* in each system. In (A) both illusion and its object are *bādhitā*; but in (D) illusion is a fact and only that which is presented is *bādhitā*.

Bādhyā. The same as *bādhitā*.

Bhakti. (V) Devotion to God. It involves knowledge also.

(D) Firm attachment to God with the correct understanding of Him. It gives spirituality to discipline. In its entirety it is the final phase of the spiritual discipline.

Bhaktiyoga. The path of devotion. See *Bhakti*.

Bhāvarūpājñāna. (G) *Ajñāna* positive in character. See *ajñāna*.

Bheda. Difference.

(A) Difference is *mithyā*.

(V) and (D) It forms the very nature of the thing presented.

Bhrama. (G) Wrong knowledge.

(A) *Bhrama* is called *anirvacanīya khyāti*. It is *anirvacanīya* and its object is *anirvacanīya*. Both are destroyed by correct knowledge.

(V) There is no *bhrama*. Every case of knowledge is correct and it presents a real object.

(D) *Bhrama* consists in apprehending the real as unreal and the unreal as real and in this sense it is called *abhinavānyathā khyāti*. See *abhinavānyathā khyāti*.

(C) Many positions both ontological and epistemological depend upon how *bhrama* is defined. Synonyms are *bhrānti*, *viparyaya* and *ayathārthajñāna*.

Bhūtākāśa. (D) *Ākāśa* as one of the five elements. It is a product of *prakṛti*. It exists in *avyākṛtākāśa*. See *avyākṛtākāśa*.

Bijarūpa. (G) Causal form.

Brahmasūtra. The aphorism that systematises the meaning of the Veda.

C

Caitanya. (A) Knowledge in the real sense of the term. It is *nitya*, *svayamjyoti* and *akhaṇḍa*, eternal, self-evident and partless. It is Brahman. All else is superimposed on it. Synonym, *cit*.

Cakṣur. The sense organ, eye.

Cārvāka. (1) The philosopher who denies the spiritual principle and holds that matter is ultimate. (2) The system that expounds the idea that matter is ultimate.

Cetana. (D) Spirit. It is characterised by consciousness.

Cidacitisamvalanātmaka (A). That which consists in the confusion of *cit* and *acit*. (See *cit* and *acit*.) This entity is the individual soul presented as 'I'.

Cit. (A) The same as *caitanya*. See *caitanya*.

(V) That which is conscious for the sake of itself.

Citta. (A) An aspect of *antahkārana*.

D

Darśana. (1) A philosophical system supposed to be based on the realisation of the founder. (2) A philosophical system that helps *tattvajñāna* and *tattvasākṣātkāra*.

Dharmabhūtajñāna. (V) The principle of knowledge which is an attribute of the self. As an attribute it is inseparable from the self. It is a substance and what we normally call knowledge is its expression. Its full expression is omniscience itself. All psychic activities are its various manifestations. As a principle of knowledge it corresponds to *antahkārana* of (A) and *manas*

of (D). Knowledge as its expression corresponds to the *vyti-jñāna* of (A) and (D). The difference between them is this. According to (A) and (D) *antahkaraṇa* or *manas* ceases to be in *mukṣi*, but according to (V) it is an inseparable accompaniment of the self. Each self has its own *dharma-bhūtajñāna*. Even God has His own *dharma-bhūtajñāna*.

Dravya. Substance.

(A) It is identical with its quality and so on.

(D) Between substance and quality and so on, there is *savi-śeṣābheda*.

(V) It is different from quality and so on.

Drṣṭānta virodha. (D) A kind of *virodha*, a fallacy of *anumāna*.

Drṣṭāntāpatti. (A) A variety of presumption (*arhāpatti*) which removes the apparent inconsistency between two cases of perception.

Dvaita. (G) Difference and (2) Abbreviation of Dvaita Vedānta founded by Madhvācārya. This term stands for the distinction between the Independent and the dependent. The Independent is God and the dependent is the world consisting of spirit and non-spirit. This term signifies that the Independent is real in the full sense of the term, and It is therefore distinguished from the dependent which has only a derived reality.

Dvāpara. (G) One of the four periods of time. This period is characterised equally by both merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*).

E

Eka. One.

Eka-jīvavāda (A). The doctrine that holds that there is only one individual soul (*jīva*).

G

Garva. (G) Egoism.

(A) An aspect of *antahkaraṇa*.

Gaunī. A secondary relation between a word and its meaning, based on the fact that the meaning in question has the same properties as the primary meaning, e.g. Devadatta, the lion.

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The word *lion* here means not the beast but the man who is as brave as a lion.

Gauṛya. A wild animal that resembles a cow.

Ghrāṇa. The sense organ that smells, the nose.

Guṇa. Quality.

(A) It is identical with its substance.

(V) It is called *adrśya* and it is different from the substance in which it is found.

(D) Though it is identical with its substance, it can be treated as though it were different from it. This is its peculiarity (*viteṣa*). From this standpoint the identity between substance and quality is called *saṁviteṣābheda*.

H

Hetu. Proof. Synonyms are *yukṣi*, *vyūhya*, *linga*, *upapatti*, and *sādhana*.

Hetuvirodha. (D) A fallacy of *anumāna*.

I

Indriya. (1) A sense organ. (2) A motor organ.

Itaretarādhyāsa. (A) The superimposition of *cit* and *acit* each on the other.

(C) In (A) *acit* as such is superimposed on *cit*. But *cit* is *akhaṇḍa*. It is itself not superimposed on *acit* and only its relation (*samśarga*) is superimposed.

Iśvara. (G) God.

(A) Brahman as qualified (*saguna*). At times this term is taken to mean *nirguṇa* also.

(V) and (D) Brahman, the ultimate.

J

Jahadojahlakṣaṇā. (A) The secondary meaning of an expression in which the primary meaning is partly abandoned and partly retained.

Jahlakṣaṇā. The secondary meaning of an expression in which the primary meaning is abandoned.

Jarāyuga. That which comes from the uterus.

Jāgrat. The state of waking. In this state *manas* or *antah-karṇa* functions with or without the co-operation of the sense organs.

Jāti. (N-V) Universal. That which is eternal and common to many particular things.

(V) The same as full similarity (*sauśāḍṛīya*).

(D) Self-contradiction.

Jīva. Individual soul.

(A) *Caitanya* conditioned by *antahkarṇa*.

(V) and (D) The same as *ātman*.

(C) In (A) *jīva* is *mithyā* and in (V) and (D) it is *satya*.

Jīvanmukta. One who is practically liberated though still in the body.

(A) After the *sāṅkṣāṭhā* of Brahman, owing to *prārabdha* *kaṛma*, till *prārabdha* *kaṛma* is exhausted the self continues to live in the body. But during this period it is not bound by the bodily conditions like other selves.

(D) *Sāṅkṣāṭhā* of Brahman may not in some cases mark the fullness of discipline required for obtaining liberation. Till the discipline is full the self still lives in body. During this period it is called *jīvanmukta*.

Jñāna. Knowledge, idea. In its special sense it is applied to the knowledge of the Truth. Knowledge may be immediate or mediate.

Jñānamārga. The path of knowledge of the Truth.

(A) It is independent of *kaṛmamārga*.

(V) It is the same as *jñānayoga* and it presupposes *kaṛmayoga*. It consists in understanding the self as being dependent on God, and it leads to *Bhaktiyoga*.

(D) It necessarily presupposes proper *kaṛma* and it is an expression of *bhakti*. Not to be an expression of *bhakti* is a defect in it. It is the best aspect of the spiritual discipline. It culminates in *bhakti* in its full sense.

Jñānayoga. The same as *jñānamārga*. See *jñānamārga*.

K

Kali. The fourth period of time. It is characterised by one part of merit (*dharma*) and three parts of demerit (*adharma*).

Kāraṇa. The proximate cause. The special cause of a product with its operation. That condition of a product without which though all other conditions are given the product does not appear, e.g. the percipient, the object, say a colour, and necessary light to enable perception might be given, yet without the sense organ, eye, with its operation the perception of colour does not take place. So the eye with its operation is the proximate cause (*kāraṇa*) of the perception of colour. The operation of the eye consists in its being in contact with colour.

Karma. (1) Motion. (2) Action of the human beings. (3) Its result, merit or demerit (*dharma* or *adharma*).

Karmamārga. The path of action as leading to *jñānamārga*, the path of knowledge.

Karmayōga. (A) The same as *karmamārga*.

(V) The stage of discipline which results in the purity of the *manas* of a *jīva*.

(D) Performance of one's duty with *jñāna* and *bhakti*.

Karmendriya. A motor organ.

Kapṭha. The taste that is bitter.

Kaṣṭha. The taste that produces a burning sensation.

Kāla. Time.

Kāraṇa. Cause.

Kāraṇānumāna. The cause as the proof of its effect.

Kārya. Product.

Kārya Brahma. (A) The *Brahma* that has its appearance due to the superimposition of *ajñāna* or *māya* on Brahman as pure *cit*.

Kāryarūpe. That which is a product.

Kāryānumāna. The product as the proof of its cause.

Kevālakṣaṇāvyāpti. (A) The same as *jahallakṣaṇā*.

Kevālavyatirekī. The *anumāna* based on *vyatireka vyāpti* alone.

Kevālvāpyi. The *anumāna* based on *anvaya vyāpti* alone.

Kṛta. The first of the four periods of time, characterised by merit (*dharma*) without demerit (*adharma*).

L

Lakṣaṇā. The secondary relation between a word and its meaning. This relation may completely abandon the primary meaning, or it may include it, or it may include it in part and exclude it with reference to another part. In accordance with these three ideas it is called respectively *jahallakṣaṇā*, *ajahallakṣaṇā* and *jahadojahallakṣaṇā*. *Lakṣitalakṣaṇā* is another variety.

Lakṣitalakṣaṇāvṛtti. The relation between a word and its meaning which is based on a secondary relation between the same.

Lakṣyārtha. The meaning of a word obtained through a secondary relation.

Lingāśrava. The subtle body of an individual self which is the condition of the bondage of the same. It is beginningless and it continues to be till the self obtains liberation.

M

Madhyamaparimāṇa. The medium size which is neither infinitesimal nor infinite.

Mahattatva. The first stage of *prakṛti*'s change. Synonym, *buddhi*.

Mahārūḍhi. (D) The primary relation between a word and its full meaning based on usage.

Mahāyoga. (D) The primary relation between a word and its full meaning based on the literal meaning of the word.

Mahāyogarūḍhi. (D) The primary relation between a word and its full meaning based on both usage and the literal meaning of the word.

Manana. Philosophical reflection.

Manas. (A) An aspect of *antahkaraṇa* whose function consists in doubt.

(V) The sense organ that resides inside the body which is the proximate cause of memory and so on.

(D) The abode of *vytti* knowledge. It has also the function of a sense organ and the external sense organs function only when they are assisted by it.

Māyā. (A) An aspect of *ajāna*. It is the condition of God in the sense of the Creator of the world. Its speciality consists in not deluding the entity it conditions.

(D) The power of God. It is therefore as real as God.

Mitrahva. (D) The individual soul which is not purely of *satva* character. Therefore it does not obtain liberation which can be had only by the soul of pure *satva*—character.

Mithyā. (A) That which is *sadasadvilakṣaṇa*, i.e. neither real, nor unreal, nor real-unreal, e.g. the silver superimposed on a shell.

Mukta. The liberated soul.

Mukti. Liberation. It consists in a soul's realising its own nature.

Muktiyogya. (D) The soul that is fit to have liberation.

Mumukṣā. The desire for liberation. It is a condition of discipline leading to liberation.

N

Naimittika. That which is due to a condition (*nimitta*).

Naiṣṭmyavāda. (B) The doctrine that there is no unitary soul.

Naiṣṭhika. (1) The follower of the Nyāya system and (2) A position of this system.

Nāma. Name.

(A) The world consists in name and form.

Nāstika. One who does not believe in the validity of the Vedas.

Nididhyāna. Meditation.

(D) Application to the study of *śāstrā*.

Nimitta-kāraṇa. The cause which is other than the material cause.

Nirguṇa. That which is propertyless.

Nirvikalpa. That which is not determined.

(A) A variety of *pratyakṣa* the object of which is pure and simple.

(V) The *pratyakṣa* at the first instance which apprehends the object without its relation to the other things.

Niscaya (G). Determination.

(A) A phase of *antahkaraṇa*. It is also called *buddhi*.

Nitya. That which has no end. It is also used in the sense of that which has no beginning and no end.

(A) That which is not non-eternal.

Nityasamsārin. (D) The soul that will never escape from bondage.

Nityavibhūti. (V) That which is characterised by pure *satva*. This is the abode of the liberated souls. The things of their enjoyment are also made of this.

Nityānitya. (D) That which is eternal with reference to its substantive aspect and non-eternal with reference to its attributive aspect, e.g. *Prakṛti*. It is eternal with reference to its substantive aspect and non-eternal with reference to its changes.

Nityānitya vastuviveka. (A) The discrimination between eternal and non-eternal things. This is one of the conditions leading to liberation.

P

Pañcikaraṇa. The mixing of the five elements, space, air, fire, water and earth, so that each of the five resultant elements consists of half of itself and with regard to the other half it has the other four elements in equal parts. It is supposed that this work is done by the Creator.

Pancikṛta. That which results from *pañcikaraṇa*.

Paratah. By means of something other than itself or that which presents it.

(C) This term is usually an attribute of *aprāmānya* in the Vedānta systems. The idea is this. The whole expression stands for '*Aprāmānya is paratah*'. *Aprāmānya* is untruth of

knowledge. That it is *paratah* means that it is produced or determined by something other than that which produces or presents knowledge. For example in (D) two types of knowledge are accepted—*vytti* and *sākṣi*. *Vytti* is presented by *sākṣi* and *sākṣi* is self-evident. *Vytti* may be true or untrue. If it is untrue, its untruth is caused by the defects of the conditions of knowledge and is determined by the absence of coherence. The defects are external to the conditions of knowledge, because the conditions of knowledge in the normal case are sound. Similarly, coherence is external to *sākṣi*. For these reasons *aprāmānya* is regarded as *paratah*.

Parimāṇa. Size.

Paripramāṇa. The material cause. The cause which becomes the product.

Parokṣa. Mediate.

(C) This term is an attribute of knowledge. Knowledge as *parokṣa* is produced by the *pramāṇas* other than *pratyakṣa*.

(A) Particular cases of *śabda* and *anupalabdhi* give rise to *pratyakṣa* knowledge.

Pasruṣya. That which comes from an author.

(C) This term is an attribute of *śabda* or *āgama*.

Pāramārthika. (A) That which has unconditioned reality. Such an entity is Brahman.

Pāramārthika prameya. The thing that has unconditioned reality. Brahman.

Prabala pramāṇavirodha. (D) Sublation by a stronger *pramāṇa*, e.g. of the two *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, *pratyakṣa* is stronger (*prabala*). If *anumāna* is not sublated by *pratyakṣa*, then it is valid. If it is sublated, then it is invalid. *Pratyakṣa* is not sublated by an *anumāna* which is not based on a sound *pratyakṣa*. If an *anumāna* based on a sound *pratyakṣa* sublates a *pratyakṣa*, then what really follows is that a sound *pratyakṣa* sublates the unsound.

Pradhvanisābhāva. The absence of a thing resulting from its destruction. This absence has a beginning but no end.

Prākāra. (V) Mode.

(C) In (V) the world of *cit* and *acit* both in the subtle and

in the gross form is regarded as a mode of God. To amplify the same idea, it is described as *ādheya*, *vidheya* and *śeṣa*. *Ādheya* is dependent, *vidheya* is controlled and *śeṣa* is part. To imply the same idea, it is called *apṛthaksiddha*, inseparable. It is inseparable from God.

Prakṛti. The rock matter.

(A) It is the same as *ajñāna*.

(V) and (D) It is the material cause of the material universe excluding time and in (D) excluding *avyākṛtākāśa*.

Pralaya. Dissolution.

Pramā. Right knowledge.

(A) (i) The knowledge of that which is novel and non-sublated. (ii) The knowledge of that which is non-sublated. According to the former, memory is not right and according to the latter it is right.

(V) The knowledge that is consistent with correct usage.

(D) The knowledge that is *yathārtha*. Owing to its imperfect condition, knowledge may not apprehend its object as it is and such knowledge is wrong (*ayathārtha*).

Pramāṇa. (C) The proximate cause of right knowledge.

(D) Right knowledge is also a case of *pramāṇa*.

(C) The importance of the problem of *pramāṇa* is very great in epistemology. The solution of this problem is an expression of the discipline of thought.

(A) Six *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *arthāpatti*, *śabda* and *anupalabdhi* are recognised.

(V) Three *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, and *śabda* are recognised. *Upamāna* and *arthāpatti* are included in *anumāna*. In (A) *anupalabdhi* is taken to apprehend absence (*abhāva*). But absence is a way of expressing presence. The absence of the book from the table is an expression of the bare table. Therefore no special *pramāṇa*, as *anupalabdhi*, is needed to apprehend absence, and *anupalabdhi* is not a *pramāṇa*.

(D) Three *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda* are recognised. *Arthāpatti* is included in *anumāna*. *Upamāna* is included in the three *pramāṇas* in accordance with its nature. Absence is a fact as is presence. But it does not require a special *pramāṇa* to apprehend it. It is apprehended by *pratyakṣa* or *anumāna* as the case may be.

Pramāṇa caitanya. (A) The *caitanya* on which *antahkaraṇa-
vytti* is superimposed.

Pramāṇavirodha. (D) The sublation by a *pramāṇa*.

Pramāṇacaitanya. (A) The *caitanya* on which the subject of experience is superimposed.

Prameya. That which is given by right knowledge.

Prapatti. (V) The final stage of discipline required to obtain the grace of God. It is characterised by complete self-surrender to God. This marks the culmination of *bhakti*.

Pratibhā. (V) Intuition, a variety of *pratyakṣa*.

Pratijñāvirodha. (D) A fallacy of *anumāna*.

Pratyakṣa. (1) Immediate apprehension. (2) The proximate cause of immediate apprehension.

(A) Knowledge as *pratyakṣa* is characterised by the identity of *pramāṇacaitanya* and *viśayacaitanya*. Object as *pratyakṣa* is characterised by the identity of *pramāṇacaitanya* and *viśayacaitanya*.

Pratyāsata. (D) The suitable distance between a sense organ and its object. It makes the correct apprehension of the object possible.

(C) This position is accepted in this system after the (N-V) idea of *sannikarṣa* or contact between a sense organ and its object is determined to be unsatisfactory.

Prāpabhāva. The absence of a thing preceding the production of the same. It is beginningless but it has an end.

Prākṛta. That which comes from *prakṛti*.

Prāmāṇya. The truth of knowledge.

Prāṇa. The vital breath.

Prātibhāṇika. (A) That which exists only during the time of its apprehension, e.g. silver superimposed on a shell.

Priya. (A) Bliss, an aspect of Brahman.

Pūrvaśimāṇa. The system expounded by Jaimini.

R

Rajas. An attribute of *prakṛti*.

Rasana. The sense organ that apprehends taste.

Rājasa. That which consists of *rajas*.

Rūdhi. Usage.

Rūpa. (1) Colour and (2) form.

(A) Form.

S

Sadasadvilakṣaṇa. (A) That which is other than real, unreal and real un-real. Synonyms are *mithyā*, *anirvacanīya* and *anirvācya*.

Sādasat. That which is real and unreal.

Sakhaṇḍa. (V) That which has parts.

Samabalapramāṇavirodha. (D) The state of being opposed by a *pramāṇa* of equal strength.

Samāna. The vital breath that resides in the navel of the body.

Samijñā. (B) *Savikalpaka* knowledge. It is an aggregation (*skandha*). It is an aspect of the mental world.

Samisargābhāva. Absence expressed as *prāgabdhāva*, *pradhvamisābhāva* or *atyantābhāva*.

Samsāra. Bondage.

Samskāra. The mental retentum.

(B) An aggregation forming an aspect of the mental world.

Samvāda. The mental and volitional harmony.

Samyoga. The relation between two substances.

Samyuktatādātmya. (A) The identity with the thing that is related by *samyoga*.

Samyuktābhinnatādātmya. (A) The identity with the thing that is identical with that which is related by *samyoga*.

Samyuktāśrayaṇa. (V) The relation between a sense organ and a non-substance.

Sarvajña. One who is omniscient.

Sarvalakṣa. One who is omnipotent.

Sarvavyāpa. One who is all-pervading.

Sat. That which is real.

Sāṅkhyā. (V) The so-called wrong knowledge. This term signifies that that which is presented by illusion is real.

Satva. (1) Being. (2) An attribute of *prakṛti*.

Samsādr̥śya. (V) A close similarity.

This is accepted in place of *jāti* of (N-V).

Saṅkalpa. (A) A variety of *pratyakṣa* knowledge whose object is complex.

(V) A stage in *pratyakṣa* knowledge which apprehends its object with its reference to other things.

Savitābheda. (D) The identity that is not opposed to the peculiarities of things that are identical.

(C) This term has a great ontological importance in (D).

Sādhana. Proof. Synonyms are *yukti*, *linga*, *vyāpya*, *upapatti*, and *anumāna*.

Sādhanaśaṅkalya. (D) A fallacy of *anumāna*.

Sādhyā. That which is proved. Synonyms are *lingi*, *vyāpaka* and so on.

Sādhyaśaṅkalya. (D) A fallacy of *anumāna*.

Sākṣīkāriṇāna. (V) *Pratyakṣa* knowledge.

Sākṣi. The witnessing principle that forms an aspect of the subject of experience.

(A) An aspect of *caitanya*.

(D) *Sākṣīndriya*—*sākṣi* as the source of knowledge that forms the nature of the self. *Sākṣījñāna*—the knowledge due to the operation of *sākṣi*. This knowledge is an aspect of the self.

Sātenka. That which has the domination of *satva*, an attribute of *prakṛti*.

Siddhārtha. An accomplished fact. Opposite, *ḥāryārtha*.

Skandha. (B) An aggregation. This term signifies that there is no whole consisting of parts.

Smarana. Memory.

Smṛti. (1) The same as *smarana*. (2) The *purāṇa* and *itihāsa*.

Sthūla. (V) Gross.

Sthūla cidacit. (V) *Cit* and *acit* in a gross form.

Sūkṣma. (V) Subtle.

Sūkṣma cidacit. (V) *Cit* and *acit* in a subtle form.

Suṣupti. Sleep.

Svapna. Dream.

Svarūpa. Nature, essence.

Svarūpajñāna. (A) and (D) The knowledge which forms the essence of the self. In (A) this knowledge is *akhaṇḍa* and it is therefore objectless. In (D) it is just knowledge and it has an object.

Svarūpāsiddhi. The absence of the proof with reference to the subject of conclusion. A fallacy of *anumāna*.

Svavacanavirodha. (D) Self-contradiction.

Śvayamjyoti. (A) The knowledge which being itself of the character of illumination is not made evident by anything other than itself.

Svedaja. That which is born out of perspiration.

S

Śabda. Verbal testimony.

Śabdapramāṇa. The verbal testimony which is *pramāṇa*.

Śakti. The relation between a word and its meaning.

Samadamaḍi (A). Equanimity, self-control and so on. One of the conditions of the discipline leading to liberation.

Sarīra. Body.

Sariri. That which has a body. A soul.

Sārirakāśāstrā. The science dealing with the nature of the soul.

Śravaṇa. The study of *śāstrā*.

(A) The understanding of the intention of the *śāstrā*.

Śrotā. The sense organ which apprehends sound.

Śruṭrāhāpatti. (A) A variety of *arhāpatti* with reference to the text of *bruti*.

Suddhasatva. (V) That which is characterised by pure *satva*.

T

Tajasa. That which belongs to fire.

Tamas. An attribute of *prakṛti*.

(D) The name of the eternal hell.

Temoyogya. (D) One who is by his very nature bad.

Tanmātra. The elements in the subtle form. That which immediately precedes an element.

Tāmasa. That in which *tamas* dominates.

Tātparyasiddhānta. The knowledge of the intention of a verbal testimony.

(A) See *brahmapa*.

Tikṣa. Bitter.

Tretā. The second period of time. This is characterised by three parts of merit and one part of demerit.

Tusk. The sense organ which apprehends touch.

U

Udāna. The vital breath that resides in the part of the neck.

Uddhṛta. That which comes up from earth dividing it.

Upamāna. (A) The proximate cause of *upamiti*.

Upamiti. (A) The knowledge of the similarity of a thing to the thing which is perceived.

Upaṇiṣad. A branch of the Vedic literature. This is more philosophical in character than the other branches of the Veda.

Upāśāna. The same as *nididhyāsana*.

(D) It means two things: (1) the study and teaching of *śāstrā* and (2) meditation.

Utpattauparatah. This is an attribute of *aprāmānya*, untruth. It means that untruth is due to something other than the condition of knowledge.

Utpattau svatah. This is an attribute of *prāmānya*, truth. It means that truth is due to the very condition of knowledge.

Uttara. (1) Better; (2) Next.

Oha. (V) Guess, an aspect of perception.

V

Vaikārika. (V) A product of *ahamkāratattva* and in this *satva* character of *prakṛti* dominates.

Vairāgya. Detachment.

(D) To do one's duty, secular and religious, with the thought that God is the real doer of all.

Vāda. A doctrine.

(D) A philosophical discussion conducted with a view to obtaining the knowledge of the Truth.

Veda. The sacred literature considered to be *apauruṣeya*.

Vedānta. The systematisation of the teaching of the Veda.

Vijñānāvāda. The position that knowledge is the only real.

Vikalpa. (B) Imagination. The *vikalpas* are substance, quality, motion, universal and name.

Viparītajñāna. (V) It is a case of the so-called wrong knowledge which presents a substance in the place of another.

Virodha. Sublation, opposition.

Vṛtti. A state, mode or change.

Vṛtījñāna. (A) The knowledge which is a mode of *antah-karana*.

(D) The knowledge which is a mode of *manas*.

Viśaya caitanya. (A) The *caitanya* on which an object is superimposed.

Viśayaviśayibhāva. The relation between an object and that which apprehends it.

Vilega. (D) That which makes an identical thing have different aspects with their peculiar functions.

Vileṣaṇa. An attribute.

Vitṛṣṭādvaita. The system of Vedānta founded by Rāmānujācārya. The term signifies the inseparable relation between the world and God, and His changeless character.

Vyāna. The vital breath that pervades the whole body.

Vyāpaka. With reference to the invariable and unconditional concomitance between the proof and the proved, and from the standpoint of the relation, the proof is called *vyāpya* and the proved *vyāpaka*.

Vyāpāra. Operation, function.

Vyāpti. The invariable and unconditional concomitance between the proof and the proved.

Vyāptijñāna. The knowledge of *vyāpti*.

Vyāpys. See *vyāpaka*.

Vyāvahārika. (A) That which is empirical. That which is sublated by the realisation of Brahman. That which is in accordance with usage.

Vyāvahārika prameya (A). The entity that is *vyāvahārika*. See *vyāvahārika*.

Y

Yoga. (1) The path as *karmayoga* and so on. (2) The spiritual discipline consisting of eight stages, *yama*, *niyama* and so on. (3) The primary relation between a word and its literal meaning.

Yogarūḍhi. A variety of the primary relation between a word and its meaning. It has reference both to usage and to the literal meaning of the word.

Yogyatā. (1) Fitness. (2) The state of the meaning of a verbal testimony not sublated by any *pramāṇa*.

(D) The native disposition of a *jīva*.

Yuga. Period of time.

(C) According to the Indian conception time is divided into four parts *krta*, *treṭā*, *dvāpara* and *kali* which follow one another and form a circle. Thus after *kali*, *krta* reappears.

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CORRIGENDA

PAGE

9, l. 38	delete	'perhaps'		
31, l. 23	for	'adhyastha'	read	'adhyasta'
32, l. 28	"	'is'	"	'is'
93, l. 27	"	'father'	"	'father'
116, l. 7	"	'elucidates that'	"	'elucidates how'
120, l. 5	delete	'cause'		
122, l. 20	for	'vākhyas'	"	'vākhyas'
124, l. 31	"	'can'	"	'could'
126, l. 21	"	'could'	"	'can'
156, l. 31	"	'propertyless'	"	'propertyless'
159, l. 10	"	'upajivika'	"	'upajivika'
166, l. 2	"	'The manner how'	"	'How'
171, l. 16	"	'will'	"	'would'
l. 31	delete	'so'		
172, l. 15	for	'from'	"	'by'
175, l. 9	"	'not'	"	'none'
l. 18	"	'Advaitya'	"	'Advitya'
l. 41	delete	'down'		
176, l. 1	for	'made'	"	'given'
190, l. 19	"	'external'	"	'eternal'
203, l. 23	"	'help'	"	'helps'
206, fn.	"	'T.S.'	"	'T. S.'
211, l. 36	"	'self-conscious'	"	'self-consciousness'
229, l. 15	"	'jñānāśevati'	"	'jñānāśevati'
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
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